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Abstract 
This thesis is a transdisciplinary investigation of the link between social connec-
tion and health outcomes. Its twofold aim is to explore the nature of this relation-
ship and build a theoretical model for a possible causal chain between the two, 
and to develop and deploy a new model for engaging the very different discourses 
of theology and neuroscience. To this end it draws on both theological reflection 
and on experimental scientific data from cognitive neuroscience and psycho-
neuroimmunology. 
The opening half of the work establishes the wider epistemological and methodo-
logical frameworks within which the project is set, and also the specific frame-
work for the particular area of study. The first of these involves a critical analysis 
of the tensions at the heart of the dialogue between science and religion, and of 
the specific difficulties faced by the emerging sub-discipline of neurotheology. It 
then dissects and further develops the interdisciplinary dialogical model devised 
by J Wentzel van Huyssteen, in order to enable it to generate and support addi-
tional transdisciplinary outputs. In the second of the two framework arenas, the 
concept of health itself is first explored, and then epidemiological, Biblical, and 
immunological accounts of the link between relational connection and health are 
examined in order to establish that sufficient common ground exists to warrant a 
neurotheological approach to investigating the question of how the two are con-
nected. 
The second half of the thesis then uses the developed model as a basis for engag-
ing theological and neuroscientific perspectives on human relationality. This takes 
the form of three transversal encounters, each centred around a specific aspect of 
this: relationality as basic, as emergent, and as realised. From the output of these 
three dialogical interactions, a neurotheologically framed argument is developed 
to support the contention that relationality is an emergent phenomenon of a 
complex system concerned with social monitoring and response, and thus the way 
in which it is realised can exert causal constraints on system components. Finally a 
theoretical model is derived from this argument for a pathway linking relational 
experience to health outcomes via alterations in allostatic maintenance mecha-
nisms 
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Introduction 
Aims and challenges 
 
We live in a world that has been made precise; in 
this world only what can be precisely calculated, 
presented, measured, and made available counts 
as real.1 
(Janke, 1999:12) 
 
We are still in the pre-history of the human mind. 
Only complex thought will allow us to civilise our 
knowledge.  
(Morin, 2008:6) 
 
Nothing will unfold for us unless we move toward 
what looks to us like nothing: faith is a cascade2. 
(Fulton, 2001:2) 
 
The human propensity for exploration, technological advances enabling us to do 
this in new ways, and the rapid dissemination facilitated by the communications 
revolution, have left us increasingly inundated with data. Information does not 
however equate to knowledge, and this deluge has merely served to heighten an 
escalating problem whose roots go back to Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of 
the Mind, viz. that of progressive fragmentation and hyper-specialisation within 
disciplines and departments. Simultaneously, the capacity and ability to integrate 
the resulting specialised data across these heightened boundary divisions is de-
clining – not just due to their sheer volume, but also because of the underlying 
Weltenschauung itself. The problem has been compounded by the ongoing dis-
junction – also with Cartesian roots – between the humanist and scientific cul-
tures. Against the accompanying rise of Janke’s ‘praecisio mundi’, this has seen 
the explorations and outputs of the former discounted by the latter as a valid con-
tribution to objective knowledge about the world, with a consequent contraction 
and impoverishment of understandings. A pressing question we currently face is 
thus how to approach the task of reconnecting this ever increasing volume of in-
                                                             
1‘Wir leben in einer präzisierten Welt; in ihr wird nur noch das als wirklich gegeben 
zugelassen, was präzise berechnet, hergestellt, abgemessen, verfugbar gemacht werden 
kann.’ Personal translation courtesy of Dr F Mortenson. 
2Poem: ‘Cascade Experiment’ 
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formation: how do we build knowledge in a way which recognises and responds 
not just to the inherent complexity of the natural world investigated by the sci-
ences, but also to the ever present and increasing complexity of human lived real-
ity, as explored and articulated by the humanities?  
These concerns regarding the adequacy of current epistemological and integra-
tion strategies for delivering this complex knowledge form the backdrop to the 
current project. At first sight, the field of science-religion would seem to be per-
fectly placed to undertake this kind of reconnection, and indeed to be doing fairly 
well at it. However, as I discuss in Chapter 1, this perception is open to question. 
Epistemological parity through shared critical realism, though confidently claimed, 
is not generally accepted outside of the field. Moreover even within it, the ac-
companying declarations of bidirectional flow and mutual expansion are difficult 
to substantiate, with theology inevitably the recipient rather than the donor of 
insight. In effect then, there is a question mark as to whether such engagement 
has generated any widely accepted expansion of knowledge of the kind envisaged 
here, or whether it is irrevocably caught in an apologetic cul-de-sac. For those 
who believe not only in the inherent rationality of the theological enterprise, but 
also in its ability to produce genuine knowledge about the world, this represents a 
frustrating state of affairs. 
This thesis thus has two main objectives, one tied to each of its twin research hy-
potheses that: 
1. Relationality3 is an emergent phenomenon of a complex system involved
in social signal decoding and response, and the way in which it is ex-
pressed and experienced can directly affect health.
2. A dialogue between theology, psychoneuroimmunology, and cognitive
neuroscience can both optimise understanding of the nature of this con-
nection, and facilitate the exploration of possible underlying mechanisms.
In the first instance the objective is to explore the well documented link between 
social connection and health, particularly the possibility of an immunological 
pathway for this; and with regard to the second, to develop and test an alterna-
tive way of engaging scientific and theological understandings, in which both dis-
ciplines contribute as equal and accepted parties to produce an expanded under-
3 The neologism is used throughout the thesis to refer to the human capacity to form and 
sustain relational connections with others. 
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standing of a particular issue. To do this requires finding an alternative to critical 
realism as the locus of parity and to this end, as discussed in Chapter 2, I further 
develop the transversal model devised by J Wentzel van Huyssteen (1999; 2006) 
and predicated on his refiguring of rationality. The proposed extension offers a 
mechanism for generating and facilitating non-reductive conversations, in which 
theology’s wealth of rationally developed anthropological insights can engage 
with those of the neurosciences to expand and deepen our understanding of hu-
man relationality and its potential health consequences.  
In the ensuing transversal collaborations, theological thinking on various aspects 
of personhood and relational connection are brought together with raw experi-
mental data from social cognitive neuroscience (CGNS) and psychoneuroimmu-
nology (PNI) to build a model for connecting relationality and health via immune 
signalling pathways. However as I discuss in Chapters 1 and 2, whilst this very dif-
ferent dialogical route holds great potential, it also presents very particular chal-
lenges to, and for, the theological contribution: firstly, is it possible to make the 
necessary case in each instance that the proffered theological understandings are 
not only rational, but also do not require a concomitant assent to specific religious 
propositions (one of the chief difficulties for science-religion engagement outside 
of the dedicated field)? Secondly, can this be done without eviscerating their con-
tent of everything which makes it distinctively theological and thus reducing it to 
the ‘devalued coinage’ and ‘anaemic myth’ feared by Westhelle (2000:165-72)? 
Addressing such questions is also a major part of the project. 
The form in which the dissertation is presented is thus somewhat different from 
that of a typical humanities thesis for two key reasons, one practical and one phi-
losophical. With respect to the first, the appeal to three distinctly different disci-
plinary fields means that a large and very disparate volume of literature is drawn 
on; thus the standard form of reviewing all the literature as a forerunner to pre-
senting and developing the thesis themes and arguments is clearly inappropriate: 
to do so would require several preliminary chapters of data discussion with insuf-
ficient context to give sense or sustain interest. Moreover, the adoption of a new 
methodological approach, the background to the topic itself, and the issue of 
emergence which forms a central part of the argument, all also necessitate spe-
cific reviews to establish suitable baselines for the project work. The way I have 
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elected to approach this aspect is therefore to use the opening literature chapter 
to present an overview of the issues facing the science-religion dialogue generally, 
and the hybrid discipline of neurotheology specifically. Chapter 2 then dissects 
and discusses van Huyssteen’s dialogical model and the new extension I am pro-
posing, along with their underpinning philosophy. These two chapters thus estab-
lish the main framework for the project. Chapter 3 then moves the focus to the 
specific transversal project, reviewing epidemiological and PNI data, along with 
Biblical perspectives on relationality and health, as a way of establishing that suf-
ficient ground exists to attempt the proposed neurotheological exploration. 
Thereafter in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I introduce, review, and discuss the specific 
scientific data and the key theological ideas on a chapter by chapter basis, with 
the philosophical and scientific challenges of emergence forming an extended 
prolegomenon to this in the case of Chapter 5. Hence in a sense the literature re-
view is also gradually unfolded across the course of the thesis. However this al-
lows each tranche of data to be presented in a way which roots it in a specific as-
pect of the unfolding argument, thus anchoring it in the necessary context for 
making sense of its place in the whole. In Chapter 6, after the final transversal col-
laboration, I draw the outputs from all three of these chapters together to pro-
duce a composite neurotheologically informed argument. Finally I use this as the 
basis for developing a theoretical, transversally derived, model for a pathway link-
ing social connection and health outcomes via the mechanisms regulating al-
lostatic balance. 
Connecting the scientific data, theological reflection, and specific dimensions of a 
complex composite argument in this way also serves the second reason for the 
differently shaped presentation. Here the primary aim has been to unfold and 
present the thesis argument in a way which reflects the transversal methodology 
underpinning it. Thus just as Descartes’ Discourse on Method, or Reich’s recent 
monograph on relational and contextual reasoning (Reich, 2002), are written in a 
style which itself also expresses and illustrates the content of the thesis it pre-
sents, so in constructing this work as a series of specifically delineated transversal 
encounters, each giving rise to its own peculiar outcome, which then interlock to 
build a composite argument, I have endeavoured to also illustrate the key metrics 
of both the transversal philosophy undergirding the enquiry, and the mechanics of 
the dialogical model which it supports.  
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This format has also allowed me to fulfil the model’s postfoundational ‘epistemic 
contract’ whilst also illustrating its versatility. With regard to the former there are, 
as I discuss in Chapter 2, certain requirements for the selection and use of mate-
rial for the proposed transversal integrations. Thus an important part of each of 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 has been to establish that there is a sufficient point of inter-
section between the scientific and theological contributions; to discuss the ex-
perimental difficulties and inferential limitations of the former; and with the latter 
to demonstrate that they have been formulated in a way which satisfies the crite-
ria for claiming postfoundational rationality at work. With respect to the issue of 
versatility, each of the three chapters has been used to integrate the scientific and 
theological material in a different way. Thus in Chapter 4, CGNS and theology 
form mutually interlocking support on an issue where legitimate challenges can 
be raised against the accounts of both; in Chapter 5, theology, PNI, and CGNS 
each supply a different strand of evidence towards the chapter argument; and 
finally in Chapter 6, PNI and theology provide the obverse and reverse of the evi-
dential coin – the former from the cellular and the latter from the cognitive level. 
Similarly each chapter has allowed me to focus on a different aspect of how/why 
theological material might be suitable for this kind of engagement – for example 
because of the way the ideas have been developed over time in response to 
changing understandings, or because of the way a particular author themselves 
handles the exploratory quest.  
However the format also presents some particular challenges for both reader and 
writer. Reading requires a degree of accommodative flexibility as each chapter 
covers a large amount of often vastly different ground. This sees them segueing 
from fMRI scans, cellular function, or immune signalling to 4th century philosophi-
cal theology, the theodramatics of von Balthasar, or the theatrical dramatics of 
Marcel, via such things as epidemiology, complex systems, process metaphysics, 
and allostatic maintenance! I have attempted to strike a reasonable balance be-
tween sufficient supporting explanation for the non-specialist reader and inap-
propriate simplification for the level of the work. Alongside this issue of range, the 
potential vastness of the territories to be covered and the complexity of many of 
their features have also furnished a presentational challenge. This has necessi-
tated an approach involving maximum abstraction and compression. In the theo-
logical case particularly, the issue has been compounded by the need to present 
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extended justifications for selection alongside the actual material itself. In each 
instance, and for each contributing voice, I have tried to delineate some major 
contours and features as they pertain to the project issues and indicate where 
further, more expanded accounts of debates alluded to can be found; and also to 
demonstrate that both the scientific data and the theological concepts have been 
treated with respect and properly engaged with, despite the compressed end-
point presentations. This is particularly important in light of a number of issues 
which I discuss in Chapters 1, 4, and 5: firstly, because concepts such as social 
trinitarianism and emergence, by their very nature, lend themselves to having 
ideas and agendas projected onto them rather than derived from them; and sec-
ondly, because of problems not only to do with how theology has sometimes ap-
propriated scientific data/ideas, but also with how science can sometimes overex-
tend the inferences which can legitimately be drawn from its data, and of the 
speed with which some of these unwarranted inferences then become incorpo-
rated into the received wisdom of both fields. 
Finally, there has been the challenge of adequately balancing the various voices in 
a way which reflects the basic premise that theology and science contribute on 
equal terms to the development of the thesis arguments, but also that the wider 
project has a distinctive and distinctly theological purpose. During the course of 
its development, what began life as a primarily theologically orientated PhD un-
derwent a fairly radical transformation into a much more transdisciplinary – or 
rather transversal – venture. In this, not only has the way in which the theology 
been used become radically different from that originally envisaged, but it has 
also become only one of three contributing voices. Nevertheless it is still in an im-
portant sense a theology PhD, originating from and conducted within a theology 
department rather than a neuroscientific one, and primarily concerned to ad-
vance a case that theological thought has much to contribute, alongside that of 
science, to expanding our understanding of the world, and particularly of human 
experience within it. Thus whilst relatively speaking, the theological voice may 
appear to be overpowered, this is an artefactual effect. In fact within the chap-
ters, each participating voice has equal weight as regards the chapter percentage 
dedicated to it; and as the chapter structures and arguments make clear, each 
makes its own distinct contribution to the cumulative transversal argument. To 
further avoid the suggestion that the theology (or indeed PNI or CGNS) is reduced 
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to a second order reflection, I have also varied the order in which the material is 
presented, allowing factors peculiar to chapter purpose and content to determine 
which leads off in any particular case 
As will become clear, the theological material in the project, whilst drawn exclu-
sively from within Christianity, is not presented from a confessional standpoint. 
However in deference to a long-standing personal sensibility, I have capitalised 
the words God, Jesus, Holy Spirit and Trinity, although not the cognates of the 
latter. When referring to God I have used conventional masculine pronouns for 
consistency and clarity, but this does not imply that a specifically gendered con-
ception of God is necessary for understanding or appropriating the material. I 
have also used capitalisation for the words ‘Other’, ‘Presence’, and ‘Mystery’ to 
distinguish where these are used as conceptual markers – as for example in the 
thought of Marcel. In view of the multidisciplinary nature of the work, occasional 
explanations of terminology or mechanisms have been necessary. I have supplied 
these in the form of footnotes to avoid excessive parenthetical disruption of the 
text, and to save the reader having to look up terms in an appendix and thus 
break their reading flow. With a further view to aiding clarity, I have also adopted 
the convention of the Oxford comma throughout the thesis.  
Three very different publications have resulted so far from this work and these 
are presented in the appendix: Towards a Neurotheology of Health (Bennett, 
2009:297-334) is a paper presented at the 2008 Metanexus Conference and sub-
sequently one of the conference papers selected for publication in the journal 
Transdisciplinarity in Science and Religion. As a very early iteration of the project, 
it now stands as indication of the subsequent metamorphosis of this from an in-
ter- to trans-disciplinary endeavour. Supple and Subtle (Bennett, 2012:175-96) is 
an essay discussing critical realism as a methodological strategy through an ex-
amination of the writings of John Polkinghorne, and was published in the Fest-
schrift marking his 80th birthday. Finally, Life beyond Critical Realism (Bennett, In 
Press) is a paper discussing my development of van Huyssteen’s model which was 
presented at the 2012 ESSSAT conference, and which will be published in the 
forthcoming volume of Issues in Science and Theology. 
A finished PhD will always appear to its author as something of a palimpsest bear-
ing the ghostly marks of a thousand re-writes, and trailing the memory of all the 
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discarded sketches and maquettes which preceded them. Hand in hand with this 
is an inevitable sense of frustration that the finished piece is, as Steiner has it, ‘an 
inevitably reductive, diminished articulation of far richer [...] possibilities’ and one 
which leaves behind and unfulfilled ‘the unbounded intuitions of the workshop’ 
(Steiner, 2001:110). I am acutely aware here of a huge gulf between the possibili-
ties and the end product – something which is in part due to embarking on a pro-
ject whose complexity, as became increasingly apparent, far exceeded my initial 
naïve estimations, and which no amount of Procrustean manoeuvres could reduce 
to fit into the allowed space. I am also very conscious of venturing into a territory 
of huge complexity which has taken me well beyond any previous medical or sci-
entific competencies, and of doing so on the basis of simply a hunch and with a far 
from standard map for exploring the possibilities! In this respect, the lines from 
Fulton’s poem seem peculiarly apt, and its motifs of unfolding in the light of 
movement towards, even more pertinent and poignant given the subject matter 
of human relationality.  
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Encounter, Exchange, & Expression 
Exploring and expanding the contours of engagement  
 
“Where the place?” 
Shakespeare (Macbeth I, i) 
 
For those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is 
advantageous to discuss the difficulties well; for 
the subsequent free play of thought implies the 
solution of the previous difficulties, and it is not 
possible to untie a knot of which one does not 
know.  
Aristotle (Metaphysics III, i) 
 
And as imagination bodies forth 
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen 
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing 
A local habitation and a name. 
Shakespeare (A Midsummer Night’s Dream V, i) 
 
1.1 Introduction and outline 
Any creative engagement, whether between individuals, artistic modes or disci-
plinary discourses, is governed by an implicit threefold metric of encounter, ex-
change, and expression: where, and around what nexus is interaction to be situ-
ated? In what manner is it to be facilitated and regulated? Finally, in what form 
are any resulting progeny to be ‘bodied forth’, and for what purpose? The choices 
and manoeuvres of the three are, moreover, woven together in a web of mutual 
influence and effect; and underpinning both the parts and the whole is the critical 
question of ‘why?’ The story of engagement between science and religion is thus 
not merely one of attention to specific issues such as creation or divine action in 
the world, but concurrently also the history of the various attempts to address the 
enormous challenges enfolded within this triple dynamic.   
The appearance of neurotheology stands as one testimony to these endeavours, 
but simultaneously, the enterprise itself graphically displays in microcosm the dif-
ficulties necessitating such efforts. This is amply illustrated in Newberg’s recent 
efforts to decisively delineate the field and set out various pointers to govern and 
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direct its endeavours. The resulting Principles of Neurotheology (Newberg, 2010), 
through its attempts to identify appropriate grounds of enquiry, establish the na-
ture and purpose of a ‘neurotheological’ approach to these, and determine the 
shape of possible outcomes, brings into sharp focus some of the key problems 
underlying science-religion engagement generally. It also clearly illustrates the 
difficulties which must be negotiated if the embryonic discipline of neurotheology 
is to mature into a significant participant in this. Moreover, whilst each of the 
elements of the dynamic of engagement highlighted above pose specific issues for 
the development of a coherent account of neurotheology, Newberg arguably fails 
to resolve these, and thus a question mark still hangs, not only over what neu-
rotheology actually is, but also whether, and in what way, this nascent discipline 
can contribute to the wider field of science-religion interaction. It is the conten-
tion of this thesis that neurotheology can be more fruitfully conceptualised in 
terms of a transdisciplinary venture rather than as an uneasy hybridised neo-
discipline. This shift, in conjunction with the establishment of clear objectives and 
the employment of a suitably rooted, robust, and imaginative methodology, 
opens up a very different way of engaging theological and neurobiological per-
spectives which enables some of these difficulties to be negotiated. This in turn 
paves the way for the generation of a coherent and distinctive discourse which 
can both take a legitimate place in the engagement between science and religion, 
and also offer a valuable contribution to its ongoing quest to more fully elucidate 
what it is to be human.  
The analyses of the current chapter represent, in response to Aristotle’s injunc-
tion, the laying bare of the knots which must be unravelled before this proposed 
neurotheological investigation can be undertaken. Since these have roots in the 
parent field of science/religion, the examination begins from this wider locus and 
looks at three areas of tension. As I have already suggested, the question ‘why?’ 
underpins any attempt at constructive engagement and raises distinctive issues in 
each of these arenas. If neurotheological dialogue is to prosper and develop co-
herently both the question and the attendant implications of how it is answered 
must be grappled with. It is also intertwined in assorted ways with other tensions 
between the two discourses. These epistemological and ontological issues are 
well-rehearsed in the literature and here are addressed tout court as a way to in-
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dicate the sort of difficulties which must be negotiated in the neurotheological 
arena. 
The focus then shifts to neurotheology itself and to an exploration of its contours 
and dynamics.  This is done through an engagement with the protagonists of its 
initial and current phases – theologian James Ashbrook and neuroscientist An-
drew Newberg respectively. Ashbrook’s neurotheology, developed across a wide 
range of papers and two key books (Ashbrook, 1984a; Ashbrook and Albright, 
1997), is essentially an attempt to develop a ‘unified field theory’ of mind, brain, 
self, world, and God which draws on neuroscientific research, (Albright, 2010:483; 
Ashbrook, 1996b:480). However it rarely features in current discourse, the recent 
retrospective in Zygon (Albright, 2010:479-489) notwithstanding. Newberg’s own 
experimental neurotheological work has primarily focussed on brain activity dur-
ing religious practice (e.g. d'Aquili and Newberg, 1999; Newberg and Lee, 2005). 
However he has written extensively outside of this base and his name is now 
prominently, if not always positively (Graf, 2007:260), associated with the disci-
pline. Moreover both its formal delineation in the Encyclopedia of Religion and 
the subsequent description of the potential field given there (Newberg, 
2005:6492-5), are predominantly a reflection of his (and the late Gene d’Aquili’s) 
interests, perspectives, and empirical work. 
In keeping with the chapter’s theme of the purpose and mechanics of engage-
ment, the aim in both cases is not to offer detailed critiques of the actual content 
of Ashbrook’s and Newberg’s own neurotheological output, but instead to con-
sider how each defines and approaches the task of neurotheology.  In Ashbrook’s 
case, I examine some of the problems associated with the development of his 
‘humanizing brain’ thesis and their implications for the construction of other neu-
rotheologies. With Newberg, I address the overall vision for neurotheology articu-
lated in his recent Principia. For the purposes of the current chapter the focus of 
the critique is on three specific aspects relevant to its theme: the need to both 
delimit and specify the field of enquiry, the importance of clear objectives for any 
exchange, and the necessity of employing a robust methodology which can gen-
erate and sustain a coherent discourse.   
Finally, in the light of the critiques offered, I briefly sketch the possibility of an al-
ternative ‘transversal’ approach to neurotheological engagement which I propose 
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to employ in this study. This draws on the twin concepts of postfoundational ra-
tionality and transversal space dialogue developed by J Wentzel van Huyssteen 
(1998a; 1999) and subsequently used as the foundation for his 2004 Gifford Lec-
tures interfacing theology and paleoanthropology (van Huyssteen, 2006). As re-
gards the dynamics of encounter I suggest that his methodology provides a way of 
addressing and potentially overcoming some of the difficulties which are discern-
able in both Ashbrook’s and Newberg’s approaches; with respect to those of ex-
change and expression, I propose that a further development of his transversal 
space model offers a radically different way of marrying theological insight with 
neuroscientific data. As I will argue in the following chapter, this both allows the 
negotiation of some of the identified difficulties which have beset neurotheology 
and provides a new possibility for how to ‘body forth’ the fruits of any exchange in 
a way which is both distinctively and coherently neurotheological. This model, its 
underpinning philosophical stance, and the proposed extension will then be fully 
laid out and developed in Chapter 2.  
1.2 Engaging scientific and religious perspectives 
Any attempted vignette of the connection between science and religion immedi-
ately runs into a difficulty: there is, as historian John Brooke observed in his nu-
anced and meticulous commentary on the matter, simply ‘no such thing as the 
relationship between religion and science’ (Brooke, 1991:321). As a wide variety 
of studies indicate (e.g. Brooke, 1991; Brooke and Cantor, 1998; Livingstone, 
2003; Numbers, 2006), both scientific and religious discourses, and the intersec-
tions between them, are all highly contextualised. Thus blanket theses about the 
contours of interaction between them are difficult to sustain (Brooke, 1991:5). 
Nevertheless, the caveat duly noted, it is necessary to make some general obser-
vations about the current state of the field and its programs and ambitions; and 
about certain underlying tensions between the two discourses, particularly as 
these have a bearing on the development of neurotheology.  As with all aspects of 
science/religion engagement, such tensions are complex in nature and resist sim-
plistic reduction. However, for the purposes of this discussion I want to consider 
these under three broad categories – purpose, epistemological strategies, and 
ontological understandings – and these will be dealt with in the following three 
subsections.  
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Initially though I want to highlight a further general issue which is particularly 
germane to this study in a number of ways:  The primary locus of engagement 
between science and religion has tended to be around religious discourse as 
claims about reality (Drees, 2010:61). However this cognitive-propositional di-
mension represents only one element of the complex matrix subsumed under the 
label ‘religion’ - experiential and traditional elements are also significant carriers 
of religious content (see Drees, 1996:24-49; Lindbeck, 1984).  Of course it is also 
true, as Southgate (2011:13) notes, that science too has its imaginative, aesthetic, 
and traditional elements – though this fact tends to be suppressed or even denied 
in the context of science/religion engagement.  From the perspective of this study 
though, it is the religious side of this which is of concern here, and from two re-
spects:  firstly, religious statements about the nature of reality tend, either overtly 
or implicitly, to come attached to other propositional or dogmatic frameworks 
and this raises various problems for both ‘encounter’ and ‘exchange’ which I will 
discuss further below. One of the aims of this study will be to explore whether 
and how theological insights can be used in dialogue with neuroscience without 
this entailing either a concomitant assent to the faith propositions attached to the 
framework within which they are generated, or an evisceration of anything which 
renders them distinctively theological.  Secondly, whilst acknowledging the valid-
ity of developing engagements which reach beyond the cognitive dimension of 
religion, the current emphasis in neurotheology on imaging studies of religious 
practice and experience raises interesting and vital questions as to the identity 
and purpose of neurotheology, and its differentiation from a more reductive neu-
roscientific study of religion, which must be addressed.  I will return to this in sec-
tion 3.  
1.2.1 An ambiguous academic adventure? 
Whilst engagement between scientific and religious perspectives on the world has 
a long timeline in the history of human thought, the formal discipline has a much 
shorter pedigree. However over the last 50 years the science/religion field has 
become a recognised and stable academic discipline (Clayton, 2008:1), generating 
innumerable books, papers, and conferences. This is due in no small part to the 
imaginative, disciplined, and pellucid efforts of prominent first generation schol-
ars to grapple with the issues of appropriate location, methodology, and articula-
tion. Nevertheless, the successful establishment of academic Chairs, study cen-
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tres, and prestigious peer-reviewed journals notwithstanding, certain tensions 
remain deeply embedded at the heart of the engagement, and with them impor-
tant questions about the nature of the enterprise itself. Furthermore, a certain 
unease surrounding both ongoing dialogue in established areas, and the appear-
ance of new hybrids such as neurotheology, continues to be expressed from both 
scientific and theological camps (e.g. Atkins, 2006:124; Helminiak, 2010:47-74). 
Alongside these residual tensions regarding purpose, and organically related to 
their lack of decisive resolution, are legitimate questions as to the wider impact of 
the science/theology exchange, both generally and on its contributing disciplines. 
There is an interesting and suggestive discrepancy between Browning’s percep-
tion that  
From almost every angle of vision, particularly when viewed 
from the perspective of the success of Zygon itself, the science-
and-religion discussion is strong and vital (Browning, 
2007:821). 
and Drees’ more sombre assessment that:  
consensus on issues of importance seems far away, the impact 
on theology and on religious communities is limited and the 
academic credibility of ‘religion and science’ remains marginal 
(Drees, 2010:2). 
But whilst the latter makes for uncomfortable reading, it is by no means unsup-
ported. Many theologians have taken little or no interest in such dialogue (Knight, 
2001:1-3; Polkinghorne, 2008:xi-xiii), while Smedes (2007:596-7) notes not only 
the lack of mention of its outputs in any recent systematic theologies, but also 
believes the discipline to have become closed and introspective – essentially an 
end in itself, rather than a means to a wider end.   
From the scientific perspective, a similar lack of academic engagement and dis-
cussion from outside of the field should also be noted. There are no critiques of 
assorted attempts at ‘bodying forth’ the fruits of science/religion in journals out-
side the specialist ones, and those offered in the popular press and blogosphere 
tend to be hostile and derogatory: scientists unconnected with the field tend to 
regard explanations of resurrection in terms of information transfer, or of godly 
action via quantum physics – even when produced by distinguished scientists such 
as Polkinghorne – as at best an embarrassing aberration, and at worst a com-
pletely illegitimate and distorting appropriation of scientific data by those who 
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should know better. Similar objections have been raised from the philosophical 
perspective  but in this case directed against the way in which philosophy and 
even theology itself is used by theologians when engaging in such manoeuvres 
(e.g. Ruse, 2007:579-80).  An implicit recognition of this enduring dis-ease at the 
heart of academic science/religion engagement, and also possibly of the accuracy 
of Drees’ stark assessment, is attested to by ongoing attempts to examine and 
restate the basic nature of the debates (Drees, 2010), reframe the meeting 
ground (Hefner et al., 2010:419-522), and develop new methodological strategies 
(Gregersen and van Huyssteen, 1998a). It is also apparent in the stringent criti-
cisms which have attended the emergence of new sub-disciplinary fields such as 
neurotheology (Coles, 2008:1956; Geertz, 2009:319-24).   
But while much has been written and continues to be written on the nature of the 
relationship between science and religion, attention to and discussion of the ac-
tual purposes of dialogue is far less overt and explicitly laid out in either compen-
dia of the field or individual texts. Such attention as there is tends to be fleeting 
and dealt with under discussion of models – where phrases such as ‘unified ac-
counts of human knowledge’ are employed without their content being analysed 
or explicated (e.g. Gregersen and Van Huyssteen, 1998b:2). In effect discussion on 
how it is to be done swallows up that on why it is to be done. Thus for example 
the monumental Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science (Clayton and Simpson, 
2008) has, amongst its fifty-five chapters, nothing dedicated to specifically exam-
ining the purposes and goals of interaction. Similarly, in his new introduction to 
the field, McGrath offers a fairly typical conflation of purpose and mechanics and 
locates any value in understanding how the two can relate to each other 
(McGrath, 2010:2). 
A notable exception in this respect is Willem Drees who, though himself heavily 
involved in the science/religion field, has been very critical of its degree of pro-
gress and its intellectual health. As part of his analysis of why this stagnation 
might be so, Drees has explored the variety of purposes which engagement be-
tween religion and science appears to serve from insider/outsider perspectives. 
He discerns three main roles for this, two located at the community and one at 
the personal level: firstly there is the development of apologetics, which he con-
strues primarily as apologetics for science/technology aimed at religious commu-
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nities particularly in countries where religious sensibilities have wide-ranging im-
pacts on social, educational, and political agendas. However he sees engagement 
also serving as a vehicle for formulating apologetics for religion in more secular 
societies, as well as for the place of theology within the secular, research-
orientated university (Drees, 2010:12-23). There is certainly evidence to support 
this contention both as an historical (Harrison, 2008:255-71) and a current reality: 
for example much of the science/religion output aimed at general consumption, 
particularly that dealing with evolution, takes the form of arguments that it is not 
necessary to chose between scientific and religious understandings of the world 
(e.g. Miller, 1999; Ruse, 2001). The second identified purpose is that of providing 
legitimation or authority for different belief positions within religious traditions – 
in effect as a weapon in intrareligious battles (Drees, 2010:24-9). Once again there 
is corroboration for the claim, this time in the form of the historical analyses al-
ready alluded to. These, along with others (e.g. Numbers, 2009) which explore 
and explode myths surrounding such causes célèbres as the Galileo affair or Hux-
ley’s battle with Wilberforce, lend support to the idea that science/religion en-
gagement is, at least sometimes, used primarily as battle for authority between 
revisionists and traditionalists within each of the contributing traditions. Finally, 
Drees sees an important role located at the personal level. Here it functions to 
provide resources enabling individuals to manage the dissonance between their 
own self-images and the (reductive) images of the human (and indeed the wider 
world and cosmos) furnished by science (Drees, 2010:29-37) and the questions 
this then raises about matters such as agency, free-will, resurrection, and the soul. 
In support of this a good case can be made that, despite his denial of a primary 
apologetic intent (Polkinghorne, 1998:85), the main beneficiaries of Polking-
horne’s extensive corpus are those involved or interested in scientific discourse 
who see McMullin’s necessity of striving ‘to make [their] theology and [their] 
cosmology consonant in the contribution they make to this world view’ 
(McMullin, 1981:52); or who wish to attempt a coherent defence of their faith 
when charged with committing ‘intellectual suicide’ by attempting to hold onto 
religious belief (Bennett, 2012:193). This also seems very much the case with 
other well-known works in the field, particularly perhaps those dealing with topics 
such as emergence, consciousness, and soul (e.g. Brown et al., 1998; Clayton, 
2006; Murphy and Stoeger, 2007). 
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But whilst there appear to be grounds for claiming that apologetics, power strug-
gles, and promoting personal comfort are – even if unacknowledged – all reasons 
why the two perspectives might be brought into dialogue, it also seems clear that 
these do not exhaust the ‘why?’ aspect of engagement. Certainly the vision 
statements of both Zygon, and Theology and Science, indicate something more 
than simply apologetic intent.  Either implicitly or explicitly, a larger claim appears 
attached to many efforts to construct dialogue viz. not only that it enriches and 
expands the understanding of both disciplines equally (e.g. Murray, 2011:123), 
but also that it potentially produces a fuller picture of ‘reality’ than either disci-
pline generates alone. Claims to bi-directionality, equality of contribution (e.g. 
Newberg, 2010:54), and that theology can provide science with answers to the 
meta-questions which it raises but cannot itself answer (e.g. Polkinghorne, 
1991:75) are fairly commonplace in the literature. However the reality of the 
situation is somewhat different: van Huyssteen’s summary of his Gifford project 
(which was built on a strong, re-envisioned account of mutual contribution) pro-
vides a more realistic picture of the actual state of affairs with the author seeing 
its ‘most important interdisciplinary result’ as the powerful revisioning of the 
theological notion of the imago Dei in the light of the scientific contribution; at 
the same time, he remains virtually silent on what the theological input has con-
tributed to the thinking of scientists (he adds the revealing qualifier ‘sympathetic’) 
on human uniqueness (van Huyssteen, 2006:322-3). Further supporting evidence 
can be adduced from the introduction to one of the most recent ‘companion’ vol-
umes to the field (Harrison, 2010:3) which, in its delineation of the key issue clus-
ters of science/religion, has several relating to theology in the light of scientific 
advance, but none in which this polarity is reversed. 
Seemingly then, the issue of dialogical purpose is not currently particularly promi-
nent in the consciousness of science/religion engagement. However, for the 
emergence of a sub-disciplinary hybrid such as neurotheology, the question is a 
vitally important one since it not only defines the identity but also profoundly in-
fluences the shape, structure, and situatedness of the embryo discipline. In the 
case of neurotheology, these questions as to purpose and identity carry additional 
freight from the perspective of the role of theology, particularly in light of the fine 
dividing line from the scientific study of religion: depending on how such ques-
tions are answered, it could potentially vary from merely providing subject matter 
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for study through to actively contributing specifically theological content towards 
expanding understanding. Arguably though they have not been entirely success-
fully addressed as yet: on the one hand the declaration and discussion have been 
either vague or even absent – for example Ashbrook, who introduced the term 
into science/religion discourse4, never explicitly defines neurotheology or its re-
mit. On the other hand, as I argue further section 1.3.2 (p31), Newberg offers 
what can only be described as an immoderate specification of purpose, with the 
result that the potential territory of neurotheology becomes so vast as to be al-
most unmanageable or, in places, remain coherent. It will be the strong conten-
tion of this thesis that a combination of clear purpose and robust methodology 
can generate a model of neurotheology in which both neuroscience and theology 
are enabled to make a direct contribution to expanding knowledge. Fashioning 
such a venture however, also requires attention to the epistemological and onto-
logical knots which underlie science/religion engagement, since these too have a 
bearing on the development and potential shape of neurotheology. 
1.2.2 An unbridgeable epistemic divide? 
Both science and religion claim to give description to the same world and the hu-
man experience thereof, and thus the primary locus for tension between them is 
usually perceived as being epistemological. Each discourse has its own sources, 
resources, and distinct and rich vocabulary embedded in a dedicated semantic 
field. As such they are understood as having radically different preoccupations, 
questions, and purposes – the oft-repeated (albeit inaccurate) maxim being that 
‘religion asks ‘why?’, whereas science asks ‘how?’  
It is in response to this apparently unbridgeable divide that the various typologies 
of engagement which have been a hallmark of the science/religion field have been 
formulated. These include Barbour’s original, classic, four-fold taxonomy of con-
flict, independence, dialogue and integration (Barbour, 1990:3-30) and its as-
sorted variations and revisions (e.g. Haught, 1995:9-26; Peacocke, 1993:19-21; 
Peters, 1997:650-4; Polkinghorne, 2004:10-22; Stenmark, 2004), as well as the 
distinctively different appropriation of Niebuhr’s five-fold ‘culture’ (Murphy, 
1985:16-23) and different literary genres (Richardson, 1994). Of these approaches, 
Barbour’s model has been the most used and his delineation and defence of the 
                                                             
4 It actually originated in Huxley’s 1962 novel Island.  
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possibility of dialogue and integration, and its underpinning stance of critical real-
ism have become an enduring legacy (Gregersen and Van Huyssteen, 1998b:3).  
The mainstay of the modern dialogue has thus been to claim methodological par-
ity through shared use of a critical realist approach to investigation: both disci-
plines are held to move from interpreted experience, via metaphors, models, and 
theories, towards increasing verisimilitude with reality (Polkinghorne, 1996:3). 
This kinship has then been taken as a substantive way to bridge the gap between 
the two disciplines (e.g. Polkinghorne, 2007) and thus to facilitate engagement 
and dialogue, and work towards a ‘viable unifying account of human knowledge’ 
(Gregersen and Van Huyssteen, 1998b:2).  However citing a critical realist stance 
as a basis for claiming epistemological parity is not without its difficulties for the-
ology:  The very nature of theological reflection and its attendant commitments 
mean that, with respect to both the criticality of its thinking and the extent to 
which it can lay claim to producing realist accounts, theology is vulnerable to 
charges of having less entitlement to the label than it claims (Bennett, 2012:179-
88). Even when epistemological parity is accepted, there is still, de facto, a marked 
asymmetry to the dialogical and constraining relationship between the two disci-
plines which is openly acknowledged (Polkinghorne, 2006:171).  Once again this 
returns us to the question of purpose and the related question of whether dia-
logue can be a genuine opportunity for mutual enhancement or enlightenment or 
does it (implicitly or explicitly) necessarily entail a degree of assimilation of theol-
ogy to science?  And if the latter, what are the limits to this? On this point, major 
differences exist between the committed proponents of consonance dialogue 
(Polkinghorne, 1996:8): Polkinghorne for example has always been much more 
resistant to assimilation than Peacocke, resolutely defending a portfolio of non-
negotiable theological commitments (Polkinghorne, 2004:10). 
In the case of neurotheological endeavour, the way in which this question has 
been answered – both implicitly and explicitly – illustrates the potential pitfalls of 
pursuing the assimilative route and the profound difficulties of attempting to give 
equal weight to both scientific and theological input without an adequate meth-
odological framework. In a rapidly developing field such as neuroscience, the first 
of these runs the risk of building an inescapable and possibly rapid obsolescence 
into the output – as has happened with Ashbrook. In the case of the second, any 
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attempt to construct an exchange in which the a priori assumptions of neither 
discipline are privileged has to negotiate a variety of challenges. The absence of a 
robust strategy for managing this leads, as is sometimes the case with Newberg, 
to scenarios in which nothing useful, or sometimes even coherent, can actually be 
said. 
Enfolded within this general question of purpose is the further subset of questions 
alluded to in the previous section, whose fulcrum is essentially the issue of the 
direction and symmetry of dialogical flow: who are the beneficiaries of any sci-
ence/theology engagement?  Does it genuinely contribute to a more widely ac-
cepted expansion of human understanding of the nature of reality, or simply gen-
erate more sophisticated forms of apologetics for those with concomitant reli-
gious and scientific commitments? In what senses can or do theologies contribute 
to either scientific understandings of the world or to scientific approaches to un-
derstanding the world? One need neither dispute that theology contributes to 
hermeneutics generally nor have the dialogical, epistemological, historical, or an-
thropological naiveties identified by Jackelén (2008:289-91) to legitimately raise 
such questions outside of the dedicated sphere of science/theology interaction, 
particularly in view of the critiques of the field from both without and within 
which were highlighted in the opening of this section  
Closely allied to these questions are ones which also pertain to the ‘encounter’ 
element of the dialogical dynamic. These relate to the issue of which voices (par-
ticularly from the theological side) are admitted to dialogue. From an hermeneuti-
cal perspective we have rightly become suspicious of ‘singular forms’ and thus no 
longer speak simply of science and theology en bloc, but rather of sciences, and 
theologies (Jackelén, 2003:212).  Moreover, as I will discuss further in Chapter 2, 
simplistic understandings and assumptions about the nature of scientific progress 
and the uniformity of scientific knowledge are no longer tenable in the light of 
even the less extreme of postmodern interlocutions.  Nevertheless, there is still an 
important sense in which scientific accounts of the world are much less frag-
mented and mutually contradictory than theological ones. If the primary purpose 
of dialogue is to refine religious understandings of the world then there is essen-
tially no inherent difficulty in engaging scientific perspectives with different and 
possibly mutually exclusive religious ones – for example on creation or godly ac-
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tion. However if the aim is to offer a theological contribution, either to illuminat-
ing scientific understanding of certain matters (whether of perspective or process) 
per se, or to the development of an expanded understanding of the world and its 
workings, then this raises issues about proposed contributions which much be ad-
dressed: which of possibly conflicting theological positions can ‘science’ be rea-
sonably expected to engage with, and how are these choices to be legitimated? 
What, if any, place can there be for ‘non-negotiable commitments’ (both theologi-
cal and scientific) in such a dialogue? Does separating theological insights about 
humanness from the faith propositions of the systems which give rise to them, 
reduce them to Westhelle’s ‘anaemic myth’ and the theology to debased coinage 
(Westhelle, 2000:171-2)? 
The ramifications of such questions are particularly acute for any effort to develop 
a coherent account of what form neurotheology might take.  However, as I will 
subsequently argue and then demonstrate through the course of this thesis, con-
ceiving this in terms of a transdisciplinary venture and allying that construct to a 
suitable methodology, provides one way of negotiating these various difficulties 
pertaining to the ‘encounter’ and ‘exchange’ aspects of dialogue.  It also, as I will 
discuss in Chapter 2, opens out the possibility of a new way of integrating theo-
logical and scientific insights to generate a discourse which is both coherently and 
distinctively neurotheological. In an era marked by increasing disciplinary subspe-
cialisation and where information production is outstripping and swamping use at 
both individual and institutional level (Frodeman and Mitcham, 2007:507), such 
essays form a key part of a much larger and vital project to re-evaluate under-
standings of knowledge construction and validation. However any attempt to in-
tegrate the very different knowledge of theology and neuroscience also requires 
attention to the ontological knot underlying the science/religion dynamic, since 
this too has important implications for various aspects of the neurotheological 
enterprise – particularly as regards the potential loci for fruitful exchange. 
1.2.3 An irreconcilable ontological disjunction? 
The disjunction here is essentially that between a discourse ‘in the key of knowl-
edge’ and one ‘in the key of mystery’. For the sciences the world is, in principle, 
completely knowable and understandable given time and appropriate application. 
Proceeding via well-honed empirical methods with an emphasis on testability, re-
peatability, and shared third person description and consensus, they have pro-
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gressively expanded the boundaries of knowledge about the material world, pro-
viding an increasingly integrated and successful applied understanding of reality 
(Drees, 2006:109). Moreover they are seen by many as being not only unrestricted 
in their scope but also sufficient for a total understanding of the world – with all 
‘why?’ questions being essentially reducible to ‘how?’ ones (Atkins, 2006:124, 
127). In contrast, religions have always been far more cautious about what can be 
known and said of reality – both as to the completeness of the account that can 
be rendered of any phenomenon, and to the ultimate limits of human knowledge. 
In both respects, Christian thought has historically comprehended both cataphatic 
and apophatic elements in its explorations of both Theos and anthrōpos: in a con-
tradictory simultaneity, God is both known and not known; can be spoken of and 
is for ever beyond speech. Similarly there are aspects of humanness, particular in 
relation to the spiritual dimensions of experience and life which remain ineffable 
mysteries.  
However the difference extends beyond the issue of what can be known and ex-
pressed about God, humanness, and the world, to also encompass an aspect of 
how things are to be known (here taken in terms of ontological encounter rather 
than epistemological strategy).  In understanding certain aspects of the world and 
human experience to be essentially mysterious rather than empirically under-
standable, religion approaches them in a different way. This is particularly well 
captured in the Marcellian concept of the mystery of Presence.  Marcel describes 
two distinct levels of engagement with an ‘Other’: in the first of these, the reality 
encountered is subject to a process of abstraction and categorisation, being objec-
tified and problematised in an attempt to discover its true nature (Marcel, 
1949:116-117) – in effect the approach taken in science. However, those very ma-
noeuvres preclude the possibility of a real encounter and thus of gaining true on-
tological knowledge of it, leading to what might be termed an ‘hypostasis of ab-
sence’ (Pamplume and Brombert, 1953:92).  To fully know the other necessitates a 
further level of engagement in which such manoeuvres are set aside and the other 
is instead encountered as Presence. The apparent similarity notwithstanding, this 
is not simply a variation of the apophatic theme above: the issue here is whether, 
in the case of certain types of encounter with reality, the approach of interrogat-
ing and interpreting experiential data might actually cause that knowledge which 
we seek to understand and articulate to slip through our fingers – a sense cap-
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tured in a line from Marcel’s play L’Iconoclaste that “Knowledge exiles to infinity 
whatever it claims to clasp” (Marcel and Hanley, 2004:99).  
The contrast with the purpose of scientific endeavour could not be plainer. Sci-
ence may allow us to efficiently and effectively ‘unweave the rainbow’, but precise 
explanation, while making the world clearer can, as Keats intuited, also simultane-
ously diminish it – relegating the ‘awful rainbow’ to ‘the dull catalogue of common 
things’  (Lamia II, 233). Steiner’s observation about playwrights and novelists that: 
‘[He] who tells all communicates knowingness, not knowledge. He ruins in his 
creation the mystery of independent vitality’ (Steiner, 2001:36) seems to encapsu-
late not only the dilemma, but also its deep paradox: contrary to what might seem 
to be the case, attempts to precisely specify the world may not fully deliver, and 
indeed may even destroy, a certain aspect of knowledge which humans instinc-
tively recognise and value.  
With respect to the development of neurotheology, this is an issue which has par-
ticular ramifications for any proposed remit for the venture. Moreover, given the 
direction in which this is now increasingly tending with the development of dy-
namic brain scanning, it is a somewhat acute one: recent neurotheological work 
has predominantly taken the form of exploring religious experiences and practices 
from a neurobiological perspective (e.g. d'Aquili and Newberg, 1999; Newberg and 
Lee, 2005:469-89), in particular an attempt to determine their specific neural cor-
relates. However in light of the critique above, the perennial question of what 
theology contributes to the project is not only heightened, but must also be joined 
by ones as to whether and how a greater appreciation of precise brain activity 
contributes to understanding such experiences or activities from a religious (or 
even simply an affective human) perspective: does knowledge of the neural corre-
lates of an experience (to the coarse extent that we can currently investigate 
these) tell us decisively what the experience is or what it means?  Furthermore 
some scholars are keen to extend this type of exploration into other areas such as 
the roots of religious thought. Indeed Newberg sees gaining a more precise under-
standing on what is going on in the brain during the formulation of theological 
thoughts and ideas as a key area for neurotheological exploration (Newberg, 
2010:87-114). But whilst it might be interesting in some respects to speculate on, 
for example, what particular cognitive processes were predominating when Aqui-
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nas and Luther were formulating arguments on freewill and ethics (Newberg, 
2010:3), it would be reductive in the worst sense to think that understanding this 
will provide the ultimate key to the meaning and significance of these themes in 
their writing or indeed to understanding what these ideas signify more broadly for 
religious thinking.  
Once again then the question of ‘why?’ is critical: what is the presumed purpose of 
neurotheological engagement? As indicated by my second research hypothesis5 
and as I will argue further in section 4 below, construing neurotheology chiefly in 
terms of investigating the neural correlates of different aspects of religious life or 
spiritual experience emasculates its potential.  Theological reflection within many 
different religious traditions has generated profound insights on the nature of the 
human condition which, with the employment of a suitably critical approach, can 
be combined with those currently being generated in different branches of ex-
perimental neuroscience to produce a richer understanding of humanness. 
These then are the basic and ongoing tensions which attend any attempts at en-
gagement between science and religion, and which play out in different ways in 
each of its three phases of encounter, engagement, and expression.  I have sug-
gested that both the dialogical ‘why?’, and certain related outworkings of the epis-
temological and ontological tensions present problems to any attempt to con-
struct a neurotheological perspective, and to decisions on where it should be lo-
cated, how it should be conducted and what type of discourse it can produce. It is 
to a further exploration of these points that the chapter now turns.  
1.3 Neurotheology: exploring the current contours 
The recent explosion of the neurosciences has seen the ‘neuro’ prefix appended 
to philosophy, phenomenology, aesthetics, economics, and ethics amongst others. 
However whether these constitute disciplinary subspecialisations, interdisciplinary 
endeavours, or new hybrid disciplines is neither a clear nor a constant picture.  A 
similar uncertainty appears to attend the precise identity of neurotheology.  Al-
though obviously signifying a conjunction of some kind between cognitive and 
                                                             
5
 A dialogue between theology and neuroscience can both optimise understanding of the 
nature of [the] connection between relationality and health, and facilitate the exploration 
of possible underlying mechanisms.  
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theological perspectives, how this is to be achieved and for what purpose is not 
self-evident. Neither is it always clearly spelled-out by those employing the term 
in their work. Indeed a striking feature of a substantial number of the papers 
which have carried ‘neurotheology’ in the title or as a listed keyword, including 
Ashbrook’s original paper (Ashbrook, 1984b:331-50), is that it is never defined and 
often does not even appear in the actual text itself. This sense of vagueness is also 
reflected in both the wording of the formal definition given in The Encyclopedia of 
Religion and the number and spread of the potential contributors to the enter-
prise it which it lists: 
..an emerging field of study that seeks to integrate in some 
manner cognitive neuroscience with religion and theology […] 
Neurotheology is multidisciplinary in nature and includes the 
fields of theology, religious studies, religious experience, phi-
losophy, cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, and an-
thropology (Newberg, 2005:6492, emphasis mine). 
However as I suggested earlier, establishing a raison d'être, with its associated 
sense of identity and purpose, is an important element in both the emergence of 
a stable sub-discipline and the development of fruitful interaction.  Nevertheless, 
and the lack of a generally agreed specification notwithstanding, it is possible to 
identify two distinct strands in neurotheology – an earlier one associated with the 
work of Ashbrook and the current one which is strongly associated with Newberg. 
Whilst there are some obvious similarities and overlaps between them, they are 
also distinctively different and each illustrates some of the specific issues attend-
ing any attempt to interface theology with neuroscience, and the difficulties 
which ensue if these are not adequately addressed. 
1.3.1 Ashbrook: neurotheology as a unifying endeavour 
For Ashbrook, the early pioneer of the discipline, the neurotheological project was 
conceived as being essentially one of integration. His approach reflects his own 
eclectic background (Ashbrook, 1996a:402-11), his work as a therapist, and his 
self-professed identity as being primarily a negotiator (Greenfield, 1996:47). This 
range of very different inputs influences and underpins his attempts to advance a 
case for giving the human brain privileged status as an analogical expression of 
God (Ashbrook, 1989:65-81), and to fashion a holistic understanding of the spiri-
tual, psychological, and neurological dimensions of personal and spiritual life (Al-
bright, 2010:480). His lack of explicit definition of the term he introduced has al-
ready been noted, however his neurotheology essentially involved taking the neu-
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roscientific research that was then available and interpreting it in a theological 
framework: ‘I turned to brain research to discern within it its theological promise. 
I found that theology presents parallels to the brain’s regularities and mind’s 
emergent properties’ (Ashbrook, 1984a:314). 
But whilst his preferred locus for encounter at the coalface of experimental neu-
roscientific research is easy to identify, analysing his methodology for ‘exchange’ 
and interpreting the resulting neurotheological theses presents something more 
of a challenge: Ashbrook employs an eclectic mix of sources, often proceeds by 
imaginative leaps and draws inferences in a way, and of a kind, which he freely 
admits as ‘unscientific’ but justifies as necessitated by the task in hand (Ashbrook, 
1984a:307-45). Moreover his language is sometimes rather opaque and it is thus 
not always easy to discern precisely what some of his theses actually entail. How-
ever the following brief overview of The Human Mind and the Mind of God 
(Ashbrook, 1984a)  and The Humanizing Brain (Ashbrook and Albright, 1997) gives 
an indication of the processes which his approach to neurotheology involves and 
the outcomes which ensue. There are several elements to this which cause signifi-
cant difficulties for his project and thus throw further light on the question of how 
best to conceive the neurotheological task and develop stable and coherent neu-
rotheological approaches. 
In the first part of The Human Mind, Ashbrook takes as his neuroscientific base 
the functional asymmetry or lateralisation of the brain (the understanding that 
the right (R) and left (L) hemispheres execute different functions), synthesising a 
four-fold typology which divides mind input into either naming (L) or immersed 
(R), and mind output into analytic (L) or imaginative (R) (see also Ashbrook, 
1984b:331-50). Such dichotomies are characteristic of Ashbrook and, as I will ar-
gue later, somewhat problematic. From this he then makes the leap of claiming 
that this same asymmetry is reflected in Christian history and theology and more-
over that in each case, when the two halves do not work properly together, the 
response generated is flawed and inadequate: if one half predominates then func-
tion is deficient; if both halves are in competition, or frank conflict, then function 
is disturbed.  
In essence there is a two stage shift involved in his development: from brain to 
mind and then the somewhat larger leap from human mind to divine mind.  To 
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accomplish the second he uses the duality drawn by Ricoeur between the ‘phe-
nomenology of manifestation’ and the ‘hermeneutics of proclamation’ (Ashbrook, 
1984a:13)  and once again he ties this to brain lateralisation. Thus manifestation 
reflects the R brain-mind (Ashbrook refers to them as a single unit) and is related 
to ‘mystical-priestly-metaphysical-aesthetic’ ways of perceiving God i.e. where 
‘people see and sense what God discloses in non-conceptual ways’; in converse 
fashion, proclamation, as tied to L brain-mind, he links to ‘prophetic-ethical-
historical doctrinal’ modes i.e. where ‘people hear and heed what God discloses 
explicitly’ (Ashbrook, 1984a:13).  Ashbrook’s thesis here is essentially that ‘the 
brain is the neurobiological substratum of the human mind, and the working of 
the mind is a reliable image of the intentions of God’ (Hefner, 1985:346), and that 
people, particularly in the West, thus experience and interpret the way God works 
in ways which parallel how the brain works.  Hence theologians distinguish be-
tween God’s creating or world–affirming activity, and God’s redeeming or world-
transforming activity (Ashbrook, 1984a:10), which Ashbrook then links to right 
brain-mind (Ashbrook, 1984a:82f) and left brain-mind (Ashbrook, 1984a:78f; 
1984b:336) respectively. 
In part 2, by way of an exploration of the architecture of Hagia Sophia and Char-
tres Cathedral, Ashbrook uses this idea as a basis for analysing the differences be-
tween the theologies of Eastern and Western strands of Christianity. Here he cor-
relates the former with the functions of R brain-mind and the latter with those of 
the L. Onto this base, he then maps his first thesis regarding deficient and dis-
turbed functioning of the R/L brain-mind balance to suggest that the Eastern tra-
dition suffers from R dominance deficiency resulting in too much vision and not 
enough sight (Ashbrook, 1984a:151-78), whereas the problem for the Western 
strand is a pre-occupation with inquiry at the expense of context rooted in L 
dominance disturbance (Ashbrook, 1984a:231-58). The impasse which he discerns 
between Western and Eastern Christianity is, according to his analysis, simply a 
microcosm of that which will continue to afflict humanity en masse, until it dis-
covers the unity of one brain, one mind, one divine mind.  
In the final part, he expands his thesis that the workings of the brain-mind mirror 
the nature and intentions of God, to take in humanity more generally. Here he 
focuses on connections between what he calls ‘surface structures’ such as lan-
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guage and social interaction and the underlying ‘realm of deep structure [which] 
provides the material for what is sensed, seen and spoken’ (Ashbrook, 
1984a:291). Surface structures are ‘transformations of the deep common struc-
ture of humanity’s capacity to conceptualise’ (Ashbrook, 1984a:289). Thus from 
the story of Pentecost he infers the presence of the ‘Primal Word below every 
word’ and the ‘Primal Community below every group’ – the first reflecting the 
deep structure of language, the second the deep structure of participation 
(Ashbrook, 1984a:289f). We can only access these deep structures through the 
surface structures, but in our awareness of them we discover ‘an order that goes 
beyond our ability to create or understand fully’ (Ashbrook, 1984a:291). Once 
again Ashbrook draws on his base neurobiological material to suggest that al-
though the surface structures are unavoidably constituted by the dualities which 
mark how brain-mind functions, they can become increasingly integrated as we 
access the deeper realities – something he couches in terms of a leap from the 
total disarray of Babel  to the unity in diversity (diversity in oneness) of Pentecost 
(Ashbrook, 1984a:284f). In essence then, he constructs a whole system of analysis 
and interpretation on the back of a particular feature of brain structure/function. 
The Humanizing Brain is similarly predicated on the conviction that the structures 
and processes of the brain reflect the nature and work of God. Drawing once 
again on a very particular neuroscientific base, Ashbrook and co-author Albright 
set out to explore how the workings of the human brain correspond with human 
understandings of the divine, taking common perceptions that God is ‘ever pre-
sent’, ‘nurturing’, ‘meaningful’, ‘purposeful’ etc. and linking these to different as-
pects of the brain’s evolution and operation. They describe their approach as ‘one 
of convergence and overlap amongst technical disciplines’ in which they ‘combine 
the languages of religion, whether it is understood in broad cultural terms or nar-
rower theological categories, with neuroscience talk to make sense of religion’   
(Ashbrook and Albright, 1999:9). Broadly speaking, their thesis is that, as the apo-
gee of evolutionary processes, the orderly structure of the brain reflects the uni-
verse from which it emerged and points to the nature of its ultimate reality – God 
(Ashbrook and Albright, 1997:20). Since it is on this evolved brain that religious 
experience depends, neuroscience in effect also studies, albeit indirectly and un-
intentionally, God and the human experience of God: ‘So, in the era of the brain, 
religion finds its logos, its inner logic, in terms of the accumulating evidence of 
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neuroscience’ (Ashbrook and Albright, 1997:xxvi). Ashbrook is however at pains to 
point out that taking the brain as an analogical metaphor for God is not to be seen 
as a reductive manoeuvre (Ashbrook, 1996c:389). 
The first part of the book lays out a neurobiology of faith in which the central 
element is the contention that human brains have evolved to be both humanised 
i.e. to seek out and respond to faces, and to collate and organise experiences and 
memories, and humanising, i.e. ‘the mind-producing brain compels us to deal with 
our universe as a human-like reality’ (Ashbrook and Albright, 1999:18). Thus they 
offer an account of reality which is constructionist but also involves critical real-
ism: the brain creates its own orderly environment but its perceptions, including 
religious ones, do ‘tend to have referents in reality’ (Ashbrook and Albright, 
1999:9).  
In the second part, Ashbrook and Albright attempt to establish the connection 
between the brain and religion using MacLean’s model of the triune brain (Mac-
lean, 1990). Their thesis here is that the three different anatomical and functional 
sections proposed by MacLean are also suggestive of various ways of ‘understand-
ing God’s ways of being God’ (Ashbrook and Albright, 1999:20). Thus the ‘reptilian 
brain’ which, in MacLean’s scheme, attends to concrete matters of survival, is 
seen as reflecting an understanding of reality, and thus of God, in functions such 
as territoriality and hierarchical social relationships. Similarly the ‘old mammalian 
brain’ correlates with images of the loving and nurturing God, as found through 
personal attachments and emotional responsiveness which give meaning to life. 
Finally the ‘neo-mammalian brain’, through its organising and pattern-making 
abilities, suggests ‘God’s creative power in ordering a universe whose vastness 
exceeds our comprehension’ (Ashbrook and Albright, 1999:20). As in Ashbrook’s 
first book, the explorations draw on a wide variety of sources to support different 
aspects of the thesis. These include the object relations theory of Winnicott 
(1965) and the complexity work of Prigogine (1984) and Kauffman (1996) as well 
as more esoteric material relating to interpretative readings of Michelangelo’s 
Creation scenes in the Sistine Chapel. Theological influences are similarly wide 
ranging and include Augustine, Tillich, and Kaufman (1993); but they are also in-
debted to Hefner’s ‘created co creator’ reading of the imago Dei (Hefner, 1993) 
and most of all to a Whiteheadian process theology.  
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What Ashbrook’s neurotheology involves then is an attempt to bring together 
various aspects of human religious experience and understanding and neuroscien-
tific understandings of brain structure and function to produce an integrated un-
derstanding of mind, brain, self, world, and God. Thus in some senses, his ap-
proach is not out of harmony with the metric set out by Schrag and van Huyssteen 
(see Chapter 2). However several aspects of the way in which he goes about this 
task present problems for both the durability and the wider applicability of the 
neurotheological theses which result. Thus they indicate knots which must be un-
ravelled if the neurotheological project is to make progress.  Although these prob-
lems shade across its boundaries, I want to consider them using the metric of en-
gagement laid out at the beginning of the chapter. The first issue is therefore one 
of location – though this is not with the chosen field of neuroscientific research 
per se, but with the way in which Ashbrook uses extremely particular models of 
brain function as the whole basis on which to then build his neurotheological the-
ses. Thus for example in The Human Mind, although Ashbrook refers to a whole 
range of the (then) current neurobiological data, he judges hemispheric lateralisa-
tion to be the lesson to be taken from such research and thus focuses almost ex-
clusively on this as the foundation for his initial thesis. This, as indicated, then be-
comes the basic heuristic through which he analyses other things such as ways of 
perceiving and understanding God (Ashbrook, 1984a:10-13, 78-82), or Christian 
history (ibid : 151-78, 231-58). A number of dangers attend this sort of manoeu-
vre. Firstly, it may generate models or analyses which are simply inadequate: 
whilst in a vast field such as neuroscientific research it is obviously necessary to 
delimit the data with which one can feasibly engage, concentrating solely on one 
aspect of a complex system like the brain, particularly as a basis for developing a 
unified account or exploring other complex psychological, sociological or historical 
phenomena, runs the risk of producing models which are too etiolated or analyses 
which are too simplistic – something which is arguably the case with some  of 
Ashbrook’s theses, particularly in The Human Mind. 
Secondly, in such a rapidly advancing field as neuroscience, tying a thesis and thus 
the analytic development based on it to a particular model of brain function, runs 
the risk of building obsolescence into the whole system (possibly very quickly) 
when models become disputed, or are superseded and discarded, and with it the 
potential undermining or loss of any and wider understandings developed from it. 
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This is a particularly acute problem for the assorted theses presented in The Hu-
manising Brain because of its heavy dependence on MacLean. Although, as Smith 
(2010:1) notes, tripartite neuro-psychologies have featured through two and half 
millennia of Western thought, and thus MacLean’s triune model stands in a long 
line stretching back at least to Plato’s Timaeus, it is based on work which was al-
ready outdated at the time of its publication and which has subsequently been 
‘unequivocally contradict[ed]’ by an extensive body of work in comparative neu-
robiology (Butler and Hodos, 2005:114). Thus whilst the model has retained sup-
port in the popular press and with some psychological and educational therapists, 
it has never been widely accepted and has had no enduring impact on neurobiol-
ogy (in marked contrast to MacLean’s work on the limbic system).  This absence of 
scientific currency calls into question the lasting significance of the neurotheologi-
cal formulations predicated on the model. It also highlights the dangers in trying 
to focus theological analyses through this kind of neuroscientific lens, particularly 
against a background of exponential growth in raw experimental data and under-
standing: in Rolston’s pithy phrase “The religion that is married to science today is 
a widow tomorrow’ (1990:87). 
The question thus raised is not simply that of which experimental neuroscientific 
data and models form the best loci for any attempted engagement with theology 
and of how to identify these but, once again, the more fundamental one of pur-
pose. Closely related to this is the issue, already hinted at earlier and which be-
comes even more acute with Newberg’s proposals, as to whether conceiving neu-
rotheology chiefly in terms of investigating and articulating spiritual experience 
and understandings in terms of brain structure and function is the most fruitful, or 
indeed the only, way in which the two disciplines can be brought together. It is 
the contention of this thesis that there are other possibilities for engagement 
which not only avoid some of these potential pitfalls but which also allow the 
theological side of the equation to extend beyond merely supplying the material 
for analysis, or contributing to the devising of better scientific studies by providing 
more precise delineations of ‘spirituality’ or the different nuances of various reli-
gious practices. 
This leads inevitably to considerations of the ‘exchange’ element of the project. 
Here there are a number of pertinent points connected with how material – both 
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neuroscientific and theological – is handled. Whilst one does not expect an in-
depth discussion of complex neurobiological technicalities, the actual degree of 
detail about or discussion of, the experimental data and its possible limitations on 
which Ashbrook draws is often quite slight, and statements such as ‘New tech-
nologies are catching the mind in the very act of processing and thinking’ 
(Ashbrook and Albright, 1999:16) generate a slight feeling of discomfort.  As I will 
touch on in Chapters 2 and 4, one of the things which has contributed to the lack 
of credibility of some science/theology discourse, has been an occasional theo-
logical over-eagerness to appropriate and build on scientific theories and data 
without sufficient understanding of either the meanings of the former or the limi-
tations of the latter. Whilst Ashbrook and Albright do not necessarily fall into this 
trap, their project does raise the issue of how, and to what extent, the non-
specialist can successfully make extrapolations from, and then build models and 
theses using complex experimental data. One of the aims in this study will be to 
offer a clear account, not only of the current experimental data in the chosen ar-
eas of scientific study, but also of their limitations from both an experimental and 
an extrapolative perspective (see further at p129 for example). 
Regarding the use of theological material, the issues are somewhat different, 
though equally relevant and no less acute.  As already mentioned, Ashbrook 
draws on a variety of theological inspirations in formulating his different theses 
and there are a number of points to be made in connection with this. Firstly, in 
The Human Mind certain theological concepts – for example those of analogia 
entis and imago Dei – seem to be foundational. However the assumption that 
these enable us to make larger, and ultimately, given the nature of that thesis, 
theological sense of neuroscientific data, is simply assumed, never examined.  
Secondly, an unquestioning normativity is sometimes assumed for some of the 
theological and hermeneutic elements used in thesis construction – for example 
certain Augustinian elements, the opposition of creation with redemption, or Ri-
coeur’s manifestation/proclamation typology (Hefner, 1985:357-8). Similarly, 
whilst in The Humanising Brain Ashbrook and Albright site themselves very firmly 
within the mainstream Judeo-Christian tradition, their use of process theology as 
the basic theological vehicle underpinning the project, draws on an articulation of 
God which many within that tradition might struggle to accept as a valid.  
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Once again this raises wider questions which were touched on earlier relating to 
the multiplicity of voices and perspectives within theology: how does one select a 
suitable dialogical partner from amongst the different possible theological voices 
– especially if these stand in contradiction to each other?  Is it possible to use mo-
tifs from the theological canon – such as the imago Dei – which themselves, either 
historically or currently, comprehend a variety of different interpretations?  In this 
thesis, I will argue that using van Huyssteen’s methodology, in its identification of 
specific intersecting trajectories and in its requirements of a critical stance to-
wards material offered to dialogue, provides a way of addressing these dilemmas. 
Ultimately all these issues lead to the further question of how widely useful or 
applicable any neurotheology can be which is formulated and articulated using 
ideas (and imagery) which are themselves very specific to or tightly tied to under-
lying dogmatic frameworks of one kind or another; and, in turn, of whether there 
are ways of using theological material which do not fall prey to this kind of diffi-
culty. This is a question which is of central interest in this thesis and to which I will 
return briefly in section 4 below before addressing much more fully in Chapter 2. 
Finally, I want to note the role which making imaginative and intuitive leaps (of 
faith) plays in Ashbrook’s methodology and the questions this raises about how 
one moves between very different disciplines. Neither Ashbrook nor, as we will 
see, Newberg, advance any clear methodology for negotiating the inter-
disciplinary divides and disjunctions outlined in sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 above. For 
Ashbrook it essentially comes down to juxtaposing these disciplines ‘as if they be-
long together. They may not correspond except through an act of faith or an exer-
cise in imagination’ (Ashbrook, 1984a:18). Whilst acknowledging the important 
role which imaginative leaps play, relying solely on such is methodologically in-
adequate. Arguably it leaves anything which Ashbrook builds on the back of such 
acts of faith and imagination (essentially the greater part of his neurotheological 
output) in a somewhat vulnerable position. It also raises a number of issues to do 
with the transfer of concepts and terminology across disciplines, and here neuro-
scientist Leslie Brothers has been very critical of what she terms ‘neuroist litera-
ture’ which equates the conceptual architecture of psychology with the neural 
architecture of the brain. Particular problems which she identifies are the use of 
shared words which have very different meanings in neurobiological and non-
neurobiological contexts, and the drawing of analogies between the structures of 
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psychological concepts and the physical structure of the brain in ways which sug-
gest the former is realised in the latter (Brothers, 2002b:857-70). However as I will 
suggest below and develop in the following chapter, there are methodologies 
which permit both the identification of points of correspondence in a much more 
defensible way and provide a safeguard against improper translations between 
disciplines, whilst at the same time, also allowing room for more imaginative han-
dling of material. These thus provide a fruitful way of ‘juxtaposing the disciplines’ 
whilst avoiding some of the difficulties noted above. 
The main issues surrounding ‘expression’ have already been touched on previ-
ously, notably the question of who the intended audience is, and of the difficulties 
associated with formulations tightly tied to particular religious traditions or sub-
sets of these.  To these the issue of clarity of formulation can also be added. 
Ashbrook’s work is difficult to follow in places, being marked by both a certain 
ambiguity and some rather opaque elaborations – something which Hefner sug-
gests is due to his awareness of the difficulties surrounding the task he is attempt-
ing  (Hefner, 1985:345). These points once again highlight the need for neurothe-
ologies to be conducted from the basis of a clear sense of identity and purpose – 
something which is also an issue in Newberg’s work.  
In the fifteen years since the publication of The Humanising Mind, research in the 
neurosciences has grown exponentially and advances in dynamic scanning, 
amongst other things, have generated a wealth of new experimental data, includ-
ing material pertaining to various aspects of religious practice and experience. It is 
against this background that Newberg has recently made the first attempt to 
more formally describe and define neurotheology and suggest possibilities for its 
future development, and it is this project which now becomes the focus of discus-
sion. 
1.3.2 Newberg: neurotheology as equal exchange 
Whilst ‘no one person can define a field’ (Clayton, 2008:3), Newberg’s name is 
very prominently associated with neurotheology: both its formal delineation and 
the subsequent description of the potential field given in the Encyclopedia of Re-
ligion is predominantly a reflection of his interests, perspectives, and empirical 
work, and builds on substantive (but not necessarily substantiated) claims arising 
from these. Similarly the section in the Principia dealing with neurotheology’s his-
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tory involves no discussion of the work of Ashbrook or any other recent scholars 
using the term. In effect then, the current shape of neurotheology and the desig-
nation of its task are very heavily influenced by Newberg’s preferences. 
However his work has been strongly criticised from the perspective of methodol-
ogy (Geertz, 2009:319-24), data interpretation (Goldberg, 2009:325-30) and, in a 
particularly withering critique by Cambridge neurologist Alasdair Coles, for dem-
onstrating a complete ‘deafferentation from both important neuroscience and 
mainstream theology’ (Coles, 2008:1956). Moreover Newberg’s sometimes hy-
perbolic and grandiose claims for neurotheology – for example that it will poten-
tially ‘propel scholars, and hopefully all of humanity, towards a new enlighten-
ment’ (Newberg, 2010:267) – seriously damage its credibility. He also makes as-
sertions which are misguided and impossible to sustain – for example that neu-
rotheology not only functions as a metatheology which can describe the general 
principles and rules for constructing ‘any concrete theological system’, but also 
has the potential to form the basis of a megatheology generating content that all 
religions could adopt as basic ‘without any serious violation of their essential doc-
trines’ (Newberg, 2010:64, 65). These latter claims have been rightly criticised as 
neurologically reductionist and naively modernist (van Huyssteen, 2006:259) and, 
particularly in the light of religious history, as being ‘astoundingly naïve’ (Geertz, 
2009:321).   
With respect to Newberg’s recent Principia, while its aim of comprehensively 
mapping out a substantive territory for neurotheology is laudable, the project 
founders at key points precisely because it fails to address fundamental issues as 
to where and how theology and neuroscience might intersect. In the case of 
‘where?’ the territory claimed on neurotheology’s behalf is simply too vast to be 
either manageable or, at times, remain coherent as a distinctive enterprise. The 
difficulties resulting from this lack of delimitation are then amplified by those at-
tending the ‘how?’ question. Here the problem is principally that despite bold 
claims about the nature of the proposed dialogue between the disciplines, New-
berg offers no clear strategies for managing the actual mechanics and tensions 
associated with these.  Not only is this rooted in a failure to answer the more fun-
damental ‘why?’ question, but the combined result of these two issues is a failure 
to establish clearly what form any resulting neurotheological discourse is to take, 
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and what weight its insights might legitimately claim in any given interaction. This 
leads to a scenario in which, despite Newberg’s claims that neurotheology repre-
sents ‘a fundamentally different form of scholarship in the science-religion arena’ 
(Newberg, 2010:54), it is often difficult to see how it differs from the scientific 
study of religion, or how it can generate either the rich multidisciplinary dialogue 
or the distinctive new insights which Newberg promises (Newberg, 2010:21). 
A comprehensive critique of Principles of Neurotheology is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Instead I will concentrate on some of the key features and issues 
with particular reference to the points made above. From this I want to draw out 
three things which Newberg’s vision signally fails to deliver but which, in light of 
the issues considered in this chapter, are essential for developing a fruitful dia-
logue between theology and neuroscience: the need to delimit the field of en-
quiry and determine clear objectives for any engagement, and the absolute ne-
cessity of a well-defined and robust methodology for managing this. As I indicate 
in 1.4 and then argue further in Chapter 2, the proposed methodology for this 
thesis not only meets the latter requirement, but can also play a pivotal role in 
managing the first two necessities. 
Newberg offers ‘a foundation for future neurotheological discourse and scholar-
ship’ (Newberg, 2010:1) structured around fifty-four principles, the first of which 
states that neurotheology ‘should strive to provide and seek clear definitions for 
the topics of its enquiry’ (Newberg, 2010:23). It is therefore somewhat ironic, but 
also symptomatic of underlying problems, that the term itself is both imprecisely 
defined and also qualified by the observation that it is misnomered (Newberg, 
2010:45). Newberg’s initial basic definition that ‘neurotheology refers to the field 
of study linking the neurosciences with religion and theology’ reflects not only the 
more widespread ambiguity as to the nature of that connection but is also imme-
diately widened to include both ‘the totality of religion and religious experiences’ 
along with ‘psychiatry, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, genetics, endocrinol-
ogy as well as other macro- and micro- perspectives of the neurosciences’ (New-
berg, 2010:45).  Later principles that neurotheology ‘should be applied to a wide 
range of cognitive processes’ (PXXV) and ‘address any and all theological ques-
tions’ (PXLI, Newberg, 2010:185, 221), along with the associated discussions of 
these points, confirm the feeling of an envisioned disciplinary reach that is virtu-
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ally unbounded. A similar sense is also carried across into the designated ‘goals’ of 
neurotheology viz. improving our understanding of the human mind and brain; 
improving our understanding of religion and theology; improving the human con-
dition, particularly in the context of health and well-being; and improving the hu-
man condition, particularly in the context of religion and spirituality. This expan-
sive stance is traceable back to what Newberg sees as a fundamental topographi-
cal feature of the neurotheological landscape – that all human perceiving, experi-
encing, knowing and construction is shaped by the fundamental constraints of 
brain function (Newberg, 2010:84-85, 214). Essentially the point here seems to be 
that since all religious thought and function is determined, shaped, and expressed 
via brain processes, then any and every aspect of it can be considered as ground 
for neurotheological exploration. Paradoxically this emphasis becomes something 
which actually severely limits the scope of Newberg’s proposed neurotheology – a 
point I will return to shortly. 
Whatever the roots though, the result is a proposed arena of encounter that is 
vast. This absence of any useful delimitation seems to stem from (rather than pre-
cede) a basic lack of clarity as to the precise purpose of neurotheology. This leads 
to a situation where a neurotheological approach assumes something of an ‘Ever-
est’ rationale – topics are addressed simply because they are there rather than 
being actively selected as a point of intersecting interest with potential for a use-
ful expansion of understanding through a combined approach. In some instances 
(e.g. Newberg, 2010:231-43, 245-7), this lack of limitation seems to bring the pro-
posed neurotheological discourse dangerously close to vacuity.  
However Newberg’s vision for the loci of neurotheological encounter is, paradoxi-
cally, also somewhat too narrow: much of the reach envisaged actually exists 
within a single conceptual framework controlled by the perspective indicated 
above and formalised in his 'crucial' neurotheological principle (PXVII) of brain 
constraint (Newberg, 2010:84). The stance towards theological and religious ideas 
which ensues focuses primarily on understanding the ideas themselves in terms of 
their cognitive underpinnings, and locates their primary value as a contributor to 
neurotheology in being thus understood. At times this approach, particularly in 
view of the lack of dialogical directives, strays perilously close to the reductive 
assimilation which Newberg wishes to avoid (ibid:3, 19, 54). Whilst there may well 
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be potential value in improving our understanding of the underlying cognitive 
processes in assorted aspects of religious thinking, this represents only one way of 
interfacing cognitive neuroscience and theology, and ignore the existence of other 
fields of encounter which may be equally if not more productive. Thus rather than 
focussing exclusively on trying to deconstruct theological ideas or religious experi-
ences from a cognitive perspective, a neurotheological approach should also 
comprehend taking the ideas themselves, as products of a particular and long-
established mode of human reflection, and interfacing them with the evolving 
perspectives on human personhood emerging from the current explosion in the 
cognitive neurosciences. This is the approach I will adopt in constructing the neu-
rotheology of health in this project. 
The vast range of possibilities within Newberg’s proposed arena of encounter also 
raises the question of where, and for what reasons, neurotheological endeavour 
could be most fruitfully concentrated in order to build up some kind of basic cor-
pus for the discipline and develop its distinctive identity.  Newberg gives a clear 
indication as to some of his most favoured options for suitable loci – either via the 
principles themselves (e.g. Newberg, 2010:195, 225), as direct statements 
(ibid:21) or by the amount of text he devotes to certain areas such as health 
(ibid:195-210), or spiritual practice and experience (ibid:147-86). However what is 
less clear is the framework within which such judgements are to be made, since 
he presents neither overview nor specific guidelines for this.  Although there is no 
explicit appeal to a search for consonances or for areas of overlapping interest, 
the implicit heuristic seems to be something akin to Midgley’s multiple maps 
metaphor (Midgley, 2006:112-4). In the light of earlier comments about the im-
balances between excessive knowledge production and our ability to assimilate or 
utilise it, what seems to be urgently required is some mechanism for identifying 
those areas which offer the combination of potential usefulness and possible dia-
logical fruitfulness, at which to coordinate and concentrate engagement. As I will 
argue in Chapter 2, van Huyssteen’s transversal approach with its intersecting line 
heuristic is one possible mechanism for generating such delimitation.   
However, there are other significant issues with Newberg’s articulation of neu-
rotheology beyond those relating to the locus of engagement.  These relate to 
how dialogical exchange is actually to be managed, and stem from the combina-
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tion of a strong claim to disciplinary equality, non-privilege and reciprocity but a 
complete absence of an adequate methodology for enabling this. At an early stage 
of making his case for developing a principia neurotheologica, Newberg offers a 
vision of neurotheology centred on constructive and complementary exploration 
in which all those involved must remain open ‘at least somewhat’ (the qualifier is 
characteristic) to all the different perspectives involved, whether religious, cul-
tural, theological, or scientific (Newberg, 2010:16-17). But while the attitude is 
commendable, Newberg ultimately provides no clear guidelines as to how the 
‘constructive and complementary’ nature of the dialogue is to be instigated and 
maintained. This methodological lacuna leads to a vacuum at the heart of the pro-
ject into which it is, at times, in danger of collapsing.  
This is not to say that discussion of methodological matters is absent: indeed 
Newberg himself explicitly links the establishment and flourishing of the discipline 
to the development of sound methodology and declares his intent to ‘determine 
the methodological issues that currently affect the field and explore how best to 
address such issues’ (Newberg, 2010:113). However his efforts are, to a large de-
gree, concerned with practical experimental issues of study design and data inter-
pretation (ibid:113-46) and do not address the actual dialogical mechanics of any 
neurotheological projects. There is of course always a danger that a focus on and 
preoccupation with such methodological considerations may lead to them becom-
ing an end in themselves, at the expense of the search for specific insights and 
questions. Such dislocation from the bigger picture may then result not in the es-
tablishing of ‘common working ground’ but at best ‘common horizons’ and at 
worst ‘common clouds’ (Welker, 2006:553). These cautions notwithstanding 
though, attention to the methodological aspects of constructing neurotheological 
exchange and dialogue are vital if it is to avoid lapsing into vacuity or incoherence. 
With regard to dialogical exchange, PVII states that ‘Neuroscientific and theologi-
cal perspectives must be considered to be comparable contributors to neurothe-
ological investigations’ (Newberg, 2010:54, original emphasis). Newberg sees this 
principle as key to the neurotheological endeavour and one moreover which en-
ables it to achieve a ‘high level of sophistication’ (ibid). This requires ‘a modicum’ 
(the tepid word choice is interesting) of acknowledgement of ‘the value, impor-
tance, significance and accuracy of both religion and science’ (Newberg, 2010:45), 
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but the Principia itself gives no indication of the grounds on which this assent is to 
be founded. Moreover the designated cornerstones for ensuring equality merely 
highlight the difficulties they signally fail to address. Here I want to focus on the 
second such cornerstone: the disqualification of any a priori assumptions which 
automatically privilege either discipline.  
Newberg makes it clear that the assumptions of neither discipline can be privi-
leged as normative in advance of any analysis (Newberg, 2010:55). However in the 
absence of any suggested methodology for doing so, it is not clear how an a pos-
teriori decision about the direction of any causal arrow is actually to be made. It is 
thus difficult to see how any distinct neurotheological interpretation can be ar-
rived at, offered or defended.  The scenario offered as an illustration of the prin-
ciple in action – a hypothetical study of brain activity in nuns experiencing the 
presence of God – is in fact an exquisitely apposite exemplar of the problem:  
If we find there are specific changes, what causal conclusions 
can actually be drawn? The most that can be said is: there are 
certain brain activity levels associated with the experience […] 
The results do not suggest either that the brain activity caused 
the experience...or whether the findings reflected the brain’s 
response to the experience. [But] the brain scan only suggests 
that there is a link, and does not necessarily help to point the 
causal arrow one way or the other (Newberg, 2010:55, empha-
sis mine). 
Newberg makes the somewhat obvious observation that non-religious and reli-
gious perspectives will point the causal arrow in diametrically opposite directions 
but gives no indication of how in these circumstances a neurotheological ap-
proach would determine causality other than the vague suggestion that it ‘might 
be possible’ to set up a study which allows a more specific determination of cau-
sality. Given the important place which studies of brain activity hold in his overall 
project, this lack of any methodology for guiding interpretation of data is all the 
more striking.  Tendering ‘the most than can be said’ descriptions of results as 
neurotheological ‘insight’ does not make its discourse distinctive but instead ren-
ders it vacuous. 
Newberg glosses over the obvious difficulty here by maintaining that such an ap-
proach demonstrates the ‘substantial questioning and healthy scepticism’ which 
neurotheology demands. Indeed he even formulates this into a further principle 
of scepticism which questions both science and theology and thus allows neu-
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rotheology to ‘explore the intersection between the two far more thoroughly’ 
(PVII Newberg, 2010:56). Subsequent comments that scepticism must then be 
allowed to give way to new ideas and paradigms, and that neurotheology should 
be open to and evaluate all such possibilities, simply shift the problem of ‘how?’ 
to another location. The claim that utilising such scepticism will help in either ex-
ploration or in determining which approaches and lines of questioning will be 
most fruitful (Newberg, 2010:56) is meaningless in the absence of a either a 
methodology or a specified larger framework against which to do this. The devel-
opment of a neurotheological addition to Occam’s razor in PXVI that ‘we must not 
assume what constitutes necessity until we have adequately evaluated all of the 
possible pluralities’ (Newberg, 2010:83) is similarly unhelpful when examined. 
Again the aim is to outlaw any prior philosophical commitments as being norma-
tive and thus constraining the answer. However once again this approach falters 
because there is no strategy for how the ‘possible pluralities’ are then to be ‘ade-
quately evaluated’ and an a posteriori conclusion of what constitutes necessity 
arrived at: the neurotheological razor may cut in very different directions depend-
ing on the disciplinary hand which wields it, but no neutral mechanism for doing 
so is specified. 
Once again the question of ‘why?’ lies at the heart of these problems, but this 
time it is rooted in the confusion as to disciplinary identity which runs through 
Newberg’s project. This confusion is due partly to the extreme expansiveness of 
remit previously noted, and partly to an unresolved tension between his wish to 
espouse (for both pragmatic and personal reasons) a non-reductive stance with 
respect to the religion/theology, and an essentially physicalist stance with respect 
to the limiting role of brain function. Newberg consistently denies reductive intent 
and proposes mutual illumination, but while it is evidently possible that there may 
be different aims in different scenarios, there is a general vagueness as to 
whether outcomes are envisioned as a harmonisation of accounts, a sharpening of 
theological/scientific understanding of a particular issue, or the generation of 
novel insight. Newberg’s general claims for neurotheology as a discipline implicitly 
suggest that the latter is the preferred aim, but by what criterion a suitable out-
come might be decided for any specific project is unclear. Nevertheless the an-
swer to the question of ‘why?’ is vital since it will affect not only the nature of the 
study itself but also the form of the resulting output, and to whom it might be 
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supposed to be of interest. This also brings into sharp focus the difficulties which 
arise when, either explicitly or implicitly, the fulcrum on which engagement be-
tween theology and science pivots is that of causality. One of my contentions in 
this thesis is that there are other axes around which interaction can be con-
structed, and that these are not only give far more scope for rich theological input 
but also have the potential for genuine bidirectional exchange and the generation 
of expanded accounts of aspects of humanness.  
Ultimately, these unresolved issues of identity and purpose, combined with the 
lack of any clear strategy for interfacing the two disciplines not only undermine 
Newberg’s twin claim that neurotheology merges ‘these two [often incompatible] 
methodologies into one overarching discipline’ (Newberg, 2010:63) and that a 
neurotheological approach enables a ‘free exchange of ideas, data and informa-
tion’ (ibid:54), but ultimately lead to a dialogical vacuum at the heart of the pro-
ject into which any claim to provide new and distinctive integrated insights is in 
danger of collapsing. 
In summary then, both the form of neurotheology practiced by Ashbrook, and 
that envisioned by Newberg, encounter problems in each phase of the dynamic of 
engagement: for ‘encounter’ these have to do with the identification of either 
appropriate loci or suitable contributory material; with ‘exchange’ they relate to 
the coherence and defensibility of the methodologies employed or proposed; and 
with expression they concern not only the generation of stable or coherent out-
puts, but also the development of a distinctively neurotheological discourse. 
These difficulties, particularly in the case of Newberg, also seem to have roots in a 
lack of a clear identity for neurotheology and a related inadequate delineation of 
its primary purposes. Many of the identified issues are potentially remedial with 
the employment of a suitable methodology and they do not therefore fatally un-
dermine the attempt to conjoin religion and neuroscience in the ways envisaged 
by Ashbrook and Newberg. However such approaches do not exhaust the possi-
bilities of neurotheology and in this thesis I want to explore a distinctively differ-
ent way of bringing together the two discourses and combining their insights. My 
interest here is not just in finding a way of negotiating the difficulties in interfac-
ing either science/religion generally or neuroscience and theology specifically but 
also, as part of a larger project, in whether and how we can address the issues 
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raised by increasing disciplinary subspecialisations and the attendant generation 
of a large and rapidly growing volume of disconnected quanta of knowledge.  The 
final section thus briefly outlines the direction I propose to take in this thesis for 
developing a neurotheological investigation of the links between relational con-
nection and health.  By clearly identifying both purpose and locus of engagement, 
and through adopting a robust methodological approach and generating a distinc-
tive discourse, this seeks to address some of the issues highlighted as problems in 
Ashbrook and Newberg’s projects. At the same time, it is also an attempt to re-
spond to some of the questions raised in section 1.2 regarding the purpose of dia-
logue between science and religion, and to explore the possibility of bringing to-
gether scientific data and theological insights in a very different way to develop 
what Morin describes as ‘complex knowledge’ (Morin, 2008:2-6). Once again I will 
structure this brief outline according to the three-fold heuristic of encounter, ex-
change, and expression offered at the beginning of the chapter.  
1.4 Neurotheology: expanding the roadmap 
One of Newberg’s foundational goals for neurotheology is ‘to improve our under-
standing of the human condition particularly in the context of health and well be-
ing’ (Newberg, 2010:18). In his case, the suggested arena for intensive neurothe-
ological exploration is the connection between spirituality/religious involvement 
and health. This is an area which has generated a huge amount of interest in re-
cent years alongside a wide range of books and papers claiming that religious in-
volvement leads to a significant improvement in health outcomes (e.g. Chamber-
lain and Hall, 2000; Koenig and Cohen, 2002; Koenig et al., 2001).  However there 
are serious difficulties with some of these data-sets, many of which are drawn 
retrospectively from epidemiological studies examining other issues – something 
which has led to charges of data dredging. Other issues include poor controls for 
confounding variables, and vague and inconsistent definitions of spirituality and 
health (for a review see Sloan, 2005). 
In the current project, rather than exploring a particular aspect of religious in-
volvement or practice and health I want to take a somewhat different line: as I will 
discuss in Chapter 3, there is a wealth of evidence from both epidemiological and 
immunological studies to suggest a strong connection between the number and 
nature of social relationships and health outcomes. There is also a strong thematic 
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strand in both Old and New Testament narratives linking the experience of rela-
tionality with wellbeing. I will therefore be taking as the basic locus for neurothe-
ological exploration the experience and expression of human relationality and its 
connection with health outcomes. These different evidential strands will be fully 
delineated and explored in Chapter 3 by way of grounding the proposed project. 
The aim here is not the development of an apologetic related to Christian views 
on health and healing, but to bring together various neurobiological and theologi-
cal perspectives on human relationality and health as a way of expanding under-
standing of the connection between them. The wealth of data currently emerging 
from the neurosciences offer unprecedented opportunities for theology to engage 
with science around a very different set of questions, with the potential to move 
beyond apologetics into a much more truly bidirectional collaborative attempt to 
augment and enrich knowledge. 
One of the major criticisms I have raised against both Newberg and Ashbrook is 
the lack of any clear methodology for engaging theology and neuroscience. I have 
also suggested that such methodologies are available, and in this project I will be 
appropriating one such viz. the transversal space dialogue developed and utilised 
by Wentzel van Huyssteen in his Gifford Lectures (van Huyssteen, 2006). From a 
basic philosophical stance of postfoundational rationality, this takes the notion of 
shared tools of rationality as the basis for the mutual acceptance of epistemic and 
intellectual parity and as such offers a different way of addressing the issue of dis-
ciplinary equality. It also opens the way to dealing with some of the other issues 
which have been raised, for example the delimitation of territory. Rather than 
looking for possible consonances of meaning, van Huyssteen’s approach is cen-
tred on identifying intersecting lines of interest at which dialogue can be situated. 
The associated idea of opening up a transversal space (which belongs to none of 
the contributing disciplines) for dialogue, taken in conjunction with the accep-
tance of epistemic parity already indicated, raises the real possibility of achieving 
the bidirectional ‘free exchange of ideas, data and information’ which Newberg 
sees as the hallmark of neurotheology (Newberg, 2010:54). In this instance the 
intersecting point will be human relationality and the contributing disciplinary 
voices will be theology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychoneuroimmunology. 
This methodology, through its selection and accountability aspects, also provides 
a way of addressing the ‘many voices’ issue noted with regard to theological con-
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tributions to dialogue, as well as the possibility of using such material in a way 
which preserves its theological identity without tying this to systematic particu-
larities. In the next chapter I will provide a full exposition of these points as well as 
of the model itself and the further development which I propose below as the ba-
sis of the methodology to be employed in this study. 
I earlier suggested that for neurotheology to claim legitimacy as a coherent enter-
prise, it must be able to produce and ‘body forth’ insights which are distinctively 
neurotheological in form and expression. To this end I further develop van 
Huyssteen’s basic methodology in a way which takes it beyond the interdiscipli-
nary confines within which he himself has employed it. In this, I expand the con-
cept of transversal space engagement to support the production of what I term 
transversal arguments and models – that is, ones which also inhabit a space at 
intersections between the disciplines and which are therefore not constrained by 
any one of them but which belong to all. Over the course of the thesis, I will use 
the neurotheological exploration of relationality and health enabled by this ap-
proach to develop a model for a possible pathway connecting them via immune 
signalling mechanisms.  The aim here is twofold: firstly to address the issue of un-
even flow and constraint which have been identified as a feature of sci-
ence/religion exchange generally and of Newberg’s neurotheology specifically; 
and secondly to generate a perspective on the connection between relationality 
and health which can be coherently designated as neurotheological. 
This alternative approach is thus not only in keeping with the concept of neu-
rotheology as an engagement between diverse elements of cognitive neurosci-
ence and theology, but also addresses some of the issues which have been noted 
in respect to the particular delineation of neurotheology explored in this chapter. 
It is also an essay into exploring different ways in which knowledge can be con-
structed and validated across disciplinary boundaries – an essential step in a 
world marked by ongoing disciplinary subspecialisation, explosive information 
growth and increasing complexity. In the following two chapters I will establish 
both the particularities of the methodology to be employed and the validity of the 
chosen ground for engagement between theological and neuroscientific insights 
and data. Subsequent chapters will then take the form of three separate transver-
sal space connections between the contributing voices, each of which will provide 
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one strand of a transversal argument from which the neurotheological model will 
be derived and developed. 
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Knowledge in the Making 
Postfoundational rationality and transversal approa ches to dia-
logue 
 
How do we engage in enquiry? How do we think 
about the world, and more specifically, how do we 
approach research? Above all, how do we organ-
ise knowledge? How can we live and think in a 
pluralistic universe, with complexity, uncertainty 
and ambiguity? 
Montuori (2008:xxv) 
 
Explanation […] works by widening the context, 
not by atomising the structure. 
Midgley (2000:36) 
 
It is often at the boundaries between disciplines 
that new and exciting discoveries take place. 
van Huyssteen (2006:9) 
 
2.1 Introduction and outline 
The previous chapter raised questions as to the essential purposes of engaging 
scientific and religious discourses. I suggested that the explosive growth of the 
neurosciences opened up unprecedented opportunities for moving beyond either 
apologetic or reductive intent towards a much more truly bidirectional collabora-
tive attempt to augment and enrich understanding of humanness. However to do 
this requires a robust methodological strategy for negotiating the assorted diffi-
culties and tensions involved, something which is notably absent in both Ashbrook 
and Newberg’s approaches to neurotheology. The purposes of the current chap-
ter are thus firstly to explore, delineate, and develop such a methodology, and 
secondly to set out a clear statement as to the purpose and planned development 
of the proposed neurotheological exploration of relationality and health. 
These will also be set within a larger noegenetic framework since it is against this 
that any claims to the production of both new and distinctively neurotheological 
understandings must be evaluated. The thirst for knowledge is, as Aristotle noted 
in the opening line of the Metaphysics, a defining characteristic of the genus 
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homo. Indeed we are as much, if not more, h. quaerens – ‘the animal that asks 
and asks’ – as h. sapiens (Steiner, 2001:16).  This relentless pursuit of understand-
ing has formed an integral part of human endeavour since grammar first allowed 
us to frame the thoughts of ‘why?’ and ‘how?’ But hand in hand with such ques-
tions have also gone ones about the nature of knowledge itself – its sources, con-
struction, and validation. Human history has witnessed paradigmatic shifts with 
respect to these: in the West, pre-Enlightenment knowledge grounded in revela-
tion and legitimated by the authority of sacred texts has given way to the narra-
tives of modernity, founded on the appeal to rationality and the valorising of the 
scientific method. However these in their turn have now been challenged by the 
discourse of postmodernism with its suspicion of power relations, rejection of 
metanarratives, and emphases on the relative, context dependant and socially-
constructed nature of knowledge.  
Both of these shifts have implications for attempts to connect scientific and reli-
gious narratives and understandings. In the case of the first, its accompanying 
change in perception as to what constitutes ‘reliable knowledge’ about the world, 
brings into question the ability of, and extent to which religious thinking can con-
tribute to this. The accompanying, narrowed definition of knowledge has height-
ened and reinforced the epistemological and ontological tensions outlined in 
Chapter 1. With the current shift, the challenge to the very heart of modernist 
assumptions about objective knowledge moves the focus of contention back to 
science, questioning its hegemonic claim to be the gatekeeper and arbiter of all 
‘real’ knowledge of the world. Inevitably these postmodern critiques have been 
strongly and vehemently resisted, particularly from within the scientific estab-
lishment itself (Brown, 2001; Gross and Levitt, 1994; Koertge, 2000; Sokal, 2010). 
But nevertheless, and even when their extreme forms are discounted, they have 
still been acute and important interlocutors of modernist epistemologies, and as 
such have expanded our understanding of the nature, purpose, and acquisition of 
knowledge: one need not embrace the anarchism of Feyerabend (1975) to agree 
with Midgley’s assessment (2006:50) that the idea that science represents a free-
standing skill which is both omnicompetent for all human exploration and has a 
monopoly of rationality, is simply no longer tenable. It is this idea of rationality as 
a shared resource which lies at the heart of van Huyssteen’s current approach to 
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interfacing science and theology and which underpins the dialogical model used in 
his 2004 Gifford Lectures (van Huyssteen, 2006) on which I will be drawing. 
Long a proponent of the need to develop suitable methodologies for sci-
ence/theology engagement (van Huyssteen, 1989; 1998a; 1998b; 1999), he is not 
unique in advancing a new approach to replace the current critical realist one. The 
internal tensions and sense of stasis noted in Chapter 1, along with the external 
pressures from the changing philosophical climate indicated above, have led to a 
various attempts to produce new dialogical models which address these issues 
(Gregersen and van Huyssteen, 1998a). However his transversal methodology is 
particularly promising from both a general and a specific perspective: firstly it ne-
gotiates a distinct path between the foundationalism challenged by postmodern 
thinking, and the extreme relativism it advances as a replacement. Secondly, it 
offers a combination of disciplinary rootedness, intellectual robustness, and cog-
nitive fluidity which seems admirably suited to the particular issues and demands 
of neurotheological engagement identified in Chapter 1. 
The following section of the chapter focuses on the concept of postfoundational 
rationality which structures this approach. In conversation with both van 
Huyssteen and several of his major dialogical partners, I explore three key ele-
ments of this reconfigured understanding: rationality as a practical skill; progress 
through responsible epistemic judgement and the role of experiential accountabil-
ity. The associated ideas of transversality and transversal space dialogue will then 
be taken up and developed in section 3. Here I argue that these provide a robust 
mechanism for negotiating some of the previously identified difficulties attached 
to exchange between theology and neuroscience. However, as I suggested in 
Chapter 1, to claim that such an engagement can generate distinctively neurothe-
ological insights or understandings is implicitly to offer something more than sim-
ply scientific explanations of religious ideas/behaviour, or experimental improve-
ment through better definition and delineation of the religious material under 
investigation. Section 4 therefore addresses the issue of whether the proposed 
methodology can also generate a distinctively neurotheological ‘bodying forth’. I 
argue that in both its philosophical underpinnings and its practicalities, the model 
supports not just interdisciplinary outcomes, but also the development of what I 
term transversal arguments and models. These offer the possibility of framing in-
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sights in a way which is informed by both theology and neuroscience, but is not 
simply reducible to either of these in form or expression. This also facilitates a 
move beyond assimilative or apologetic function, centred on debates about cau-
sality, into territory where theological insights can be combined with those being 
generated via experimental neuroscience to expand and enrich our understanding 
of humanness. Thus it also addresses the issues of knowledge production and 
construction raised at the end of the previous chapter and underlined by Mon-
tuori’s questions above. 
Finally, I move from the general methodological to the specific contours of the 
proposed project. Section 5 sketches out the way in which van Huyssteen’s model 
and the proposed extension will be used to bring together theological insights on 
aspects of relational connection with raw experimental data from cognitive neu-
roscience and psychoneuroimmunology, as a way of exploring the connection be-
tween relational experience and health outcomes. 
2.2 Reconfiguring rationality 
Van Huyssteen sees the prime locus of the postmodern challenge as being to ra-
tionality itself (van Huyssteen, 1999:3). Hence his response has been a move to 
recover its rich resources without falling prey to the problems associated with 
postmodernism. Thus whilst conceding elements of postmodern critiques against 
foundationalism and accepting the necessity of abandoning modernist notions of 
rationality rooted in it, he also rejects the relativist forms of non-foundationalism 
and contextualism urged by postmodernity. Instead, in conversation with a variety 
of pragmatist philosophers, he attempts to plot a course between ‘modernist 
metanarrativist overstatements of universality and objectivity’ on the one side 
and ‘the extremes of postmodernist over-emphasis on contextuality and personal 
judgement’ on the other (van Huyssteen, 2006:12).  The result is an understanding 
of rationality not as an abstract cognitive notion but as a practical skill, operating 
in all domains of human life that 
enables us to gather and bind together the pattern of our in-
terpreted experience through rhetoric, articulation and dis-
cernment (van Huyssteen, 2006:18). 
This has important consequences for the dialogue between science and theology 
since it establishes a completely different basis for claiming epistemological and 
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cognitive parity between the disciplines (see p59ff). It allows van Huyssteen to 
acknowledge important differences in their reasoning strategies of the kind noted 
in Chapter 1, whilst also claiming significant epistemological overlaps between 
them because of their shared rational resources (van Huyssteen, 1999:187-8). 
Thus he argues that, whilst the skills might be more refined in science,  
effective problem solving and good judgement reach beyond 
the sciences and already form part of the common sense rea-
sonableness by which we live our daily lives (van Huyssteen, 
1999:12). 
In itself this insight is not new: ‘Darwin’s bulldog’ himself observed that science 
was ‘nothing but trained and organised common sense’ (Huxley, 1893/2011:45, 
original emphasis), a perspective with which others have concurred (Dewey, 
1938:66; Einstein, 1954:290; Haack, 2007:95; Laudan, 1977:13; Sokal and 
Bricmont, 1998:54). However van Huyssteen goes beyond mere observation, de-
veloping a detailed case from bases in philosophical and evolutionary epistemol-
ogy to support his contention. 
2.2.1 Rationality as a practical ‘transversal’ skill 
Fundamental to the notion of postfoundational rationality is the understanding 
that rationality is not an abstract concept which exists separately from contextual 
located humanness. Rather, it represents a complex embodied set of practical 
evaluative skills involving both judgement and accountability, and operating 
across the many different domains of human enquiry and knowledge. As such 
these have been developed through and conserved by evolutionary processes be-
cause of their survival value (Rescher, 1990:2-3; van Huyssteen, 2006:92); indeed 
they may ultimately define who we are as a species (van Huyssteen, 2006:11). It is 
through the performance of these everyday problem-solving skills that we identify 
and realise the key epistemic values of intelligibility and optimal understanding, 
and learn the crucial epistemic skills of discernment and responsible judgement 
(van Huyssteen, 2006:11). Van Huyssteen develops these ideas in close dialogue 
with Calvin Schrag, whose dissection of the postmodern challenge to modern 
foundationalism (Schrag, 1992), significantly contributes to his construction of a 
postfoundational rationality (van Huyssteen, 1999:139). Both see the problemati-
sation of rationality itself, particularly as it figures in the discourse of modernity,  
as a key motif of postmodern discourse (Schrag, 1992:7; 1994:61). However 
rather than thus bidding farewell to reason (cf. Feyerabend, 1987:319), they em-
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brace the postmodern critique of the classical and modern claims for universality, 
whilst at the same time using postmodernism against itself to develop a more 
productive alternative to the relativity which it proffers (Schrag, 1994:75; van 
Huyssteen, 2006:12). It is through this dynamic of negotiated passage that the 
basic idea of transversality which illuminates van Huyssteen’s approach is engen-
dered and developed.  
Schrag couches the issue as a conflict between the vertical ‘logos tradition’ and a 
horizontal ‘anti-logos of becoming’ (Schrag, 1992:166). The former, grounding 
rationality in a substantive metaphysics, appeals to ahistorical essences and crite-
ria; whereas the latter dismisses all such foundations and universals in favour of a 
‘cavalcade of signifiers’ (Dallmayr, 1996:230), thereby leading to a complete rela-
tivisation of all forms of thought and culture  (van Huyssteen, 1999:138-9). 
Schrag’s reclamation project thus takes the form of a ‘split the difference’ ap-
proach between these two extremes (Schrag, 1992:166): the resulting ‘transversal 
logos’ offers an alternative to the hegemony of the vertical form but one which 
avoids simply plunging into the relativism of the anti-logos. His thesis here is that 
rationality operates not simply as a cerebral faculty, but also as a practical skill 
ranging over and across the array of actions and experiences which form our lives. 
As such it engages these and knits them together through three intercalated 
phases of ‘communicative praxis’: praxial critique, interactive articulation, and 
incursive disclosure (Schrag, 1992:63). Engaging these ‘coefficient dynamics of 
transversal rationality’ (Schrag, 1992:9) allows the formation of transhistorical 
judgements and assessments which avoid both the discredited universalism of 
modernity and the disruptive heterogeneity of postmodernism (Schrag, 1994:75).  
This idea of the transversal operation of rationality also becomes a key feature of 
van Huyssteen's dialogical model (see 3.3.2). 
The first phase of the process – praxial critique – is essentially a pragmatic dialec-
tics of participation and distanciation. The first of these provides a set of pre-
theoretical, pre-cognitive, pragmatic understandings – an ‘entwined ‘knowing 
how and knowing what’ of discourse and action – arising from ‘the ongoing life of 
our intercommunal situatedness in the world’(Schrag, 1992:64). The second in-
volves a stepping back in order to ‘discern what it is that has been going on be-
hind our backs’ (see Ricoeur, 1981:131-44 for a fuller discussion of distanciation) 
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and furnishes the necessary and distinctively critical moment of rationality. Both 
elements are vital: participation without distanciation, in its blindness to re-
sources for critical evaluation, ‘congeals into traditionalism and conservatism’; 
while distanciation without participation, bereft of its ‘background conditions’, 
cannot offer discernment since this requires the prejudgements which flow from 
our situatedness in a particular linguistic community and world of social practice 
(Schrag, 1992:64-5). In essence then, the dialectic enables different options to be 
distinguished and assessed through the employment of practical judgements 
whose criteria are not antecedently defined (Schrag, 1992:61-4). Here Schrag 
views transversal rationality as an ability to identify areas of consensus and dis-
sensus between the different constellations of thought and action which make up 
our situated experiences. Furthermore it also enables discernment of where these 
are already organically connected, where establishing connection might enable 
modification or transformation to occur, and where incommensurability precludes 
the possibility of any useful interaction (Schrag, 1994:66-70). Van Huyssteen iden-
tifies this ability to distinguish and then assess the viability and potential produc-
tivity of these different connections as the first step in the operation of transver-
sal rationality in specific interdisciplinary conversations (van Huyssteen, 
1999:137). 
In the second key movement of communicative praxis, transversal rationality then 
finds its expression through interactive articulation of the choices made in praxial 
critique and of the best reasons supporting these (Schrag, 1994:70). Once again 
rationality moves from being understood as simply an abstract mental act and 
takes form instead through social practice: the understanding and articulation of 
how our beliefs and praxes ‘hang together, bind and separate, come to be and 
pass away’, and of the background features through which such practices are ex-
pressed and shaped (Schrag, 1994:71). Van Huyssteen further argues that this ar-
ticulation is also anticipative in the sense that it identifies and marks out new pos-
sibilities for both discourse and praxis. This provides a new benchmark against 
which past and present forms of these can be re-evaluated. Critically, it also pre-
serves praxial critique from being simply deconstructive, and thus takes it beyond 
the problems occasioned by extreme postmodernism (van Huyssteen, 1999:137-
8). Once again the necessity of articulating the reasons for our rational choices is 
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underlined as an important element of both postfoundational rationality and the 
kind of interdisciplinary dialogue which it can engender and sustain.  
Whereas articulation grapples with meaning, the final dynamic element of discur-
sive disclosure is seen as being ‘an act of reference’ (Schrag, 1992:141). Here the 
incursion of life-world experience gives rationality a momentum which allows it to 
move outside the self-referential confines of narrative. Schrag’s aim is to prevent 
the operations of transversal rationality becoming re-enmeshed in a hermeneuti-
cal subjectivism and self-enclosed textualism. Thus the incursive revelations of 
otherness into the dynamic of rationality serve as a reminder and reaffirmation of 
its connection with the concrete life-world giving rise to the experience and praxis 
on which it is operating. Disclosure therefore reminds us of the fact that we relate 
to our world(s) only through interpreted experience (van Huyssteen, 1999:138). 
For van Huyssteen this recognition and the associated dynamic of experiential 
accountability become critical features of his articulation of postfoundational ra-
tionality (see 2.2.3). 
Essentially then, what Schrag’s approach offers is an account of rationality which 
is configured neither in terms of a vertical appeal to ahistorical foundations, nor 
of a horizontal one to localised contextuality. Instead it involves a transversal ap-
peal to specifically embedded and yet interconnected experience and custom. 
However this is not merely a play of consciousness over a range of experiences, 
but instead represents an active extension over, and linking together of, various 
forms of discourse, modes of thought and action. As such this transversal rational-
ity ‘resides in the domain of our social, communal and institutional practices’ (van 
Huyssteen, 1999:136). For van Huyssteen this idea of a refigured rationality lo-
cated in activity rather than abstract reason represents a retrieval of the rich re-
sources of rationality which foundationalism threatens to stifle and postmoder-
nity to dissipate. He sees such resources as offering fruitful possibilities to both 
scientific and theological thinking. Moreover in facilitating the transcendence of 
specific context whilst still in a very real sense remaining rooted in it, this trans-
versal understanding of rationality offers the possibility of a completely different 
approach to interdisciplinary dialogue. However before this can be realised, van 
Huyssteen believes that the related and crucial question of what a postfounda-
tionalist notion of rational accountability would look like must also be addressed 
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(van Huyssteen, 1999:140). In pursuit of this he undertakes a further development 
of two elements which become the cornerstones of his articulation of a postfoun-
dational rationality: the exercise of responsible epistemic judgement, and the role 
of experiential accountability. 
2.2.2 Rationality as responsible judgement 
For van Huyssteen, developing a postfoundationalist perspective involves not just 
a refiguring of rationality but also a reconception of the epistemic quest itself. 
Since this can no longer be conceived within a framework of modernist notions of 
linear progress, absolute truth, and standardised knowledge, he redefines it in-
stead in terms of making progress towards optimal understanding in any given 
situation. Consequently the epistemic skills of rational judgement and theory 
choice are seen as forming part of a fallibilist process of progressive problem solv-
ing (van Huyssteen, 1999:12). The importance of this pursuit of clarity and under-
standing is indicated by the high value language of ‘epistemic responsibility’ which 
van Huyssteen attaches to it, and his designation of it as ‘possibly the most impor-
tant epistemic goal that shapes the way we interact with others, ourselves and 
our worlds on a daily basis’ (van Huyssteen, 2006:11). 
This restatement of the epistemic quest brings two key questions in its wake 
which must also be addressed if the associated notion of responsibility is to be 
actualised: what constitutes ‘optimal understanding’, and by what mechanisms do 
we make progress towards it? The quest for intelligibility is a crucial factor for van 
Huyssteen here. However as his reconfiguring of rationality makes plain, this can 
no longer be inextricably tied to modernistic notions of foundationalism or to a 
hope for the establishment of indubitable certainties (van Huyssteen, 1999:114-
5). Once again therefore he sets about establishing a postfoundational basis for 
the concept, envisaging it instead in terms of making assessments of, and judge-
ments about, the relative problem solving potential of different models and theo-
ries.  In this development a major conversational partner is philosopher of science 
Larry Laudan (1977; 1990; 1996), whose understanding of rationality has many 
points of overlap with van Huyssteen’s own. Laudan’s thinking on the nature of 
scientific progress, in particular his decoupling of the classical linkage between 
progress, rationality, and truth, together with his dissociation of progress and cu-
mulativeness, are important to van Huyssteen’s development of the connections 
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between postfoundational rationality and the exercise of responsible epistemic 
judgement 
In defending science and its progress from what he sees as both the errors of 
positivism (1996:3-5) and the pernicious and intellectually bankrupt readings of 
post positivism (Laudan, 1990:x), Laudan offers a fresh reading of the threads 
which bind truth, rationality, and progress, and which link these attributes with 
scientific theories. Rather than seeing rationality as leading progress by its power 
to discern the increasing truthfulness of theories, he argues that rationality con-
sists in making more progressive theory choices (Laudan, 1977:6). Moreover he 
dismisses the assertion that what science accesses can be claimed as either ‘truth’ 
or increasing verisimilitude to it (cf. Popper, 1969:228-34), arguing that we have 
no way of knowing whether or when this is in fact the case (Laudan, 1977:125), a 
sceptical stance which meshes comfortably with van Huyssteen's rejection of 
foundationalist frameworks. The most appropriate measures of the progressive-
ness of theories are thus related not to their nearness to truth but to their prob-
lem solving ability. In other words the primary aim is to produce better rather 
than closer estimates of truth (Rescher, 1992:53). Consequently the role of epis-
temically responsible judgement is no longer a matter of assessing different theo-
ries for their degree of correlation with truth, but instead for their relative effec-
tiveness in problem solving, and then judging which is the more successful in this 
latter respect.  
This inevitably raises questions as to the relationship between progress and prob-
lem solving capacity. Once again however, Laudan produces a decoupling which 
helps van Huyssteen’s formulation. Here the received wisdom he challenges is the 
almost universal assumption that scientific progress is linked to cumulativeness. 
Laudan argues that this is not only incorrect but also belied by the history of sci-
ence itself (Laudan, 1977:148-9). Thus it is not the case that progressive theories 
are those which simply expand the domain of solved problems. Instead progress is 
measured by the balance between the problems solved and those created, and 
the relative importance of these. Here Laudan also distinguishes empirical prob-
lems – questions created by the object of enquiry itself (Laudan, 1996:15) – and 
conceptual problems concerning the structures which have been derived to an-
swer these first order empirical questions (Laudan, 1977:45-70). Since solutions to 
one type do not necessarily imply resolution of the other, indeed sometimes the 
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opposite, the key issue becomes whether those problems which have been re-
vived by a theory outweigh those which it solves. This means that sometimes, 
progress can actually be secured by moving from an empirically well-supported 
theory to a less well-supported one, if the latter resolves significant conceptual 
difficulties confronting the former (Laudan, 1996:77, 87). Being able to asses this, 
and to specify circumstances in which a theory can be judged to be progressive 
even at the expense of a loss of some problem solving capacity, thus also be-
comes an important element in the exercise of epistemically responsible judge-
ment. Similarly, since theories are never isolated entities but always situated 
within larger networks of research traditions, epistemic judgement also encom-
passes evaluation of the wider tradition in which any theory is itself located. Once 
again determinations of relative truth or falsity are irrelevant; instead what counts 
in the evaluation of progress is the problem solving balance these competing ap-
proaches provide (Laudan, 1977:119-20). It should however be noted here that 
Laudan does not provide any detailed development as to how any determination 
of which of two competing traditions has solved the most problems should pro-
ceed – something for which he has been criticised (Matheson, 2009). 
What Laudan presents then is a fallibilist account of scientific progress in which 
growth in problem solving effectiveness, rather than presumed increasing verisi-
militude, generates the dynamic of forward movement.  Moreover, instead of be-
ing a necessary antecedent to progress, rationality becomes the mechanism by 
which such progress is made. It is thus freed from being understood as an abstract 
cognitive skill employed in the assessment of the relative truth of competing 
theories. Instead it is recast as a tool-set used to assess and evaluate their respec-
tive problem solving potential. This articulation of rationality as first and foremost 
a practical skill which science shares with other domains of enquiry (Laudan, 
1977:13, 171) offers firm support to van Huyssteen's model of postfoundational 
rationality and its cross-disciplinary applicability. Similarly Laudan’s account of 
scientific progress allows van Huyssteen to reclaim the epistemic quest from both 
the constraints of a foundationalism which is seen as no longer tenable, and the 
isolating disjunctions of relativism which threaten to consign it to being nothing 
more than a local, contextualised conceit. He is able instead to reformulate it in 
terms of the pursuit, via increasing clarity and intelligibility, of the optimal under-
standing of an issue (van Huyssteen, 2006:11). In this quest, post-foundational 
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rationality provides the necessary judgemental tools not just for problem-solving, 
but also for the evaluative discrimination necessary for making progressive 
choices. 
It is also clear that rationality thus conceived is inseparable from both our self 
awareness and from the various communities, disciplinary and otherwise, in 
which we are embedded.  This raises the inevitable question as to the role which 
our experiences play in the outworkings of rationality and brings us thus to the 
final element of the triad under consideration: the connection between rationality 
and experiential accountability, and the role which evidence plays in this. 
2.2.3 Rationality and experiential accountability 
The explorations of postfoundational rationality already undertaken have under-
lined the degree to which rationality is actually a deeply social practice ‘always 
embedded in the narratives of our daily lives’ (van Huyssteen, 1999:181). More-
over the indications that this is not just confined to our personal narratives but 
also spirals out to involve the larger networks – social, religious and disciplinary – 
in which we are embedded, highlights the extent of overlap which already exists 
between scientific and theological investigation and knowing. 
The central dynamic in this re-envisioned account of rationality is one of articula-
tion and critique: although part of the praxis involves the giving of interpretation-
laden accounts, it also contains within itself the resources and tools for evaluating 
these. For van Huyssteen this conjunction is not only key, but also another exam-
ple of successfully negotiating a way between the respective errors of modernity 
and postmodernity: in the case of the former its glossing over of narrative, and in 
the latter its blindness, through an over-enchantment with narrative, to the ‘ines-
capable moment of evaluative criticism’ (van Huyssteen, 1999:182). In contrast, 
the postfoundational rationality which van Huyssteen proposes allows a construc-
tive appropriation of the return to locality and context demanded by postmodern 
understandings, and supports a process of critical judgement sitting over and 
above these. However a necessary element of the successful functioning of this 
dynamic is recognition of the connection between experience and the shaping of 
rationality itself – in effect a return to the content of Schrag’s third movement of 
‘incursive disclosure’ (p48).  
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Our specific embeddedness within a particular culture and time, our self aware-
ness and self conceptions are thus not only intrinsic to rationality but are also in-
dispensible starting points for any account of the values that shape human ration-
ality. Moreover since the person-sensitive nature of rationality inevitably leads 
towards the attuning of our beliefs, decisions, and actions to the overall pattern of 
our experiences, we will always tend to find these rationally compelling (van 
Huyssteen, 1999:271). Hence just as scientific theories are never isolated entities, 
so theological and scientific reflection are also set within a wider community con-
text, and the reflections of these communities give rise to the concepts, models, 
structures and language which also shape the experiential aspects of rationality. 
Scientific data are thus inescapably theory laden. Consequently choices about ex-
periments, observations, and interpretation are theoretically selected, and func-
tion within the network of presupposed theories that constitute a specific re-
search strategy (Smolin, 2008, gives an illuminating account of this in the context 
of theoretical physics). To make such claims is not in any way to accede to the 
postmodern deconstruction of science, but it does give a way of legitimately un-
derstanding both how scientific belief has an inescapable personal dimension of 
commitment (cf. Polanyi, 1962:312; Ricoeur, 1967:351), and how all scientific 
knowledge can be seen as beginning in a local context.  Similarly religious experi-
ence is always interpretation laden – shaped by the particular beliefs and com-
mitments of the community in which it arises: beliefs and practices are interpreta-
tions of our experiences which in turn become objects of interpretation and as-
sume explanatory roles (van Huyssteen, 1999:192). Hence in both science and 
theology, beliefs are both brought to and derived from experience, and inter-
preted experience thus becomes the matrix from which meaning and knowledge 
arise (van Huyssteen, 1999:191). A postfoundationalist model of rationality re-
quires that we find a balance between the way our beliefs are anchored in inter-
preted experience and the broader networks of belief which are themselves the 
matrix in which these interpretations are shaped (van Huyssteen, 1999:14). This is 
equally true for both science and theology, but for the latter the intensity of Po-
lanyi’s inescapable ‘coefficient of knowledge’ is significantly heightened and thus 
the need to stand in critical relation to experience is similarly sharpened (Bennett, 
2012:180-1,187-8). 
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Ultimately then what we know of the realities on which science and theology fo-
cus, irrespective of the extent to which these may be ‘mind independent’, repre-
sents information which is always and only attained through an interpretation of 
our experiences.  For theology a vital consequence of this is that the content of 
belief can never be directly given in the experience itself; similarly religious cogni-
tion cannot be understood as directly experiential (van Huyssteen, 1999:188). 
Hence fideistic strategies which claim either the existence of a logic internal to 
theology or self-authenticating notions of divine revelation as a basis for discipli-
nary integrity are simply inadmissible to any neurotheological dialogue aimed at 
noegenesis. For both theology and science it is only once we recognise and ac-
knowledge these roles which interpreted experience plays in shaping our access 
to reality, that we can then engage the epistemic skill of responsible judgement. 
Only then will we move to the rational accountability and thus to the fallibilism 
which a post foundationalist approach to the epistemic quest entails. Moreover 
such a move, in entailing a critical evaluation of personal beliefs offers the possi-
bility of allowing us to transform these into ‘genuine’ knowledge (van Huyssteen, 
1999:182-3), something I will return to in section 4. 
This understanding that theology and science both relate to the world epistemi-
cally only through the medium of interpreted experience also has important dia-
logical implications.  Firstly since both offer cognitive claims about the same world 
in the form of complementary interpretations of experience, the praxial critique 
element of postfoundational rationality itself demands that we seek some way of 
connecting these up. This serves as an imperative to find constructive ways of dia-
logue which can enable us to do this, of which I believe van Huyssteen's transver-
sal approach is one. However this overlap also raises an important issue for theol-
ogy as it approaches such dialogue, one which is exemplified by McMullin’s asser-
tion that:  
The Christian cannot separate his science from his theology as 
though they were incapable of interrelation […].He may, in-
deed must strive to make his theology and his cosmology con-
sonant in the contribution they make to this world view 
(McMullin, 1981:52) 
and which has fuelled the apologetic emphasis in science/religion dialogue dis-
cussed in Chapter 1.  As already noted, both science and theology are embedded 
in assorted wider communities and traditions which also shape the actions of ra-
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tionality and the type of experience which is found to be rationally compelling. 
Van Huyssteen argues strongly that for theology such beliefs cannot be declared 
off limits but must be critically examined in interdisciplinary conversation (van 
Huyssteen, 2006:114). What is obvious here is that the shared experiential ac-
countability and rational resources revealed by a postfoundationalist approach 
mean that the rationality of theology cannot be seen as opposed to that of sci-
ence. Thus any uncritical retreat to fideistic commitments seriously challenges the 
epistemic status of theological reflection as a credible partner in interdisciplinary 
dialogue (van Huyssteen, 1999:195). Whilst one may bring personal convictions 
deemed to be rationally compelling to cross-contextual discussions, at the same 
time postfoundational rationality also means that one is rationally compelled to 
open these convictions to critical evaluation as a part of such dialogue (van 
Huyssteen, 1999:202). This brings us up against the dialogical dilemmas caused by 
the issues of ‘many voices’ and ‘non-negotiable commitments’ touched on in the 
previous chapter, and raises the possibility that van Huyssteen’s approach might 
provide a way of confronting these. It also brings to the fore the crucial matter of 
the nature and role of evidence, and it is to this that attention now turns. 
Van Huyssteen's postfoundational account of the links between experience and 
evidence must therefore once again attempt to negotiate a path between ex-
tremes. This time the poles are the foundationalist notions which he rejects as no 
longer credible, and the potential for endlessly circling self-referentiality which 
postmodernism seems to entail. In order to do this, he draws on the work of 
Susan Haack whose pragmatist reconstruction of epistemology (Haack, 2009) pur-
sues just such a ‘split the difference’ course. Like van Huyssteen, Haack’s episte-
mology is an evolutionary one (Haack, 2009:281), and her basic stance is taken 
against the Popperian ideal of ‘epistemology without a knowing subject’ (Popper, 
1979:106-152). Instead she argues that since claims and theories are always 
‘somebody’s, or somebodies’, any theory of warrant must begin with the personal 
and then move to the social, before it can get to grips with the impersonal sense 
in which we speak of a well-warranted theory or an ill-founded conjecture (Haack, 
2007:60ff). Her argument is essentially that all knowledge is anchored in experi-
ence but is then justified by claims to coherence and she thus proposes a ‘third 
way’ forward which she terms ‘foundherentism’.  The goal of her restructured 
epistemology is to explicate an epistemic justification which both allows for the 
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relevance of experience to empirical justification, and for pervasive mutual sup-
port among beliefs (Haack, 2009:117). The first of these aims requires an articula-
tion of the interplay of causal and evaluative aspects, and the latter an account of 
the difference between ‘legitimate mutual support and objectionable circular-
ity’(Haack, 2009:118). Since van Huyssteen has already provided the former, he 
looks to Haack principally with respect to how she tackles the latter. 
In so doing, Haack works through a carefully and closely argued sequence involv-
ing the differentiation between the state and the content of belief, evidential and 
non-evidential components within the causal nexus of these, the strength of justi-
fication, and the role of the passage of time. From this she builds her case that the 
justification of our beliefs is never unidirectional but always involves relations of 
mutual support between them. However this relationship does not merely de-
scribe a perpetual circular trajectory but is genuinely interlocking (Haack, 
2009:117-139). Here the argument is developed through the use of a helpful 
crossword puzzle analogy (Haack, 2009:126ff): in essence crossword clues become 
analogues of the subject’s experiential evidence, and already completed entries 
analogues of their reasons. The reasonableness of any crossword entry depends 
on a number of things:  how well it fits with both the clue and any other already 
completed intersecting entries; how reasonable those other entries are, inde-
pendent of the entry in question; and how much of the overall crossword is com-
pleted. Similarly, how justified someone is in believing that p depends on how 
supportive their evidence is, how secure any reasons are independent of the be-
lief itself, and how much of the relevant evidence their own particular moiety in-
cludes. Hence the good reasons for the beliefs we hold are always justified by a 
mixture of experience and other beliefs. In other words the explicandum is always 
couched in terms of ‘A is more/less justified in believing that p depending on …’ 
(Haack, 2009:58). 
There are clear and obvious connections here with the account of postfounda-
tional rationality which van Huyssteen is attempting to develop. Not only does the 
fallibilism of Haack’s approach accord very closely, but also the way in which rea-
son is employed to connect up, bind together and evaluate different elements of 
experience is strongly suggestive of the mechanisms of rationality which van 
Huyssteen has articulated. Moreover foundherentism offers support to key ele-
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ments of his thesis, for example the argument that epistemically responsible 
judgement will always imply a choice between good, better and best reasons for 
retaining certain beliefs (van Huyssteen, 1999:224). Similarly Haack’s notion of 
what counts as empirical experience, including as it does a wide spectrum of sen-
sory introspective and memory experiences – all of which she argues are neces-
sary for justified epistemic belief (Haack, 2009:16, 274) – is very much in keeping 
with his thesis. However it should be noted that here Haack is herself somewhat 
inconsistent in her application since, in keeping with her own rational pre-
commitments, she admits to construing ‘empirical’ in such a way as to exclude 
religious experience (Haack, 2009:275). Van Huyssteen too has been critical of 
aspects of Haack’s work, questioning whether in her application she is still in fact 
covertly privileging a species of scientific foundationalism (van Huyssteen, 
1999:229). Nevertheless he sees her foundherentist approach to evidence and 
belief as essentially supporting his model of the operations of postfoundational 
rationality. Moreover it offers a useful account of the way these combine experi-
ential accountability and responsible judgement to produce justified beliefs which 
are neither foundationalist nor depend on an illegitimate circularity of argument. 
In summary then, van Huyssteen, through his engagement with Schrag, Laudan, 
and Haack, offers a rich, flexible, and well-supported revisioning of rationality 
which responds to the postmodern challenge without becoming dissolved and 
dissipated in it. This understanding sees rationality as a complex set of tools used 
for evaluation and expression which are shared across all domains of human in-
vestigative cognition. It recognises and acknowledges the vital role of experiential 
understanding, and allows us to remain connected in important ways with the 
formative traditions in which this is set. But at the same time, it also contains the 
absolute imperative to step outside of and stand in critical relation to them.  Fur-
thermore, it furnishes us with the skills and tools with which to do this, thus ena-
bling us to us to reach out beyond our own immediate contexts in plausible forms 
of intersubjective, cross contextual and cross disciplinary conversation (van 
Huyssteen, 2006:10).  Indeed in constructing his account through diverse and 
many levelled conversations with a range of other disciplinary voices, van 
Huyssteen himself does just this, and thus he also presents a vivid example of the 
skills of postfoundational rationality in action. 
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However his approach has not been without its critics, with both Osmer 
(2006:344-5) and Petersen (2008:468-9) questioning his dependence on evolu-
tionary epistemology. In the case of the former because of a perceived tension 
between this and certain aspects of Christian eschatology, mission, and witness; in 
that of the latter because he deems such a dependence to be itself ‘transparently 
foundational’ – a charge which van Huyssteen has vigorously rejected (van 
Huyssteen, 2008:513-4). Despite using the model for aspects of his own interdis-
ciplinary work (Osmer, 2005:308), Osmer has also expressed concerns that the 
language of problem solving which van Huyssteen deploys can be too easily as-
similated back into the instrumental reasoning which characterises science and 
technology. Moreover he questions whether a problem-solving emphasis is ap-
propriate for theology, given that religion deals in mysteries such as evil, suffering, 
and death which, in contrast to problems, do not necessarily admit of solutions 
(Osmer, 2006:345). However van Huyssteen’s search for optimal understanding 
does not necessarily entail an assumption that a ‘solution’ is the appropriate end-
point. Moreover, whilst religion may not seek solutions to such issues, it neverthe-
less concerns itself with trying to understand and explain certain dimensions of 
them. Seen in this light, the epistemic quest as articulated by van Huyssteen is an 
entirely apt description of these sorts of manoeuvres. 
Such criticisms not withstanding, van Huyssteen’s undertaking represents a sig-
nificant move forward in understanding the nature of rationality. Moreover, in 
effecting a critical shift in the centre of gravity with respect to epistemological 
parity, it provides a very different basis for engagement between science and the-
ology. This, in conjunction with the evaluative tools and critical imperatives which 
come in its train, opens up interesting new possibilities for constructing dialogue 
between the two disciplines. These not only offer a way of overcoming some of 
the tensions discussed in Chapter 1 but also raise prospects for addressing the 
issues of noegenesis which were touched on earlier and highlighted in Montuori’s 
questions at the chapter head. A consideration of the structure and mechanics of 
this ‘transversal’ style of dialogue, and of the possibilities of using these to further 
extend its reach, is the subject matter of the remainder of the chapter. 
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2.3 ‘Transversal’ interdisciplinary dialogue 
2.3.1 Encounter: the basis for transversal dialogue 
The critical moment here is that van Huyssteen’s reconfiguring of rationality 
moves the epistemological locus of interdisciplinary connection from the specific 
methodological to the shared rational: under the postfoundational rubric, com-
monality between the disciplines becomes located firstly in the problem solving 
activities which sit at the heart of all investigative traditions (Laudan, 1977:190); 
and secondly in their appropriation of the same tools of rationality for the prose-
cution of these, albeit within very different reasoning strategies. This move has a 
number of significant consequences from the dialogical perspective. 
Firstly epistemological and cognitive parity becomes inherent not in an appeal to 
some universal guaranteed epistemology, but instead in the possession and em-
ployment of the skills and tools common to human rationality.  Each discipline is 
therefore also answerable to the same epistemic standards – ones which are not 
domain specific but which are integral to the nature of rationality itself. Episte-
mology is thus no longer a strategic place of control between them, where a par-
ticular discipline acts as a ‘border policeman’ with a monopoly on verification and 
thus on knowledge (cf. Morin, 2008:28, 34). Instead the rational merits of ideas 
and positions, particularly as they are proffered as contributions to dialogue, are 
evaluated not with respect to a particular world view, or in terms of a perceived 
approximation to ‘truth or ‘reality’, but against the standards demanded by a 
postfoundational understanding of rationality. These involve progress towards 
optimum intelligibility; the execution of responsible epistemic judgement for 
which suitable accounts can be articulated; an acknowledgement of the role of 
experiential accountability; and a willingness to both adopt a critical stance to-
wards that which is rationally compelling and to open it up to critical evaluation 
outside of its disciplinary home. Such standards, along with the quality of epis-
temic humility which they entail, can arguably be regarded as providing a legiti-
mate, transdisciplinary court of appeal for evaluating the rationality of any stance 
within any particular research tradition. In subsequent chapters, both the scien-
tific and the theological contributions to each specific transversal dialogue will be 
evaluated in this way and their suitability as contributors assessed, along with any 
caveats raised in the light of these criteria which need to be born in mind. 
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Secondly moving the philosophical fulcrum for dialogue enables the epistemologi-
cal and ontological tensions identified in Chapter 1 to be negotiated in a more 
positive way. In linking disciplinary likeness to the centrality of problem solving, it 
enables both recognition of the distinctive differences in scientific and theological 
approaches, and an acknowledgement of their validity. This frees theology from 
some of those difficulties identified earlier as arising when it has to cast itself in a 
strong critical realist mode as a prerequisite to dialogue. While the issue of criti-
cality is not removed, the dynamics of postfoundational rationality present, as 
suggested above, a different framework within which specific theological posi-
tions and ideas can be evaluated from this respect, particularly in the context of 
being offered as contributions to dialogue. Furthermore, since this problem solv-
ing pursuit is no longer understood in terms of the uncovering of absolute truth, 
difficulties presented to both theology and to science by the pressures of claims 
either of having direct access to an independent reality, or of generating increas-
ing verisimilitudinous accounts of it, are also reduced. In liberating theology from 
the need to transform itself into natural science or perpetually defend itself 
against dismissal as non-science, van Huyssteen's move also has significant further 
benefits for theology itself: firstly it enables concentration to be focussed on the 
development of theology’s own unique perspectives; and secondly it provides a 
way, through cross-contextual and interdisciplinary engagement, of strengthening 
the rational redeemability of these, thus increasing their dialogical potential. Both 
of these can then feed not only into stronger dialogue, but also into paving the 
way for the recovery of a public voice for theology – something which van 
Huyssteen has long argued for (van Huyssteen, 2006:310). Once again it is also 
something on which I will be drawing in the course of producing the theological 
contributions to the thesis. 
Finally, this relocation of epistemological parity enables and facilitates a move 
away from any need to try and establish over-generalised blueprints for how to 
‘do’ science/theology dialogue. Instead of forcing all such efforts into a pre-cut 
die, it now becomes possible to focus instead on defining specific loci for engage-
ment in terms of the very specific science and very specific theology which might 
be usefully engaged: the nature of the model, as will become clear in the follow-
ing section, allows for the identification and development of precise dialogical 
intersections, thus increasing the chance of fruitful outcomes. From the specific 
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perspective of pursuing neurotheological dialogue, this economy of delimitation 
also offers a solution to the problem identified in Chapter 1 of potential territorial 
vastness. Simultaneously, the standards of accountability inherent to postfounda-
tional rationality provide a way of assessing the suitability of specific voices as po-
tential dialogical partners at such intersections. This opens up a way to approach 
the dilemma of ‘which voices?’ that was raised in Chapter 1, thus further enhanc-
ing the prospects for developing coherent and potentially fruitful engagements. 
The combination of re-envisaged parity and the resultant shift away from abstract 
dialogical models, by allowing the recognition of legitimate difference, also helps 
to minimise the pressures for reductive or assimilative manoeuvres. This in turn 
reduces the need for reflex adoption of defensive positions and instead frees dia-
logue to explore in a more unfettered way the dynamics of challenge. This re-
moval of assimilative pressure also enables a fuller actualisation, in the context of 
interdisciplinary dialogue, of the transversal imperative to stand in critical relation 
to that which we find rationally compelling. There is thus the possibility of moving, 
not just beyond apologetics into enriching or expanding specific disciplinary un-
derstandings, but also of pushing disciplinary limits themselves.  
In essence then, taking a postfoundational account of rationality as a starting 
point leads to a set of dialogical dynamics which are very different from those of 
more traditional models. This allows van Huyssteen to then develop and model a 
way of pursuing dialogue between science and religion which is very different in 
its aims, mechanics, and outcomes to those which have so far been the mainstay 
of the field(van Huyssteen, 2006). 
2.3.2 Exchange: the mechanics of transversal dialogue  
Van Huyssteen’s model is basically conceived and executed using the ideas and 
language of transversality which arise from his explorations of rationality.  This 
finds form in two important ways: firstly through employing a notion of transver-
sal reasoning by which dialogue is facilitated; and secondly in the delineation of 
what van Huyssteen terms ‘transversal spaces’ in which dialogue can be located. 
Transversal reasoning is essentially coterminous with the transversal performative 
dynamics at the heart of postfoundational rationality examined in section 2. In 
summary, these are the skills, which through the cognitive fluidity they enable, 
allow us to gather and bind together the patterns of our experience; to set these 
68 
 
within the wider contexts which enmesh us; to recognise the extent to which 
these shape our interpretations; and through discernment and articulation, to 
give account of that which we take to be rationally compelling. In interdisciplinary 
exchanges these same skills enable us to work, again under the direction of the 
associated dynamics of epistemic responsibility, in and across the intersections of 
very different disciplinary discourses as they come together in dialogue. Under the 
operations of transversal reasoning, questions of asymmetry and hierarchy be-
come, as I have argued above, non-issues since interdisciplinary dialogue is 
opened up in a way which identifies the various contributory voices, whether 
from science, theology or other disciplines, as different but equally legitimate 
ways of looking at the world. 
Transversal reasoning thus allows us to move from context to context, across dif-
ferent disciplines and research traditions in search of what van Huyssteen terms ‘a 
wide reflective equilibrium’ (van Huyssteen, 2006:31). This in no way implies that 
complete consensus is a necessary endpoint but is instead the fragile communal 
understanding which we might be capable of achieving in ‘the transversal mo-
ment’ (van Huyssteen, 2006:219). An essential element of this process of moving 
across boundaries is the actualisation of what I would term the ‘transcendence-in-
rootedness’ which transversal dynamics facilitate. Essentially this is the ability to 
retain a sense of being connected to our disciplinary commitments and beliefs 
and yet simultaneously to be able to consciously move beyond their constraints. 
In other words it is a recognition that that we are not cultural prisoners of these 
contexts but are able, using the tools of transversal reasoning, to cross boundaries 
and explore other perspectives. 
This dynamic of moving beyond is vital if we are to gain the maximum benefit 
from the interdisciplinary encounter. However this is not simply about allowing 
ourselves the possibility of being enriched by the insights, theories, or evidence 
that a different discipline finds to be rationally persuasive. It is also a recognition 
of the fact that, under the epistemic imperative of postfoundational rationality, 
we have an obligation to also stand in critical relation to our beliefs and the tradi-
tions and worldviews which give rise to them; and that one of the arenas in which 
critical reflection can shape disciplinary identity and endeavour is in the transver-
sal spaces of interdisciplinary encounter.  As I have argued above, the freedom 
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from competitive and assimilative pressures which van Huyssteen's model entails, 
not only provides the security to experience and explore the riches and the chal-
lenges of interdisciplinary dialogue, but also makes it dense with possibilities for 
fruitful outcomes. 
That freedom is also a function of the second feature of van Huyssteen's model: 
this is the creation of a unique and distinctive location in which the complex many 
levelled connections and exchanges facilitated by transversal reasoning occur. 
Although he does not provide much in the way of detailed development, this is an 
integral part of and a key element in the model’s rich potential. The essential and 
unique feature here is that this dialogical locus is situated not within the confines 
of any one contributing discipline, but in what van Huyssteen labels ‘transversal 
spaces’ sitting between them at their ‘porous boundaries’ (van Huyssteen, 2006:9, 
43). As such they do not belong to any of the participating disciplines and thus 
they are not constrained by any of their particular features vis-à-vis epistemologi-
cal strategies or particulars of proof. In this respect I believe that they can appro-
priately be conceived as liminal spaces – Turner’s ‘realms of pure possibility’ 
(Turner, 1967:97) – with all the openness of outcome possibilities that this im-
plies. 
Rather than being a disciplinary construct, transversal spaces can more usefully be 
thought of as being a shared rational space – in fact it is the very nature of a dia-
logue predicated on the tenets of postfoundational rationality which generates 
them. It is also what sustains them as places where the different disciplinary 
voices can operate with a freedom from the assorted constraints which character-
ise other models. Both their shape and structure, and the freedom they confer, 
are a direct consequence of the shift in the ground of connection already outlined, 
and the related translation of epistemic standards to those which inhere in ra-
tionality itself rather than in any particular methodological approach (p 3.2). The 
net result of this is that the voices contributing to dialogue need no longer be 
seen as in contradiction or competitive; neither need they be suspected of being 
predatory in a reductive or assimilatory way. This then allows a dynamic of inter-
action which can be both expansive and challenging for the participating voices. 
From a neurotheological perspective, such spaces would thus seem to provide an 
ideal way of accommodating Newberg’s insistence that neither the assumptions 
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of science nor those of theology are to be taken as normative. While this does not 
necessarily solve the problems earlier identified for the production of a distinctive 
neurotheological perspective, I believe the use of transversal spaces can be fur-
ther developed to address this aspect (see further at 2.4 below). 
In identifying potential locations where transversal spaces might be generated, 
the metaphor which van Huyssteen draws on is Schrag’s mathematically informed 
picture of a line intersecting a system of other lines or interfaces (Schrag, 1994:64; 
van Huyssteen, 2006:20). The idea here is one of convergent paths moving to-
wards an imagined vanishing point – the transversal space. The nature and abun-
dance of human experience is such that there is the likelihood of many such inter-
sections between different discourses. Locating these potential intersections can 
take a variety of forms – for example the identification of common interests or 
shared research foci; alternatively phrases in common currency in different disci-
plines may flag up potential overlaps and thus point towards the possibilities of 
generating transversal spaces (van Huyssteen, 2006:9). Once such possibilities 
have been identified then further specification may be deemed necessary. In fact 
van Huyssteen himself sees the ideal standard in extremely refined terms – involv-
ing specific theologians attempting to do very specific theologies, entering dia-
logue with similarly designated scientists, working within specified sciences on 
clearly defined, shared problems (van Huyssteen, 2006:5).  
Osmer (2006:343-4) has suggested that a weakness of the model is that there is 
no clear ‘principle of selection’ by which to justify why specific persons or per-
spectives are engaged in dialogue. He sees this as leaving it vulnerable to two 
charges: firstly, that those who participate in such dialogues need not engage with 
anything which challenges their viewpoint; and secondly that there is a selection 
principle but it is methodologically covert. However van Huyssteen makes it clear 
that prior agreement is not a sine qua non of attempting transversal space dia-
logue (van Huyssteen, 1999:274; 2000:430; 2006:9). On the contrary, he follows 
Rescher’s argument that we should not be looking to consensus as the ultimate 
epistemic touchstone since dissensus and diversity play key constructive roles in 
human interaction (Rescher, 1995:6-7; van Huyssteen, 1999:270).  There is also no 
suggestion that congenial dialogical partners should be privileged – something 
which is anyway, in complete antithesis to the criticality which is central to both 
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postfoundational rationality and to the model itself. With respect to the second 
possible problem, the selection principles inherent in the creative identification of 
possible transversal spaces and the need for epistemic accountability of dialogical 
contributions are arguably completely in keeping with the combination of open-
ness and accountability which comprise the model’s great strengths. Moreover 
the delineation of a rigid set of rules governing selections would seem to be not 
only against the nature of the model itself, but also likely to close down the possi-
bilities for more imaginative or oblique connections – with all the surprises which 
might potentially flow from these. 
Essentially then, safeguards against both an avoidance of risk and a privileging or 
protecting of material are built into the model through the dynamics of postfoun-
dational rationality itself: the themes of responsible judgement, lucid articulation 
of the justification for holding something to be rationally compelling, and the will-
ingness to adopt a critical stance towards this, have already been expounded as 
key elements of the metric.  Thus for material to be suitable for the kind of ex-
change envisaged in transversal spaces, it must first of all be shown to be ration-
ally defensible as this concept is understood within the rubric of postfoundational 
rationality.  The difficulties for dialogue presented by unquestioning fideism have 
already been noted and are heightened in the light of the dynamics of transversal 
space dialogue in which no belief can claim a privileged status with respect to in-
terrogation. In this respect it is also worth noting that though dialogue may begin 
with willingness to take a critical stance on one’s own contribution, its course may 
subsequently present challenges which precipitate a withdrawal into dismissive or 
protective stances. However any such manoeuvres disrupt the transversal space 
and thus effectively terminate the dialogue. Thus once again the basic nature of 
model simultaneously furnishes safeguards for it. 
A final point here concerns the bringing of material from very different explana-
tory and reasoning strategies into a dialogical space which is relatively unregu-
lated, at least from a disciplinary perspective: it is of vital importance to the integ-
rity of the transversal exchange and the success of dialogical outcomes that scru-
pulous attention is paid to the meaning of words and concepts as they are em-
ployed by the contributing disciplines (van Huyssteen, 2006:9). Taking words or 
concepts out of context to support the arguments of another discipline tends, un-
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surprisingly, to be seen in a poor light (e.g. Brothers, 2002b:862-3) and may, as 
already noted in Chapter 1, present a particular issue for theology with respect to 
science (Drees, 2010:58-9; Polkinghorne, 1999:151-8). It is also a very present po-
tential danger in the current project, dealing as it does with concepts (such as 
emergence) which are all too easily appropriated as ubiquitous explanatory para-
digms, and experimental data (for example on brain scans) which are often in 
danger of being over-interpreted. In light of this, close attention will be paid in 
each conversation to conceptual appropriation as well as to the limits of experi-
mental data. As such this obviously also represents part of the criticality towards 
contributions entailed in the model. 
Transversal spaces are thus dynamic places of interaction, based on the shared 
tools of rational enquiry and coming into transient existence as part of a cross-
disciplinary engagement on a specified topic. The freedom they entail allows for 
mutual influence and critique – the exchange of ideas and insights, models and 
reasoning strategies, in a non-assimilative and a multidirectional manner. 
Generally speaking, boundary transgression, particularly with respect to the 
borders between the natural sciences and humanities, is viewed as a subversive 
undertaking (Greenberg, 1990:1). Van Huyssteen’s model, by restructuring 
specific boundary intersections as liminal spaces under the governance of shared 
postfoundational rationality, turns it instead into a potent driver in the quest for 
optimal understanding of a given issue. As such then, his model more than fulfils 
the first of the methodological criteria which I earlier suggested were necessary 
for a neurotheological engagement viz. the facility to enable a free and fruitful 
exchange between the very different perspectives of neuroscience and theology. 
However a second requirement – that of being able to generate a distinctively 
neurotheological output – was also specified. It is therefore necessary, when 
assessing the model’s suitability for purpose, to also consider the sort of dialogical 
outcomes it might be capable of generating. 
2.3.3 Expression:  the outcome of transversal dialogue 
As his repeated reiterations make clear, van Huyssteen regards the outcomes of 
any multidisciplinary transversal engagement to be essentially interdisciplinary 
(van Huyssteen, 2006:35,39,40,159,273,307,323). That is to say, the output 
trajectory of the transversal space dialogue is always downwards back into the 
contributing disciplines to enlarge, clarify or challenge their respective 
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understandings of the area under exploration. Hence the scientist and theologian 
‘return to the boundaries of their disciplines to consider the interdisciplinary 
results of the multidisciplinary conversation’ (van Huyssteen, 2006:264).  Van 
Huyssteen sees this as taking two possible forms: the enrichment of existing 
understandings, and expansion into new territory. Thus he talks in terms of other 
disciplines providing ‘clues, challenges, criteria, or other forms of persuasive 
evidence that will help us push the limits of our own disciplines’ (van Huyssteen, 
2006:309, emphasis mine); he also raises the possibility of making ‘new and 
exciting discoveries’ at the boundaries between disciplines (van Huyssteen, 
2006:9) – though such discoveries are still essentially disciplinary in nature. These 
are clearly valuable outcomes and ones which, when taken in conjunction with 
the other key features of the model as I have discussed them here, promise a rich 
potential harvest for theological thinking. 
However apropos of the particular issues for science/theology dialogue which 
have been discussed both here and in Chapter 1, this approach to outcomes 
means that arguably the model, for all its strengths, may ultimately still fail to 
negotiate the disciplinary imbalance previously noted. Thus the theologian is seen 
as using a transversal dialogue ‘to enrich current research in theology’ whilst at 
the same time maintaining conversation with scientists ‘interested in the broader 
religious or specific theological perspectives that theology might bring to the 
table’ (van Huyssteen, 2006:270). However it is much less clear how the same 
dialogue feeds into enriching scientific research or thinking and hence the 
question as to what precisely theology contributes to such dialogue still lingers. 
This sense is heightened by the terms in which van Huyssteen summarises the 
results of his own multidisciplinary exploration of human uniqueness: here he 
describes ‘the most important interdisciplinary result’ as being the powerful 
revisioning of the theological notion of the imago Dei which has resulted from the 
scientific contributions. Arguably this is not surprising since van Huyssteen is 
writing as a theologian; however, and despite the richness of the preceding 
explorations, there is still an inescapable asymmetry in the terminology with 
which he subsequently describes the different outcomes for science and theology 
consequent upon the transversal dialogue he has undertaken (van Huyssteen, 
2006:322-3). 
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This raises questions as to whether the model is capable of facilitating the 
production of the distinctively different discourse which Newberg claims as being 
the hallmark of neurotheology. As I suggested in Chapter 1, for such a concept to 
have any traction, then alongside disciplinary enrichment, any dialogue between 
theology and neuroscience also needs to develop an output which is separate 
from, and distinctively different to, an expanded scientific or theological account 
of a phenomenon. Newberg is somewhat opaque as to the form this might take; 
furthermore, despite the vision presented in his Principia, the case remains to be 
made as to precisely how the discipline can facilitate both a non-reductive 
exchange and an integration of perspectives to form a new and distinctively 
neurotheological viewpoint on any issue under investigation. As the arguments of 
previous sections have demonstrated, employing van Huyssteen's 
postfoundational methodology provides a way of doing the first of these; I believe 
that with a further development, it can also become a means to achieving the 
latter. In order to undertake the planned neurotheological exploration of 
relationality and health, I therefore propose to employ an extension which I 
believe to be a natural consequence of the epistemic imperatives which drive the 
basic model. As such it is in harmony with both the intrinsic nature of this model 
and the postfoundational rationality which undergirds it. It is also totally in 
keeping with the liminal nature of transversal spaces that they can give rise to 
novel configurations of ideas and relations of the kind I am envisaging here. In the 
following section l will discuss how these features all combine to support the 
generation of what I will designate as ‘transversal outputs’. These take the form of 
rationally and epistemologically defensible composite arguments and models 
which combine the insights and data of both disciplines without either reduction 
or improper blending. Thus I believe they can legitimately be designated as being 
distinctively neurotheological in nature. 
2.4 Developing the transversal dimension 
As already noted, van Huyssteen makes it clear that the envisaged output trajec-
tory from the transversal space is downwards, back into the contributing disci-
plines. What I want to consider here is whether, under appropriate circumstances, 
the model can also support the possibility of an additional output trajectory – one 
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which involves not a move back into the contributory disciplines, but instead a 
move beyond them. 
2.4.1 Generating transversal outputs 
In light of the dynamics of both postfoundational rationality and transversal dia-
logue as they have been explicated in this chapter, a good case can be made that 
in some instances such additional outcomes could indeed be generated alongside 
any specific interdisciplinary ones. The trajectory envisaged for these would not 
be back into the participating disciplines but instead would lie between and be-
yond them in a way not dissimilar to the spaces themselves. As such they would 
therefore, like the dialogue which engenders them, exist and be supported in the 
shared rational space between the disciplines. Hence they too would neither be-
long to, nor be fully constrained by them. Clearly any such arguments and models 
would be neither strictly ‘scientific’ nor ‘theological’ in their formulation and ex-
pression. Instead, drawing on and knitting together disparate material brought 
into the transversal space by the contributing disciplines, they could appropriately 
be designated as ‘transversal’. Similarly, just as with the transversal dialogue, they 
would not be answerable to the domain-specific epistemic standards of the con-
tributing disciplines, but to those which inhere in postfoundational rationality it-
self as set out above. Essentially then, the argument here is that the model’s in-
herent characteristics validates the attempt, where appropriate, to use the differ-
ent disciplinary contributions to build composite arguments and models. Indeed 
to do so is actually a logical development of the model itself – standing in direct 
continuation with the dynamic operations of both transverse rationality and the 
transversal space interactions themselves. Thus it receives both sanction and sup-
port from the model’s two central elements. 
With respect to the first of these, as extensively discussed in sections 2.2.1 and 
2.3.2 above, a postfoundational understanding of rationality sees it as a set of 
practical skills whose hallmark is a certain cognitive fluidity. These enable us to 
identify, explore and bind together different elements and patterns in our as-
sorted experiences. In interdisciplinary exchanges these same skills enable us to 
work, under the direction of the associated dynamics of epistemic responsibility, 
in and across the intersections of very different disciplinary discourses as they 
come together in dialogue. This allows the identification of places of actual and 
potential connection and attention to the possibilities inherent in these for in-
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creasing understanding of the topic under consideration. However this self-same 
cognitive fluidity can also be employed at a more meta level to range over and 
above these different developments in the transversal space dialogue; likewise 
the same practical skills of transversal rationality can be used to evaluate, take up, 
and connect elements from different discourses which are held in the transversal 
space as part of the interdisciplinary dialogue. In effect then this is simply the 
same dynamics and skills being engaged in connection with a different constella-
tion of thought and action – that which belongs to the ‘situated experience’ of a 
specific transversal space dialogue. It thus represents a natural extension to van 
Huyssteen's ‘first movement of transversal rationality’ i.e. that of identifying and 
evaluating viable and productive connectional possibilities in specific interdiscipli-
nary conversations (van Huyssteen, 1999:137). It is also completely in keeping 
with the anticipative nature of rational articulation (p49) through which it identi-
fies and marks out new possibilities for both discourse and praxis. 
The development of transversal outcomes can also be seen as being driven by an-
other integral element of van Huyssteen's refiguring viz. the pursuit of the epis-
temic quest. In the postfoundational perspective, this is conceived in terms of op-
timal understanding, realigning progress in this regard with improved problem 
solving ability, rather than with correlation to ‘absolute truth’ (see p51). Such a 
reconfiguration furnishes both imperative and warrant to use the skills of rational-
ity to pursue different possibilities for achieving these goals.  Moreover it means 
that any resulting transversal argument or model can be evaluated by these same 
standards of optimised understanding and improved problem solving, rather than 
by specific epistemic standards such as those, for example, which attach to the 
scientific method. Thus the development of transversal outputs merely represents 
an extension of the cognitive skills of postfoundational rationality which already 
undergird and facilitate van Huyssteen's dialogical model. Moreover the model’s 
own internal regulation makes the development of transversal outputs of various 
kinds not only an obvious but also a reasonably secure course to pursue in this 
regard. 
The second key element offering validation and support for suggesting such an 
extension is the actual mechanics of the model itself, particularly as they act as 
critical filtering mechanisms: firstly the nature of the transversal space model is 
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such that any dialogical ground is already fairly specifically delimited. This pre-
selection of closely intersecting interests, even if dissensus is the predominant 
voice, increases the likelihood of discovering elements from different disciplines 
which might be connected to yield transversal outputs. Moreover, as I have ar-
gued above, the identification of just such possible areas of fruitful connection is a 
key skill of transversal rationality. This dynamic and its associated skills could also 
arguably be extended to facilitate pre-identification of those conversations in 
which the development of a transversal output might conceivably be either an 
appropriate course to actively pursue or a likely spontaneous outcome. In this in-
stance, one possible scenario might be where a question has been raised in one or 
more of the contributing disciplines which cannot be completely answered from 
within any of them. In fact it is just such a situation which I wish to explore in this 
thesis with respect to whether and how relational connection might affect health 
outcomes. As I will suggest in the following chapter, although evidence from a 
variety of different perspectives indicates a connection, the mechanisms cannot 
be directly elucidated from either the scientific or the theological perspectives. 
However the contention underpinning my second research hypothesis is that 
even in the absence of direct evidence, it may still be possible through multidisci-
plinary dialogue, to explore this link, and to develop a transversal argument for 
such a connection with an accompanying model for a possible mechanism. 
Another key feature of the model which also facilitates the development of trans-
versal outcomes is the epistemic standards which are applied both prior to and 
during the course of transversal conversations. As has already been discussed one 
of the criteria for engagement is that contributory positions need to demonstrate 
that material intended for this is suitably accountable to the standards of post-
foundational rationality and thus displays the features of responsible judgement 
and a fallibilist approach. Moreover whilst strong convictions may be brought into 
dialogue, it is an imperative that such convictions are not offered privileged pro-
tection but must be open to critical evaluation as a part of such dialogue. Thus at 
various levels of the dialogical process, there is a winnowing of data, theories, and 
models through the mechanisms associated with epistemic responsibility. This 
allows various elements which might be incorporated into a planned transversal 
output to be evaluated against the standards of rational and epistemic account-
ability inherent in the model; this in turn gives a confidence that for any proposed 
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output, a suitably robust account of its defensibility in these respects can be ar-
ticulated. 
The notion of defensibility leads to the issue of what warrants might be offered in 
support of both the general concept being developed here and for any specific 
transversal outcomes which might be generated from a transversal space dia-
logue.  Here once again the twin dynamics of postfoundational rationality and of 
the model itself hold the key through the nature of evidential support for beliefs 
and claims which these enable. 
2.4.2 Transversal warrants 
As discussed earlier (p56ff) van Huyssteen draws on Haack’s foundherentism as a 
way of developing a postfoundational account of the connections between ex-
perience and how we justify the beliefs arising from this. Haack uses the idea of 
the crossword puzzle to argue a case for the feasibility of developing legitimate 
mutual support between beliefs which avoids circularity (Haack, 2009:126ff). The 
same analogy can also be used both to support the development of transversal 
models and arguments generally, and as a way of assessing the relative coherence 
and strength of any specific one. Here it is important to state something about the 
nature of the transversal developments proposed: what is envisaged is not the 
uncritical transfer of theological convictions into science to function as ‘data’ 
within its systems; neither is it a reverse flow which places theological agendas 
under the direction of science. Indeed Van Huyssteen has rightly cautioned 
against both such manoeuvres within transversal space dialogues (van Huyssteen, 
2006:323-4). On the contrary, what is key here is that the different contributions 
are in no way envisaged as operating in a ‘god-of-the-gaps’ type manner. Hence 
this is not a case of theological perspectives plugging holes in the scientific data or 
vice versa. Instead different disciplinary perspectives interlock to provide the sort 
of ‘pervasive relations of mutual support’ for a thesis which Haack (2009:57) de-
scribes. In this way it is envisaged that arguments and models may be built in re-
sponse to particular questions, even in the absence of direct definitive evidence 
from within a particular discipline, on the basis of mutually supportive, albeit radi-
cally different types of evidence. 
It is here then that the applicability of Haack’s crossword analogy becomes clear. 
The plausibility of a crossword entry depends on various things: how well it fits 
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with both its clue and any intersecting entries, how plausible these latter are in-
dependent of the entry in question, and on how much of the overall crossword is 
completed. Similarly, the relative strength of a claim depends on how supportive 
the evidence actually is, how secure this evidence is independent of the claim in 
question, and how much of the relevant evidence it includes (Haack, 2007:24). In 
other words the key features required in building a convincing case are suppor-
tiveness, independent security, and comprehensiveness, where supportiveness is 
not categorical but a matter of degree (Haack, 2007:66). Translating this to the 
context of the proposed transversal arguments and models: different contribu-
tions to a specific transversal space dialogue (which thus potentially come from 
different disciplines) can be seen as standing for the different entries in the puzzle 
and as offering support for other possible entries to be added, even if the clues 
leading to these are not always completely clear. 
Assessment of the evidence supporting each of these individual entries comes 
from the operation of the tools and dynamics already described, at both discipli-
nary and transversal level. The degree of confidence with which each such entry 
can be made is likely to be variable and thus whereas some answers may be 
‘inked in’ with a fair degree of certainty, other elements of the model being built 
may remain rather more provisional ‘pencilled’ entries, subject to revision at a 
future date as more data are accrued or ideas develop further. This however is 
completely in keeping with the dynamics of epistemic responsibility entailed by 
postfoundational rationality and it addresses moreover the issue of obsolescence 
raised in connection with Ashbrook’s approach. Indeed Haack herself uses the 
picture of a giant crossword with many entries blank, some completed in indelible 
ink, others in regular ink, still others pencilled in and repeatedly rubbed out, to 
describe how the growth and integration of the body of scientific knowledge itself 
proceeds (Haack, 2007:93-4). Over and above this method of evaluating the 
strength of any proposed construction, transversal models can also be judged on 
the same criterion as those which Laudan proposes with respect to scientific pro-
gress generally: the degree of conceptual clarification enabled, and the balance 
achieved between resolving/generating empirical and conceptual problems. Such 
indicators of the coherence and usefulness of any particular argument or model 
thus generated are also completely consonant with the conceptualisation of epis-
temic accountability expounded here. 
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My argument is thus that the proposed development of van Huyssteen's model is 
not only a natural extension of its normal workings, but also one demanded by 
the imperatives of the epistemic quest which the model serves. Furthermore, the 
skills employed in the identification and construction of transversal outcomes are 
those which are already at work driving the dynamics of the model as it currently 
operates. Indeed one could argue that both postfoundational rationality and 
transversal space dialogue already straddle the border between inter- and trans-
disciplinarity, and that this development and the possible results which might en-
sue moves this approach to dialogue decisively into the growing territory occu-
pied by transdisciplinary approaches. As Montuori’s challenge indicates, such ap-
proaches to the understanding and integration of knowledge – the development 
of ‘complex thought’ (Morin, 2008:2-6) – are an urgently needed response to the 
growing complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of the current times. 
2.4.3 Transversal models as a form of transdisciplinary en-
terprise 
Although there are differences between different models of and approaches to, 
transdisciplinary endeavour, they are united in addressing the fragmentation of 
knowledge caused by disciplinary specialisation. The resulting insulation and isola-
tion this leads to not only allows key realities to be disintegrated and ‘slip through 
the cracks between disciplines’ (Morin, 2008:2-6), but also proves inadequate for 
understanding and responding to the increasing complexities of the world. Trans-
disciplinary approaches have a history stretching back at least as far as the work 
of Jantsch (1972) and Piaget (1973). More recently the work of writers such as 
Morin (1992:371-85; 2008) and Nicolescu (2002:110-3; 2005; 2008:1-22), the es-
tablishment of an International Centre for Transdisciplinary Research (CIRET) and 
a Charter of Transdisciplinarity (de Freitas et al., 1994) have all fuelled a gathering 
interest in approaches which cut across orthodox disciplinary boundaries to work 
against the segregations and disjunctions imposed by relentless disciplinary sub-
specialisation. Such approaches are now linked with comprehensive paradigms 
(e.g. Marxism), broad interdisciplinary fields (e.g. cultural studies) and synoptic 
disciplines (e.g. geography) as well as being a major imperative in a wide range of 
academic discussion forums, websites, and conferences (Thompson Klein, 
2004:515-6). In short transdisciplinarity is becoming a major mode of thought and 
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action (ibid:524) even though conceptual, institutional, and social barriers to its 
continued progress still remain(Lawrence and Després, 2004:398-9). 
Although van Huyssteen never appropriates the term himself, there are in fact 
many similarities between transdisciplinary approaches and the dynamics of post-
foundational rationality: for example transdisciplinary approaches involve con-
text-specific negotiation of knowledge (Thompson Klein, 2004:521), practical rea-
soning (Horlick-Jones and Sime, 2004:445), and communicative praxis (Després et 
al., 2004:476-7), all of which find ready echoes in van Huyssteen’s work. And 
whilst Després looks primarily to Habermas’ theory of communicative action to 
inform the associated ‘post rationalist approach to knowledge building’, there are 
strong similarities between this and the postfoundational rationality expounded in 
this chapter. Moreover van Huyssteen's dialogical model itself also sits very com-
fortably within the umbrella of transdisciplinarity. There are strong resonances for 
example with Després’ description of the search for ‘convergent interpretative 
schemes’ or of the ‘mediation space’ opened in transdisciplinary boundary cross-
ing and the specific activities, such as the definition of complex research objects 
and questions, which are located there (Després et al., 2004:475). The proposed 
extension also provides one possible way of addressing the difficulty of interfacing 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ disciplines: in epistemological terms, transdisciplinarity involves 
integration of different knowledges (Horlick-Jones and Sime, 2004:444). But 
whereas integration across the boundaries of ‘hard’ disciplines such as physics 
and chemistry is well established (ibid:445), there has been a tendency to sideline 
concepts and approaches that are incompatible with ‘hard’ knowledge (Thompson 
Klein, 2004:520). Van Huyssteen's model provides a methodology which is ideally 
suited to transdisciplinary engagement between very different disciplines and the 
extension I propose provides for the possibility of integrating these to form a 
transdisciplinary output. 
Seen in this light, neurotheology can then be understood not as a hybrid neo-
discipline but as transdisciplinary venture – something which has a number of im-
portant effects: it helps it to avoid the trap (and associated epistemological con-
straints) of becoming restricted to the neurobiological study of the cognitive 
markers of different aspects of religious life and thought, and allows it instead to 
become the neurotheological study of humanness. This then means that theology 
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can contribute more than simply the providing of better definitions of spirituality, 
or improved design for studies of brain activity in connection with religion to 
which Newberg’s approach seems to relegate it. As I suggested in Chapter 1, this 
would be to potentially waste much of what theology could bring to the enter-
prise. The neurosciences are generating vast amounts of experimental data – 
much of which challenges long held folk ideas about personal identity and the ex-
istence of the soul, free will and intentionality, morality and responsibility etc. 
Since theological thinking has always concerned itself with anthrōpos, such 
themes have long been reflected on within its different systems. Thus whilst 
clearly standing to gain insight from such neuroscientific data, theology also has 
much to contribute towards expanding understanding in such arenas. Van 
Huyssteen’s model allows for both bidirectional interdisciplinary enrichment, and 
the possibility of transdisciplinary expansion of knowledge in response to specific 
questions, beyond that which either discipline could reach alone. It is the latter 
route which this project will follow in its neurotheological exploration of relation-
ality and health. In the final section, I will thus give a brief outline of the purpose 
and planned development of the project, indicating how I intend to use van 
Huyssteen’s model to facilitate this. 
2.5 Constructing a transversal neurotheological inves-
tigation 
We live in an age which is increasingly information rich but knowledge poor. This 
is a multifaceted problem but the aspect of interest here is the combination of an 
explosive growth in data generation of different kinds, and the constraints im-
posed by the continuation of modernity’s influence on disciplinary structure and 
epistemological enclosure. The challenge is thus not necessarily in gathering in-
formation, but in making sense of that which we have. From this perspective, in-
terfacing disciplines such as neuroscience and theology, whilst it presents enor-
mous challenges, also has the potential for rich rewards. In this chapter, I have 
suggested that van Huyssteen has provided a very different way of both meeting 
the challenge and reaping the harvest. It is this route which I intend to follow in 
this thesis with a view not primarily of disciplinary enrichment, but to formulating 
a transversally derived understanding of the connection between relationality and 
health. 
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The intent here is to explore the connection between the quantity and quality of 
relational connections and health outcomes as these might be mediated by al-
terations in immune functioning. The research thesis under investigation is that 
how we express and experience relational connection has the capacity to directly 
moderate immune functioning. Epidemiological and immunological data are 
strongly suggestive of such a connection but neither can, of themselves, furnish 
sufficient warrant to claim a causal link; neither can they, alone or in combination, 
definitively establish its mechanism. What I will set out to do in this project will 
therefore be to build the argument transversally. To do this I will use experimen-
tal data from cognitive neuroscience and psychoneuroimmunology, in transversal 
conjunction with theological reflection on various aspects of relationality. The 
primary transversal intersection between the three disciplines is thus the notion 
of relationality, but within this three separate loci for interaction have been iden-
tified: relationality as basic, relationality as emergent, and relationality as realised. 
Each of these will take the form of a transversal space encounter in which tar-
geted contributions from the dialogical partners in different combinations will be 
brought together transversally. Material will be selected and justified according to 
the criteria laid out in this chapter and any appropriate caveats, such as the limita-
tions of experimental data, will be noted. Theological material presented will 
comprise insights on aspects of human relationality generated within Christianity 
but which are not ultimately dependant on a concomitant accession to particular 
faith propositions. Each conversation will generate, through the interlocking of 
information described above, a transversal outcome to be carried forward. These 
outcomes will then themselves be integrated in the same way to build a compos-
ite transversal argument that how we express and experience our capacity for 
relational connection can directly modify immune function and thus affect health 
outcomes. Finally I will use the transversally generated material to construct a 
theoretical model suggesting a possible physiological pathway by which such a 
connection could be mediated. 
Firstly though it is necessary to establish that an interest in the connection be-
tween relationality and health is a sufficiently strong point of intersection be-
tween the three disciplines to generate and support a transversal space within 
which to situate the proposed dialogues.  This will be the work of Chapter 3.  
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Connections and Causes  
Exploring the links between sociality and health  
 
Jesus reached out his hand and touched the man 
[…] Immediately he was cleansed of his leprosy.  
(Mt 8:3) 
 
Social relationships have a predictive, arguably 
causal, association with health. 
 (House et al., 1988:544) 
 
The link between personal relationships and im-
mune function is one of the most robust findings 
in PNI, spanning diverse populations and stress-
ors.  
(Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002a:21) 
 
3.1 Introduction and outline 
The intimation that a close connection exists between aspects of social status and 
health outcomes is a longstanding one; and the formal recognition of social varia-
tions in morbidity and mortality has existed since 1662, when John Graunt ana-
lysed deaths in London parish records and noted significant variations both be-
tween the sexes and between urban and rural dwellers (Graunt, 1662/1939). Early 
studies of the nature of such variations focussed primarily on poverty, poor hous-
ing, and work environments. However following publication of Durkheim’s semi-
nal work on suicide (Durkheim, 1897) social integration also came into focus as 
another potentially important factor in health outcomes, and it is now widely rec-
ognized that social relationships and affiliation have powerful effects on both 
physical and mental health (Berkman et al., 2000:843). Social epidemiology, the 
study of ‘the social distribution and social determinants of states of health’ 
(Berkman and Kawachi, 2000:6), has played a leading role in exploring this impact 
of social relationships on health.  Connections between social factors and disease 
have also been extensively studied, in a somewhat different way, by the emerging 
discipline of psychoneuroimmunology (Daruna, 2004:117-78). A presentation of 
the relevant data from both of these disciplines will form a central plank of the 
current chapter, alongside an account of biblical motifs connecting social integra-
85 
 
tion and health. The aim here, in keeping with the transversal methodology out-
lined in Chapter 2, is to establish from a variety of intersecting perspectives the 
existence of a connection which invites and would be illuminated by a neurothe-
ological exploration. 
In the opening chapter it was suggested that whilst the idea of ‘improv[ing] our 
understanding of the human condition particularly in the context of health and 
well being’ (Newberg, 2010:18) was a legitimate arena for neurotheological en-
deavour, the assorted difficulties inherent in reading epidemiological data linking 
religion/spirituality to health warranted the exploration of other approaches to 
investigation. The alternative proposed in this thesis is that, given the important 
role which relation plays in religious narratives generally, and the strong connec-
tions between social relationships and health which are implicit and explicit in 
both Old and New Testament texts, then undertaking a neurotheological explora-
tion of the connections between relationality and health would form a useful, 
complementary endeavour to set alongside that of investigating the links between 
spirituality and health (and indeed that there might be some strong areas of over-
lap between these two). The reviews in this chapter thus aim to establish that this 
a legitimate arena for a neurotheological investigation and synthesis using the 
transversal methodology developed in Chapter 2. This requires the demonstration 
of two things: firstly, that a firm enough ground exists to substantiate a claim of 
significant connection which warrants further exploration. Secondly, that there is 
a sufficiently strong intersection between theological and neuroscientific interests 
in the topic to generate and sustain the formation of a transversal space within 
which a dialogue between the discourses can be conducted. 
In order to provide a framework of understanding within which the proposed neu-
rotheological explorations can be set and against which any resulting model can 
be read, it is also necessary to address the issue of health itself. However the con-
cept is complex and chimeric and hence achieving a precise and satisfactory defi-
nition is somewhat akin to chasing a mirage. The chapter thus begins with a brief 
exploration of this issue, especially as it pertains to the investigation of social in-
fluences on health. A wide variety of models of health and illness have been pro-
posed but it is beyond the scope of the chapter to review all of these. The focus is 
therefore on the two which currently predominate in Western medicine viz. the 
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biomedical and the biopsychosocial, and on their very different Weltanschauun-
gen. A brief delineation of their key features is followed by a consideration of the 
related perspectives of conceiving health in terms of either mechanical break-
down or as a disruption of the life-world. One of the contentions of this thesis will 
be that, in the case of relationality and health, these two are in fact organically 
related, with distortions of relational connection leading directly to degradations 
in endocrine and immune function. 
The central sections of the chapter then deal with data presentation and the con-
sequent establishment of connections: section 3 gives an overview of key motifs 
and themes in Biblical texts dealing with social integration and health. The follow-
ing section examines the epidemiological evidence supporting a link and outlines 
possible pathways for the transmission of the observed effects. Out of these po-
tential candidates, that of a physiological pathway is then taken up in section 5 
with the presentation and assessment of various PNI data linking social interac-
tion with alterations in endocrine and immune function. Since such data are ex-
tensive, these reviews are indicative rather than exhaustive; moreover they do 
not offer detailed analyses of the individual studies. However, in keeping with the 
imperative for criticality enshrined in postfoundational rationality, they examine 
some universally relevant methodological and interpretive issues from a general 
perspective. As with the theological contribution, specific aspects of these studies 
will be taken up and further explored through the transversal dialogues of later 
chapters. The final section then considers issues arising from these epidemiologi-
cal and scientific contributions connected with the attribution of causality and the 
exploration of causal mechanisms. I suggest that constructing a transversal space 
dialogue between theology, immunology, and neuroscience might be a way of 
both addressing some of these issues, and of illuminating one possible causal 
chain connecting relationality and health. 
3.2 Health and illness 
3.2.1 Defining the terms 
Health and illness are part of the universal human experience – we are, as Sontag 
(1978:1) observed, almost invariably ‘passport holders of both domains’. Indeed it 
could be argued, following Nietzsche, that the latter condition is a defining fea-
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ture of humanness (Morris, 1998:1). Yet the concepts themselves are strangely 
resistant to precise and satisfactory definition. The tacit assumption that health is 
a state in which there is no experience of disease belies the reality that the terms 
‘health’ and ‘illness’ actually represent a nexus for a wide variety of understand-
ings and perspectives. Moreover, we often only know or think about health in 
terms of its disruption by illness: it is, on the whole, an unexamined state, taken 
for granted until threatened. Hence health is often defined in the negative and 
much of the discussion concerning it is actually conducted through consideration 
of the concepts of illness – a point perfectly illustrated by the term ‘ill-health’. 
Various other factors also contribute to making the possibility of a circumscribed 
and universal understanding something of a mirage. For example definition also 
depends on who is articulating it: patients and physicians may have very different 
understandings of what constitutes ‘good health’ (Goldsmith, 1972:213; Helman, 
2007:121; St Claire et al., 1996:511-6). Furthermore, for any one person, the con-
ception is likely to change with the alteration of external variables, with the pas-
sage of time, and with experience of illness (Blaxter, 2001:21-7; Radley, 1994). 
Finally the notion of health has been somewhat distorted by an increasing ten-
dency to medicalise normal aspects of life: birth (Johanson et al., 2002:892-5), 
adolescence (Timimi, 2004:1394-6), ageing (Ebrahim, 2002:861-3), sexuality (Hart 
and Wellings, 2002:896-900), and unhappiness (Double, 2002:900-4) are amongst 
a variety of ‘conditions’ for which people now demand  and expect treatment. 
The extent to which this latter phenomenon simply reflects the inexorable ad-
vance of an ‘information-rich’ consumerist culture is debated (Bonaccorso and 
Sturchio, 2002:910-11; Mintzes, 2002:908-9), and it has been argued that tech-
nologies such as the internet may actually reverse such trends (Moynihan and 
Smith, 2002:859-60). Others commentators, notably Illich (1995; 2001), lay the 
blame firmly at the door of biomedicine itself, accusing it of facilitating a combina-
tion of clinical, social and cultural iatrogenesis.  What is clear however is that not 
only are health identities an emergent and increasingly multiple phenomenon 
(Fox and Ward, 2006:477) but also that health care spending and perceptions of 
wellness are inversely related (Sen, 2002:859-60). Hauerwas (1993: 49) has fur-
ther argued that this relentless pursuit of absolute health has led to a loss of the 
ability to develop communities that can absorb suffering and sustain the sufferer. 
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Given that concepts of health and illness have no universally agreed and fixed ob-
jective meaning, it is unsurprising that many alternative models of health and ill-
ness co-exist, even if they are rarely explicitly discussed and defined (Wade and 
Halligan, 2004:1398). Contemporary Western medicine is still currently dominated 
by the biomedical model, centred on a mechanistic view of body functioning and 
shaped by the fear of biological death (Illich, 1995:74; Wilson, 1975:71-2). There is 
growing recognition however, particularly in light of the emergence of ‘new’ ill-
nesses such as chronic fatigue syndrome and PTSD, of the role played by psycho-
logical, social, and cultural factors (Morris 1998: 71-74) and thus the development 
of new nosologies that accommodate this. Of these, the biopsychosocial model 
first proposed by Engel (1977:129-36) has become the most prominent and the 
main challenger to the biomechanical perspective.  
3.2.2 The biomedical model 
In his magisterial account of the medical history of humanity, Roy Porter argues 
that Western medicine, arising in a culture preoccupied with the self, has devel-
oped a radically distinctive approach to understanding sickness: throughout his-
tory, most peoples and cultures have primarily construed life – birth and death, 
sickness and health – within a context of understanding human beings as related 
to the wider cosmos. However the West has dispensed with this connectional un-
derstanding and contracted its focus to the individual body and embodied per-
sonality. Thus whereas traditional healing systems have sought to readjust rela-
tions between the sick individual and the wider world (society and cosmos), the 
Western medical tradition ‘explains sickness principally in terms of the body itself 
– its own cosmos’ (Porter, 1999:7). 
Biomedicine’s roots lie in the rise of the mechanistic view of the body initiated by 
Descartes in his 1662 treatise L’Homme. The subsequent relentless advance of the 
Newtonian world view validated this understanding and the rise of medical tech-
nology has fixed it. Firmly situated within the scientific paradigm, key points in the 
model’s development were Descartes’ separation of body and soul, Harvey’s ini-
tiation of a systems view of the body, and Virchow’s view that all disease ulti-
mately results from cellular abnormalities (Porter, 1999). The Flexner report rec-
ommendation that medicine should be underpinned by a thorough training in 
both biology and laboratory science underscores its lineage (Flexner and Pritchett, 
1910). Traditionally then, the biomedical model focuses attention on discovering 
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the pathology rather than on understanding the illness in a wider context. Fur-
thermore the discoveries of the medical profession have assumed the mantle of 
positive truths rather than being seen as interpretive accounts of the nature of 
health problems (Aggleton, 1990:59). 
Such a model clearly has great intuitive appeal, an obvious relevance for many 
disease-based illnesses, and a wealth of supporting biological evidence. Health is 
seen simply as the absence of disease and the essential reductionism of the model 
gives rise to a number of associated understandings in which illness and its symp-
toms always arise from an underlying abnormality of body systems (disease) and 
are uninfluenced by external factors (though these may affect consequences) 
Moreover the patient is essentially passive – both aetiologically as a victim of cir-
cumstance, and therapeutically as a recipient of treatment. 
Western medical thinking is thus firmly based on the concepts of scientific ration-
ality – i.e. that to be valid, hypotheses must be testable and verifiable under ob-
jective, empirical, and controlled conditions, and that phenomena must be capa-
ble of objective measurement and testing if they are to be considered ‘real’ (Hel-
man, 2007:121). This, in conjunction with the underlying theory of disease, pre-
sents obvious difficulties for attempts to tease out the complex interactions which 
might connect social integration to health via PNI systems. A contention of this 
thesis is that whilst such effects cannot be conclusively established within the 
constraints of the scientific and biomedical paradigms, a transversal approach, 
integrating data from different disciplines may provide a convincing warrant for 
them, albeit of a rather different kind. 
3.2.3 The biopsychosocial model 
It was in response to some of the perceived failings arising from biomedicine’s 
reductive atomism that Engel launched his bold critique of it and presented an 
alternative model. This stressed the necessity of simultaneous attention to the 
biological, psychological, and sociological dimensions of illness (Engel, 1977:129-
36) and has seen increasing usage within various branches of the medical sci-
ences. In contrast to biomedicine, it recognises that psychological and social fac-
tors influence not only disease susceptibility and processes, but also the patient’s 
perceptions and actions, and the progress and outcome of the illness. Thus these 
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factors have an important bearing on both what it means, and how it feels to be ill 
(Wade and Halligan, 2004:1398). 
Engel’s model was formulated at a time when science itself was evolving from an 
exclusively analytical and reductionist position to become more contextual and 
cross-disciplinary (Borrell-Carrio et al., 2004:576), and was influenced by the ad-
vent of systems theory (Engel, 1977:134-5; von Bertanlaffy, 1975). Whilst not de-
nying the important advances which biomedicine had fostered, his criticism of its 
dualistic and reductionist understandings effectively signalled both a desire for a 
move away from the machine approach, and that systems theory might be a con-
structive influence on how health could be understood. Embracing the insights of 
this theory, Engel postulated that mental and social phenomena depended on, 
but were not reducible to more basic physical phenomena. He espoused what 
would now be understood as a complex emergent understanding with respect to 
the interactions of biological, psychological and social factors, regarding mental 
and social life as exerting a real influence on biology. Thirty years on from his in-
sight, there is now increasing evidence to suggest that health and ill-health are 
strongly linked to a variety of structural factors such as social class, gender, eth-
nicity, and sexuality (Naidoo and Wills, 2008:4). It is the contention of this thesis 
that the experience and expression of social relationships also has a direct effect 
on health via alterations of PNI function. 
The biopsychosocial model in fact has roots that stretch back to Plato’s Phaedrus 
and a passage that speaks of the wellbeing of the body, of the soul, and of the 
whole, in a single context. Plato suggests that compartmentalisation is a false step 
and instead allows the inference that the nature of the whole involves the entire 
life situation of the patient, including his relation to the wider cosmos (Gadamer, 
1996:39-42). As an approach to understanding health Engel’s model has been 
hugely influential and most other contemporary formulations owe a debt in some 
way to its insights and suggestions. But although, like biomedicine, the biopsycho-
social approach attends to the biological dimensions of illness, its connectional 
aspect stands in very sharp contrast to Porter’s delineation of the Western con-
cept of the body as ‘its own cosmos’, and points towards the possibility of a very 
different Weltenschauung. However the central elements of these two contrast-
ing models – mechanisation and embodiment – both have implications for the 
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understanding the connection between relationality and health explored in this 
thesis. 
3.2.4 Mechanised bodies or embodied persons? 
It was suggested earlier (p80) that the dominance of biomedicine has led to a cul-
tural iatrogenesis which has eroded the potential of people to deal with their hu-
man weaknesses, uniqueness, and vulnerability in a personal and autonomous 
way. This in turn has led to led to a loss of the ability to develop communities that 
can absorb suffering and sustain the sufferer. This would seem in some ways to be 
an inevitable end result of the ultimate ‘mechanised body in a machine-world’ 
model with its alienation of the self from its body and its social situatedness. 
Moreover, this mechanical worldview both transforms the body into a scientific 
object and reduces it to a collection of separate parts.  It is thus ‘simply a machine 
with interchangeable components’, and advances in medical technology – supply-
ing both artificial parts and increasingly sophisticated diagnostic and supportive 
machinery – as well as developments in genetic engineering indicate its seemingly 
inevitable ‘cyborg’ trajectory (Marcum, 2003:37-9). 
Medical philosopher James Marcum has argued that the mechanisation conse-
quent upon biomedicine has a threefold effect: fragmentation, standardisation, 
and alienation. In the first the patient’s body is broken into isolated component 
parts; in the second it is compared to a generic, standardised body; and finally it is 
estranged from the patient’s self, from other people, and the patient’s lived con-
text (Marcum, 2003:38). Thus ironically the pursuit of health through the eradica-
tion of disease may have the paradoxical effect of increasing illness. As will be-
come clear from both the PNI data presented in section 5 and its subsequent de-
velopment in the following chapters, the first and third of these effects stand in 
complete antithesis to the functioning of the immune/endocrine system and to 
the role which relational context and experience plays in regulating this. The 
themes of objectification, dismantling, and problematisation and the resulting 
isolation and alienation will also be taken up in the central conversations, particu-
larly in conjunction with Marcellian contributions to these. 
Against this mechanical understanding, Marcum sets an alternative rooted in the 
phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty and their reaction 
against what they saw as scientific abstraction and its attendant problems. Here, 
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rather than being reduced to their component elements, or considering in terms 
of standardised universals, the person is seen as creating a unique life-world (or 
being-in-the-world). This is not the physical universe depicted and defined by sci-
entific understanding, but is the world made up of personal activities and rela-
tionships. Moreover the body is not something merely possessed as an object but 
is a lived and integrated unity. Hence illness, rather than being conceived as the 
mechanical dysfunction of a body part, is understood as a disruption of the life-
world. Whilst this is obviously not completely congruent with the biopsychosocial 
approach there are clearly strong resonances and the two appear to be positioned 
within a very similar Weltenschauung. As will become apparent in subsequent 
sections, they both also have strong connecting threads, not only with the themes 
which run through both Old and New Testaments dealing with relational connec-
tion and health, but also with the pictures presented by epidemiological and PNI 
data. 
Such data offer strong support for the belief that elements of lived experience do 
indeed exert real effects on biology. They thus point to the necessity of a more 
expansive construct than the merely mechanical within which to site the concept 
of health. The contention developed in this thesis is not simply that social connec-
tivity is one such element, but that the way relational capacity is expressed and 
experienced can exert effects not merely indirectly – via ‘external’ mechanisms 
which reduce perceived stress (such as increased support or better access to in-
formation and resources), but also directly – by itself moderating biological path-
ways in immune and endocrine systems. In effect to argue that, apropos of this 
feature at least, distortion of the life-world and disruption of the mechanics are 
intimately and inextricably entwined. The difficulties involved in establishing such 
a connectional chain directly and simply from the observational and experimental 
data themselves will be discussed at the close of the chapter, along with the pro-
posal that a transversal dialogue between PNI, cognitive neuroscience and theol-
ogy presents a novel but viable alternative way of approaching the issue.  
The first stage in this process though lies in establishing the warrants for the basic 
contention that relationality and health are connected. It is to this which the 
chapter now turns, beginning with an outline of some key Biblical understandings 
of the role which social connection plays in the healthiness of both individuals and 
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the societies in which they are situated. In keeping with the approach laid out in 
the previous chapter, these are not offered as items of propositional faith from a 
specific confessional standpoint, but as rational articulations explored, developed 
and expressed over long periods of history within two particular frameworks of 
religious thought. Thus for example vignettes from the life of Christ are not pre-
sented as items which are indicative on the basis of a claim to literal factual truth 
of an incident. The interest is rather on what has been selected as important 
enough to be preserved and passed on in the oral tradition, and then enshrined in 
the written record, and in what this then reveals about the underlying under-
standings of relational connection and health which have been developed within 
this framework of experiential reference. 
3.3 Biblical perspectives linking relationality and 
health 
Although the word ‘health’ appears only about fifteen times in the entire Bible, it 
could be argued that the findings of the epidemiological and PNI data presented 
later in the chapter are strongly foreshadowed in the Testamental canon: woven 
throughout the texts are themes and motifs which not only indicate that social 
connection is a central element of existence, but which also link it intimately and 
inextricably with human wellbeing and flourishing. Indeed relational connection - 
and the consequences of its disruption - lies at the heart of both Old and New Tes-
taments. 
In the former, relation is not only a cornerstone of the key themes of covenant 
and community, but is also implicit in Hebrew anthropological understanding it-
self. Thus for example the term nepheš, though usually translated as ‘soul’, im-
plies something very different from the typical Western understanding of such a 
term. Always occurring in a relational or social context, it is better understood not 
as an isolated component of a dualistic entity, but rather as a person-in-relation, 
with the person isolated from their community regarded as sick in their soul 
(Bruckner, 2005:10-11; Ladd and Hagner, 1996:501).  In this respect, it is instruc-
tive to realise that the Old Testament concept of sheol (the abode of the dead) 
was one of a ‘ “thinned down”, reduced, isolated life’ – essentially, a world in 
which there was no possibility of relation (Thiselton, 2005:77). The New Testa-
ment too turns on a similar axis: from its great theological themes of disrupted, 
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restored, and transfigured relationships, through their vivid instantiation in the 
life and actions of Christ, to the ‘communism of love’ (Troeltsch, 1912/1992:62) 
displayed by the early church, the whole text is richly redolent with stories and 
motifs suggesting the absolute centrality of good relationships. 
Moreover the close links between how such relationality is expressed and the 
health and wellbeing of individuals and societies are also strong themes across the 
canon, both overtly and as significant subtexts. In the Old Testament this is estab-
lished and explicated chiefly through the concept of shālôm. In the New it is given 
explicit expression in the life of Christ through both the healing miracles them-
selves and in his constant attention to the preservation and development of rela-
tional connections. It is these aspects that will be the primary focus for considera-
tion here.  As is the case with each of the disciplinary strands contributing to this 
chapter, the range and depth of the issues precludes anything other than a gen-
eral overview at this stage, and the biblical verses cited are indicative rather than 
exhaustive. However specific elements of these themes will be taken up and de-
veloped much more fully from a theological perspective as part of the transversal 
dialogues through which the argument of the thesis will be constructed. 
3.3.1 The concept of shālôm 
Shālôm, an ‘iridescent word with many levels of meaning’ (Swartley, 2006:27), is 
derived from a primitive root denoting wholeness or completeness. However the 
usual translation of ‘peace’ does not do adequate justice to the richness of the 
Hebrew concept, which ranges over a number of spheres of action and compre-
hends many dimensions of physical and emotional experience: for example in 2 
Sam 11:7 David inquires of Uriah about the shālôm of an individual (Joab), a 
community (the people), and a larger political sphere (the war). The term and its 
cognates are very common and usage is distributed across almost all of the Old 
Testament books (Westermann, 1972:20). As one of the names by which God 
chooses to disclose himself (Jud 6:23-4), it is strongly associated with God as its 
source (Is 52:7; 60:17) and with his righteousness, love and faithfulness (Is 32:17; 
Ps 85:7-13). 
With roots in the Yahwistic sense of community arising from Hebrew experiences 
of slavery and delivery, the early understandings of shālôm were linked to the 
concept of a realm defended against the intrusion of chaos and where life could 
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be fostered free from fear of all that would diminish and destroy it. It was thus 
seen as  
a condition of life received by those allowing themselves to be 
drawn into a pattern of community by the God who delivered 
Hebrew slaves from bondage (Hanson, 1984:347).  
From these beginnings, a rich concept evolved which extended to reach out to a 
wider community beyond Israel’s borders, and to encompass many dimensions of 
life: wholeness, healing and well-being (Ps 38:3; Jer 8:15; 14:19; 33:6-9, Ps 
119:165); justice (Zech 8:19), salvation and the eschatological hope of peace (Is 
9:2-7), and material prosperity (Ps 37:11, 147:14) amongst others. In effect the 
term came to comprehend 
Everything necessary to healthful living: Good health, a sense 
of well-being, the cohesiveness of the community, relationship 
to relatives and their state of being, and anything else deemed 
necessary for everything to be in order (Westermann, 
1992:25). 
There was thus a strong sense in which shālôm was seen as a divine gift, some-
thing which was built into a universe from which God had driven back chaos, and 
which flowed from the covenantal moral attributes of mišpāt, sĕdāqāh, and he-
sed.6 But simultaneously, there was also a clear understanding that it was not, 
first and foremost, a private, inner state but rather one which found external ex-
pression in the context of communal life (von Rad, 1985:208). As such it had to be 
actualised through the way people chose to live – the manner in which they ex-
pressed their relational connections with one another. Its active pursuit (Ps 34:14) 
thus took on a moral dimension, since it involved standing against all that violated 
the divine order for life. Hence there was understood as being a close link be-
tween the shape of relational connections and the health (broadly construed) of 
individuals, nation, and even the wider cosmos. 
However this also meant that that the health of people and nation was not guar-
anteed: breakdowns in relational connections led to disruptions, distortion and 
complete disappearance of shālôm, as seen for example in the descent of post-
exilic Israel into bitter community strife dominated by exclusivist views. Here the 
resulting total loss of shalomic social harmony, and thus of health and well-being, 
was also accompanied by the displacement of shālôm from being understood as 
                                                             
6 Justice, righteousness, and faithfulness. 
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an active earthly vocation (Is 2:4; Mic 4:3), to being seen, distortedly, as a future 
event in which God would inflict defeat on those ‘outside’ whilst simultaneously 
blessing Israel (Hanson, 1984:361). 
The importance of the moral imperative to pursue shālôm, the ease with which it 
could become subverted and the resultant consequences are also clearly demon-
strated in assorted conflicts between the false and true prophets: here the former 
were loudly proclaiming the existence of shālôm whilst in reality injustice was rife 
(Mic:3:5ff; Jer 6:14; 8:11; Ez 13:16). That they were thus construing shālôm in a 
way which directly contravened it was not only an offence against God, but also 
intensely damaging to the health of people and nation. In this respect it is inter-
esting to note that despite a tendency to assume that in very unequal societies, 
the negative social and health consequences are only carried by the least well off, 
this is not in fact the case: there is increasing and convincing evidence that the 
increased rates of mental and physical illness and social problems seen in such 
societies are distributed across the whole population – rich and poor alike suffer 
in their health when social connection becomes distorted (Wilkinson and Pickett, 
2009). One could also understand Haurewas’ observations about the pursuit of 
individual health and its wider effects on community ability to support and sustain 
others (Haurewas, 1993:49) as another example of how the subversion of shālôm 
by an individualism inimical to its essential nature has potentially disastrous con-
sequences for individual and communal health. 
These biblical understandings are born out, taken up and amplified in the wealth 
of the rabbinic texts. In these shālôm is again held as a normative ethical category 
and denotes the overcoming of strife, quarrels, and social tension, and the pre-
vention of enmity and war. Its pursuit is at once both an individual obligation and 
the goal of various social structures and rules. Thus many passages and sayings 
which treat on the subject are orientated towards its promotion and preservation 
in family and communal life, although others are directed more externally to ad-
dress affairs between Israel and its neighbours (Ravitzky, 2009:686). Moreover it 
is also, in some senses regarded as a meta-value – one which represents the 
summation of all other values with the possible exception of mišpāt although 
even this it might temper in some instances (ibid:687). 
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However rabbinic treatments of the theme, especially from mediaeval times on-
wards, evidence a more cosmic dimension to shālôm in which it is also seen as 
constituting a distinct ontological principle in the universe. Here, whilst retaining 
the classical denotations pertaining to human social and political dimensions, it is 
simultaneously elevated to the level of the metaphysical as a ‘cosmic principle’ – 
the ultimate and supreme divine attribute (Ravitzky, 2009:688). Thus shālôm also 
comes to be understood not only as the foundation for all being, but also a condi-
tion for the existence and preservation of reality. 
Here then we have a concept which not only links social relationships closely to 
individual, communal, and national health, but which is also seen as being, in 
some way both reflective of, and fundamentally connected with, elements of the 
basic order of the universe. These are points which will be considered further in 
the transversal discussions of Chapters 4-6. There are also strong parallels with 
insights and understandings which emerge from both the epidemiological and PNI 
data presented in sections 4 and 5. 
3.3.2 Relationality and health in the New Testament 
Once again there is little direct discussion, and certainly no explicit definition, of 
health in the New Testament texts. However attention to, and transformation of, 
relational states play a key role in many of the healing narratives, as well as other 
events in the life of Jesus which touch on the issue of wellbeing as construed in a 
larger sense than simply physical health. In fact Jesus serves as a prime exemplar 
of the relationally-connected person and is repeatedly seen giving himself to oth-
ers: ‘If we see Him alone, we do not see Him at all […] we see Him as theirs, de-
termined by them and for them, belonging to each and everyone of them’ (Barth, 
1958a:216). If, as Swinton (2000:46) suggests, the act of caring reveals the nature 
of one’s being, then one might reasonably adduce from Jesus’ actions something 
of the central role of relationality ascribed to the character and purposes of God. 
Once again this is an issue which will be taken up and developed in the first of the 
transversal dialogues, which considers relationality from an ontological perspec-
tive. 
Jesus is also seen as coming to usher in the Kingdom of God and his choice of 
manifesto (Lk 4:16-21) with which to announce this is an interesting one for any 
consideration of the link between social connection and health. The quoted text is 
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ostensibly Is 61:1-2, but Jesus omits one of the lines and instead substitutes an-
other taken from elsewhere in Trito-Isaiah: the words in question ‘to let the op-
pressed go free’ are imported from Is 58:6, where they form part of a much longer 
prophetic complaint about Israel’s close attention to religious ritual whilst simul-
taneously ignoring the duties of hospitality and social justice – in effect neglecting 
the moral imperatives of shālôm and thus jeopardising the health of both indi-
viduals and nation. Jesus’ incorporation of such a text not only announces an in-
tent to fulfil the program of social justice he sees as required by God (Byrne, 
2000:49), but also underlines the centrality of shālôm, with its relational obliga-
tions and their associated health-related effects, in the divine order. 
The New Testament texts also make clear not only Jesus’ concern to repair dis-
rupted relationality with individuals, but the consequences of this in the wider 
relational network: for example in Lk 19:1-9, it is not just Jesus’ own actions in 
accosting and claiming hospitality from Zacchaeus that establish relational con-
nection to him; his declaration that “This man too is a son of Abraham” restores 
and publicly reinforces the latter’s proper place within God’s people, effectively 
also reminding the listeners of the obligations of the shālômic community. As Zac-
chaeus in turn begins to mend his own disrupted relational network, both through 
making redress for wrongdoing, and also by actively overturning a far more fun-
damental imbalance of resources, health is restored not just to him but also to the 
wider community in which he is embedded. 
However Jesus is not only seen to acknowledge and respond to the importance of 
good social connection in repairing and fostering well-being, he is also depicted as 
not averse to pointing out to others where they have failed in this respect, and 
highlighting the potential consequences for them. Thus in the Lucan vignette pre-
sented in 7:36-48 Simon, who had actively solicited Jesus’ company at his house 
and would almost certainly have given him a shālômic greeting (1 Sam 25:6) on his 
arrival, had clearly failed to instantiate the obligations of the implied relational 
connection. Jesus’ actions in accepting anointing from a ‘sinful’ woman and his 
accompanying words to Simon not only point out to him the poverty of his rela-
tional state, but also hint at its larger implications. In this instance, the comfort 
and well-being of Jesus is fostered not by the person proclaiming shālôm, but 
through the relational connection offered (at personal cost) by an excluded 
99 
 
woman; and she in turn, as Jesus makes clear, recovers shālôm through her ex-
pression of that relationality. 
Jesus then is always shown as keen to acknowledge the central place of relational 
claim and connection in everyday human life – and in this respect it is significant 
that his first action in dealing with the Gaderene demoniac in Lk 8:26-38, is to ask 
“what is your name?”: even the forces of chaos which threaten divine order can 
be dealt with in the context of relational connection. His words also often under-
line the idea that the maintenance of proper relationality requires active partici-
pation; and his actions demonstrate a readiness to do whatever is necessary in 
this respect to ensure its healthy functioning. An archetypal example here is that 
given by the author of Matthew in 8:1-4 in which Jesus’ declaration “I am willing” 
is immediately followed by the establishment of a physical contact with the leper 
who has accosted him. The story of the ten lepers in Luke 17:15-19 is also illumi-
nating on the subject of the importance of active relational participation to health 
in its fullest, shālômic sense: here, although all the lepers are physically healed, 
only one returns to acknowledge and celebrate the connection which has been 
the instrument of healing; only one reaches out to establish, through praise, a 
relational link with God; and only one is recognised by Jesus as being ‘well’. 
This care which Jesus is shown as demonstrating for both the repair and preserva-
tion of relationality, and its connection to wellbeing, is perhaps most clearly and 
poignantly illustrated by its prominent place in both the Lucan and Johanine ac-
counts of episodes occurring in the final hours of his life. In the former (Lk 23:40-
3) the dying thief gropes towards a final experience of social connection which 
Jesus, despite his own suffering, recognises and responds to: through both the 
fact of his answering and the content of his response, he is shown as not only in-
dicating his willing acceptance of the bond but also confirming both its ongoing 
trajectory and its healing nature. In the Johanine account (Jn 19:25-7), Jesus is 
recorded as demonstrating a similar attention to the relational needs of his 
mother: here, through words directed towards her and a particular disciple, he 
takes steps to affirm the importance of these needs and to make future provision 
for them to be met when he can no longer do so himself. 
This strong impetus towards relational restoration is also a consistent feature of 
the accounts of Jesus’ healing miracles. In these there is almost invariably a sub-
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text of alienation and disrupted relationships, and the restoration of health is as 
much to do with the repair of these as with any physical healing involved. There 
are many such instances but Luke 8:42b-8 serves well as a paradigmatic example 
here: the woman in question suffers a sickness that is both physically and socially 
devastating since it renders her ritually unclean. Like the demoniac of Luke 8, who 
was reduced to inhabiting the tombs of the dead, she exists outside the bounda-
ries of the living community. There is thus a severe curtailment of normal rela-
tional possibility – indeed she is as good as dead in the communal sense (Byrne, 
2000:83) – and it is this, as much as the bleeding, which destroys her health. As 
with so many of the healing stories, the sequence is initiated by an appeal to rela-
tionality, although in this case, it is not vocal. But whilst the woman’s touching of 
Jesus apparently effects an immediate physical result, Luke underlines that he is 
not content to leave her cured only in the biomedical sense. The account of his 
subsequent search for and identification of her, coupled with the public affirma-
tion of kinship which his appellation of “daughter” confers, proclaims, and con-
firms her right to relational connection, and restores her to both shālôm and to 
the larger community from which her bleeding has excluded her. 
Thus in its treatment of events in the life and ministry of Jesus, the New Testa-
ment confirms and amplifies the apprehension running through the Old that social 
connection and health are inextricably linked. In both instances, strong and 
healthy social relationships are seen as not only essential to personal health and 
well-being, but also as having significant ramifications for the health of others in 
the connectional network, and for the society within which this is situated. The 
importance of maintaining and developing this relational connection is such that 
its pursuit takes on the nature of a moral imperative, and its neglect is seen as 
threatening the divine order. As has already been suggested, there are many ele-
ments in this biblical perspective which anticipate and resonate with the conclu-
sions increasingly being drawn from the studies undertaken by social epidemiolo-
gists which form the next arena of exploration. 
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3.4 Epidemiological perspectives on sociality and 
health  
3.4.1 Review of studies 
Epidemiology’s roots extend back to observations made by Hippocrates, but its 
formal disciplinary beginnings lie much closer in the 19th century. Similarly, de-
spite the previously noted longstanding recognition that social conditions influ-
ence health, the rise of social epidemiology – the study of the relations between 
social factors and disease in populations (Kauffman, 2008:532) – is a much more 
recent enterprise, albeit one already yielding important information (Berkman 
and Kawachi, 2000:10). A wide range of variables have been investigated but 
those of interest here relate to social networks and their connection with morbid-
ity and mortality rates. 
The suggestion that social environments might have effects on health was first 
raised more than thirty years ago in seminal papers by Cassel (1976:107-23) and 
Cobb (1976:300-14), with a subsequent explosion of studies addressing the issue. 
One perennial difficulty, particularly with early studies, is the variability of the 
definition and measurement of terms and concepts such as social ‘support’, ‘ties’, 
‘bonds’, and ‘networks’. Thus although the predictive power of such measures 
often appeared indisputable, the interpretation of what was actually being meas-
ured was much more debatable (Berkman and Glass, 2000:142). However work on 
more rigorous definitions of critical dimensions of support (e.g. House, 1981) and 
the development of new models for categorising support (Thoits, 2011:145-61) 
have attempted to address these issues and provide clearer conceptions of these 
features and their interconnections. Such difficulties notwithstanding, there has 
been a steadily accumulating wealth of epidemiological evidence supporting the 
idea that the degree to which an individual is embedded in, and interconnected 
with, a community has important implications for their health and wellbeing. 
Multiple studies appearing in the 70s and 80s, usually measuring numbers of close 
relatives/friends, marital status, and membership of religious or other social or-
ganisations, consistently linked impoverished social connection with increased 
mortality from almost all major disease groups (for meta reviews see Berkman, 
1995:245-54; Cohen, 1988:269-97; House et al., 1988:540-5). The significance of 
this wave of studies lay in the nature of the studies themselves: earlier epidemiol-
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ogical work had been almost entirely retrospective (taking data from hospital re-
cords and death certificates) and cross sectional, and thus not only was control for 
confounding variables at best partial, but the studies were unable to determine 
whether poor social relationships preceded or post-dated ill health. In contrast, 
these new studies were, by and large, long term prospective studies of commu-
nity populations. They therefore offered significant advantages, not only by pro-
viding large sample sizes with low drop-out rates and reducing confounding biases 
but also, because the markers of social connection were measured at the out-
come, making it possible to assess the predictive value of such variables. Classic 
large scale population studies such as those from Alameda (Berkman and Syme, 
1979:186-204), Tecumsah (House et al., 1982:123-40), and Durham (Blazer, 
1982:684-94) counties, Finland (Kaplan et al., 1988:370-80), and Sweden (Orth-
Gomér and Johnson, 1987:949-57) all reported significant correlation between 
poor social connectivity and all-cause mortality. 
In a seminal paper, House collated and reviewed these and other studies, setting 
the results alongside experimental human and animal data from psychosocial re-
search, and new theoretical models arising from these. The conjunction of these 
different data and perspectives led him to conclude that a relative lack of social 
connection constituted a significant risk factor for health comparable to that of 
well-established factors such as hypertension, obesity, and smoking (House et al., 
1988:540). Furthermore, since controlling the psychological studies for personality 
variables, and the epidemiological studies for biological and health variables, had 
both failed to explain away the predictive association between social isolation and 
mortality, then there were reasonable grounds to conclude that social relation-
ships had a predictive, and arguably causal, relationship with health in their own 
right (House et al., 1988:545). Further studies have followed and there is now a 
substantial volume of literature exploring and establishing this link and investigat-
ing a wide range of outcomes. It is not possible here to provide anything other 
than a brief indication of representative studies connected with two significant 
causes of mortality – cardiovascular and malignancy. However comprehensive 
reviews covering a whole array of outcomes exist in the literature (see for exam-
ple Anderson D, 1996:739-44; Berkman, 1995:245-54; Ell, 1996:173-83; Olsen, 
1993:176-80; Seeman, 1996:442-51; Thoits, 1995:53-79). 
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As already indicated there have now been a number of large prospective cohort 
studies in the USA (see above), the UK (Stansfeld et al., 1998a:247-55; Stansfeld et 
al., 1998b:881-92), Scandinavia (Welin et al., 1985:915-8), the Netherlands 
(Penninx et al., 1997:510-9), and Japan (Sugisawa et al., 1994:S3-S13) showing 
that those who are socially isolated (as variously measured) are more at risk of 
dying prematurely from all causes of mortality. For example the Alameda county 
study cited above revealed a 2-3 times greater risk of death in a nine year follow-
up period for those with fewer social connections; it also established that this 
relative risk was not simply centred on a single pathology such as cancer or is-
chaemic heart disease but related to all causes of mortality. Moreover the relative 
risk of social isolation was independent of both assorted health behaviours and 
co-morbid conditions present at the baseline recording. Several studies on older 
populations have confirmed that the protective effect of social connection per-
sists into later life (Seeman et al., 1993:325-35; Seeman et al., 1987:714-23). 
With respect to cardiovascular causes of morbidity and mortality, no evidence of 
influence, either protective or otherwise, has so far been convincingly demon-
strated on the actual onset of cardiovascular disease (Berkman and Glass, 
2000:162); although there is some evidence of a reduced incidence of cerebrovas-
cular accidents in those with strong social networks (Kawachi et al., 1996:245-51). 
However a variety of studies suggest that the strength of social ties significantly 
influences outcomes with respect to recovery from both myocardial infarction and 
cerebrovascular accidents, (Berkman et al., 1992:1003-9; Orth-Gomér et al., 
1988:205-15; Ruberman et al., 1984:552-9; Williams et al., 1992:520-4), with 
stronger connectivity being associated with improved outcomes. Conversely, im-
poverished social networks have been shown to be significantly correlated with 
premature mortality from vascular disease in middle-aged men (Olsen, 1993:176-
80). In the case of cerebrovascular accidents, those who are socially isolated have 
a greater risk of death (Kawachi et al., 1996:245-51; Vogt et al., 1992:659-66) par-
ticularly in the presence of concomitant depression (Morris et al., 1993:124-9). In 
contrast, good social connection has been associated with improved recovery 
both functionally and psychologically (Evans et al., 1987:508-12; Friedland J and 
McColl, 1987:475-80; Glass et al., 1993:64-70) and shown to be an important pre-
dictor of hospital course (Colantonio et al., 1993:S261-8). 
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In respect to malignancy, a 17 year prospective study of the Alameda cohorts 
showed that while social connections were not predictively associated with cancer 
incidence or mortality in men, those with fewer connections had significantly re-
duced survival times. Socially isolated women were found to have a significantly 
elevated risk of dying from cancer of all sites (Reynolds and Kaplan, 1990:101-
110). Other studies have suggested that degree of social involvement plays a role 
in survival from breast cancer and other cancers (Ell et al., 1992:531-41; Funch 
and Marshall, 1983:77-83; Waxler-Morrison et al., 1991:177-83); and a recent 
meta-analysis of 87 studies confirmed a decrease in relative risk for mortality in 
those with high levels of perceived support and larger social networks, especially 
in younger patients (Pinquart and Duberstein, 2010:122-37). 
3.4.2 From connection to causality 
Even from such a limited presentation of the available data, it is clear that a 
strong predictive link exists between social connection and assorted health out-
comes: House’s original assessment on this point has been born out by multiple 
studies of different types, involving analysis of different variables and different 
populations and drawing on increasingly sophisticated theories, models, and ana-
lytical tools. However as his comment makes clear, this does not automatically 
imply that the connection is necessarily a causal one: in disease patterns, things 
are rarely as simple as a one-to-one correspondence between observed cause and 
effect, and while epidemiological studies may permit inferences of causality, they 
cannot prove its existence. 
In part this is because of the nature of the studies themselves and unintentional 
selection bias, unrecognised or poorly controlled confounding variables, and 
chance occurrences can all distort observed linkages. It also reflects the complex 
nature of causality in disease: factors may be operative in a variety of different 
‘causal’ ways – as predisposing, precipitating, enabling/disabling, or as reinforcing. 
Moreover there are often multiple causes at work with a hierarchy of proximal 
(precipitating) and distal (enabling) factors. Indeed the very concept of cause is 
the source of much controversy in epidemiology (Bonita et al., 2006:83). Various 
guidelines such as plausibility and consistency exist for assessing the likelihood of 
a linkage being causal but of these, only correct temporal relationship is a sine qua 
non. 
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Causal inferences in epidemiological studies thus require extremely skilful judge-
ments in a whole variety of directions and leave much room for legitimate dis-
agreement. Hence epidemiological inferences about causal hypotheses are inten-
tionally sceptical. Moreover even after tentative conclusions are reached, alterna-
tive explanations and theories will continue to be raised and considered 
(Gerstman, 2003:290). Occasionally aetiological hypotheses attain an extremely 
high degree of certainty which is almost universally accepted (for example the 
connection between cigarette smoking and lung cancer). These are as close as 
epidemiology comes to proof (Rothman et al., 2008:24) – indeed just as with em-
pirical science, there simply is no such thing as ‘ultimate proof’ in epidemiology 
(Gerstman, 2003:289). Nevertheless, more than a quarter of a century after 
House’s original observation, a generation of empirical research seems to strongly 
validate not only the assessment of the predictive value of social relationships for 
mortality, but also the suggestion that they exert an independent influence on 
this (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010:12), and the weight of the accumulated epidemiol-
ogical evidence is taken by many to provide sufficient warrant for the attribution 
of some kind of causal link.  What these studies cannot do however is provide any 
evidence as to the mechanisms by which this might be mediated, although various 
pathways seem to offer possibilities (Uchino et al., 2012:221). 
Social networks provide opportunities for a variety of psychosocial mechanisms 
through which health can, by a complex array of paths, be influenced. Thus for 
example they can offer various and very different types of support and influence; 
they present a range of possibilities for contact and different types of social en-
gagement; and they can be the means of accessing assorted resources, informa-
tion, and material goods. Any of these may in their turn affect health outcomes 
via modification (positive or negative) of three key pathways: i) health-related 
behavioural ones such as diet, exercise, drug and alcohol consumption, sexual 
habits etc. ii) psychological mechanisms, for example self-esteem, coping strate-
gies etc. and iii) through physiological pathways such as the transmission of infec-
tious disease, or alterations of immune and endocrine function and of allostatic 
load. 
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It is this final route which is the focus of the current project – specifically altera-
tions of immune and endocrine systems in response to allostatic7 demands. The 
possibility the project seeks to explore is that something about the nature of so-
cial relationship itself can affect these systems directly – in other words that it has 
an internal effect, directly integrated into immune and endocrine regulation. The 
final tranche of data to be presented thus looks at PNI studies exploring the ef-
fects of different aspects of relational connection on endocrine and immune func-
tion. 
3.5 PNI Perspectives 
3.5.1 Immunological Prolegomena  
The modern early view of the immune system was of a closed and functionally 
autonomous system. However Ader’s elegant demonstration that immune re-
sponses could be influenced in precisely the manner associated with classic cen-
tral nervous system (CNS) conditioning (Ader and Cohen, 1975:333-40) decisively 
overturned this view. Now, what were previously seen as completely separate 
systems are increasingly understood as components of a single, integrated ‘de-
fence mechanism’ in which interactions between the systems are as vital as those 
within the individual systems themselves:  
The immune system is highly integrated with other physiologi-
cal systems. It is sensitive to virtually every hormone, and sym-
pathetic, parasympathetic, and sensory nerves innervate the 
organs of the immune system. In turn, the nervous, endocrine, 
and immune systems communicate bi-directionally through 
common hormones, neuro-peptides, and cytokines. […] behav-
ioural responses are key in the activation of neuroendocrine 
and autonomic pathways, which in turn modulate the immune 
system with implications for increasing susceptibility to a vari-
ety of diseases. […] communication between the brain and the 
immune system is reciprocal (Irwin, 2008:137). 
Psychoneuroimmunology is the relatively young but substantial and rapidly ex-
panding discipline which studies these relationships between behavioural, neural, 
endocrine, and immune processes (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002c:16). Its growing 
corpus of experimental data increasingly confirms the apprehension, held since 
antiquity, that the emotional, spiritual, psychological, and physical dimensions of 
                                                             
7 The maintenance of homeostasis in the face of change (McEwen and Wingfield, 2003:3). 
See further at p220ff. 
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life are intimately linked with health. Immune function and its operational inter-
action with the endocrine system are both complex and multileveled phenomena, 
thus a brief outline of some key points is necessary as a basis for understanding 
the following data and subsequent thesis arguments (Daruna, 2004:23-55, has a 
comprehensive and accessible introduction to system elements). In particular, I 
want to highlight the role of cytokines (signalling molecules) since this will play an 
important part in the final thesis argument. 
It is now well established that the immune system is hardwired to the central 
nervous system, that communication between the two is bi-directional, and that 
each exerts a variety of influences on the other (Ader and Kelley, 2007:2). Both 
systems monitor the internal and external environments, evaluating possible 
threats and initiating appropriate response mechanisms in response to patho-
genic invasion or other challenges to system integrities. Detection of a perceived 
stressor leads to neuronal activation in specific brain loci; this in turn excites the 
release of hormones from various endocrine glands or nerve terminals. These 
hormones then interact with specific receptor cells within the immune system 
and the ensuing cascade of events moderates immune function at the cellular 
level via the action of leucocytes (white blood cells) and cytokines. The latter are 
a diverse group of small proteins which act as the basic signalling molecules of the 
system, mediating specific physiological responses via alterations in neuroendo-
crine and neurochemical processes, and by up or down-regulating specific genes 
or their transcription factors to facilitate the production and proliferation of spe-
cific immune cell subsets in response to infection or other tissue insult. Cytokines 
exhibit both pleiotopy8 and redundancy9 and their regulatory system is one of 
huge complexity employing feedback loops whereby they can inhibit or stimulate 
their own release or that of other cytokines depending on the tissue and the spe-
cific situation (Banks, 2005:973). They are active in both the peripheral tissues 
and the CNS itself. In the latter case they originate directly from neurons, astro-
cytes, and microglia, in response to stimuli external to the CNS. Such stimuli are 
transmitted either via afferent nerves – principally the vagus (Jain et al., 
2012:323) – or by other, blood-borne, cytokines which can cross the blood-brain 
barrier and affect brain tissue directly via interaction with intrinsic brain cytokine 
                                                             
8 i.e. any one cytokine may have several different actions.  
9 i.e. several different cytokines may have the same action. 
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systems (Banks, 2005:973-84). There is also increasing evidence that these play an 
important role in aspects of neuroplasticity (see Bauer et al., 2007:221-32, for a 
review). 
Cytokines can be broadly divided into two groups: those which promote inflam-
matory processes and those which inhibit them. The former are essential in the 
early phases of response to invading pathogens and to other threats at both tis-
sue and central level. At the former they act in a variety of ways to facilitate im-
mune response – for example by increasing vascular permeability to allow the 
ingress of cells to damaged tissue, stimulating the differentiation and release of 
certain immune-cell subsets etc. Within the CNS, they influence neurotransmitter 
metabolism, neuroendocrine function, synaptic plasticity, and the neurocircuits 
regulating mood, motor activity, motivation, anxiety, and alarm (Capuron and 
Miller, 2011:226-38). This leads to the classic symptom constellation of ‘sickness 
behaviour’: loss of appetite, fever, aching joints, fatigue, withdrawal etc. (Dantzer 
and Kelley, 2007:153-60; Dantzer et al., 2008:46-56). Anti-inflammatory cytokines 
are important in the subsequent management of the amplitude and duration of 
the inflammatory response – something which is essential to prevent unnecessary 
tissue damage. The balance between these two aspects of cytokine activity is 
critical: acute responses to pathogens and other stressors are a vital part of al-
lostatic responsiveness, but pro-inflammatory cytokines and chronic inflammatory 
states are increasingly being implicated in the pathogenesis of major causes of 
mortality such as cardiovascular disease (Hansson, 2005:1685-96) and cancer 
(Hong et al., 2007:1911-28), as well as in depression (Miller et al., 2009:732-41) 
and neurodegenerative conditions (Hayley and Anisman, 2005:947-62). There are 
also indications that they may be involved in conditions such as bipolar disorder 
(Brietzke and Kapczinski, 2008), autistic spectrum disorder (Li et al., 2009:111-6), 
and in depression-related suicide (Kim et al., 2008). Both good immune responses 
and their subsequent regulation are thus key integrative aspects of good health, 
and maladaptive alterations have the potential to influence the aetiology, sever-
ity, and progression of a spectrum of diseases (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002b:543). In 
Chapter 6, I will suggest that altered cytokine responsiveness and subsequent 
shifts in the balance of allostatic load are a possible mechanism linking relational 
connection directly with pathological processes and thus health outcomes. 
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Turning to PNI studies themselves, these are not only complex, but are also 
fraught with methodological difficulties (Robinson et al., 2002:165-175). It is thus 
vital for any argument attempting to build on such data to be aware of their limi-
tations. Firstly, it must be noted that the vast majority of the studies are, like the 
epidemiological studies, correlational in nature. Thus although they may raise evi-
dence of a relationship between variables studied, statements about direct cau-
sality drawn from the studies themselves are inadmissible. Secondly, a large num-
ber of factors are known to be immunomodulating – for example age, sex, exer-
cise, tobacco and other recreational drugs have all been demonstrated to affect 
immune function (Hoffman-Goetz and Pedersen, 1994; Kiecolt-Glaser and Glaser, 
1988). Hence successful control for all confounding variables is difficult and many 
studies only achieve limited controlling. 
Further difficulties arising from the laboratory aspect of the studies relate to the 
standardisation of collection and measurement procedures (Uchino et al., 
1996:519); and to the degree to which the measured immune system variables 
actually reflect the true level of immunocompetence (Schulz and Schulz, 1992). 
Since the only component of the immune system easily studied is the blood, most 
in vitro assays from human studies are done on peripheral blood samples. Thus 
they do not necessarily reflect what is actually happening in the lymphoid organs 
(Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002c:21). Data also need to be analysed with a clear under-
standing of their functional and clinical implications, particularly since statistical 
and clinical significance may not necessarily equate. For example if measured lev-
els of immunoglobulin G in an individual are 2 standard deviations below the 
mean, this would be deemed a statistically significant variation; however such a 
level would still be comfortably above that required to protect from bacterial in-
fection and thus clinically this would not constitute a significant result (Robinson 
et al., 2002). 
From the non-laboratory side, a key issue for the studies of interest here relates 
to how the social variables under examination are operationalised. As with the 
epidemiological studies, there is a marked heterogeneity of approach across stud-
ies as to how ‘social support’ is understood and measured. Furthermore there is a 
tendency to treat it as a one-dimensional construct (Uchino et al., 1996:522). 
However social support, broadly speaking, incorporates two distinct but intercon-
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nected elements – one structural and one functional. The former relates to the 
extent of and degree to which an individual is integrated into social networks 
(family, friends, colleagues, interest groups etc.) Measurement of these social ties 
can take the form of number of network members, the type of relationship, and 
the amount of contact (Uchino et al., 2012:215), though such aspects are often 
not analysed in any great detail in PNI studies. The precise contribution of each 
element is far from clear and a recent meta-analysis indicates a significant vari-
ability in the predictive utility of these different variables, with multidimensional 
assessments of social integration being the optimal predictor of mortality risk 
(Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010:1-20, 14). The functional element of social support deals 
with the degree and type of support received, and incorporates emotional, infor-
mational, practical, and belonging elements (Uchino et al., 2012:216). Another 
important potential dividing line is between perceived and actual support since 
these seem to have significantly different effects (e.g. Reinhardt et al., 2006:117-
29) and to correlate differently with mortality rates (Uchino et al., 2004). In con-
trast to the epidemiological studies which focus mainly on structural support, 
most PNI studies deal with elements of perceived functional support. I will return 
to these issues when considering the role which the shape of relational connec-
tion might play in mediating PNI effects. 
Finally problems also arise from the complex and multilayered nature of the sys-
tems and processes under investigation, and the difficulties of disaggregating 
their various elements – the pleiotropy of the cytokine system has already been 
noted and the issue is further complicated by the fact that some key cytokines 
implicated in chronic inflammatory states – for example Inter-Leukin 6 (IL-6) – are 
known to have both pro- and anti-inflammatory functions (Hawkley et al., 
2007:83-5). Furthermore, since any study can only supply information about a 
small portion of the processes which may be involved, definitive determinations 
of the degree of overall effect on immune functioning are difficult. I will return to 
these various difficulties in section 6 and suggest that the transversal approach 
adopted in this study provides a possible way of negotiating them. 
3.5.2 PNI studies involving relationality 
The epidemiological data presented in the preceding section have established the 
importance of relational connections in connections with health outcomes: Those 
with a higher level of social contact (both quantitatively and qualitatively) are 
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more likely to live longer and maintain better health; those with impoverished 
relationships carry a significantly increased risk of morbidity and mortality, com-
parable in terms of statistical effect, to those associated with smoking, obesity 
and hypertension. One possible pathway through which this effect might be me-
diated is through alterations of PNI systems and a large and steadily growing 
number of studies have investigated assorted measures of social connectivity 
against an array of endocrine and immune markers. 
One of the explanations offered for the protective role of social relationships in 
health terms is that they offer a defence against stress, which is known to be a 
potent moderator of PNI function. Although the concept of stress was formulated 
over 60 years ago (Selye, 1956:525-30), it remains ambiguous: ‘Everybody knows 
what stress is and nobody knows what it is’ (Selye, 1973:692); this is further com-
pounded by the conflation of both the stressor and the physiological response it 
evokes under the term. However a critical point to note here is that stress is not 
synonymous with damage, and the expression of stress responses does not of it-
self necessarily compromise health and/or welfare – indeed short term stress re-
sponses are a central part of allostatic adaptation (Korte et al., 2005:4). This is 
underlined by a recent meta-analysis of 300 studies published over 30 years, deal-
ing with the relationship between psychological stress and immune functioning: 
while acute stressors (i.e. short-lasting ones) produce adaptive up-regulation of 
PNI systems, chronic stress depresses both cellular and humoural10 immunity 
(Segerstrom and Miller, 2004:601-30). With regard to the latter scenario however, 
the effect is clearly far from being uniformly benign, and another large scale re-
view of all data published since 1939 concluded there are now sufficient data to 
establish that this immune down regulation by social stressors also leads to actual 
health changes (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002c:15-28 ). Moreover, since age and 
stress seem to interact in a way which leads to an increased down-regulation of 
immune systems when the two factors coincide (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1997), then 
stress related alterations in immune function are likely to have increasing health 
consequences with increasing age. From this perspective it is worth recalling that 
confirmation provided by Seeman’s studies (p94) that the protective effect of so-
cial connection persists into later life. 
                                                             
10i.e. that involving antibody responses. 
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The strongest experimental evidence for the effects of stress relates to wound 
healing (Broadbent et al., 2012:212-7; Broadbent et al., 2003:865 - 869 ; Gouin 
and Kiecolt-Glaser, 2011:81-93; Walburn et al., 2009:253-71) – where the effects 
are not just statistically significant, but large in a substantive and measurable 
clinical sense – and to susceptibility to infectious diseases (Cohen, 2005:123-131). 
However such studies reveal nothing about the actual process behind this effect. 
There are two possible (but not mutually exclusive) scenarios here: social support, 
via structural or functional dimensions alone or in combination, moderates the 
perceived severity of stressors, in other words the modulating effect occurs prior 
to excitation of PNI responses; alternatively there is something about the experi-
ence of relatedness itself that directly affects the components or regulation of PNI 
systems. It is this latter option which this thesis is exploring. 
Studies have looked at psychological, endocrine, and immunological components 
of PNI function in relation to social support networks. A number of large scale re-
views deem social support to be reliably related to a variety of beneficial effects 
on cardiovascular, endocrine and immune systems (Uchino, 2006:377-387; Uchino 
et al., 1996:488-531; Uchino et al., 1999:145-8), with Kiecolt-Glaser concluding 
that the link between personal relationships and immune function is ‘one of the 
most robust findings in PNI’ (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2002a:21). Positive primary rela-
tionships also appear to reduce cardiovascular stress responses (Uno et al., 
2002:243-62). Effects on both cell-mediated and humoural immunity have also 
been demonstrated, with good social contacts consistently correlating with up-
regulation (Moynihan et al., 2004:950-953) and demonstrating improved re-
sponses to vaccination(Glaser et al., 1992:22-9), whereas those with poor con-
tacts consistently demonstrate down-regulation of various immune functions 
(Pressman et al., 2005:297-306). Similarly, interpersonal relationships can also 
modulate cardiovascular and endocrine function in a variety of up- or down-
regulatory ways (McGuire and Kiecolt-Glaser, 2000:136-9). 
Further studies indicate that support can act as a buffer during both acute and 
chronic stressors to protect against immune dysregulation (Esterling et al., 
1990:397-410; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1992; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1991:345-62; Linn 
et al., 1988:230-44; Theorell et al., 1995:32-6; Theorell et al., 1990:511-6; Uchino 
et al., 1996:488-531). The converse also appears to hold, with other studies show-
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ing that in the context of naturalistic stressors such as job stress (Theorell et al., 
1990), dementia care-giving (Esterling et al., 1994), and surgery (Linn et al., 1988), 
lower levels of support are associated with poorer immune function. An impor-
tant point should also be emphasised here, namely that being a provider of sup-
port, especially in the long term, can be detrimental to immune functioning, lead-
ing to down-regulation (Baron et al., 1990:344-52). Studies of spousal care-givers 
in dementia have found them to show depressed cellular immunity and higher 
rates of depression and infectious disease; these effects are most marked in those 
who are chronically stressed and who receive lower levels of support themselves 
(Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1991:345-62). These points will be developed further as part 
of the examination of realised relationality in Chapter 6. 
There has also been some work looking at the effects of social support on immune 
function in cancer sufferers. Here studies looking at gynaecological malignancies 
have shown a correlation between good social support and lower levels of cyto-
kines implicated in tumour oncogenesis (Costanzo et al., 2005:305-13; Lutgendorf 
et al., 2002:808-15) and angiogenesis (Lutgendorf et al., 2000:127-42). Further 
studies by Lutgendorf have also demonstrated an association between good social 
support and positive changes in cellular immune responses in both peripheral 
blood and ascitic (i.e. tumour-related) fluid (Lutgendorf et al., 2005:7105-13) as 
well as in tumours themselves (Antoni and Lutgendorf, 2007:42-6). A study in 
breast cancer patients showed a similar correlation with enhanced levels of im-
mune components active against malignant cells (Levy et al., 1990:73-85). There is 
also evidence from a number of studies that well-supported partners or spouses 
of patients with cancer also have better immune function than those who are less 
so (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1992). Moreover this appears to be a positive correlation 
in its own right, rather than due primarily to higher levels of depression or stress 
in the latter group (Baron et al., 1990). 
In the studies involving patients with HIV/AIDS, the relationship between social 
support and changes in immune markers is less clear cut. A significant volume of 
literature indicates that psychosocial factors influence disease outcomes (see 
Chida and Vedhara, 2009:434-45; Cole, 2001:583-612, for reviews). However stud-
ies of the specific role of social support have produced conflicting results with 
some studies (e.g. Burgoyne, 2005:111-124; Leserman et al., 2000:1221-8; Leser-
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man et al., 2002:1059-73; Persson et al., 2002:184-90; Theorell et al., 1995:32-6) 
indicating a more favourable disease course in those with good support, whilst 
others (e.g. Blomkvist et al., 1994:185-92; Patterson et al., 1996:30-9; Persson et 
al., 1994:580-5) indicated a detrimental effect. This discrepancy may reflect the 
changing trajectory of disease progression in HIV/AIDS – for example participants 
in early studies carried a far higher burden of both AIDS-related bereavement and 
care giving duties. It may also be affected by complex social and identity issues 
involving the gay community amongst whom most of the studies have been car-
ried out (Sloan and Cole, 2007:1062). Studies which looked specifically at immu-
nological function reveal a similar discrepancy: a number show a correlation be-
tween levels of support and CD4+ cell numbers in HIV positive men, particularly 
the rate of decline in cell numbers over time – an important marker of disease 
progression (Persson et al., 1994:580-5; Theorell et al., 1995:32-6). Others though 
have been less successful at establishing a link between social support and immu-
nological disease markers (Goodkin et al., 1992:635-50; Perry et al., 1992:396-
401). Additional difficulties here may stem from the nature of the disease process 
itself however, since not only is the primary locus of disruption within the immune 
system itself, but also the nature of that disruption is overwhelming. 
Another significant group of studies are those looking at PNI function in married 
couples. Marital/partner relationships are a central source of social support and 
are powerfully linked to an individual’s emotional and psychological functioning 
(McGuire and Kiecolt-Glaser, 2000:136). Marital discord has been correlated with 
both poorer wound healing and raised levels of pro-inflammatory cytokines (Kie-
colt-Glaser et al., 2005:1377-84).  Moreover, disruption of close or partner  rela-
tionships whether by bereavement (Bartrop et al., 1997:374-77) or divorce (Kie-
colt-Glaser et al., 1988:213-29) has shown correlations with a depression of im-
mune functioning as measured by a variety of markers. 
Key studies here have been ones looking at aspects of couple interaction: married, 
recently separated or divorced couples, newly weds, and established couples, 
have all been studied interacting, particularly under conditions of stress, and vari-
ous endocrine and immunological markers measured. Such studies have shown 
that marital or relationship ‘quality’ (variably operationalised) correlates with  a 
variety of markers. Typical findings are that recently separated couples have sig-
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nificantly poorer immune function as indicated by a variety of functional meas-
urements; as do those couples with ‘poorer quality’ marital relationships. Immu-
nological changes were not always large but were consistent (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 
1987:13-34). Similarly, separated or divorced men had significantly impaired im-
mune responses in a variety of assays when compared with matched controls 
(Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1988:213-229). Studies looking at behaviour during conflict 
resolution tasks have demonstrated both a down-regulation of immune function 
and an increase in stress hormones in those couples with more abrasive interac-
tions (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1993:395-412). This effect is seen in both new (Malar-
key et al., 1994:41-51) and established marriages (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1997:339-
49). In contrast, spousal support and satisfaction appears to positively moderate 
both hormonal and affective responses to conflict discussion (Heffner et al., 
2006:317-25), the effect again demonstrated in both new and long-established 
marriages. In the latter group, this was particularly marked in the men – possibly 
indicating a relative impoverishment of their other social networks. Positive and 
supportive behaviour during the conflict task itself has also been correlated with 
regulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, a key player in immune sys-
tem excitation (Robles et al., 2006). Finally, and intriguingly, PNI measurements 
might foreshadow later relational changes: one large study looking at immune 
variables in response to conflict discussion in ninety couples in the first year of 
marriage and then after ten years found that initial neuroendocrine function 
measurements were related to marital dissolution and satisfaction 10 years later 
(Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2003a:176-88). These marital studies will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter 6. 
In summary, and despite some of the methodological caveats noted above, there 
would appear to be sufficient weight of evidence to warrant a claim that aspects 
of interpersonal relationships appear to modulate endocrine and immune func-
tion in a variety of ways resulting in both up- and down-regulation of systems. 
Over a wide range of studies, close and supportive relationships consistently cor-
relate with lower levels of stress hormones, stronger immune responses (as 
measured by a variety of parameters), decreased risk of infection, and better 
wound healing. Conversely, social isolation and negative or acrimonious relation-
ships are consistently associated with raised levels of stress hormones, poorer 
immune function (as measured by a number of variables) and higher morbidity. 
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However, there are additional difficulties beyond the practical methodological 
ones which not only make it difficult to definitively attribute causality but also to 
determine and delineate the precise nature of any causal pathways and whether 
they represent direct or indirect effects. 
3.6 Bridging the gap: developing a transversal ap-
proach 
The difficulties inherent in interpreting epidemiological studies, the necessity of 
exercising skilful judgement in so doing, and the absence of any possibility of de-
finitive proof of a hypothesis have already been noted. Similarly, with the PNI data 
presented above, experimentally derived suggestions of a connection between 
the elements under investigation cannot simply be transformed into attributions 
of causality. In part this is due to the methodological issues outlined in 3.5.1 
above, but also to the inherent difficulties in studying such a complex system – 
something which also presents difficulties for determining the clinical significance 
of any laboratory results. 
The neuroendocrine system consists of a vast array of components, intercon-
nected in multiple ways. PNI studies usually involve measurements of a specific 
immune or endocrine component at cellular level and any study can only supply 
information about a very small portion of the processes which may be involved. 
Thus definitive determinations of the degree of overall effect on immune func-
tioning are difficult. Moreover, since system events continuously modify events at 
cellular and higher levels, with consequent effects on other variables in both the 
system and the external environment, it is likely that results from even the best 
constructed experiments may differ significantly. These factors, taken in conjunc-
tion with the correlational nature of the studies, means that there is a big leap 
from laboratory data to any clinical inferences about health-related effects. Thus 
it is impossible to conclude, on the basis of PNI studies alone, that a particular 
variable such as social support directly affects health outcomes via immune 
modulation. The epidemiological studies reviewed do however lend additional 
support to the hypothesis and this opens the possibility of developing a transver-
sal version of the mutually interlocking support described in the previous chapter. 
However the establishment of causality is only part of the issue here. 
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Even were it possible to confidently assert a causal link, from either the PNI or the 
epidemiological data or a combination of the two, it is not immediately deducible 
from these data how this effect is mediated. One likely candidate is the idea that 
social relationships provide a protective effect by decreasing stress in various 
ways. In PNI terms this would situate the primary locus of action as thus prior to 
CNS excitation: because of social connection and attendant support, the per-
ceived severity of the stressors is lessened, CNS response is moderated and PNI 
effects ameliorated accordingly. Thus the immune and endocrine systems are pro-
tected from outside the system. However a second possibility is that the func-
tional response of PNI systems to CNS stimulation is being directly moderated in 
some way by the experiences of relationality. Here there are again two possible 
scenarios: Firstly that that this moderation occurs simply during the stressful 
events themselves (the ‘stress-buffering’ model); secondly that relational connec-
tion might in some way effect biological systems irrespective of whether people 
are under stress (the ‘main effect’ model). The idea that there may be different 
pathways at work is not a new one (Cohen and Wills, 1985:310-57) and studies 
correlating social support with reinforcement of components of both innate and 
acquired immunity (Miyazaki et al., 2005:30-37) suggest social support affects 
immune function in a way consonant with both stress-buffering and direct effects, 
though the mechanisms themselves remain unclear. 
The question then is whether, given the data and experimental limitations and 
difficulties outlined, it is possible to actually establish any causal connection or to 
investigate its potential mechanisms. Essentially this would seem to be a scenario 
of the kind alluded to earlier where questions have been raised within a discipline 
which cannot then necessarily be answered solely from within its own knowledge 
and resource base. The possibility thus opens up for the kind of transversal explo-
ration outlined in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the data from the different 
disciplinary perspectives on the connection between relationality and health pre-
sented in this chapter appear to form a good basis from which to begin such an 
attempt. Theology and neuroscience (as represented by PNI) clearly have a shared 
interest in exploring the links between relational connection and health; more-
over both theology and cognitive neuroscience have a shared interest in exploring 
the nature and enabling of relational connection in human persons. Thus there 
are at least two transecting lines here between the disciplines - one of van 
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Huyssteen’s cardinal hallmarks for identifying a potential transversal space to be 
opened up. 
The notion of relationality will thus be taken as a suitable location for the siting of 
a transversal dialogue between theology and neuroscience. Within this however, I 
want to further specify three specific arenas for exploration and exchange which 
will each then operate as a separate transversal space for which relevant contri-
butions can be identified, examined and validated. These three sub sections are: 
relationality as basic; relationality as emergent; and relationality as realised. The 
first will address the role that the capability for making relational connection plays 
in the nature of humanness; the second will consider whether this capacity is ex-
plicable simply in terms of the possession of cognitive apparatus for various de-
coding tasks; and the third will examine the different ways in which such connec-
tion can be realised and experienced, and the possible effects of these. In each 
case, the transversal dialogue will draw on different material from the disciplines 
in different combinations. It will also take a somewhat different form each time, 
as a way of exploring various possible ways of generating transversal outputs. The 
aim of this three stage dialogical sequence is twofold: to build a case via the ‘per-
vasive relations of mutual support’ envisaged by Haack (2009:57) for a direct 
causal link between relational connection and health, and to explore and eluci-
date something more of its nature. The contention advanced will be that relation-
ality represents an emergent phenomenon of cognitive function and thus its op-
erational shape can directly moderate aspects of the systems which give rise to it. 
The first step in this process is to establish to what extent the capacity for rela-
tional connection is a basic aspect of what it is to be a person, and what form this 
takes. This is the locus of the first transversal space engagement – which will be 
between theology and cognitive neuroscience – and will be the subject matter of 
Chapter 4. 
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In the Beginning is Relation 
Relationality as basic 
 
To be and to be in relation becomes identical. 
(Zizioulas, 1985:88, original emphasis) 
 
When the eyes say one thing and the tongue an-
other, a practiced man relies on the language of 
the first.  
(Emerson, 1860/2004:77) 
 
The sense of gesture is not given but understood, 
that is, it is recaptured by an act on the specta-
tor’s part […] It is as if the other person’s inten-
tions inhabited my body, and mine his. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002:215) 
 
4.1 Introduction and outline 
The first step in the transversal project proposed at the end of the previous chap-
ter is to explore the extent to which relational capacity can be said to be constitu-
tive of humanness. The understanding that humans are fundamentally social crea-
tures is hardly a novel one: from the ancient Hebraic ideas of shālôm outlined in 
Chapter 3, and on through the poetic imagery of Donne’s much-loved Devotion 
XVII, to the Zulu maxim ‘Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’11, the idea has been pre-
sent through time and across cultures. Whilst the Cartesian turn-to-self inevitably 
triggered a fading of this apprehension in the West, an increasing discomfort with 
solipsistic accounts of humanness has recently fuelled a resurgence of interest in 
the social nature of humankind in a wide range of academic spheres. In the bio-
logical sciences, this has seen the emergence of social neuroscience with its explo-
rations of  the neural underpinnings of social behaviour; in theology it has stimu-
lated a resurgence of interest in social understandings of the Trinity and the sig-
nificance of these for praxis (e.g. Boff, 2000; Cunningham, 1998; Fiddes, 2000; 
Swinton, 2000), thereby generating a wealth of thick theological reflection. 
                                                             
11 ‘A person is a person through (other) persons’. 
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It is these two fields which will provide the voices for the first transversal space 
engagement between theology and neuroscience and in keeping with the meth-
odological imperatives regarding selection and evaluation of material discussed in 
Chapter 2, each will be subject to critical scrutiny in relevant areas. In the case of 
theology, this involves demonstrating that the material put forward has been de-
veloped in ways consonant with the employment of postfoundational rationality. 
With respect to the scientific contribution, it takes the form of highlighting some 
of the issues connected to the tools used to investigate cognitive processes. Fur-
ther observations in keeping with the epistemic evaluation criteria previously out-
lined will also be offered at appropriate places in the subsequent examination of 
the theological and scientific material. 
Section 2 thus begins with a general examination of why the development and 
nature of the theological canons make them a suitable source of material for 
transversal space dialogue, before considering more specifically the suitability of 
the social trinitarianism of the Cappadocian Fathers as a contributor in this par-
ticular instance. Their revolutionary understanding of personhood is then used as 
a lens through which to reconfigure another potent and pertinent motif – creation 
in the imago Dei – as a further theological contribution. Here I argue that for each 
of the three ways this idea of human uniqueness has traditionally been inter-
preted, a ‘relational’ re-reading is not only valid, but also provides valuable insight 
for understanding the connection between humanness and relationality.  
Section 3 introduces the scientific contribution by looking at a variety of issues to 
do with the use of dynamic imaging technology, the extent to which it accurately 
represents cognitive functioning, and to the inferences that can be drawn from 
such studies. It then examines whether neurobiological evidence supports a con-
tention that relational capacity is an essential element of humanness. Here, two 
key areas are explored: the decoding of biological signals, and the activity of so-
called mirror neuron systems (MNS). These are both increasingly seen as provid-
ing vital biological bases for social interaction and are currently the subjects of 
intensive investigation – although some of the extrapolations from this are con-
troversial. Once again, as with PNI studies, material drawn on is indicative rather 
than comprehensive. The final section of the chapter brings these theological and 
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neurobiological explorations together to generate a transversal outcome to be 
carried forward as the basis for the next stage of the dialogue. 
4.2 The theological voice 
The Christian tradition contains a wealth of different canons – curatorial bodies of 
texts, doctrines, symbols, rituals etc. – relating to specific areas of thought and 
action. The strong contention offered in Chapter 1 and 2 that material from these 
can be put forward and defended as a suitable transversal partner for experimen-
tal neuroscience raises a number of significant questions to be addressed. Firstly, 
and of particular importance in this chapter, can understandings formed in re-
sponse to philosophical or theological issues which may have long since disap-
peared, contribute insights which can still be interfaced with those of modern 
neuroscience? Secondly, can material evolved in connection with particular reli-
gious questions, be used in a dialogue whose intent extends beyond specific 
apologetics? The answer to these questions, and thus to the defence of the se-
lected material, lies in understanding the nature of the theological canons them-
selves, and then in using the critical tools of postfoundational rationality to select 
and develop appropriate material from within these. 
4.2.1 Galaxies and constellations: canons and their contents 
As noted in Chapter 2, both conceptual development and experimental investiga-
tion within science are contextually embedded in particular research traditions 
and communities. One result is the generation of (sometimes radically) different 
paradigms of understanding clustered around key concepts under exploration. 
Similarly the development of theological ideas over the unfolding course of Chris-
tianity has produced varied (though not necessarily mutually exclusive) under-
standings on many key points. In a sense this is simply a reflection of the epis-
temic themes already rehearsed regarding the contextual situatedness of inter-
preted experience: different moments in history and the influence of different 
philosophical or cultural backgrounds generate different questions and emphases. 
Unsurprisingly then, within the various canons that make up the Christian tradi-
tion, specific theological understandings of key topics tend to evolve and change 
both as to formulation and emphases. Furthermore, the relative prominence of 
any canon within the total corpus of theological endeavour advances and recedes 
under the same dynamic. These features are perfectly illustrated by the history of 
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thinking related to the themes of the Trinity and the imago Dei employed in this 
chapter, which are both currently undergoing a resurgence of exploration and re-
development in the light of recent changes in both the philosophical climate and 
scientific understandings. 
Canonical collections are not however, simply loose aggregations from which any 
bricolage can be assembled at whim; neither are they inflexible deposits impervi-
ous to interpretative variation. Instead Brown (1994:55-74) has proposed the use-
ful cosmological analogy of a galaxy: less circumscribed in form and trajectory 
than a planet and less arbitrary than a constellation, galaxies nevertheless have 
both gravitational centre and recognisable form but the latter varies according to 
the time and direction of viewing. Similarly canons comprise ‘dynamic, richly plu-
ral and pluriform’ collections of sometimes conflictual ideas which generate their 
own gravitational pull of meaning on the wider tradition.  However this ‘pull’ is 
itself the product of the vast and complex array of possible meanings within the 
canon and of how these are, at any one time, construed (Brown, 1994:76-7). Thus, 
whilst retaining a core identity, canonical galaxies also give rise to different con-
stellations of meaning, constructed through interaction with the different contex-
tual challenges presented by different moments in history. The canon is not in 
itself a definitive answer or truth claim therefore – rather, its normative character 
is the depth of its fecundity, and its value is 
not the permanence of its solutions but the ‘size’ of its re-
sources. Size means the multiplicity of visions it harbours, but 
it also means the fluidity with which it adapts meaningfully to 
changing circumstances (Brown, 1994:81). 
In effect then, the emergence of different perspectives on key concepts, which 
are both connected to the core idea and responsive to the contextual situation, is 
not only a natural part of the canonical dynamic, but also necessary for the con-
tinued vitality of thinking within the Christian tradition. One can also argue 
strongly that it is indicative of both the employment of the gathering, binding, and 
evaluating tools of postfoundational rationality described in Chapter 2, and the 
continual search for the optimal understanding and increased problem solving 
capability which van Huyssteen designates as the hallmarks of the reconfigured 
epistemic task. The evolution of different readings of the imago Dei outlined later 
in the chapter, and the further development subsequently offered, is an illustra-
tion of this. 
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Thus theological canons by their very nature comprise rich collections of re-
sources which can both contribute to, and benefit from, engagement with scien-
tific perspectives in transversal dialogue. This does not however mean that all ma-
terial they contain is suitable for the kind of work envisaged here. As discussed in 
Chapter 2 this, whilst acknowledging and retaining connection with the formative 
traditions in which experience is set and interpreted, also contains the absolute 
imperative to step outside of and stand in critical relation to these. Any material 
which is linked to fideistic claims to a special logic internal to theology, or to self-
authenticating notions of divine revelation, and which also then claims privileged 
protection for these, is inadmissible to any transversal neurotheological dialogue 
aimed at a noegenesis which is generally appropriative. This then leads to the 
second question as to whether and how it is possible to use specific theological 
material without this necessitating a concomitant acceptance of other features of 
its generative framework. Here the nature of the topic under examination is criti-
cal: many of the most prominent interactions between science and theology both 
past and current have involved topics – creation, general and special divine action, 
spiritual experiences, soul, death and resurrection – which concern in some way 
or other the nature of the relationship of God (however conceived) to the world 
and the cosmos. However these require the acceptance of certain starting reli-
gious assumptions and thus have associated difficulties to negotiate; hence such 
interactions tend to become constrained into the apologetic outcomes which 
seem to be the hallmark of much science/religion debate. 
However topics with a primary focus on the divine by no means exhaust the pos-
sible contributions which theology can make to exploration of the world. By its 
very nature, the religious framework has produced not only many different ques-
tions about what it is to be human, but also a wide range of material through 
which to rationally reflect on and grapple with these. Moreover, some of the un-
derstandings arising through this process, whilst they may have begun from reli-
gious questions, can be understood completely separately from them. From the 
dialogical perspective, this has two consequences: firstly, since the theological 
contribution does not depend on non-negotiable religious elements, all aspects of 
it can be opened up to critical inspection within the transversal space, thus fulfill-
ing the necessary conditions of epistemic responsibility; secondly, since such in-
sights are not inextricably tied to a specific religious Weltenschauung, their accep-
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tance by other participating voices does not require a simultaneous assent to par-
ticular religious propositions or doctrinal formulations. Once again the evaluative 
skills of rationality, operating under the epistemic guidelines set out in Chapter 2, 
can enable the identification of material within the theological canons with the 
potential to be used in this way. 
It is from these bases that the two particular theological contributions to this dia-
logue have been selected. They also explain the apparent paradox of a starting 
point which at first sight seems to be both esoteric and inescapably religious – the 
Cappadocian exploration of the internal relations of the Trinity. However, whilst 
originally undertaken to articulate a clearer understanding of God in the face of 
specific philosophical heresies, it also produced a radical reorientation of Classical 
Greek humanism and, in so doing, gave rise to important insights into the connec-
tion between person and relation. These have been recovered and further devel-
oped as part of the 20th century shift in the canonical galaxy of trinitarian thinking 
already alluded to, and it is as they pertain to the human experience and expres-
sion of relationality that they are of interest here. Thus the justification for the 
material is not one of it being religious truth, but of it being a rationally developed 
perspective on the role of relationality in the definition of personhood, and the 
following account of how the doctrine evolved functions to establish its rational, 
not its religious credentials. 
Similarly the doctrine of the imago Dei also represents a core tradition of the 
Christian faith – arguably one of its earliest and most enduring ones. Essentially it 
represents the attempt to explore within the Christian framework the feeling – 
held across times and cultures – that humanity is somehow a special kind, differ-
ent from the rest of the natural order. Once again the concept is not chosen be-
cause it expresses an inarguable religiously revealed truth, but because it intro-
duces different perspectives which theological reflection has, under various stim-
uli, produced on this apparently ubiquitous apprehension. This particular canon is 
also, under the turn to relationality, currently experiencing a ‘galactic shift’ in 
which these understandings are advancing in new directions. Grenz (2001) for 
example has recently undertaken an extensive ecclesial/eschatological treatment 
of the imago, while van Huyssteen (2006) has produced a very different and de-
tailed exploration from an evolutionary viewpoint. The project here is the much 
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more modest one of re-evaluating, through engagement with the Cappadocian 
insights into relationality, the classic substantive, functional, and relational under-
standings of the imago Dei. Although this draws on religious material and ideas, 
the understandings which are developed are not tied to the acceptance of specific 
religious propositions, but stand in the line of a postfoundational accountability. 
As such, and in the subsequent interaction with neuroscience, this represents a 
response to Welker’s challenge to demonstrate that fundamental core concepts 
from historic Christian thought can still provide valuable stimuli and insights for 
contemporary understanding (Welker, 1999:2-4). 
4.2.2 Social trinitarianism 
The doctrine of the trinity is no longer ‘one of the best-kept secrets in theology’ 
(Peters, 1993:7). Instead, in response to changes in the philosophical climate (see 
Shults, 2003:11-32 for an overview of this), it has become a focus of exploration 
across ‘nearly every ecclesiological tradition and theological persuasion’ (Grenz, 
2004:1). Amongst these, the recovery, restatement, and development of the so-
cial trinitarianism of the 4th century Cappadocian Fathers, particularly by Zizioulas 
(1985; 2006), has been important both in its own right and as a stimulus to other 
developments (Grenz, 2004:134; Russell, 2003:169). Some of the technical aspects 
of Zizioulas’ model have been criticised (e.g. Torrance, 1996:288-93), and other 
aspects of his reading have divided opinion (e.g. Papanikolaou, 2004:601-7; 
Turcescu, 2002:530-36). However his interpretation and development of Cappa-
docian trinitarianism has served as the basis for a wide variety of relational the-
ologies, with even his sternest critics appropriating and building on some of his 
fundamental insights (Grenz, 2004:145). Since the main interest here is not trini-
tarian technicalities per se, I will not discuss this aspect in detail (but see Grenz, 
2004:139-47; LaCugna, 1991:53-79; Zizioulas, 1995 op cit., for detailed accounts 
and extensive primary references). Instead the focus will be on the insights into 
human relationality arising from the Cappadocian model as analysed by Zizioulas. 
Far from being an esoteric pursuit involving abstract metaphysical speculation, 
the origins and development of trintarian thought were grounded in the practi-
calities of explaining experience and establishing identity: a key differentiating 
feature between Christianity and its parent religion being the former’s very differ-
ent experience of God. Against the background of Yichud Hashem – the unity of 
God proclaimed in Deut 6:4 and constantly reiterated in the “Adonai Eloheinu, 
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Adonai Echad”12 of the shema, the early church had to attempt to make sense of 
what it understood to be a threefold experience of God in revelation, incarnation, 
and salvation. Thus it had to reconcile oikonomia (salvation history) with theologia 
(the mystery of God) in a way consistent with the monotheism that was both its 
core heritage and vital to its distinctive identity in a polytheistic world.  This com-
plex process extended over several centuries and was marked by distinct stages of 
development – often stimulated by the challenges of the prevailing philosophical 
climate.  As such it clearly demonstrates identified features consistent with a post-
foundational understanding of both rationality in action and the nature of the 
epistemic quest. 
It was as in response to two such challenges that the Cappadocians made their 
vital contribution to understandings of the place of relational connection. During 
the course of this they fundamentally changed the concept and status of person-
hood, and in so doing instigated a revolution in Greek philosophy (Zizioulas, 
1985:36). Up until this point of the 4th century, the prevailing philosophy (both 
Greek and Roman) held that ‘personhood’ (prosopon) – i.e. one’s own unique 
identity/attributes – was something completely separate from and additional to, 
one’s essential nature (ousia or hypostasis). In effect prosopon, as its original the-
atrical meaning indicates, was a mask held in front of ousia: the nature which ex-
isted behind the mask was primary, and the mask itself, the persona, merely a 
secondary identity in relation to this. However in response to Sabellius’ claim that 
Father, Son, and Spirit were simply roles assumed by God and not full persons in 
the ontological sense, the Cappadocians produced a radical reconception of the 
nature of being. This involved firstly a linguistic and philosophical clarification 
which overturned the classical ontological primacy of substance and bestowed it 
instead on personhood – a complete reversal of the mask scenario outlined 
above. In this, ousia and hypostasis were firstly decoupled and then differentiated 
into a general predicate and its particular instance; the illustrative argument being 
that while there was one human nature (ousia), there were many human persons, 
and each of these could clearly only embody part of human nature since this sur-
vives their death. Hence individuals were not ousiai but hypostases (Basil, 
Ep.236.6; 38.5). Secondly they forged a never-previously made link between hy-
postasis and prosopon – essentially conjoining an ontological term with a socio-
                                                             
12 “The Lord is our God, the Lord is One” 
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logical concept. By so doing, they elevated the ontological status of personhood 
to a constitutive part of being itself (Zizioulas, 1985:39). Thus personhood was no 
longer to be seen as simply an adjunct of being, but rather as its actual hypostasis: 
the ontological principle is thus understood not as consisting in the ousia but in 
the hypostasis i.e. the person. This was a radical departure from Classical under-
standings, indeed it stood in opposition to all the Greek ontology against whose 
background it had been thought (Gunton, 1997:10; Jacobs, 2008:331-58 ). 
The second crucial Cappadocian contribution was the establishment of an un-
breakable connection between personhood and relation. This time the stimulus 
was the extreme Arianism of Eunomius who, in claiming that the ousia of God was 
his ‘unbegotteness’, thus excluded the Son (declared by Nicaea to be ‘begotten’) 
from the Trinity. Once again the notion of person was to prove critical: in this in-
stance Cappadocian thought resulted firstly in the establishment of a clear and 
fundamental distinction between person and nature (Zizioulas, 1995:50), and sec-
ondly, in making a crucial link between person and relationship. Essentially they 
argued that since Father, Son, and Spirit share the same substance, their particu-
lar identities must come from the different properties of their personhood viz un-
begottenness, begotteness and spiration. Such properties were unique to each 
individual and could not be communicated between them in the same way that 
their identical substance could. This definition of each person of the Trinity 
through the unique characteristics of their individual hypostasis rather than their 
shared substance allowed the new conception of ‘person’ as a distinct ontological 
category to emerge more clearly. It also underlined the idea that personhood is 
‘known and identified through its absolute uniqueness and irreplaceability’ 
(Zizioulas, 1995:50). 
The second significant element was their insight that the unique characteristic of 
each hypostasis within the Trinity existed only because of the relationship (sche-
sis) between the Father, Son and Spirit: ‘The Father is the name neither of sub-
stance, nor energy but of schesis’ (Gregory Naziansus Or. 29). In a radical depar-
ture from the classical Aristotelian categorisation of ‘relation’ as an accident with 
no influence on the nature of substance, or role in defining it, ‘Person’ finally 
emerges as a distinct identity which only makes sense in relationship: as their 
trinitarian names imply, none of its persons can be conceived without reference 
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to the others, either logically or ontologically (Zizioulas, 1995:50). Thus ‘being’ can 
be understood as simultaneously both hypostatic and relational – in Zizioulus’ fa-
mous maxim: ‘To be  and to be in relation becomes identical’ (Zizioulas, 1985:88). 
This also gave rise to a very dynamic model of the Trinity in which there was a 
continuous movement of each person towards and through the others whereby 
the divine substance and life was shared, and relational identity was formed, but 
within which unique identity was also preserved. Whilst the mechanisms of this 
mutual interpenetration and indwelling (perichoresis/circumincession), belonging 
as they did to the interior life of the Trinity, were seen as remaining forever mys-
terious, what could be understood was that it allowed the members of the Trinity 
to retain their individual uniqueness whilst still sharing in the life of each other. 
Moreover this movement, in its transcending of personal boundaries as part of a 
‘communion of love’, reveals ekstasis (moving out beyond oneself) as also being 
an essential component of relatedness (Zizioulas, 1985:46-7). The relevance of 
these aspects of the model to the emergent and realised dimensions of relational-
ity will be addressed in the following chapters. 
The question under consideration in this chapter however is whether relationality 
is a basic constituent of human being. The Cappadocian model of the social Trinity 
provides some vital input into this in various ways. In their moves to develop an 
optimal understanding of the nature of God, in response to particular experience 
and against a specific philosophical backdrop, the Cappadocians also produced a 
profound exploration and articulation of the nature of personhood itself. This es-
tablished both its ontological nature and demonstrated that persons cannot exist 
in isolation: since personal identity is established through relationship, ‘otherness’ 
is a necessary ingredient in the realisation of personhood, allowing the emergence 
of unique and irreplaceable entities. The Cappadocian anthropology is thus one in 
which relationality is understood as an essential part of both human being and of 
human becoming. This understanding that personhood necessitates a dialectic of 
individuation and participation is remarkably prescient – anticipating the insights 
of writers such as Marcel (1948/2002), Macmurray (1961) and Tillich. Indeed the 
latter’s comment that ‘when individualisation reaches the perfect form which we 
call a person, participation reaches the perfect form which we call communion’ 
(Tillich, 1951:176) would not seem out of place in a Cappadocian treatise. 
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Aspects of these understandings of the role of relationality in human becoming 
will be developed as part of the conversations in Chapters 5 and 6. With respect 
to the current dialogue however, the focus is on its role in human being. Here 
there are two important elements to bring forward: firstly that relationality is an 
integral part of personhood, an understanding which stands in sharp contradis-
tinction to the growing individualism which has marked the Western view since 
Boethius pronounced a person to be ‘naturae rationabilis, individua substantia’13 
(Contra Eutychem III.4). The diametric nature of this prevailing view is beautifully 
captured in Fiddes’ acute observation that in current usage, to have a product 
personalised is actually to have it individualised and privatised (Fiddes, 2000:17). 
The Cappadocian anthropology thus presents us with an insight on humanness 
which is radically different but which, as will become clear, is very much sup-
ported by and supports the current understandings of social neuroscience. Sec-
ondly, it suggests that relationality is not a later addition to the equation of hu-
manness but a vital element from the outset. Thus relationship is not something 
extra which individuals can choose to enter or not enter into. Again this stands in 
contrast to the usual assumption that relationships exist between i.e. that they 
are only possible subsequent to the existence of two or more discrete entities 
(Cunningham, 1998:165). This is a theme which will be expanded further in Chap-
ter 6 through the thought of Gabriel Marcel. 
What emerges therefore from the Cappadocian contribution to trinitarian theol-
ogy is a rationally developed understanding, from a non-scientific viewpoint, that 
somehow, the capacity for relational connection is a foundational aspect of what 
it is to be a human person. Whilst these insights can stand as a contribution in 
their own right to the chapter’s transversal endeavour, they also serve as a lens 
through which, under the guidance of postfoundational rationality, the second of 
the selected theological themes – that of the imago Dei – can be re-examined. 
4.2.3 The imago Dei  
The idea that humankind is somehow distinctively different to the rest of the 
natural order is widespread across time and culture. In Christianity, this has been 
expressed through the enduring and potent motif of the imago Dei. However the 
concept itself has always been, for a variety of reasons, distinctly enigmatic. 
                                                             
13 An individual substance of a rational nature. 
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Firstly, the form in which this ‘fundamental and unique statement of biblical an-
thropology and theology’ is couched in Gen 1:26-7: 
Then God said, ‘Let us make humankind in our image, accord-
ing to our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of 
the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and 
over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping 
thing that creeps upon the earth.’ … So God created human-
kind in his image, in the image of God he created them; male 
and female he created them.  
is ‘limited in its content, guarded in its expression, and complex in its structure’ 
(Bird, 1981:130). Furthermore, the biblical texts themselves subsequently provide 
no systematic theory as to its intended meaning, and direct references are limited 
to a scant handful in the Priestly tradition writings at Gen 1:26-7, Gen 5:1-3, and 
Gen 9:6. The motif is also conspicuously absent from both the rest of the Penta-
teuch and the Prophetic writings. There is thus a striking discrepancy between its 
centrality in tradition and its minimal place in the canonical texts. 
Additionally the precise meaning and significance of selem (image) and demut 
(likeness) is not clear from the text itself, and usage elsewhere is both abstract 
and concrete (Grenz, 2001:186-7). Moreover, neither of the two New Testament 
instances in which a directly analogous wording is used (1Cor 11:7 uses eikon, the 
Septuagint rendering of selem; James 2:3 uses homioiosis, its equivalent term for 
demut) are helpful in elucidating the actual meaning of the Genesis texts. Thus 
whether the terms are simply interchangeable, whether they each convey some-
thing subtly different, or whether the motif is in fact a theologoumenon whose 
primary purpose is to say something about God rather than about humankind 
(Barr, 1994:170), have all been widely debated. Despite these difficulties the 
statement is seen as representing a rare instance of the Old Testament canon of-
fering a very direct and definitive statement concerning the nature of the rela-
tionship between God, humanity, and the wider creation. As such it has exerted a 
peculiar fascination for both theologians and textual exegetes throughout Chris-
tian history. 
In fact the potency of the trope is such that despite exhaustive exegetical treat-
ments of the texts and the existence of substantial consensus between biblical 
scholars on linguistic/textual matters (Bird, 1981:129-30), the subject continues to 
give rise to richly detailed theological exploration and articulation. Such endeav-
ours reflect the understanding, in keeping with the canonical dynamic outlined, 
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that the meaning of such a central motif is neither exhausted nor absolutely con-
strained by the original authorial intent. On the contrary, not only is it open to 
further exploration and reworking in the light of ongoing evolutions of human 
knowledge and understanding, but there is an imperative to do so since ‘[e]ach 
century has the task of elaborating its thought ever anew on the basis of that in-
destructible symbol’(Ricoeur, 1965:110). Here, once again then, there are various 
indications of the dynamics of postfoundational rationality and its associated epis-
temic quest at work. 
For the reasons already indicated, the focus in this chapter is not on issues of tex-
tual analysis per se (Grenz, 2001:186-203, has extensive references to key de-
bates). Instead the interest is in the three historic theological perspectives on the 
motif – substantive, functional, and relational – as these reflect rational attempts 
to understand human uniqueness using the matter of a particular religious 
framework. Various aspects of these perspectives can rightly be criticised, particu-
larly in the light of evolving social and ecological understandings, but this does not 
devalue their primary underlying insights. Nor does it preclude the possibility of 
re-imaging them – indeed to do so is to simultaneously obey the command im-
plicit in Ricoeur’s assertion and to respond to Welker’s challenge (p114). A re-
examination in conversation with the insights outlined in the previous section is 
thus proposed. Whilst the dangers of ‘social model euphoria’ (Horrell, 2004:419) 
and the attendant risk of projection (Kilby, 2000:432-45) are ever present, a post-
foundational approach provides both tools and mechanisms to guard against an 
uncritical projection of prior commitments into the endeavour. Since the litera-
ture on each position is extensive, only a brief delineation of development, key 
elements, and issues is possible (but see Berkouwer, 1962:67-118; Grenz, 
2001:141-82; Herzfeld, 2002:16-33; Shults, 2003:217-42; van Huyssteen, 
2006:126-45 ; and Welker, 1999:60-73 for detailed accounts). For each position its 
core idea will also be reviewed and re-formulated in conjunction with insights 
from the social trinitarianism of the Cappadocians. These also allow the substan-
tive, functional, and relational readings of the imago Dei to be brought together in 
a mutually illuminating way; and one moreover which has an important contribu-
tion to make to this first transversal engagement. 
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4.2.3.1 The imago Dei as a substantive property 
This earliest – and historically most influential – reading in Western thought sees 
the imago as inhering in a particular property or capacity of human nature. Even 
prior to early Christian musings, reason was seen to be the prime candidate for 
this: Philo of Alexander declaring that ‘The term image has been used here with 
respect to the director of the soul, the intellect’ (On the creation of the cosmos 
according to Moses 12.69). Under the influence of the prevailing Greek philosophy 
this idea rapidly gained ascendancy and became established as the dominant in-
terpretation. Unfortunately since reason was at that time perceived as essentially 
a male characteristic, this subverted the clear implication of the Genesis texts that 
all humans participate in the imago Dei regardless of gender or generation 
(Herzfeld, 2002:13). It also served to introduce a misogynistic element into the 
heart of the doctrine which became (and, in some contexts, continues to be) a 
source of discrimination against and oppression of women, and thus ultimately a 
very distorting influence on this reading. 
The linkage between mind and image was further reinforced by Augustine: 
There is no doubt that man was made in the image of God, not 
according to the body, nor according to any part of the soul, 
but according to the rational mind wherein the knowledge of 
God can exist (De Trinitate 12.7.12)  
and this in turn exerted a significant influence on the later developments of Aqui-
nas, Luther, and Calvin (van Huyssteen, 2006:128-32). More recently the Augus-
tinian line was developed by Niebuhr who, following Heidegger, expanded the 
idea of reason to include the capacity for self-transcendence (Niebuhr, 
1943/1996:161-2). However this capacity, whilst going beyond reason, was still 
understood as being a function of it (Niebuhr, 1963:25). At the same time, whilst 
holding the body to be a defining part of our nature, Niebuhr also saw it as sepa-
rate from the imago and thus bodily nature as standing in perpetual tension over 
and against this. 
Some variant of this appeal to rationality/reason continues to predominate where 
substantive readings of the imago Dei are invoked. However it has tended, be-
cause of its associated difficulties, to be superseded by functional and relational 
understandings which do not have these particular difficulties and whose own 
associated issues are possibly seen as less acute. As such, this is clearly in keeping 
with Laudan’s understanding of progress as set out in Chapter 2. However the 
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primacy, potency, and persistence of the substantive view are indicative of a 
powerful, deeply intuitive element to this way of understanding the imago. Ar-
guably then it is worth re-evaluating despite its inherent weaknesses. Setting 
aside the problems already noted which specifically relate to the designation of 
reason as a locus, these take two main forms (Herzfeld, 2002:19-20). Firstly, all 
substantive interpretations essentially see the imago in individualistic terms, of-
ten then entailing frank or crypto dualism – as Niebuhr’s variation clearly illus-
trates. Moreover, the resultant hierarchy of traits is almost invariably detrimental 
to understandings of the body and embodiment. Secondly, locating likeness in the 
existence of a necessary element which corresponds to a similar element in God 
produces an understanding which is essentially static: if the analogia entis rests 
simply in the possession of an attribute, then neither responsibility nor effort is 
entailed – there is no call to response or need for human effort to make up some 
moiety which is lacking for the fullness of the image. Ricoeur’s criticism here is 
acute: 
The image of God is we believe the very personal and solitary 
power to think and to choose; it is interiority.  According to 
such an atomistic interpretation of the image of God, I am an 
image of God and you are an image of God, but the facts of his-
tory cannot be coordinated with this divine stamp which is 
passive, immutable and subjective (Ricoeur, 1965:111). 
However, the understandings discussed in 2.2 offer the possibility of overcoming 
these two problems by pointing towards a shift in the locus of the image-bearing 
capacity from reason to relation. This might at first sight appear to be simply con-
flating the substantive reading with the relational one which will be discussed 
shortly. However what I am proposing here is not simply a restatement of the 
Barthian view (p125 below) that likeness resides in the relationship with 
God/other. Instead it is one in which the substantive element is seen as indicating 
that both the possibility and necessity of relationship are a constitutive element of 
humanness. Defining the likeness in this way leaves it far less susceptible to 
charges of inappropriate individualism. Moreover, since it cannot be localised to 
particular areas or functions, and depends on embodiment for its realisation, then 
such a recasting also provides a way of negotiating the hierarchical and dualistic 
issues indicated above. Furthermore it enables a response to the second criticism 
of substantive readings since, according to the Cappadocian understanding, the 
role which relationality plays in constituting specific identity is far from static. 
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However this is an element which needs further development; and this is some-
thing which can be supplied by a similarly reconfigured functional understanding 
of the imago.  
4.2.3.2 The imago Dei as a functional responsibility 
Functional interpretations, developed mainly by OT exegetical scholars, have a 
much shorter lineage. However their advent early in the early 20th century signifi-
cantly displaced substantive readings, replacing them with a much more dynamic 
understanding. Von Rad’s proposal, taking up an earlier suggestion made by Hehn 
(1915:36-52,), and drawing on both linguistic analysis and extra-biblical resources, 
was that the imago texts of Genesis 1 were less to do with the nature of the im-
age than with its purpose. Building on a comparative exegesis of the word selem 
(von Rad, 1973:57-60) he argued that Man was ‘God’s sovereign emblem’ and 
that hence ‘The decisive thing about man’s similarity to God therefore is his func-
tion in the non-human world (ibid:60)’. Substantive accounts were further dis-
missed on the grounds that since the Priestly author is generally at pains to stress 
the infinite qualitative difference between God and man – for example the Gen 
2:7 designation of men as dust – he is unlikely to be implying a shared attribute 
between the two (von Rad, 1964:390). The proposal was that the imago should be 
understood not as in inhering in an attribute we posses but located instead in the 
performance of a task we are called upon to undertake. Such a reading is not un-
disputed: Westermann for example is both sceptical about the use of extra-
biblical resources to define selem, and critical of the contextual understandings 
which are evidenced (Westermann, 1984:24-5). Nevertheless it has become the 
favoured view amongst exegetes. 
However this reading, whilst it may resolve some of the problems associated with 
a the substantive view, brings new ones: the textual interpretations of selem as 
akin to the images set up by kings to establish their sovereignty over land give it 
something of a viceregal ‘feel’. This, alongside the close conjunction of the words 
in the Genesis 1 text, has led to this task being envisaged almost exclusively in 
terms of dominion over creation. Moreover, given the vigour of the language 
which the text employs to describe such dominion – rādā means ‘trample’ and 
kābaš ‘stamp’ (von Rad, 1973:60) – this has in turn come to be interpreted in a 
very specific way: humankind in God’s image becomes the ‘maître et possesseur 
de la nature’ of Descartes’ famous designation (Discourse on Method: 6). Equally 
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unsurprisingly, such readings have been the source of much disquiet and criticism. 
Both of these have increased with the escalation of ecological uncertainties and 
disasters precipitated by the human exploitation of the natural world. Assorted 
theological and exegetical attempts have been made to address some of these 
difficulties, for example a move to the more relational focus discussed below, or 
the proposal of alternative exegetical readings (Bird, 1981:129-59), and under-
standings of dominion (Welker, 1999:60-73). Nevertheless acute problems remain 
for any functional readings tied to the notion of dominion. However in the light of 
relational perspectives set out earlier, and against the wider context of the 
Priestly tradition in Genesis, a different reading is possible which sees a move 
from dominion to shālôm. 
The theme of chaos is a prominent element in the background of the primary 
imago text. Genesis 1, the distillation of the Priestly knowledge into concentrated 
form, essentially deals with the imposition of order on chaos: from the first move 
against the primal threat of the Tohuwabohu, via a series of separations and nam-
ings, disorder is progressively driven out and order and structure gradually 
achieved. As such the text reflects both the Priestly perspective that ‘Chaos is the 
great menace to creation’(von Rad, 1962/2001:144) and the overall soteriological 
focus of the canon (von Rad, 1964:392; 1973:60). Against this background, and in 
conjunction with the relational insights discussed in section 4.2.2, a new devel-
opment of the functional perspective – one in which the purpose signified by the 
possession of the imago is the responsibility to pursue and develop shālômic rela-
tionships at all levels – can be argued. Firstly, the Cappadocian model suggests 
that not only the capacity for but also the compulsion towards relationality is a 
foundational aspect of God/personhood. Moreover that it is through this latter 
that the hypostatic element of personhood is enabled and its full potential real-
ised. In other words expression of relational capacity can be understood not just 
as a fundamental component, but as one which also contributes towards both 
proper order and stability, and the realisation of latent potentialities. Secondly, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 the concept of shālôm is deeply and organically connected 
to understanding the world as a place from which chaos has been driven back by 
God. Furthermore, pursuing and realising shālômic relationships within society is 
seen as a vital component of keeping those forces, with their destructive potential 
for individual, society, and nation, at bay.  
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These two perspectives can be conjoined to give a relationally informed reframing 
of the functional perspective. In this, the activity carrying the imago is understood 
as the expression of an inherent human capacity for relationality, something 
which is itself also a bearer of the image. Moreover this expression takes the 
shālômic form which characterises the relationships within the Trinity itself. It is 
through this type of relational engagement, with its resultant ordering and de-
fence of society (and thus creation more widely) against the return of chaos, that 
humankind acts as God’s viceroy. Such a reading is therefore consistent with the 
general concerns of the Priestly narrative in Genesis. Furthermore it not only pre-
serves the dynamism and notion of activity undertaken on God’s behalf which are 
core insights of the functional model, but also respects its apprehension that such 
activity is in some way connected with the proper ordering of creation.  
What is beginning to emerge then is a reading of the imago Dei to which the tradi-
tional substantive and functional perspectives, reconfigured in conversation with 
insights from social trinitarianism, contribute different but complementary ele-
ments. The final piece of the picture is supplied through a reconsideration of the 
relational perspective as it has been traditionally conceived. 
4.2.3.3 The imago Dei as relational connection 
Once again the problems of a particular understanding of the imago have seen it 
displaced by one which does not carry these specific difficulties (van Huyssteen, 
2006:137-8). Although Barth is usually credited as the father of these relational 
readings, their roots are arguably much older: both Hefner and Ramsey for exam-
ple hold that the idea is present in Augustine (Hefner, 1984:331; Ramsey, 
1950:255), whilst Grenz traces a fledgling form in the writings of Luther and Cal-
vin. In these particular instances though, the image was seen principally as some-
thing which was reflected through man’s relationship to God rather then in it. 
Thus the focus was on the state or otherwise of this relationship, and the extent 
or not to which the image was disfigured or completely lost as a result of sin 
(Grenz, 2001:162-70).  
Barth’s seminal approach is somewhat different: addressing the issue in a typically 
top-down manner he moves the interpretational focus from man to God, arguing 
that the image does not consist in anything humans are or do, but in their being ‘a 
counterpart to God’ (Barth, 1958b:184-5). Following the functional interpreters, 
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he too works from a textual exegesis of the Genesis texts. However his starting 
point for the exegetical key to the imago is not dominion but the creation of male 
and female in Gen127 (Barr, 1994:159). Arguing a connection with the gift of rela-
tionship bestowed by God, he understands image as inhering not in the capacity 
for relationship, but in the actual relationship itself: first and foremost with God 
and then with each other (Barth, 1958b:186). In keeping with his general predilec-
tions, Barth takes the ‘let us’ of Gen 1:26 as indicative of the existence of an I-Thou 
dialectic within the Godhead which forms the prototype for the imago. This is un-
derstood as being between the Father and the Son (the Spirit receives little atten-
tion) with the consequent hierarchical sequence that God lives firstly in together-
ness with himself, then with men; and finally men live thus with one another 
(Barth, 1958b:207). The I-Thou dialectic of male/female relationship is taken as 
the prototype for all human-human relationship (van Huyssteen, 2006:137). How-
ever Barth subsequently also goes on to define the particularities of male/female 
relationship in keeping with a patriarchal concept of hierarchy (Barth, 
1958b:288ff; and cf. Welker, 1999:66). 
This understanding has been heavily criticised on the grounds that the male-
female differentiation is inadequate both as an understanding of relationality 
within God’s self and as a model for all human relations (Gunton, 1991:58). It has 
also been seen as speculative rather than exegetical, and as transposing too many 
of Barth’s own modern presuppositions into the text (Berkouwer, 1962:72-4; Bird, 
1981:131-4), with Barr labelling it an ‘ill-judged and irresponsible form of exegesis’ 
(Barr, 1994:160-1). There has subsequently been extensive debate on various as-
pects of the relationship between the imago Dei, human sexuality and the two 
Genesis accounts of creation (see Grenz, 2001:269-98 for an overview). However I 
do not wish to focus here on issues of sexual differentiation per se but on the 
foundational underpinning of the reading. Here once again a re-reading in the 
light of the Cappadocian relational perspectives offers the possibility of a further 
development of the relational understanding of the imago by moving its emphasis 
from capacity to realisation. This in turn may allow some of these problems to be 
solved and so facilitate progress towards optimising understanding. 
If, as the Cappadocians argued, God is a community of persons inseparably re-
lated, then Barth’s insight that the experience of relational connection is in some 
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way implicated in the concept of the imago Dei is a key one. However in limiting 
the specific content of the image to the male-female relationship, Barth intro-
duces a restriction which is both illegitimate and unhelpful (Berkouwer, 1962:73; 
van Huyssteen, 2006:137). Moreover, the Cappadocian model sees divine rela-
tionality as extending beyond a call/response dynamic to involve something fuller 
and richer. Consequently any human relationality which reflects this must also 
mirror something of this expanded understanding of the taxis of relational con-
nection. Thus despite its importance as a component of experienced relationality, 
Barth arguably significantly curtails the potential of a relational reading of the 
imago by limiting it to an I-Thou dialectic. 
Obviously there is a caveat to be acknowledged here from the theological per-
spective viz. that all human knowledge and modelling of the divine must be un-
derstood as being subject to both noetic and ontological limitations. Thus the no-
tion of perichoresis, with its mutual interpenetration and indwelling, is one which 
can only be applied analogously rather than univocally. Nevertheless, in as much 
as the Cappadocian understanding of trinitarian relationality expresses qualities 
which the concept of the imago Dei suggests humans ought to image, albeit 
within creaturely constraints, it indicates that certain features should characterise 
relational connection. Since this is a theme which will form part of the theological 
contribution to the transversal dialogue in the next chapter, it will not be explored 
here other than to note that such relationality involves both the creation of space 
in which the Other can come to fullness of being, and reciprocal self-giving. In-
deed there is a sense in which Barth himself captures something of this latter in 
his insistence that true relationship between people involves the ‘mutual giving 
and receiving of assistance with gladness’ (Barth, 1958b:256). The suggestion here 
is thus that a reconfigured relational reading indicates that the imago Dei can also 
be understood not just as pointing to the necessity of relational connection as 
part of the divine order for humankind, but as also indicative of certain patterns 
for its experience and expression.  
In summary then, Genesis 1 serves as a prologue to a more extensive Biblical nar-
rative (Grenz, 2001:202), and whilst the imago terminology is absent from this 
larger panorama, what it stands for theologically is nevertheless one of its key 
structural themes (Mays, 2006:93). The re-examination of this theme using the 
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recovered insights of the Cappadocian understanding of relationality produces a 
number of results. Drawing on attempts to understand, from within a particular 
tradition, the implications of the ubiquitous apprehension of human uniqueness, 
it provides a way of renewing their insights in response to the current philosophi-
cal and scientific turn to relational frameworks of understanding. At the same 
time, whilst these new readings honour both the original context and concerns of 
the priestly narrative in Genesis, and the greater themes which these announce, 
the insights generated do not require additional assent to these – they serve as a 
framework of ideas and questions which were rationally developed, and are thus 
capable of further such evolution in the light of new understandings. Secondly, 
this refiguring significantly reduces the problem load associated with other sub-
stantial, functional, and relational ways of understanding the imago. In this re-
spect it fits with the understanding of progress towards optimal understanding set 
out in Chapter 2. Thus in terms of both process and product, this further devel-
opment of insights from the imago Dei tradition, displays the cardinal features of 
the operation of postfoundational rationality and its epistemic commitments Fi-
nally, it brings together all three approaches to the concept into a mutually illumi-
nating triptych, in which each panel reveals a different perspective on relational-
ity, and the whole gives a fuller understanding of the central concept of the imago 
Dei. Here this is interpreted not as a specific proposition about the connections 
between the divine and the human, but as an understanding of the connections 
between relational capacity and humanness.  
Not only does this overall picture offer a significant contribution to the under-
standings which this thesis seeks to develop, but each of the three individual 
components is particularly relevant to a specific transversal focus. Thus the sub-
stantive view allows us to understand humans as essentially relational creatures. 
That is to say the capacity to relate is a fundamental part of the fabric of human-
ness, not an additional attribute: in short, relationality is revealed as basic to hu-
man being. The functional view captures the idea that this likeness is not merely a 
static possession of property but entails an active movement on our part to en-
gage and develop this faculty. Moreover this is not just for the benefit of our-
selves, but is part of a much larger relational dynamic which has evolved as part of 
the intrinsic structure of the world: thus relationality can also be understood as in 
some senses being an ‘emergent’ phenomenon. The relational perspective opens 
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a window onto the form such a faculty might take as it is expressed in this en-
gagement: in effect it indicates a pattern for the optimum realisation of relational 
connection.  
The themes of emergence and realisation form the subject matter of Chapters 5 
and 6 and those particular aspects of the imago will be taken up and developed 
there. From the perspective of this chapter, considerations of the imago Dei de-
veloped in dialogue with the insights from the Cappadocians confirm and 
strengthen the theological argument for understanding the capacity for relational 
connection as being an essential and foundational element of what it is to be a 
human person. The underpinnings of human relational capacity have also become 
the subject of extensive scientific investigation generating an increasing corpus of 
experimental data. A consideration of these data, their strengths, limitations, and 
what inferences can be legitimately drawn from them, forms the second contribu-
tion to the chapter’s transversal exploration. 
4.3 The scientific voice 
One problem for theologians attempting to engage with science has been an over-
eagerness to appropriate and build on scientific theories and data without suffi-
cient understanding of either the meanings of the former, or the limitations of the 
latter. Thus when engaging with neuroscientific data, appropriate caution is 
needed: neuroimages are epistemically compelling – ‘they invite us to believe’ 
(Roskies, 2010:214) – but seductive though descriptions and pictures of brains 
‘lighting up’ can be, the reality of such scans is infinitely more complex. Thus an 
appreciation of the possibilities and limitations of experimental cognitive neuro-
science is needed before engaging with its data. 
The scientific contribution to this thesis draws primarily on investigations of brain 
function. Typically this is conducted by one of three routes: neuro-anatomical 
(e.g. post-mortem or lesion studies); electrophysiological (e.g. EEGs and single cell 
recordings); and neuro-imaging (e.g. PET and fMRI14 scans). For a good historical 
overview see Bechtel and Stufflebeam (2001:55-69). The latter group have been a 
significant factor in the explosive expansion of cognitive neuroscience, with more 
than 75% of the 10,000 fMRI studies published in the last two years relating to 
                                                             
14 Positron emission tomography and functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
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this field. However whilst these techniques represent an immeasurable advance 
on Gall and Spurzheim’s phrenological efforts in the 1800s, there are still signifi-
cant points which need to be considered when assessing their results (see Seixas 
and Lima, 2011:1266-9, for a brief overview of key issues ). This in turn is part of a 
wider set of issues connected with the interpretation of neuroscientific research. 
Understanding the limitations of these data is an important element of the criti-
cality enjoined by the transversal space model. 
4.3.1 From voxels to cognition 
The focus of much cognitive neuroscientific research is the determination of the 
neural correlates of various conscious and subconscious cognitive processes. Ex-
perimental data are therefore chiefly measurements of different aspects of brain 
physiology – that is, of events at cellular level. However, since the object of inves-
tigation is the connection of these with higher function, data interpretation also 
usually involves a process of ‘bridging to cognition’ i.e. of drawing higher level in-
ferences and interpretations from measurements of cellular level activity. A num-
ber of issues need to be highlighted here: process complexity; data interpretation, 
and experimental limitations. 
The subject of brain complexity will be treated more fully in Chapter 5. For the 
purposes of this chapter, the important feature is the extent and manner in which 
activity in a particular region of the brain (the focus of PET/fMRI studies) can be 
connected to the higher cognitive function under investigation. In principle, brain 
structures can be conceptualised as information processing entities which receive 
and process input and then generate an output. But whilst this may describe the 
function of individual subcortical nuclei, the reality at regional cortical level is 
much more complicated, involving feed-forward and feedback loops between dif-
ferent regions, with outputs reflecting the balance between excitatory and inhibi-
tory influences. However dynamic scans only measure levels of activity – they 
cannot provide any information on whether this reflects inhibitory or excitatory 
neuronal firing. Thus ‘activation maps’ produced by scans do not necessarily yield 
information on how neural activity in a particular region is involved in the task in 
hand (Masten et al., 2012:112). Neither do they simply and unequivocally confirm 
its participation in the studied behaviour (Logothetis, 2008:870-1), indeed the va-
lidity of how ‘reverse inference’ is sometimes employed and extended has been 
challenged (Poldrack, 2006:59-63). There is also the more fundamental argument 
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that the bias in experimental neuroscience towards localising and modularising 
brain function does not reflect growing understandings of the distributed, multi-
leveled, multitasking way in which the brain actually functions (Hardcastle and 
Stewart, 2002:572-82; Logothetis, 2008:876-7). The pluripotency of brain regions 
inevitably gives rise to a many-to-one mapping scenario between cognitive func-
tions and their neural substrate, and thus there is an argument that region-based 
analyses of imaging data can only ever provide weak support for cognitive theo-
ries (Klein, 2012:952).This leads on to the second issue, that of the interpretation 
of study data. 
The focus here is once again on the dynamic scans which provide most of the 
data, but all methods of investigation have inherent limitations: for example sin-
gle cell recordings (the basis of the original ‘mirror neuron’ hypothesis) provide 
useful information about which stimuli activate a neuron, but cannot determine 
what role it then plays in processing that information. The critical point with fMRI 
scans is that what they actually record are measurements of the levels of de-
oxygenated haemoglobin (indicative of neuronal activity) in the blood in small 
sections (typically about 1mm3) or ‘voxels’ of brain tissue. These numerical data 
then require a sequence of complex mathematical processes to produce matrices 
of hundreds or thousands of numbers indicating activation in different voxels 
which are then mapped onto the brain. At each stage in the processes of data ex-
traction and mapping, choices of various kinds have to be made including deci-
sions about which subsets of voxels are going to be included in the analysis. These 
choices are themselves subject to a mixture of influences – a further reflection of 
themes discussed in Chapter 2 relating to interpretation of experience, location in 
specific research communities and their particular foci of interest etc. Moreover, 
the statistical analyses for such data sets rely on certain assumptions being met if 
inferences are to be valid – for example that errors are independently and identi-
cally distributed (e.g. that that errors for different observational time points are 
not correlated). The often significant problems with this tend to be ignored in the 
literature but non-conformity can have pervasive effects on both individual sub-
ject and group-level statistics, potentially yielding qualitatively different results 
across replications (see e.g. Monti, 2011:1-13 for an analysis of these issues). 
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Many studies also involve an additional layer of complexity as these voxel data are 
then correlated with very different sorts of data sets – for example self reported 
emotional states during the scanning task. This requires further levels of complex 
statistical computations and thus more opportunity for additional (and often 
crypto-) factors to influence results. A recent analysis of 55 such studies produced 
the rather provocative conclusion that ‘it is quite possible that a considerable 
number of relationships reported in this literature are entirely illusory’ (Vul et al., 
2009:285). Whilst such claims were vigorously contested (e.g. Lieberman et al., 
2009:299-307; Nichols and Poline, 2009:291-3), Vul’s detailed analysis (ibid:274-
90) clearly highlights a range of interpretational issues arising out of the way these 
complex data sets are manipulated and underlines the need for a cautious and 
critical approach to building on them.  
Finally there is the issue of how closely these experimental situations actually re-
produce the type of cognitive processing that goes on in normal conditions. In a 
sense this is merely an elaboration of the perennial problem of testing under ex-
perimental conditions where contexts irrelevant to normal behaviour, and proxies 
for real events, can both produce anomalous results (Insel and Fernald, 2004:698-
9). Here however the problem is particularly acute given the severe physical limi-
tations which dynamic scanning imposes on the subjects and thus the sorts of 
tasks that can be undertaken (see Eisenberger et al., 2007:1610 for a description 
of typical problems/limitations). Furthermore, because the basis of the scans is 
sequential measurement of changes in circulatory dynamics, both task and subse-
quent analysis are broken down into different components. However whether 
cognitive response is the result of such sequential brain processing is disputed 
(Lewis, 2005; MacKay, 1998:71-8; van Orden and Paap, 1997:585-94). Even if it 
does represent an accurate understanding of the mechanics, the question re-
mains as to how closely the decomposition selected as the basis of experimental 
analysis maps onto actual brain sequencing (Bechtel and Stufflebeam, 2001:70-2). 
And once again there is the issue of whether examination of localised regions re-
flects the reality of distributed brain functioning. 
Any attempt to link experimental data on brain physiology to higher cognitive 
processes thus has to negotiate various epistemic challenges. Indeed a certain 
degree of scepticism has been expressed as to whether dynamic neuroimaging 
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can yield any useful information about actual cognition – Coltheart for example 
has argued that no such study has of yet yielded data which can be used to distin-
guish between competing psychological theories (Coltheart, 2006:323-31). It fol-
lows that the conclusions derived from these experiments are neither so uncom-
plicated nor necessarily so definite as is sometimes presented in both the aca-
demic and the popular scientific press. Howbeit, data are steadily accumulating on 
certain aspects of brain function in connection with social interaction, which are 
believed to indicate the existence of dedicated cortical loci and processes con-
nected with this. In the following review of these however, the caveats set out 
above need to be held firmly in mind. The aim here is to explore whether there is 
sufficient evidence, from a scientific perspective, to establish the premise that the 
capacity for relational connection is constitutive of humanness. To this end, data 
connected with aspects of social decoding and with the proposed existence of 
mirror neuron systems are examined, set against the general background of the 
‘social brain’ hypothesis. Whilst this has both an evolutionary and a neurobiologi-
cal aspect, it is the latter which the focus here.  
The proposal that the human brain has a circumscribed and specific distributed 
network of highly interconnected systems dedicated to social cognition was first 
made on the basis of work with non-human primates. Brothers suggested that this 
‘social brain’ had evolved to facilitate assessments of the dispositions and inten-
tions of nearby conspecifics through processing information about movement, 
posture, facial expression, vocalisation etc (Brothers, 1990/2002:367-85). Imaging 
studies have subsequently given support to the idea that certain cortical loci ap-
pear to be specifically involved in activity regulating and integrating a variety of 
mental processes involved in social cognition (Frith, 2007:671-8). 
Adolphs has proposed that there are three distinct stages to this cognitive proc-
ess: social perception i.e. the detection of significant biological stimuli; central 
cognition i.e. the recognition, evaluation, and interpretation of the received mate-
rial; and finally, social behaviour i.e. the effecting of an appropriate response to 
perception and interpretation. These steps involve various complex processes 
such as adding emotional content to experiences; assigning behavioural motiva-
tion to perceived actions, constructing internal models of the specific social envi-
ronment, the people involved and their relationship to the self etc. (Adolphs, 
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2003:166-72). It is with the first two stages – detection and evaluation – that the 
primary focus of the material presented here lies. Aspects of individual studies will 
be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters; here though, the aim is to 
give a general indication of the evidence for the existence of particular processing 
pathways connected with social interaction and the references are indicative, not 
comprehensive. Since the interest of the thesis is not primarily in the specific 
brain loci involved, neuro-anatomical detail will not be addressed. 
4.3.2 Decoding social signals 
A large volume of data, principally from fMRI studies, indicates that the brain at-
tends to a range of different biological signals given out by conspecifics within its 
immediate social environment. Different regions of the cortex have been shown 
to respond to the perception of faces (Hoffman and Haxby, 2000:80-4; Kanwisher 
et al., 1997:4301-11); to the recognition of a variety of basic emotional expres-
sions (LaBar et al., 2003:1023-33; Winston et al., 2003:84-97); to the presence of 
other bodies (Downing et al., 2001:2470-3), and to both human-like biological mo-
tion (Beauchamp et al., 2003:991-1001; Grossman and Blake, 2002:1167-75) and 
intentional actions (Castelli et al., 2000:314-24; Saxe et al., 2004:1435-46). 
4.3.2.1 Facial Decoding   
Evolutionary processes have privileged the face as the prime means of transmit-
ting the signals necessary to negotiate complex and variable social situations 
(Brothers, 2002a:67-8; Insel and Fernald, 2004:713). Face recognition and the 
analysis of facial expressions have thus become an important part of everyday 
interaction; moreover humans are skilled at making reasonably reliable judge-
ment from relatively impoverished stimuli and are sensitive both to the signals 
themselves and to their contextual details (Adolphs, 2003:166-7). Evidence indi-
cates that the visual cortex is selectively sensitive to faces (Puce et al., 1996:5205-
15) and that face processing requires both a different neural substrate and a dif-
ferent set of operations to object processing (Sergent et al., 1992:55-62).  There is 
also evidence that different aspects of facial information are processed separately 
and in different cortical loci (Allison et al., 1994:821-5; Puce et al., 1995:1192-99). 
However, despite the fact that neonates have been shown to exhibit a strong ori-
entation to faces within the first ten minutes of life (Ellis et al., 1992:105), what it 
is not yet clear is the extent to which facial processing is innately specified and the 
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matter continues to be debated. There is a long history of evidence that neonates 
have a generalised bias towards face-like stimuli. For example they show a prefer-
ence for highly schematic face-like patterns over other equally complex visual 
stimuli (Farroni et al., 2005:17245-50; Goren, 1975:544-9; Johnson, 1991:1-19). 
However this may simply reflect more general pattern and movement preferences 
(Macchi et al., 2004:379-83; Simion et al., 2001:59-65) rather than indicate the 
existence of a discrete pre-wired ‘facial’ tendency, or that faces  per se  represent 
a special class of stimulus for neonates. Howbeit, there is also evidence that from 
their first days, infants can recognise their mother’s face and discriminate be-
tween familiar and unfamiliar faces (see Gava et al., 2008:563-4, for recent stud-
ies). There are also indications that they scan own-race and other-race features 
differently (see Wheeler et al., 2011:1-2 for a summary of recent papers). Older 
infants demonstrate a very high level of facial preference and responsiveness 
(Sergent et al., 1992:55; Slater and Quinn, 2001:21-4) and an increasingly sophis-
ticated ability to discriminate and categorises faces in a variety of ways similar to 
adult processing (Frank et al., 2009:161; Nelson, 2001:6-7).  
Of all facial features, the eyes have long been held in folk-thought to be an impor-
tant source of information, and studies indicate that the eye region is often used 
as a cue to predict the emotional and mental states of others (Wicker et al., 
2003b:139). fMRI studies also point to specific attention being paid to angle and 
direction of gaze (Hoffman and Haxby, 2000:80-4), and indicate that this feature 
seems to be present from very early in life (Csibra, 2003:447). Furthermore it ap-
pears that gaze direction and strength provide vital information about the degree 
of intimacy of the encounter (Kleinke, 1986:78-100), aid interpretation of emo-
tional state (Adams and Kleck, 2005:3-11; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 
2001:241), and may influence facial recognition in young infants (Farroni et al., 
2007:396-404; Rigato et al., 2011:20-34). Angle of gaze also indicates where at-
tention is being directed and thus gives information about possible intentions: 
alterations of gaze direction produce particularly robust neurological responses in 
the cortex compared to other facial movements (Puce and Perrett, 2003:439-41). 
They also appear to significantly influence other elements of social decoding (see 
Senju and Johnson, 2009:127 for a review of studies). 
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Intimately connected with ‘eye-reading’ is another key facial processing skill viz. 
decoding expressions related to both simple basic emotions and complex emo-
tional states (Shaw et al., 2005:1410-19). Facial expression has long been known 
to be a powerful and efficient source of social information. Darwin himself noted 
from his own experiments that certain expressions were recognised by almost 
everyone (Darwin, 1872/2007:18-19). He also compiled the first evidence that 
despite linguistic and cultural differences, facial expressions of basic emotions 
were remarkably uniform (Darwin, 1872/2007:23) – an observation later con-
firmed by Ekman’s seminal fieldwork (Ekman et al., 1972; Ekman et al., 1987:712-
17). Since emotional expressions have specific roles in social interactions leading 
to rapid behaviour modification (Blair, 2003:561-72), accurate deciphering ability 
is vital. Once again there is evidence that such skill is present, at least in rudimen-
tary form from a very early age. For example neonates can distinguish between 
happy, sad, and surprised expressions (Field et al., 1982:179-81). As with other 
elements of facial cognition, the processes involved in emotion reading are com-
plex and distributed: both fMRI and lesion studies indicate that in the facial identi-
fication of the basic emotions of fear, disgust and anger, each has its own sepa-
rate processing system with a specific dedicated locus, and the ability to judge 
degrees of emotion (Calder et al., 2000:1077-8; Phillips et al., 1997:495-8; Shaw et 
al., 2005:1410-19; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998:1927-31; Winston et al., 2003:84-
97). 
Such processing is both rapid and bypasses conscious analysis – Darwin was again 
percipient in noting that the ability to detect very subtle and swift changes in fa-
cial expression often went hand in hand with a complete inability ‘to state in what 
the difference consists’ (Darwin, 1872/2007:17).  Various studies have demon-
strated that perception of a face with an emotional expression immediately 
evokes involuntary facial reactions in the viewer (Wild et al., 2001:109-124; and 
see Wild et al., 2003:17, for further studies). Moreover both the cognitive and 
muscular elements of such responses, as measured by dynamic scans and elec-
tromyography respectively, match subtle moment-by-moment alterations (Wild et 
al., 2003:17-36), with the motor mimicry being so swift that it often produces no 
observable alteration (Lundqvist, 1995:130-41). Even when there is a matching 
alteration in the observer’s features, this occurs too quickly to be intentional imi-
tation (Condon and Ogston, 1966:338-47). In other words these responses are not 
148 
 
the result of conscious evaluation of emotional content but represent a much 
swifter, neuronal level response. This is now thought to be mediated, at least in 
part by the mirror neuron system which allows an instantaneous evaluation of 
emotional content via representation in the observer’s corresponding cortical re-
gions (further at 4.3.3 below). Such social mimicry, which may also extend to 
cover vocal and postural elements, occurs in both infants and adults alike. Melt-
zoff (2002:19-40) gives a detailed review of studies involving babies and infants, 
and Hurley (2005:1-204) provides extensive coverage of recent developments in 
adult studies connected with this aspect. Both the detection and assessment of 
gaze details and the deciphering of facial emotion contribute to the development 
of more sophisticated aspects of relational connection such as joint attention, so-
cial referencing and attribution of agency (Sasson, 2006:392), something which is 
addressed further below and in the following chapter. 
4.3.2.2 Movement decoding 
Most work on the ‘detection’ stage of Adolph’s sequence has been directed at 
facial perception. However, from an evolutionary perspective at least, the ability 
to interpret the actions of nearby conspecifics is also an important skill and there 
is now a growing corpus of studies looking at the role of movement perception in 
social cognition and interaction.  Biological motion essentially refers to a biological 
entity engaged in a recognisable activity – thus for example humans walking or 
making eye and mouth moments or intentional, goal-directed hand actions. There 
appears to be something significant about the quality of such motion from which 
humans, even in the absence of other cues, extract detailed and specific informa-
tion about what the observed organism is doing (Frith and Wolpert, 2003:431). 
Furthermore biological motion cues trigger very robust reflexive attentional ori-
enting (Shi et al., 2010:348-54) – something which is not surprising viewed from 
an evolutionary perspective. Studies also suggest that certain areas of the brain 
are specifically or preferentially sensitive to biological motion (Pelphrey et al., 
2003:6819-25); that movement and gesture are subject to complex decoupling in 
which evaluation of different contributory elements is distributed across various 
cortical loci (Beauchamp et al., 2003:991-1001); and that dedicated neural sys-
tems are involved in these processes (Grossman et al., 2010:1-8; Puce and Perrett, 
2003:435-45). There is also evidence that this movement decoding is closely 
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linked to other processes involving the attribution and assessment of goal di-
rected intentionality and thus of agency – I will return to this shortly.  
Humans also appear to be extremely adept at recovering and extrapolating infor-
mation about such movements from very minimal information. In Johansson’s 
seminal work using point light sources, observers were are able to identify specific 
actions from movement pattern alone, and such processing appears to be ex-
tremely rapid (Johansson, 1973:201-11; 1977:365-76; Krakowski et al., 
2011:373,382). A recent study showing that infants as young as two days old are 
able to discriminate between point source displays of biological and non-
biological motion (Bardi et al., 2011:353-9) raises the possibility of this again being 
an innately specified process. There are also suggestions that the brain actively 
perceives and processes significant motion even when this is presented in the 
form of a still image (e.g. Kourtzi and Kanwisher, 2000:48-55, and see Blakemore 
and Decety 2001:562-3 for a review of other studies). 
Point light studies additionally indicate that motion may give information about 
gender (Pollick, 2005:1247-65; Saunders et al., 2010:1-10), emotion (Atkinson et 
al., 2007:59-72), and gesture. In the latter instance, they demonstrate that hu-
mans can apparently identify actions as communicative simply from their motion 
trajectory, and also identify specific communicative gestures from these (Manera 
et al., 2010:168-78). With respect to the interpretation of gesture, assorted stud-
ies also indicate that the brain discriminates between instrumental and expressive 
gestures and processes them through different neural networks, with the latter 
involving brain loci which are also activated during mentalising tasks (Gallagher 
and Frith, 2004:1725-36). Similarly it distinguishes between those that are body-
referred (e.g. moving a tooth brush) and those that are purely expressive (Lotze et 
al., 2006:1787-95). There also appears to be discrimination between goal-
orientated actions and those with no specific goal, with the former eliciting a 
much higher level of neural activity (Koski et al., 2002:847-55). All these are in-
dicative of a key issue here viz. the fact that motion decoding seems to be inextri-
cably linked with the discernment, attribution, and deciphering of the intentional-
ity of other conspecifics. 
Perception of the world in terms of agents and their intentional relations is a fun-
damental aspect of human experience. It has long been understood that our per-
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ception of the actions of others is structured by intentional relations – that is, we 
do not read these actions as isolated movements through space, but always as 
movement in relation to some goal or object of attention (Barresi and Moore, 
1996:107-22). Moreover, this spontaneous perception of others as intentional 
agents is universal across human culture (Lieberman et al., 2005:889-901; Noren-
zayan and Nisbett, 2000:132-5). Once again evidence suggests that this corner-
stone of social perception is present from the first year of life and that infants too 
are able to attribute intentional relations at increasingly sophisticated levels of 
analysis: from early in the first year of life they can discern the relational structure 
of concrete instrumental actions, by the end of it they can represent goals as spe-
cific to individual agents, and by early in the second year they can discern shared 
goals that organise collaborative actions (see Woodward et al., 2009:187-222 for 
an extensive review of infant studies). 
There is thus a wide ranging corpus of experimental data suggesting that the brain 
has particular mechanisms for decoding elements of movement and expression 
with social implications. The general caveats regarding interpretation of such data 
have already been highlighted. In keeping with the critical nature of the postfoun-
dational epistemic stance, further aspects should be noted in conjunction with the 
studies surveyed here. Firstly, the numbers of subjects are often small and many 
studies are never precisely replicated. Additionally, as with the PNI studies, there 
is a strong research community identity around some of these avenues of explora-
tion. As was discussed in Chapter 2, community embeddedness plays a strong role 
in how questions are formulated, and experience and data are interpreted. More-
over a certain circularity of referencing between papers is sometimes evident, 
which may give the appearance of more collateral support for certain aspects of 
the hypotheses under investigation than is actually warranted. These cautions 
duly noted however, studies of various aspects of facial expression and biological 
motion indicate that there is at least some evidence for the existence of specific 
cortical loci and dedicated neural processes for the perception and decoding of 
biological signals involved in social cognition.  
The second stage of the process suggested by Adolphs is that of evaluation – add-
ing content and assigning meaning to the signals detected from facial and move-
ment observations in the first phase. In some ways the distinction between per-
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ception and evaluation is somewhat artificial, since it is obvious from the studies 
already discussed that the complexity of the neural processing loops is such that 
the two cannot be so easily or so cleanly separated as such staging implies. This is 
particularly the case with the recently discovered mirror neuron system which 
appears to be simultaneously involved in both analysing signals and adding, both 
directly and via recruitment of other systems, evaluative content.  
4.3.3 Mirror neuron systems 
Mirror neurons were first observed nearly two decades ago in laboratory monkeys 
(Gallese et al., 1996:593-609; Rizzolatti et al., 1996:131-41). Since then mirror 
neuron systems (MNS) have moved from being a low-level neurophysiological 
phenomenon to holding a putative, though somewhat contentious, role (Lieber-
man, 2007:271) as major players in a number of high level cognitive processes. 
The original observation, made via single cell recordings, was that monkeys pos-
sessed motor neurons which fired not only when they performed specific actions, 
but also when they observed those same actions being performed. This led to the 
proposal that perception and action, far from being neurophysiologically separate 
phenomena, were in fact intimately connected through shared representation at 
neuronal level. The observed ‘mirroring’ was postulated as the mechanism for 
understanding the actions of conspecifics (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004:172): 
thus as actions are observed, the corresponding part of the observer’s motor cor-
tex is activated i.e. an automatically induced motor representation – identical to 
that which would be spontaneously generated if they themselves were to do that 
action – is formed. This automatic matching of observed actions against the 
agent’s own motor repertoire enables them to ‘read’ the perceived action.  In 
other words MNS transform visual information into neuronal knowledge about 
the action (Rizzolatti et al., 2001:661-70) and Merleau-Ponty’s observation at the 
chapter head seems thus to have been remarkably prescient. 
Since single cell recordings in humans are not possible, studies of MNS have relied 
mainly on fMRI and EEG data. However since these each measure very different 
physiological markers of neuronal activity, there are significant issues with trying 
to reconcile their findings with the data from monkey studies. Moreover as previ-
ously discussed, it is not possible to determine whether the neuronal activity 
measured by fMRI studies is excitatory or inhibitory hence they may be measuring 
a very different phenomenon to the excitation recorded by single cell studies  (Lo-
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gothetis and Wandell, 2004:760). Thus the existence of  MNS is still questioned by 
some – for example an extensive analysis of all MNS scanning studies published 
over an 11 year period concluded that, for various methodological reasons, these 
have not provided sufficiently compelling evidence to warrant the conclusions 
that MNS exist in humans (Turella et al., 2009:18-9). Such critiques notwithstand-
ing, the evidential data from fMRI and EEG studies is widely seen as confirming 
the existence of a human homologue of the monkey system (for a recent over-
view of current  understandings see Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2010:240-9). 
There are also some indications that such a system may be innately specified, al-
though obtaining direct evidence is hard due to the difficulties of undertaking in-
fant imaging studies. However a variety of studies using electrical and spectro-
scopic approaches have provided some indirect support for the existence and op-
eration of MNS in early infancy (Falck-Ytter et al., 2006:878-9; Shimada and Hiraki, 
2006:930-9; Southgate et al., 2009:769-72). 
Adult studies (Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006:945-8; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 
2008:115-38, provide extensive listings) suggest that MNS activity occurs not only 
in response to an extensive range of situations, but also operates with a high de-
gree of subtlety. Thus there is apparently a response to both object and non-
object related actions (Buccino et al., 2001:400-4) with increased activity when 
the former are embedded in specific contexts (Iacoboni et al., 2005). There also 
appears to be a response to both goal orientated actions and those with no spe-
cific goal (Koski et al., 2002:847-55) including intransitive communication actions 
(Buccino et al., 2004:114-26). Moreover in the former group, activation still occurs 
even when part of the action can only be inferred (Jackson and Decety, 2004:260). 
MNS also seem to be stimulated when simply observing the goal of a particular 
dynamic hand/object interaction, rather than the action itself  (Johnson Frey et 
al., 2003:1053-8), with one recent study suggesting that the goal of the action it-
self might in fact be a significant factor in activation (Gazzola et al., 2007:1674-
84). There is also a suggestion that MNS may engage motor circuits predicatively, 
rather than just reactively, with activation anticipating the next move in an action 
sequence (Flanagan and Johansson, 2003:760-70). Evidence thus seems to suggest 
a complex system whose activity extends beyond mere recognition and represen-
tation of the motor acts themselves, to encompass and encode more complex 
information about context. 
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The rapidity and subconscious imitative aspects of facial decoding have already 
been noted, and given what is understood of MNS function, it is possible that 
MNS activity may play a vital role in this. The link between such decoding and 
emotional evaluation was also noted and arguably some of this may also be ex-
plained with reference to such motor MNS activity. Darwin noted that simulating 
emotion engenders it (Darwin, 1872/2007:369) and studies have demonstrated 
that reproduction of the characteristic facies of the six basic emotions leads to 
autonomic nervous system arousal comparable to that attending a direct experi-
ence of the emotion (Levenson et al., 1990:363-84). However a much more direct 
route to emotional decoding has also been proposed namely the activation of a 
specifically emotional MNS – in essence something similar to the internally acti-
vated ‘as-if-body-loops’ hypothesised by Damasio as a way of explaining empa-
thetic feelings (Damasio, 1994/2000:155-8). A variety of studies have sought indi-
cations of such a system by looking for evidence of shared neural substrates be-
tween the observation and the experience of particular emotions. Some of the 
most compelling evidence here comes from studies of disgust: results from fMRI 
and PET studies (Phillips et al., 1997:495-8; Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998:1927-31; 
Wicker et al., 2003a:655-64) suggest that both the personal experience of disgust 
(e.g. as a response to a noxious smell) and the perception of it in others, share a 
common neural substrate in the insula. Additional support comes from lesion 
studies which show that patients with insular damage not only have a decreased 
ability to feel disgust, but also demonstrate impaired skills for recognising the fa-
cial expressions associated with it (Calder et al., 2000:1077-8). Rizzolatti thus sug-
gests that understanding the disgust experienced by others is not based on infer-
ential or associative cognitive processes but on the activity of an emotional MNS 
(Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008:182). Such automaticity may possibly also explain 
occasional shared visceromotor responses – for example the reflex gagging that 
occurs when observing someone vomit. This highlights the fact that MNS (both 
motor and emotional) must also therefore involve a mechanism for maintaining 
self/other separation. How this is regulated is not understood, although there is 
some evidence that it may be achieved through lateralisation of function to right 
and left parietal lobes, with one side dealing with representations and the other 
the ascription of agency (Meltzoff and Decety, 2003:498). 
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Various studies involving the experience and perception of pain may also lend 
support to the hypothesis of an emotional MNS. For example subjects given a 
painful stimulus and then subsequently led to believe that a significant other had 
received the same stimulus showed identical activation of the affective part of 
cortical pain processing centres in response to both situations (Singer et al., 
2004:1157-62). Other studies too have demonstrated a partial cortical commonal-
ity between experiencing pain and perceiving it in others (Jackson et al., 
2005:771-9; Singer, 2006:857-9, for a review of other studies). For Rizzolatti the 
overlapping activations demonstrated by such studies 
confirm the hypothesis that the understanding of the emotive 
states of others depends on a mirror mechanism that codes 
the sensory information directly in emotional terms (Rizzolatti 
and Sinigaglia, 2008:186). 
The observation that there is an instantaneous link between observation of an 
emotional state and a corresponding visceral reaction in ourselves is not new – 
William James noted as much, adding moreover that the former without the latter 
produces colourless perception ‘destitute of emotional warmth’ (James, 
1890/1957:450). However it is important to note that, unlike the motor MNS, the 
existence of an emotional MNS has never been demonstrated physiologically. This 
raises an important issue with respect to evaluation of MNS studies and the role 
such systems might play in social cognition. 
That the MNS clearly has a huge and intuitive explanatory appeal is evident in the 
way that its postulated role has spread beyond simply action perception to in-
clude emotional interpretation and also language evolution and development 
(Arbib and Rizzolatti, 1997:393-424; Fogassi and Ferrari, 2007:136-141). However 
the increasing tendency to postulate new MNS – for example ‘echo-neurons’ link-
ing action and sounds (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004:186-7), or the proposed ‘su-
per MNS’ regulating other MNS (Iacoboni, 2008:30) –  coupled with suggestions 
that MNS may play a significant role in a host of social malaises and political be-
haviours (Iacoboni, 2009), raises legitimate questions about overextension into 
areas for which there is as yet insufficient warranting evidence. There is clearly a 
huge gap between the simple motor representations first postulated from mon-
key studies and the sophisticated emotional decoding and attribution of intention 
which are now claimed as due to MNS activity. However the mainstream trend in 
MNS thinking and investigation has increasingly been to extend its function in 
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humans beyond mere motor cognition to become also a tool of social cognition. 
Here the suggestion has been made that MNS representations supply not just in-
formation about the observed motor intention but also about the prior intentions 
which have precipitated it and thus about mental states attached to these.  In 
other words it is suggested that the proposed simulations facilitated by the MNS 
are also the basis of theory of mind skills, and that the motor system itself con-
structs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it 
interprets (see for example Blakemore and Decety, 2001:561-7; Fogassi, 2011:66-
75; Metzinger and Gallese, 2003:549-71). However whether these leaps are ade-
quately warranted by the experimental evidence so far available is highly debat-
able, especially given the limitations of dynamic scans and of some experimental 
design (cf. Turella et al., 2009:11-17). Certainly claims that assorted MNS consti-
tute the fundamental neural basis of human social cognition are not universally 
accepted. Jacob and Jeannerod (2005:21-5) for example have argued strongly that 
while simulating an agent's movements might be sufficient for understanding his 
motor intention, it is insufficient for understanding prior, social, or communicative 
intention (see Searle, 1983:79-111 for the distinction between prior and motor 
intention ). They suggest moreover, with some justification, that mirroring proc-
esses cannot furnish two critical features which characterise human social cogni-
tion viz. the capacity to read one's own mind and the ability to ascribe false beliefs 
to others.   
This ability to represent both our own mental state and the mental states of oth-
ers and to distinguish between the two – that is, the ability to develop a theory of 
mind – is a uniquely human attribute. Whereas several of the monitoring proc-
esses described in this section and the abilities they support – for example the 
recognition of conspecifics – are common to preverbal infants, apes and monkeys, 
the structure and content of human relational reasoning and interaction far ex-
ceeds these foundations. These more sophisticated skills depend on two unique-
to-human abilities: the ability to attribute mental content to others, and the re-
lated ability to represent triadic relationships – ‘You, and Me, collaboratively look-
ing at, working on or talking about This’ (Saxe, 2006:235). The development of 
such skills will be addressed in the next chapter, but from the perspective of this 
chapter, and with respect to the issue of MNS, it is reasonable to argue that these 
systems are necessary but not sufficient for the complexities of social interaction, 
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providing important scaffolding for other aspects of social cognition such as men-
talising. Indeed there is some evidence, such as shared cortical loci (Gallagher and 
Frith, 2003:77-83; Ramnani and Miall, 2004:85-90), to suggest a particularly close 
association between the MNS and theory of mind processes. 
To summarise the scientific contribution then: with respect to the question of 
whether the capacity for relationality can be considered as basic to humanness, 
the key question is whether social cognition is simply a by-product of general cog-
nitive processes or whether it is a specific feature, supported by specialised and 
innately specified systems. Despite the methodological and interpretational limi-
tations of dynamic scanning, the data they have generated are widely seen as 
confirming the existence of a network of cortical loci dedicated to aspects of so-
cial cognition. Whilst some aspects of this are acquired, contextual and volitionally 
based, those discussed in this chapter are both automatic, and cognitively im-
penetrable i.e. they occur outside of either conscious awareness or control.  There 
is also evidence that such processes are present from birth or very soon after-
wards, at least in a crude form. Whether such mechanisms are completely suffi-
cient for social cognition is much less certain, as is the question of whether MNS 
extend beyond the field of action simulation to constitute a basic organisational 
feature of the brain. Although there is great intuitive appeal and obvious explana-
tory power in the notion that multiple MNS enable representations of both action 
and emotion to be made from a wide range of cues, the neurobiological evidence 
does not yet provide sufficient warrant for a strong claim to be made in this re-
spect, certainly with regard to emotional mirroring. However the evidence for a 
motor MNS is rather stronger, especially when taken in conjunction with the data 
from studies of facial processing. Given the rapidity of facial and movement analy-
sis, it seems reasonable to postulate close connections between the neural proc-
esses involved in these and MNS activity. As well as interacting to facilitate the 
reading of basic social information about nearby conspecifics, these decoding and 
mirroring processes also provide scaffolding allowing the emergence of theory of 
mind skills and thus ultimately of a capacity for relationality which extends be-
yond mere decoding as a survival skill. Thus despite the evolutionary question 
mark over whether sociality drove brain evolution, or resulted from it, and duly 
noting the caveats regarding MNS, the neurobiological evidence reviewed argua-
bly provides some reasonably solid support for the contention that cognitive 
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mechanisms enabling relational interaction are indeed an integral and founda-
tional element of humanness. 
4.4 In the beginning is relation: a transversal outcome 
Whilst van Huyssteen's dialogical model is geared towards producing interdiscipli-
nary results, the focus in this thesis is, as indicated in the previous chapter, not on 
these per se, but on the possibility of generating transversal outcomes from each 
of the three planned dialogues from which a transversal argument and related 
model can then be constructed. Thus whilst there are clearly some promising 
points around which interdisciplinary exchange and illumination could be focus-
sed, these will not be explored here, although doing so at a future stage would 
potentially bring additional depth to the exploration being undertaken. 
The transversal task here has been to explore whether a case can be made for 
designating the capacity for relational connection to be a constitutive element of 
humanness. From the theological perspective, the argument has firstly been put 
forward that unique identity arises from relational connection, and that thus rela-
tionality can be understood as being an ontologically basic element of human per-
sonhood. Secondly that using this insight to explore and expand the understand-
ings of humanness developed within the imago Dei canonical galaxy, not only 
gives additional weight to this view, but also reveals relational connection to be 
an intense and central dynamic of human life, as well as a reflection of a wider 
relational principle of order and stability. As such it also has important personal 
and societal consequences in its mode of instantiation, and thus carries a corre-
sponding obligation for the fullest possible realisation. From the scientific side, 
the argument has been offered that despite various methodological issues, there 
is a substantial corpus of evidence to suggest the presence of dedicated cortical 
areas and specific processes enabling and supporting social cognition. The auto-
matic and cognitively impenetrable nature of these, coupled with evidence sug-
gestive of innateness, allows a claim for their ontologically basic nature to be 
made. 
Thus both disciplines are able to offer arguments in support of the contention. 
However in both instances there are also weaknesses to the cases presented: de-
spite its grounding in experience, the Cappadocian model is open to a charge of 
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being simply a speculative account about that of which we can have no knowl-
edge. Similarly, given the textual ambiguities involved, readings of the imago Dei 
are also vulnerable to accusations of being a conveniently flexible framework onto 
which one can simply hang interpretations compatible with one’s prior meta-
physical commitments. From the perspective of the cognitive neuroscience con-
tribution, there are clearly significant issues to do with data interpretation at a 
number of levels. These leave the studies open to a certain scepticism regarding 
both the adequacy of the research protocols themselves, and the accuracy of 
some of the interpretative claims offered. These issues are possibly heightened by 
the fact that many of the groups of studies are coming from within the same re-
search communities and thus there are clear theoretical preferences as well as 
some circularity to referencing and evidential support. From this perspective, the 
gold standard of repeatability and independent verification has arguably not yet 
been sufficiently attained to support some of the claims and inferences made for 
some of the data, particularly those relating to MNS. 
It can be argued that in neither case are these difficulties fatal to the perspectives 
being offered. Nevertheless they do weaken the degree of warrant which either 
discipline can be said to have for claiming, in its own right, to make a convincing 
case that relationality is a foundational element of humanness. However, if we 
approach this from a transversal perspective then, following the criteria of 
Haack’s crossword model set out in the second chapter, the theological and neu-
roscientific perspectives set out in this chapter can legitimately be seen, in various 
ways, as offering interlocking mutual support for each other. There are thus good 
grounds on which to form and defend a transversal argument that relationality is 
a basic, a foundational, constituent of humanness. This understanding now serves 
as the starting point for the next stage of the exploration which takes up elements 
which have so far only been touched on in passing, for example the dynamism 
and recursion implicit in both theological and neuroscientific understandings of 
relational processes, and the suggestion that relational experience is itself a cru-
cial element in enabling and developing relationality. In light of these, the ques-
tion arises as to whether the capacity for relationality is simply the innate posses-
sion of certain mechanisms developed and conserved through evolutionary proc-
esses for decoding the biological signals of conspecifics as a basic survival mecha-
nism, or whether in fact it represents something more rich and complex for which 
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these mechanisms are the underpinning. In other words, are there grounds for 
considering the capacity for relational connection as an emergent phenomenon – 
a case of ‘something more from nothing but’? These questions will be addressed 
in Chapter 5. 
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Something More from Nothing But 
Relationality as emergent 
 
Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of 
the co-operant forces […] Further, every resultant 
is clearly traceable in its components […] It is oth-
erwise with emergents […] The emergent is unlike 
its components […] and it cannot be reduced to 
their sum or their difference. 
(Lewes, 1879:413) 
 
Swiftly the head mass becomes an enchanted 
loom, where millions of flashing shuttles weave a 
dissolving pattern-always a meaningful pattern-
though never an abiding one; a shifting harmony 
of subpatterns. 
(Sherrington, 1951:178) 
 
[Love] sometimes finds its most generous 
enlargement in the acceptance of restraint  
(Vanstone, 1977:44) 
 
5.1 Introduction and outline 
The preceding chapter developed a transversal argument from theological and 
neurobiological bases that, contrary to the solipsistic account of humanness which 
has by and large dominated our view of personhood since Descartes, the forma-
tion of relational connection is in fact an intrinsic and inescapable part of what it 
means to be a person.  This constitutes the first component of a wider transversal 
argument which the thesis seeks to develop viz. that the expression and experi-
ence of this aspect of personhood can directly moderate immune function. The 
subject matter of the current chapter is whether relationality – defined here as 
the capacity to form and sustain such connections – is more than simply the sum 
of the assorted neurobiological decoding processes which support it, and repre-
sents instead an emergent phenomenon.  
Rooted in evolving understandings of the nature and behaviour of dynamic sys-
tems, the theory of emergence postulates that the self-organisation of complex 
systems generates novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties (Gold-
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stein, 1999:49). These resulting distributed wholes are understood to not only be 
irreducible to their component parts, but also, against standard Newtonian me-
chanics, to be capable of regulating both these parts and the whole system in a 
top-down direction. Thus, far from being inert epiphenomena, and in defiance of 
the Aristotelian dictum retained by science that things cannot cause themselves, 
these complex dynamic wholes can exert active power over their own shape and 
functioning such that the system which gives rise to them is continually devel-
oped, shaped, and maintained by their presence and activity (Juarrero, 2008:279). 
Against a scientific backdrop dominated by reductionism and the related appre-
hension that all that unfolds in the universe is logically entailed by the fundamen-
tal laws of physics, the concept of emergence therefore presents a severe chal-
lenge to received wisdom in the arenas of both mereology and causality. Thus, 
like its Copernican, Darwinian and quantum cousins, it necessitates a significant 
paradigm shift within science, and as such is the focus of ongoing and vigorous 
debate.  
As a concept, emergence holds great emotional, aesthetic, and intellectual appeal 
(Jackelén, 2006:623) and as such has been taken up by various disciplines and ap-
plied to systems and phenomena from cellular to societal level, generating a wide 
range of typologies en route (e.g. Cunningham, 2001:s74; Deacon, 2007:88-110; 
Fromm, 2005:1-23; Halley and Winkler, 2008:10-15). Goldstein (1999:49-72), 
Corning (2002:18-30) and Clayton (2006) provide useful historical overviews and 
guides to some of the issues related to such appropriation. From the perspective 
of this study, the particular interest is its application within neuroscience where 
emergence has been linked with both the production of consciousness itself and 
the development of various characteristics of consciousness (Clayton, 2006:vi, 
107-55; Juarrero, 2002:150). The argument which this chapter seeks to establish is 
that relationality is also a candidate for construal as an emergent phenomenon 
arising from neurobiological systems – in this instance those dealing with social 
signal decoding; the overall thesis argument being that this provides one possible 
pathway through which the connection between social interaction and health 
outcomes discussed in Chapter 3 could be mediated.  
To advance the case for designating relationality as an emergent property necessi-
tates demonstrating that it exhibits key characteristics of these. However, be-
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cause of both the inherent difficulties of defining, delineating, and studying emer-
gent phenomena, and the assorted experimental and inferential limitations indi-
cated in the previous two chapters, this is difficult to do solely from within the 
domain of cognitive neuroscience. Thus once again a transversal approach is 
adopted. In this instance, evidence for each of three cardinal features is presented 
predominantly from the perspective of one of the project’s three contributory 
voices. First the presence of complexity, self organisation, and irreducibility to 
parts is considered through analysis of experimental data from cognitive neuro-
science itself. The role of primary articulating voice then passes to theology; here 
the aim is not to produce a theological analogue of emergence from which to ar-
gue a case for its existence as a genuine phenomenon, but to examine, through a 
theological lens, whether relationality displays one of its characteristic features. 
The focus here is the notion that constraint is a necessary element in the expres-
sion of relationality, and the lens will be that of kenotic theology. An important 
aspect of the theological contribution is that, in contrast to that from the scientific 
voices, it examines the issue and discusses evidence at cognitive rather than cellu-
lar level. Since this is where the conscious, embodied experience of relational 
connection is located, there is a strong case that evidence for designating rela-
tionality as emergent must also be sought at this level. Theology’s traditional con-
cern with anthrōpos, and its significant interest in the making and breaking of re-
lational connection in various dimensions, mean it is well placed for such an un-
dertaking. Finally I suggest that evidence for downward causation can be adduced 
from the PNI data previously presented in Chapter 3. These three strands are then 
brought together in the type of transversal conjunction proposed in Chapter 2 to 
build the case for designating relationality as an emergent phenomenon with 
causal efficacy.  
However emergence is itself still a very controversial and contested concept, with 
many critics claiming that it amounts to little more than a philosophically moti-
vated promissory note. Taking emergence to be an epistemological rather than an 
ontological phenomenon, this stance holds it as simply a matter of descriptive 
inadequacy/incomplete analysis which will ultimately yield to further research. At 
the heart of this epistemological/ontological tussle lies the issue of supervenience 
– that is the thesis, widely accepted in science, that every high level phenomenon 
and property is ‘fixed’ or strictly determined by lower level properties – in essence 
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that there is no ‘free lunch’. Unsurprisingly, this is closely linked to issues regard-
ing causality which continue to be hotly debated both philosophically and scien-
tifically. Such questions are of crucial importance here, since the idea of down-
ward causation provides a vital fulcrum in the argument that the nature of real-
ised relationality has a direct effect on immune function. Thus prior to attempting 
to gather evidence for relationality as an emergent phenomenon, it is first neces-
sary to address the matter of emergence itself.  
The chapter begins therefore by considering the challenges posed by emergence 
and arguing that contra assorted objections, it represents a genuine ontological 
phenomenon. This is done through an exploration of the tensions surrounding the 
central claim that emergent phenomena exert causal power – since this also lies 
at the heart of the thesis argument. This tension has a twin focus: firstly the loca-
tion of any such causality, and secondly its nature. In both cases I argue that the 
problems stem in part from misapprehensions about emergent phenomena, but 
also that significant difficulty arises because, and in keeping with the idea that 
emergence thinking represents a paradigm shift, the wrong frameworks of refer-
ence are employed: substance metaphysics and Newtonian mechanics – within 
which these questions are routinely addressed – are inappropriate for the task 
and thus generate problems which are artefactual rather than actual.  Since these 
matters (and subsequent chapter and thesis arguments) also depend on an un-
derstanding of complex system dynamics, a brief explanation of key aspects of 
these will also be incorporated as necessary at certain points.  
5.2 Emergence: contours and challenges 
The modern concept of emergence, first articulated by Lewes (1879), was formu-
lated in response to late 19th century views of causality and methodology (Dea-
con, 2012:146-54). Subsequent attempts by the ‘British emergentists’ (Alexander, 
1920; Broad, 1925; Morgan, 1927) to develop solid philosophical foundations for 
the concept stimulated vigorous debate but shed little light on the actual proc-
esses involved. The possible mechanics thus remained locked in the black box be-
tween the observed lower level inputs and higher level outputs (Goldstein, 
1999:54) and the idea lapsed. But whilst it is inarguable that methodological re-
ductionism has been an invaluable heuristic for the purposes of investigation, and 
that determinism as classically understood is sufficient for Newtonian mechanics, 
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their complete adequacy for explaining certain sorts of phenomena has continued 
to be questioned from within both the physical and the biological sciences.  The 
advent of complexity theories (see Taylor, 2001, for a multidimensional account of 
this), Prigogine’s seminal work on the thermodynamics of far-from-equilibrium 
systems (see Prigogine, 1997), the development of nonlinear dynamical systems 
theory and chaos theory, and the complex adaptive systems theory developed 
by the Sante Fe institute (e.g. Kauffman, 1996) have generated a serious and sus-
tained challenge to the standard accounts of summation and linear causality. They 
have also provided tools and models for prising open the black box of emergence 
and throwing some light on the apparent aporeia which lie at its heart. Neverthe-
less, both the charge that accepting emergence entails giving up the causal clo-
sure of physics and the abandonment of physicalism (Kim, 1993:209), and the 
perception that emergence entails ‘illegitimately getting something from nothing’ 
(Bedau, 1997:377) continue to persist and be hotly debated. 
Some of the chief difficulties underlying these tensions are rooted in confusion as 
to the nature of the novelty proposed in emergence scenarios. This in turn is re-
lated to that hegemony within science which holds the explanatory locus of things 
to be their constituent or material features, rather then their topological or rela-
tional ones. However emergence seems to be essentially associated with phe-
nomena in which the latter dominate over the former in determining aggregate 
features. Thus emergents, rather than being ‘things’ are more accurately thought 
of in terms of forms, patterns or functions (Deacon, 2003:276).  Moreover a criti-
cal element to understanding their properties – but which is not provided by the 
physical properties and laws of the system giving rise to them – is an additional 
account of the configurational regularities affecting their constituent reactions 
(Deacon, 2007:93). It is here that the increasing understanding of the dynamics of 
complex, self-organising systems plays a key role in clarifying the genesis and be-
haviour of emergent phenomena and the nature of the causality which they sup-
port.  
 
The lack of terminological clarity associated with the key concepts particularly as 
these are used across different disciplines, further complicates matters. However 
following an extensive review of usage in the literature, De Wolf and Holvert 
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(2005:1-15) have provided a set of working definitions and these will be followed 
here. Thus In the following discussions self organisation refers to 
a dynamical and adaptive process where systems acquire and 
maintain structure themselves, without external control (De 
Wolf and Holvoet, 2005:7), 
and in which ‘structure’ can be spatial, temporal or functional. In other words it is 
a spontaneously arising dynamic under which the system moves over time from a 
not (or less well) organised to a more organised state which entails a global coor-
dination (Prokopenko et al., 2009:12). Emergence references the appearance of 
coherent emergents at the macro-level that dynamically arise 
from the interactions between the parts at the micro-level. 
Such emergents are novel w.r.t. the individual parts of the sys-
tem (De Wolf and Holvoet, 2005:3). 
Emergents may take the form of properties, behaviour, structure, patterns, etc 
and arise at system level. While explanations cannot necessarily be completely 
rendered in terms of the physical properties of the constituents, the physical laws 
which govern these are neither superseded nor violated in emergent phenomena 
(Deacon, 2007:93). It is against these contours that the challenges presented by 
emergent causality must now be examined. 
5.2.1 Parts and wholes: the location of causality 
The question of causal location is inextricably linked with the inherent mereologi-
cal tensions of emergence. The idea of the sum exceeding its parts is neither novel 
or without influence in Western thought: its lineage reaches as far back as Aris-
totle’s musings on syllables in the Metaphysics (VII) and on Zeno’s paradoxes of 
motion in the Physics (IX), and it is central to the school of psychological under-
standing which developed from Goethe’s concept of Gestalt. However the notion 
of irreducibility to parts which emergence entails has significant differences. 
Firstly, the wholes in question are not pre-given coherent entities in the way that 
words or Gestalts are, but instead are ‘dynamical construct[s] arising over time’ 
(De Wolf and Holvoet, 2005:2). Secondly, whilst supervenience is a critical com-
ponent of their dynamic, emergents are, as Lewes’ original description quoted 
above indicates, inherently different from and irreducible to the lower level com-
ponents from which they arise. This latter feature sits at the heart of the disjunc-
tion between emergence and reduction. It is thus at the centre of some of the 
major objections raised against emergence, particularly with respect to the loca-
tion of causality. These objections have been developed in a detailed and sus-
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tained way by philosopher Jaegon Kim, primarily within the framework of the 
mind/body problem (Kim, 1991:257-65; 1993:189-210; 1998; 1999:3-36; 2005:36-
69; 2006:547-59).  
If the emergentists’ twin commitment to both full supervenience and irreducibility 
to the subvenient base is not to succumb to dualism, it necessitates the adoption 
of some form of non-reductive physicalism. Kim claims this is incompatible with 
the causal closure of the universe, and thus that any such attempt to distinguish 
between higher level properties and their physical bases must always collapse 
back into standard reductive physicalism.  The underlying premise is that suffi-
cient causation at one level excludes sufficient causation at another level, and is 
based on his principle of explanatory exclusion that ‘no event can be given more 
than one complete and independent explanation’ (Kim, 1989:79). Kim’s basic ar-
gument regarding the supervenience issue can be stated thus: Suppose an emer-
gent M has causal powers and that an instance of it brings about another property 
M*. But, ex hypothesi, M* must have a basal state P*, on which it supervenes and 
without which it could not be present. Therefore M can only instantiate M* by 
bringing about P* (i.e. by downward causation). However M, as an emergent it-
self, also must have a realisation base P. And if M fully supervenes on P, then the 
presence of P is sufficient for the presence of M. Thus it follows by causal transi-
tivity that P is causally sufficient for both P* and M* and the hypothesised causal 
efficacy of M is superfluous. Hence regardless of whether causation is understood 
in terms of nomological sufficiency or of counterfactuals, then unless we accept 
causal over-determination as normative, M becomes otiose and dispensable as a 
cause of P* (Kim, 1998:37-41; 2006:557-8). By thus undermining both the claim to 
irreducibility and the capacity for distinctive and novel causal contributions at 
higher levels, Kim appears to deal a fatal blow to the possibility of causally effica-
cious emergence:  if higher level phenomena are fully supervenient then causality 
must reside in the lowest subvenient base (which Kim takes to be fundamental 
particles) and all causation at the emergent level is essentially an illusion. 
Kim furthermore argues that a bare statement that a supervenient relationship 
holds between two sets of properties is relatively uninformative: for it to be use-
ful, a deeper explanation of that which grounds and explains the relationship is 
needed. Thus if Emergentism says (as Kim claims) that this information is unavail-
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able or even unknowable, then the supervenience condition on emergence is no 
more than an assertion that there is an in-principle unexplainable covariation be-
tween the putatively emergent properties and their base properties – something 
which ‘cannot be considered a substantive positive characterization of the emer-
gence relation’ (Kim, 2006:556). In a similar vein Kim also designates the hallmark 
of irreducibility as essentially a negative condition rather than a positive account 
of what emergence really is. His case here is that whilst reducibility is a genuine 
relationship characterising two domains of properties, the same is not necessarily 
true of its absence. Thus the claim of irreducibility contributes no useful informa-
tion as to the generation and nature of emergent phenomena. Hence he argues 
that for emergence to be taken seriously, there needs to be ‘an illuminating posi-
tive characterization of emergence’ which explains how and why emergents su-
pervene on their base properties and why, in spite of this supervenience relation, 
they are not reducible to them (Kim, 2006:557). 
However Kim’s critique is itself open to various challenges: as Campbell’s analysis 
demonstrates, his arguments are weakened by assorted terminological blurrings, 
petitio principii statements and self-contradictions – for example his invocation of 
nomological sufficiency is not justified by the concept of supervenience as he him-
self expounds it (Campbell and Bickhard, 2011:33-56). Moreover his causal exclu-
sion stance leads to assorted and potentially serious difficulties connected with 
the downward drainage of causal power (Block, 2003:133-50). However the chief 
point of interest here is not in the fine detail of Kim’s arguments themselves, but 
in whether the substance metaphysics which underpins them and thus frames 
and shapes his mereological analysis, is an appropriate background against which 
to explore the phenomenon of emergence; and thus whether it can actually fur-
nish an adequate toolkit for its analysis, or provide a language suitable for its ar-
ticulation.  
Kim’s criticisms are raised within an intellectual framework which has dominated 
Western thought since the Pre-Socratics. This holds and perpetuates the deeply 
entrenched metaphysical assumption common to both physicalism and Cartesian-
ism, that the basic form of existence is ‘thingness’ (Campbell and Bickhard, 
2011:34). Hand-in-hand with this privileging of substance, and exacerbating the 
difficulties of analysing emergent phenomena, goes a deep philosophical and sci-
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entific bias in favour of the small. This ‘smallism’ assigns ontological priority to 
small things and their properties over the not-so-small things which they consti-
tute (Wilson, 2005:38-41). However Bickhard has long argued, from a variety of 
perspectives, that such assumptions confuse and vitiate the project of developing 
a coherent and fecund account of emergence as a genuine alternative to physical-
ism and dualism (Bickhard, 2003:121-55; 2008:252-6; 2009:547-91; Campbell and 
Bickhard, 2011:33-56). A critical issue here is the already noted apprehension that 
the dynamics of interaction between system components are a key element in the 
generation of emergence. Indeed the original delineation of supervenience explic-
itly invoked novel forms of relatedness as a central feature (Morgan, 1927:15-6, 
18). Complex systems theory has added to the understanding that emergence is 
essentially a phenomenon of process rather than ‘thingness’ and therefore needs 
to be studied as such. But while such a shift in perception is not without prece-
dent in the sciences – as for example in the transition from ‘phlogiston’ to com-
bustion – classic substance and atom assumptions still tend to dominate and thus 
constrain thinking. Hence process is still often conceptualised in terms of mecha-
nistic causal interactions between fixed objects. This leads on to consideration of 
the second issue viz. the question of whether, in the light of the ongoing expan-
sion of quantum understandings, the substance framework itself any longer con-
stitutes an adequate normative metaphysics within which to cast our reading of 
the natural world.  
Unresolved theoretical tensions and inconsistencies notwithstanding, such ad-
vances have cast sufficient light to move our understanding of the basic ontology 
of the universe away from its former locus in the particulate. Instead, quantum 
field theory has led to a reconception of particles as particle-like processes and 
interactions. Thus at the presumed lowest level of scale there are no longer rec-
ognised indivisible point particles, or distinguishable stable and extended configu-
rations, only quantum fields-in-process. Unlike particles, such fields have no dis-
crete extensional boundaries, being defined instead by the statistics and dynamics 
of wave function. At this level therefore, the distinction between dynamics and 
their supporting substrate disappears (Campbell and Bickhard, 2011:45-6; Dea-
con, 2012:167-8) and thus the whole validity of assigning ontological priority to 
substance has now been brought into question. Consequently a strong case can 
and has been made for shifting explorations of emergence (and indeed much else) 
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into an explanatory framework predicated on the primacy of process rather than 
substance (e.g. Bickhard, 2003:121-55; Campbell and Bickhard, 2011:33-56). 
It is important to note here that the proposed move from substance to process 
metaphysics (especially since predicated on quantum understandings of the 
world) does not then simply segue into ‘explaining’ the difficult aspects of emer-
gence as somehow reflecting quantum strangeness. Rather, by enabling assorted 
conceptual and explanatory defaults to be set aside, it opens up different spaces 
within which the questions surrounding emergence can be articulated and ex-
plored, and the critiques against it answered in a coherent and legitimate way. 
With respect to the specific issue of supervenience and causal locus, it enables a 
challenge to be made to the claim that causality is, of necessity, restricted to the 
lowest subvenient level: a crucial factor in Kim’s account is that all causal power is 
located at the ‘basal level’ of elementary particles. Moreover these particles al-
though participating in organisation, do not in themselves (as elementary) have 
organisation. Thus any organisation at this layer is simply a boundary condition 
and organisation per se can never be seen as a legitimate locus of causal power 
(Campbell and Bickhard, 2011:46-7); ipso facto emergent phenomena can never 
be causally efficacious. However if, as contemporary physics seems to suggest, 
there are no particles, and the basal level comprises instead quantised field proc-
esses, then this radically changes the situation: if all is in fact process then, since 
processes inherently involve organisation, causal power must be located in proc-
ess organisation itself. Thus ‘organisation cannot be de-legitimated as a potential 
source of causal power without eliminating causality from the world’ (Bickhard, 
2003:124).  
This relocation of causality from particle to process removes its restriction to the 
lowest subvenient base and thus opens the possibility that emergent phenomena 
can also be a locus of causality; and if the world is recognised as being constituted 
in terms of organisation of process, then there is no longer any in-principle mys-
tery to new organisations giving rise to causally efficacious emergents (Bickhard, 
2008:254); nor is there any reason why this cannot arise from interactions at any 
level, or indeed between different levels. It also implicitly recognises the vital role 
which process and organisation play in any mereological reckoning of a system. 
Liberating causality from a substance straightjacket thus enables coherent ac-
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counts to be developed of both emergent causality, and of how emergent phe-
nomena can be both fully supervenient on and yet at the same time irreducible to, 
the systems components which give rise to them. Nevertheless the assumptions 
which go with two millennia of substance metaphysics are deeply ingrained in 
both our thought and language. Thus the proposed move, whilst opening up new 
possibilities for scientific and philosophical investigation, also demands a signifi-
cant mental effort, but one which seems to be itself demanded by the new para-
digm currently being ushered in by the complexity sciences. 
However whilst reassigning the locus of causality defuses the mereological ten-
sion of emergence, it does not fully resolve that related to the direction in which 
its causality operates. Once again these difficulties arise primarily from framing 
this within an explanatory framework which is inappropriate for, and thus inade-
quate to deal with, the dynamics of complex systems.  
5.2.2 Cause and constraint: the nature of causality 
The nature of causation is a core issue for science (Ellis, 2008:69). The prevalent 
scientific articulation of causality is couched solely in terms of Aristotelian ‘effi-
cient cause’ within a Newtonian framework; and the concept of bottom-up causa-
tion – i.e. that lower level action underlies all higher level behaviour, and that all 
interactions and mechanisms are ultimately based in the laws of physics with no 
remainder – sits at the explanatory heart of all strong reductionist views of sci-
ence. Moreover Aristotle’s dictum that ‘in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it 
cannot be acted on by itself; for it is one and not two different things’ (Metaphys-
ics IX.1), which has remained largely unchallenged throughout the history of phi-
losophy and science, would seem to absolutely prohibit the idea that a system can 
act causally on itself. The claim that emergents exert top-down control over the 
systems which give rise to them is thus doubly contentious and hotly contested.  
However the underlying idea is, once again, not a new one: Kant himself, in The 
Critique of Judgement, raised the possibility of a causality ‘of a completely differ-
ent kind’ operating in the organisation of nature (Kant, 1790/2007:216-7). Evi-
dence from complex systems research increasingly indicates that bottom-up, 
same level and top-down forms can not only exist concurrently but also act in 
concert to enable the generation of further complexity within systems (Ellis, 
2008:34). Moreover it seems that the apparent contradictions arise not (as Kant 
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concluded) from a limitation of reason, but from the inadequacy of the Newto-
nian framework itself for capturing the shape and the behaviour of the complex 
systems that give rise to and are then influenced by emergent phenomena.  
System behaviour essentially involves the reception and processing of inputs and 
the generation of outputs (e.g. as material, energy, or information). All systems 
possess a distinct, though potentially changeable, internal structure (their ‘state’) 
defined by their components and the particular relations of these at any given 
instant in time (Juarrero, 2002:110). They also demonstrate organisation in the 
form of the unchanging relationships among components which determine the 
system’s ‘class identity’. Thus while a system’s state may change (a necessary 
condition for emergence to occur), its identity remains constant (Heylighen, 
1989:27). Systems also have an external structure (their ‘boundary condition’) 
comprising the interactions between their components and the environment in 
which the system is situated, alterations in which can also affect the internal 
structure and thus the dynamics of the system. Characteristic behaviour, and the 
state to which a given system tends over time is represented by its specific ‘at-
tractors’ i.e. its asymptotic behaviour (‘attractor’ thus implies/involves no force). 
States adjacent to the attractor are ones more likely to be visited by the system, 
and all states close by in its adjacent ‘valley’ – that is neighbouring configurations 
– are directed and channelled by its dynamics. Attractors thus provide evidence of 
the way in which the overall organisation of a system constrains the alternatives 
available to it (Newman, 1996:245-61).  
Despite these shared features, systems display radical differences in the way they 
operate and in their degree of openness to the environment in which they are 
embedded. It is these differences which give rise to the possibility of emergent 
phenomena and to the difficulties of capturing them with the standard Newtonian 
descriptions employed for stable linear systems. These near–equilibrium systems 
are typically closed and deterministic and hence impervious to external influ-
ences. Their operations and outputs are proportionate to and completely predict-
able from their causes. Moreover their parts are essentially independent of each 
other, being only externally related, and therefore remaining unchanged by their 
place in the whole. This rigidity means that such systems can increase neither 
their entropy nor their complexity and thus they cannot give rise to novel features 
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or exhibit anything other than bottom-up causality. These characteristic are re-
flected by the three typical attractors of such systems – points, limit cycles, and 
torii – which are regular, described by two variables mappable on a standard two-
dimensional Cartesian grid, and thus mathematically tractable (Juarrero, 
2002:152-4; Newman, 1996:253-4). 
However systems operating far from equilibrium (Prigogine’s ‘dissipative struc-
tures’) realise their structure, organisation and function in a very different way. 
Firstly they have an openness which enables them to regularly receive energy, 
information, and/or matter from the environment. Secondly, they contain a large 
number of components which interact, both serially and in parallel, in non-trivial 
ways, giving rise to both sequential and simultaneous effects and events. Hence 
small alterations in input can generate disproportionate system changes; more-
over these interactions lead to symmetry breaking and thus to alteration of both 
the interior and exterior structures of the system, paving the way for spontaneous 
self-organisation and the development of coordinated global behaviour. This in 
turn opens up new sets of possible interactions through which the system can 
continue to evolve or develop. Such systems thus become recursive and are char-
acterised by complex feedback and feed-forward loops which may be either am-
plifying or dampening in their effects. In contrast to linear systems, attractors de-
scribing complex systems cannot be represented two-dimensionally and indicate 
that even though the system is still ‘captured’, the overall pathway of this is in fact 
multiply realisable (Juarrero, 2002:162). These ‘strange attractors’ describe or-
dered global patterns with a high degree of local fluctuation, and are indicative of 
the fact that the systems which give rise to them are governed by highly complex, 
context-dependent dynamic organisation (Juarrero, 2002:152-5).  
It is the presence of such features which allow both the possibility of emergent 
phenomena and explain why these, despite being generated by local interactions, 
tend to be global in nature. It is also the reason why standard Newtonian mechan-
ics are inadequate and even inappropriate as a framework for understanding and 
articulating them. Once again the problem is rooted in the bias towards investiga-
tion and explanation in terms of objects and their properties, at the expense of 
the processes and relations in which they are involved:  since dissipative struc-
tures are, as described, essentially distributed patterns of dynamic relations 
173 
 
rather than mechanical processes, it is a fundamental category mistake to think of 
their causal powers in Newtonian terms. Hence rather than conceiving the causal 
power of the emergent entity in the classical mechanical way as an external force 
impressed on system components, top-down causality should be understood as 
exerting its effects through the operation of system constraints (Juarrero, 
2002:131-50). Thus whole-part restraint is a more appropriate (and helpful) ter-
minology to employ. 
Self organisation and emergence – Taylor’s ‘moment of complexity – occurs in a 
narrow possibility space lying between conditions that are too ordered and those 
that are too disordered (Taylor, 2001:142-3). For a system to occupy this critical 
space between rigidity and randomness requires 
a unique balance of integration, cohesion and robustness at 
global level and, at the same time, differentiation and multiple 
realisability at component level (Juarrero, 2009:84). 
It is in achieving and maintaining this balance that constraints play a vital role: 
rather than being primary properties of the system parts, they are in fact the rela-
tional properties these acquire by virtue of becoming integrated (rather than sim-
ply aggregated) into a systematic whole as the system organises, and which lead 
to the particular ‘attractors’ of its space state. In other words they influence the 
probability landscape of the system’s behaviour leading to various forms of en-
trainment between its component parts (Juarrero, 2002:152-5, 162).  
The critical feature of such constraints as regards their causal effects is that they 
are context sensitive – in other words, their presence ensures that what has hap-
pened in the system previously significantly affects what can happen next (a point 
I will return to in chapter 6). A useful analogy is to compare throwing a die with 
dealing a deck of cards: in the former, previous numbers thrown have no effect on 
future possibilities whereas in the latter, the chances of getting a particular card 
at any point depends on what has already been dealt. This second vignette is 
analogous to the action of second order constraints which can operate once a sys-
tem is far from equilibrium. Here distributed wholes contextually constrain their 
parts by modifying their prior probability in real time. At first sight, this appears to 
restrict rather than enlarge the possibilities for the system. However, drawing on 
information theory, Juarrero argues in a strong and detailed way that whilst the 
imposition of such second-order contextual constraints limits the degrees of free-
174 
 
dom available to the system components, the translation into a more complex 
differentiated whole enabled by this improves system cohesion and stability and 
enlarges the variety of states it can access. Thus the system as a whole acquires a 
much broader causal repertoire (Juarrero, 2002:131-50). She hypothesises that 
similarly high levels of self organisation occurring in the brain would allow access 
to different states with different properties than less complex and uncorrelated 
neuronal processes can achieve, suggesting that both consciousness and various 
aspects of self-consciousness such as intentionality represent novel emergent pat-
terns. The argument of this chapter is that relationality is another such emergent, 
arising out of the integration of the decoding processes explored in the previous 
chapter into a complex whole. 
Complex systems operating far from equilibrium are thus ripe with possibility for 
self organisation and the subsequent emergence of new properties – moments of 
complexity which inevitably involve the simultaneous realisation of some possi-
bilities and the negation of others. Moreover as possibilities are actualised new 
patterns emerge which, in their turn, both impose new constraints and open up 
new possibilities for future trajectories of the system (Taylor, 2001:149). Another 
important point to underline here is that these new systems are not simply there, 
waiting to be unfurled along predetermined lines. Instead different potential tra-
jectories become available which are themselves then changed as the system 
evolves or its boundary condition alters. Thus they represent  
uniquely individuated trajectories embodying irreversible dis-
continuities – both phylogenetic and ontogenetic – that 
emerge over time while simultaneously remaining open to the 
future (Juarrero, 2009:97). 
This is an important consideration to which I will return in Chapter 6 when explor-
ing the realisation of relational capacity and the immunological effects that the 
shape of this might have. However, from the perspective of this chapter, the criti-
cal point to be carried forward is that in both the appearance of emergents and 
the subsequent exercise of their power to shape the behaviour and further devel-
opment of the systems which give rise to them, constraint plays a central role.  
The challenges raised against the claim to the existence of causally efficacious 
emergence are thus by no means insurmountable. On the contrary, when consid-
ered within frameworks which are more suited to exploring the growing under-
standings coming from complex system and information theory, the concept not 
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only becomes much more coherent and defensible, but also opens up the new 
possibilities for philosophical and scientific understanding to be expected of a po-
tential paradigm shifter. From the perspective of this chapter, the argument that 
emergence represents a genuine ontological phenomenon and that emergents 
are not epiphenomena but wield causal power is held to be defensible. Moreover 
certain hallmarks have been identified which can be now looked for as part of 
building the case for considering relationality as an emergent phenomenon out-
lined in the introduction. It is to the first of these – evidence for complexity, self 
organisation, and complexification at various levels, and to the contribution of 
cognitive neuroscience – that attention now turns. 
5.3 Underlying complexity: a neurobiological perspec-
tive 
That the human brain, with its 1011 neurons and 1015 connections, is an organ of 
staggering complexity seems to be so much the ultimate truism as to require little 
in the way of further supporting argument. However the aim here is twofold: 
firstly, to examine very briefly from a general (although necessarily restricted) 
perspective, whether neural networks in the brain behave as complex systems 
which can thus potentially give rise to emergent phenomena; secondly, to look 
specifically at whether the previously discussed processes for decoding social in-
formation show evidence of being connected together into such a system, or of 
giving rise to new features or processing abilities at higher levels of complexity. 
However whilst networks involve both structural and functional connectivity and 
thus must be investigated from that dual aspect, any attempt to think of the brain 
in terms of hardware and software is fundamentally mistaken: rather than being a 
computer with stored contents and subroutines to be called up by a particular 
program, the brain is a ‘constantly shifting dynamic system […] the flow of a river 
in which patterns emerge and disappear’ (Kelso, 1995:1). It is this which makes 
investigation and interpretation of neural networks so challenging. 
5.3.1 Neurons and networks 
Networks essentially process sensory inputs and program motor outputs, acting 
as the interface between the physiological and the behavioural level. Typically 
they comprise vast numbers of neurons hierarchically arranged upwards into col-
umns and thence into functional areas. These make distinct contributions to in-
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formation processing (Cohen et al., 2008:46), but are also themselves intercon-
nected. Once again there are significant practical difficulties to overcome in ex-
ploring aspects of their composition, connections and behaviour: the interpreta-
tional issues of dynamic scans were noted in Chapter 3 and moreover, such 
knowledge as they can provide is also limited to the regional and thus upper level 
of network hierarchies. Furthermore, cytoarchitectonic studies indicate a more 
subtle and complex scenario here than fMRI-based topographical divisions allow 
(Vogel et al., 2010:364), further coarsening the level of information these deliver.  
Alternative study tools have thus been developed such as modelling with artificial 
neural networks (e.g. Noriega, 2008:130-9); and newer scanning techniques such 
as resting state functional connectivity MRIs which examine spontaneous fluctua-
tions in the BOLD signal in the absence of any externally cued tasks (see Cohen et 
al., 2008:45-57 for an account of the technique and its possibilities). Parker 
(2006:82-7) provides a useful review of assorted investigational issues connected 
with these. However a critical issue here is not just the determination of the func-
tional architecture involved, but the identification and analysis of the relational 
dynamics at work: structural connectivity in primates has been easier to elucidate 
than the main organisational principles of the connection patterns which link 
brain areas, columns, and individual cells (Sporns and Zwi, 2004:145). Neverthe-
less, there has been a steady increase in the availability of network connectivity 
data. Moreover the extension of graph theory analysis to neural networks (e.g. 
Bassett and Bullmore, 2006:512-23; Bullmore and Sporns, 2009:186-98; Stam and 
Reijneveld, 2007:1-19) and the development from this of new tools such as com-
plex network analysis have increased understanding of connectivity data sets 
(Rubinov and Sporns, 2010:1059-69 provide an accessible introduction to this 
technique). 
These data and their analyses provide evidence that neural networks display 
characteristic features of complex systems as described by Juarrero regarding 
both the presence of second order constraints and whole/part interaction. Thus 
for example networks show evidence of sensitivity to previous history (Merzenich 
et al., 1990:293-311) in a variety of ways: neuronal activity depends not just on 
immediate input but also prior input (Fetz, 1993:188; Lockery and Sejnowski, 
1993:132); networks are also pruned in response to experience (Craik and Bialy-
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stok, 2006:132) – two features indicative of the operation of constraints. In this 
respect, the qualitative effects on spatiotemporal network dynamics produced by 
changes in network connectivity (Jirsa, 2004:183-204) are likewise suggestive. 
Neuronal networks also demonstrate entrainment (p158) with evidence of tran-
sient phase-coupling occurring between high and low frequency brain oscillations 
and producing synchronised firings in different parts of the network (e.g. Canolty 
et al., 2006; Womelsdorf et al., 2007). Whilst the mechanism of such couplings 
within and between different levels varies (Kelso, 2010:120), the net result is the 
coordination of neuronal activity in distributed cortical areas. This provides a 
mechanism for effective cognitive processing of complex information (Canolty et 
al., 2006:1628). 
As regards whole/part relationships and interaction, analyses increasingly indicate 
that networks clearly demonstrate ‘small world architecture’ – that is they com-
bine high levels of local clustering and activity with short paths that link network 
clusters into a global network (e.g. Sporns et al., 2004:423; Sporns and Zwi, 
2004:145-62). Such arrangements provide a functional connectivity of high dy-
namic complexity and adaptability (Bassett and Bullmore, 2006:512-23). They also 
enable highly efficient segregated and distributed processing in a network (Achard 
and Bullmore, 2007:0175), something which is of vital importance in the 
whole/part balance within networks: complex systems involve effective function-
ing at both local and global level. In network terms this necessitates facilitating 
enough regional activation for information propagation on the scale needed for 
cognition at global level, without this local activity then invading the totality of the 
network. If this balance is not maintained – as for example in a grand mal seizure 
when there is hyper-synchronisation of the cortex to localised firing – the compu-
tational potential of the whole network is lost (Kelso and Tognoli, 2006:2). 
The brain thus also displays a high degree of metastability in which locally segre-
gative and globally integrative processes co-exist as complementary pairs in neu-
ral networks (Kelso, 2010:128). Each specialised cortical area performs its unique 
information-expressing role whilst being simultaneously largely constrained by its 
network connections to the larger system (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2004:851) 
– a feature suggestive of the part/whole connection typical of complex dynamic 
systems.  Moreover it appears that these co-variant interactions continue even 
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when the brain is ‘at rest’ (Smith et al., 2009:13040-5), something which is seen as 
a mechanism for exploring a variety of possible functional network configurations 
around particular anatomical network skeletons (Deco et al., 2011:43-56). Again 
this is suggestive of the state and phase space system behaviour which typifies 
the ontogenic landscape of complex systems and their strange attractors (cf. Juar-
rero, 2002:151-62).  
There is therefore evidence from a variety of perspectives that neural networks 
generally demonstrate a functional connectivity which displays the characteristic 
features of complex system operation. The next section considers from a more 
specific perspective whether processes involved in social signal decoding are part 
of such a complex system from which the capacity for relationality might thus be 
emergent. 
5.3.2 The ‘Social Brain’ as a complex system 
Evidence for the existence of a variety of innate processes enabling the decoding 
of basic social cues such as facial expression, biological movement, and emotional 
state was presented in Chapter 4. The question now is whether this account is 
sufficiently comprehensive, both as a description of the ‘social brain’ itself and as 
an explanation of human relationality. Considered through the lens of emergence 
this becomes a question as to whether these disparate mechanisms also operate 
as a complex system capable of giving rise to dimensions of relational connection 
which are more than simply a summation of the individual skills they enable. As 
with neural complexity, the notion that human relationality amounts to more 
than efficient decoding of conspecific social signals seem too truistic to warrant 
further exploration. However to claim that it is an emergent phenomenon with 
causal efficacy necessitates more than a statement of intuitive belief that such is 
the case. Thus it is necessary to examine whether experimental data from social 
neuroscience provide evidence as to whether the individual processes which en-
able social decoding are also components of a complex self-organising ‘social 
brain’ system. 
Two issues need to be noted here. Firstly, the system being postulated involves a 
nested complexity: not only are neurons complex systems in their own right 
(Kelso, 1995:228) but, as suggested above, the individual neural networks sup-
porting decoding are also likely to be self-organising. Hence the basic system 
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components are themselves complex systems. Consequently there are attendant 
difficulties with disentangling at which level experimental evidence of particular 
effects should be properly located. Secondly, data on the functioning of these 
component parts are vast, providing many perspectives from which supporting 
evidence could be adduced and it is simply not possible here to address even a 
fraction of these. In light of these two problems, any account offered must there-
fore necessarily be both highly simplified and the data seen as indicative rather 
than comprehensive. Although the division is somewhat artificial, I thus propose 
to present evidence of complexity in the form of exemplars under a twofold heu-
ristic of connection and complexification. 
5.3.2.1 Connection 
Evidence previously examined in Chapter 4 suggests not only that dedicated brain 
regions deal with social processing but that each aspect of such decoding – down 
to extremely fine detail – is dealt with via very specific pathways and processing 
mechanisms. The pertinent issue here then is whether each element of processing 
proceeds independently, with outputs being simply collated at an end point prior 
to response generation, or whether mutual exchange of information is part of the 
basic processing itself. Many experiments studying specific elements of social de-
coding via dynamic scanning have also noted concurrent activation of brain re-
gions associated with other decoding skills, but this does not of itself confirm in-
fluential connection of the type which is of interest here. Instead I will consider 
evidence from the perspective of two of the basic processes which were refer-
enced in Chapter 4 – gaze processing and mirror neuron systems. 
The first of these is an important decoding skill, present almost from birth and 
apparently commanding its own very specific processing pathways (see Frischen 
et al., 2007:694-724 for a wide-ranging review). However there is also a growing 
corpus of evidence to suggest that aspects of gaze also affect and recruit other 
processing pathways and cortical loci such as those involved in theory of mind 
tasks (Conty et al., 2007:3024-37; George and Conty, 2008:197-207). Thus for ex-
ample assorted psychological and imaging studies in adults (e.g. Senju et al., 
2005:1474-96) indicate that direct eye contact modulates both attention and cog-
nition, facilitating other face related processing tasks such as gender discrimina-
tion (Macrae et al., 2002:460-64) and encoding/decoding of identity (Hood et al., 
2003:67-71). Similar effects on cognitive function are also seen in infants – for 
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example direct gaze appears to improve face recognition in young babies (Farroni 
et al., 2007:396-404; Rigato et al., 2011:20-34). Taken together such data indicate 
that gaze processing is possibly connected with other components of the social 
brain. Moreover evidence indicates that both the specific task demands and the 
social context influence which additional regions in the social brain network are 
activated (Senju and Johnson, 2009:127). 
There is also a well-documented connection between gaze direction and emo-
tional expression – the ‘shared signal hypothesis’. Here, seminal behavioural stud-
ies indicate that when gaze direction is combined with the intent communicated 
by a specific emotion, perception and interpretation of that emotion is much 
swifter (Adams and Kleck, 2003:644-7; 2005:3-11). Thus anger and joy are more 
quickly read in combination with a direct rather than an averted gaze. Conversely, 
fear and sadness are more rapidly processed and identified when presented with 
an averted gaze. These findings have some supporting confirmation from electri-
cal studies which also suggest that the very early processing of each element oc-
curs separately but then quickly becomes integrated (Rigato et al., 2010:88-97). 
Arguably these particular data may also indicate the presence of a variety of en-
trainment, (p158) with two separate components becoming synchronised to im-
prove the speed and efficiency of processing of information with high social sig-
nificance. Some corroboration for such a notion can be read from a recent study 
providing the first evidence that communicative intent signalled in auditory form 
influences interpretation of gaze direction (Stoyanova et al., 2010:1765-9). Irre-
spective of the details of possible mechanisms however, the corpus of gaze-
related data sketched here provide indications that different decoding processes, 
whilst specifically dedicated, are also connected together in a larger network 
which allows the possibility of mutual influence.  
The previous chapter expressed reservations about the explanatory ubiquity in-
creasingly assigned to mirror neuron systems (MNS) at all levels of analysis from 
the neural to the societal. Nonetheless some of the investigative data presented 
there can support an argument that MNS can be seen as performing an integra-
tive function across the disparate elements of decoding. This in turn allows for the 
possibility of mutual exchange across the social brain modules as an integral part 
of processing itself. The suggestive features here come from a number of different 
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perspectives; and whilst taken in isolation none necessarily constitute sufficient 
warrant for the claim of integrative function, taken together they could be seen as 
providing reasonable grounds for proposing it. Thus at the most basic level there 
is the dynamic evidence of concurrent activation of cortical areas identified as 
MNS loci alongside others known to be engaged by the specific decoding task be-
ing undertaken.  Secondly there is the issue of the observed rapidity of some ele-
ments of decoding response noted previously. For example although the reading 
of facial expression involves processing elements observable at both cognitive and 
muscular level, the assignation of initial emotional value occurs at a speed which 
far outstrips these or the possibility of conscious evaluation. The instantaneous 
motor (and possibly emotional) representations formed by MNS produce a form 
of direct ‘neuronal’ knowledge and it can be reasonably hypothesised that these 
could then contribute to an immediate additional input into the specifically dedi-
cated decoding pathways. Finally, experimental data indicate that MNS represen-
tations can be formed not only when visual data is restricted but also predica-
tively when action sequences are under observation.  Once again this raises the 
possibility that MNS have the capacity to provide additional and more subtle in-
formational input into a whole range of other decoding processes. This is arguably 
also indicative of a wider connectivity existing between, and contributing to, indi-
vidual decoding processes.  This point leads us to the second category for consid-
eration viz. that of evidence for complexification arising within/from these basic 
innate decoding processes. Here the exemplar I wish to consider is the develop-
ment of mentalising or ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) skills. 
5.3.2.2 Complexification 
Whereas several of the basic social monitoring skills described in the previous 
chapter are shared with apes and monkeys, the ability to represent both our own 
mental state and that of others and to then distinguish between the two, is a 
uniquely human ability. These ToM skills enable us to attribute agency to others 
and make predictions about their mental states and behaviour; they also confer 
the related ability to represent triadic relationships – ‘You, and Me, collaboratively 
looking at, working on or talking about This’ (Saxe, 2006:235). As such they repre-
sent a high end cognitive skill which if impaired, as for example in autistic spec-
trum disorders (ASDs), can lead to severe social handicap. The question here is 
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whether they represent a separate social decoding skill or whether they are evi-
dence of complexification arising from other such basic processes. 
In contrast to other social decoding processes, which appear as innately specified, 
ToM abilities are not present in neonates or young infants, even in rudimentary 
form. Instead they begin to appear at about 18 months of age with the develop-
ment of joint attention and of proto-declarative pointing. Thereafter they pro-
gress through a series of well demarcated stages, becoming increasingly sophisti-
cated in the process: second-stage skills, which appear between 18 and 24 
months with the development of pretend play, involve the ability to grasp the 
concept of ‘desire’; third stage skills, developing between ages 3 and 4, enable an 
understanding of false beliefs – indicative of the ability to understand that other 
people can hold different beliefs from oneself. Between 6 and 7 comes the under-
standing that other people can also represent mental states (i.e. that they can be 
thinking about what the child is thinking about); and associated with this, the ca-
pacity to understand 2nd order false beliefs (i.e. that others can have different be-
liefs about one’s own beliefs). The final stage, usually appearing between the ages 
of 9 and 11, involves the development of highly sophisticated ToM skills requiring 
both cognitive and empathetic elements such as the ability to recognise faux pas. 
Debate as to whether these skills are necessarily domain-specific (e.g. Stone and 
Gerrans, 2006:309-19) has continued since their existence was first postulated 
(see Saxe and Baron-Cohen, 2006:i-iii for an overview and some recent studies). In 
fact there is evidence that both domain-specific and domain-general cognitive 
resources are involved in ToM tasks (Saxe et al., 2006:284-98). A recent review of 
imaging studies suggests the presence of an integrated network of several consis-
tently involved ‘core’ regions. In addition other regions seem to be contingently 
involved in more minor aspects of ToM tasks (Carrington and Bailey, 2009:2313-
35). It is also clear that in addition to specific reasoning skills, these tasks require 
the employment and integration of a whole range of basic social processing skills 
at a very high level of operation (something in which MNS may possibly play a key 
role). These two features suggest that the development and employment of ToM 
abilities can be understood, at least in part, in terms of complexification of the 
basic social processing networks. 
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Additional support for this can be adduced from the growing body of evidence 
linking ASDs ‘with abnormal interregional brain activity’ (Koshino et al., 2008:289): 
I earlier suggested that the ‘small-world’ architecture seen in neural networks was 
both indicative of, and vital for, their successful functioning as complex systems. 
However both post-mortem and fMRI studies suggest a disruption of such archi-
tecture in ASDs (Wass, 2011:18-28) with typical findings indicating a combination 
of local over-connectivity and long distance under-connectivity. This raises the 
possibility that a lack of information transfer and synchronisation over large scale 
cortical networks can lead to impairment of the high level integration of assorted 
decoding processes needed for ToM operation (Just et al., 2004:1811-21). As such 
it provides some indirect confirmation that such skills represent a complexifica-
tion of these basic processes. 
From an evolutionary perspective such interaction and complexification also 
makes sense: for an agent to survive, it must be able to detect and use regularities 
in its environment; and the more successfully it can build and maintain a maxi-
mally predictive internal model for this, the greater its chances of so doing. The 
degree to which the agent can model depends in part on its computational re-
sources and in part on what ‘language’ it is implicitly restricted to or explicitly 
chooses when making its models (Crutchfield, 1994-9). Thus anything which in-
creases the resources and expands the ‘language’ for modelling improves the 
models which can be made of different aspects of the environment – which in the 
social context is essentially a stochastic dynamical system consisting of other 
agents. Improving the coarse-graining capabilities of signal decoding enables more 
complex modelling and maximises the ability to respond appropriately, enhancing 
the chances of survival. Conversely, anything which impairs or restricts computa-
tional resources leads to less successful modelling and thus more difficulty in 
reading and responding appropriately – as for example in ASDs where the absence 
of aspects of ToM skills can lead to severe impairment of relational skills. 
Data from different domains of experimental cognitive neuroscience thus provide 
some good general evidence that the brain fundamentally operates as a pattern-
forming, self-organised system governed by non-linear dynamical laws (Kelso, 
1995:26) – Sherrington’s loom metaphor quoted at the chapter head seems to 
have been prescient as well as poetic. From the more specific starting point of 
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systems devoted to social decoding, there is also evidence suggesting that indi-
vidual decoding processes are entrained to, or otherwise connected with one an-
other, in a way suggestive of complex system operation and resulting in complexi-
fication of decoding skills. The chapter now moves on to explore the second des-
ignated feature evidencing an emergent phenomenon, and the articulating voice 
passes to theology.  
5.4 Relationality and restraint: a theological perspec-
tive 
The problem of infelicitous appropriation of scientific ideas has already been 
noted, and emergence with its rich explanatory potential may, as Rue (2007:835) 
indicates, present particular dangers for theology in this respect. However the aim 
here is not to produce a theological account of emergence through which to gloss 
the inherent difficulties or fill the explanatory lacunae discussed in section 2. 
Rather it is to use a theological lens to explore, at a level above the neurobiologi-
cal, whether and how restraints might be involved in the development and ex-
perience of relationality. This will then become a piece of the interlocking evi-
dence being built up in the manner described by Haack. In Chapter 4 (p127-8) I 
suggested that the proffered re-articulation of the three classical interpretations 
of the imago Dei linked each perspective primarily to a different aspect of rela-
tionality; I further argued that the functional re-reading reflected elements of the 
emergence strand and that it captured the idea of likeness as not merely a static 
possession but one which entailed ‘an active movement on our part to engage 
and develop this faculty […] as part of a much larger relational dynamic.’ A further 
exploration of this movement, and in particular the role which self-limitation may 
play in its development, is now proposed. The chosen vehicle here is that of ken-
otic theology, in particular the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar. 
 
In keeping with the philosophical principles and methodological approach 
adopted in the thesis, the theological material is not intended to function as a 
species of inversely applied analogia entis (cf. Gunton, 1995:92-6): the accompa-
nying degree of accession to a concomitant full-blown Christian ontology of the 
world which this would necessitate is debarred by the project’s parameters. In-
stead it is once again offered as rationally developed and defensible insights 
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about relationality which thus have a validity and utility beyond the specific issues, 
theologoumena, and frameworks which have generated them. Hence if used with 
appropriate critically and care under the direction of postfoundational rationality, 
they need not be confined to a specific confessional context but can also be illu-
minating with regard to aspects of human relationality more generally. The neces-
sary first stage of this process is thus to introduce kenoticism and outline why this 
theological canon in general, and the writing of von Balthasar in particular, consti-
tutes a suitable and rationally defensible contributory voice here. 
5.4.1 Kenotic theology: choosing and using 
Like the imago Dei, kenoticism has a long history within the Christian tradition and 
its Judaic parent, and the conundrum of divine self-limitation has generated a 
wealth of richly detailed reflection over the centuries. As a fully fledged theologi-
cal concept, kenosis is relatively recent, having first appeared in the writings 17th 
century Lutheran scholars. However its linguistic and conceptual roots lie in a very 
early text of the Christian canonical literature – the great carmen Christi of Philip-
pians 2:5-11 with its ‘ellipsis, rhythm, parallelism, and strophic arrangements’ 
(Ward, 1999:21), and its dramatic but opaque assertion that Christ ‘emptied him-
self’ (eauton ekenōsen). Just as with the imago texts of Genesis, the passage itself 
presents a range of exegetical and theological challenges: many of its terms are 
rare in New Testament Greek and even rarer in the Pauline vocabulary and thus 
their precise translation and implications have occasioned much debate (Martin, 
1998:2-3). Moreover, since it takes the form of poetic narrative rather than theo-
logical argument, the passage is marked by an additional level of ambiguity and 
creative tension: for example the phrase which introduces the kenotic declaration 
– en morphē theou hyparchōn (being in the form of God) – can bear both causa-
tive (because he was…), and concessive (although he was..) interpretations, with 
different implications for understanding the dynamics of kenosis (Gorman, 
2007:148-63). 
Given this background and the consequent variation in exegetical possibility, it is 
unsurprising then that the kenotic motif has, like the imago Dei, given rise to a 
range of different readings. These textual challenges are also joined by assorted, 
and sometimes severe, philosophical and theological ones regarding the nature of 
God, which have led to a cyclical waxing and waning of the idea across its histori-
cal trajectory. Such difficulties notwithstanding, the concept is still widely re-
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garded as ‘a valid theological option’ (Davies and Evans, 2006:313). Moreover its 
canonical persistence, coupled with a recent resurgence of interest and energetic 
redevelopment of the core ideas, give some indication as to the strength and 
depth of the intuition that these provide an important tool for understanding as-
pects of both divine and human relational engagement.  
In Chapter 2, I argued that a key to setting up successful transversal space ex-
change was the identification of intersecting lines of various kinds between differ-
ent disciplines. Two such intersections are operational here: firstly, kenotic theol-
ogy explores the issue of divine self-limitation, in particular how this operates in 
the development, functioning, shape, and consequences of relational connection 
– both within the divine life itself and with respect to engagement between God 
and the world. Thus there is a clear intersection of interests at the nexus of the 
role of restraint in relationality. Secondly kenotic themes are inextricably rooted 
in what might be described as a metaphysic of possibility. Challenging the classical 
account of God as the actus purus in which everything is always eternally realised 
and who is thus immutable and impassible, they suggest that on the contrary, in 
order for God to create and then interact with Creation, divine change and 
movement are necessary. 
By essentially thus relocating the concept of ‘greatest possible being’ in highest 
potential rather than highest simplicity, kenotic trinitarianism can be seen as re-
versing the Aristotelian metaphysic in which actuality always stands higher than 
potential. This shift in perspective, anticipated by Heidegger in Being and Time 
(Heidegger, 1962:63), has clear and obvious resonances with the themes explored 
in connection with complex systems in section 2, and in the shift away from sub-
stance to process. Thus in both its basic subject matter and its underlying meta-
physic, kenotic theology is particularly suited and well equipped to contribute to 
the chapter dialogue. However since its arena is extensive, a further winnowing is 
necessary in order to identify the strand which has maximum potential for con-
tributing transversally. 
The history of formal kenotic developments is relatively short; but as with the 
imago Dei, the trajectory of these is illustrative of the mechanism of postfounda-
tional rationality in action within a theological framework. Shifts in focus, ques-
tions examined and solutions posited – as for example in the debates between 
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the Lutheran and Calvinist positions in the 17th century (see Ward, 1999:25-40) – 
reflect the evolving of theological thought as changing political, cultural, and phi-
losophical landscapes have presented different hermeneutical keys for unlocking 
the kenotic chest. Similarly the range of kenotic-based exploration – from early 
wrestling with the Chalcedon conundrum of Christ’s twin nature (Law, 2010:259-
64; Pannenberg, 1977:307-23; Thompson, 2006:74-111), through 20th century ex-
plorations of the trinitarian life ad-intra and ad-extra (e.g. Bulgakov, 1933/2008; 
Moltmann, 2001:137-51; von Balthasar, 1988-98), to recent science/religion ex-
cursions into areas such as cosmic creation (Ellis, 2001:114-8), divine action in the 
world (e.g. Peacocke, 2001:21-42; Polkinghorne, 2001:96-106), transcendent ex-
perience (Karo and Friedenthal, 2008:823-36), and altruism (e.g. Jeeves, 2001:66-
89) – bears witness to the normative canonical character outlined in Chapter 4 in 
which fecundity and depth of resources are key identifying features. 
But whilst material from any of these three main areas could in theory furnish a 
theological contribution, in practice the first and third are less well suited to the 
specific task in hand. In the first case, the nature of kenotic Christological debates 
centred on which of the divine attributes were relinquished and whether renun-
ciation was real or apparent, means they have not necessarily generated insights 
which can be easily applied outside specific philosophical-theological dogmatic 
pre-occupations. In the case of the various science/religion debates, the focus has 
again been very specific – for example on whether divine restraints occur at quan-
tum, genetic, or anthropic level, and on the potential mechanics for any such ken-
otically-regulated intervention. However since the aim here is to produce a more 
general exploration of and reflection on the role of restraint in enabling the de-
velopment of relational connection, such approaches again seem both too par-
ticular, and too difficult to separate from some of their faith-based foundations. 
Thus they too will not be drawn on here. 
However the kenotic trinitarianism which developed over the 20th century offers a 
somewhat more promising starting point for this project.  Although primarily con-
cerned, like the Cappadocian speculations discussed in Chapter 4, with a set of 
noetically constrained and uniquely theological issues, its explorations have simi-
larly generated some interesting insights into the development of relational con-
nection, and ones which seem to offer the possibility of a more general applica-
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tion. Within this arena the themes explored in von Balthasar’s Theo-Drama (von 
Balthasar, 1988-98)15 – the central portion of a trilogy16 which arguably consti-
tutes ‘the masterpiece of twentieth-century Catholic theology’ (Wigley, 2010:1) – 
seem particularly well suited to the project in hand. One of the most prolific, crea-
tive and wide-ranging theologians of the twentieth century, there is an increasing 
interest in von Balthasar’s writings across a very broad theological and ecclesial 
spectrum (Gardner et al., 1999:vii). From the perspective of this project he is also 
a peculiarly apt contributor in both the underlying attitude which drives his theo-
logical project, and the way in which he then executes this and presents the re-
sults.  
Because of both the daring nature of some of his speculations, and the creative 
way he reinterprets the tradition of Christian thought, von Balthasar eludes easy 
categorisation: he is neither liberal nor conservative, Thomist or modernist. Whilst 
broadly guided by an analogical lodestar, he is simultaneously driven by a desire 
to overcome the isolation of the church from its cultural and philosophical envi-
ronment, and this finds its form in a sustained openness to the world and to its 
rich cultural heritages. A coincident respect for these complex and multiple ways 
in which human nature finds expression, and which are a presupposition ‘for 
God’s speaking and being understood’ (von Balthasar, 1986:204), leads him to the 
necessity of serious theological engagement with their myriad forms (Riches and 
Quash, 1997:136-7). This is very much in accord with van Huyssteen’s template 
for a theological engagement directed by post-foundational rationality, and the 
result is a hugely wide-ranging, thick, and eclectic theology, developed through 
engagement with a rich variety of sources from an immense cultural and historical 
range extending well beyond the realm of Christian writing. Moreover the way in 
which he ranges over these sources, drawing out connections and knitting to-
gether disparate material, is also strikingly reminiscent of Schrag’s description of 
transversal rationality in operation.  
In addition, the originality which characterises his work (Kilby, 2012:4-5), and the 
creative way in which he then chooses to present his complex theses, also seems 
                                                             
15 Hereafter references to the Theo-Drama will be given parenthetically in the form of vol-
ume and page number thus (TD1:1). 
16 The Glory of the Lord; Theo-Drama; Theo-Logic. 
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pleasingly complementary with van Huyssteen’s approach: thus for example his 
conviction that dramatic categories are deeply suitable for giving expression to 
the ways of God (TD1:16-7) leads to the development of his innovative Theo-
dramatics – a completely unique theological enterprise which ‘summon[s] aca-
demic theology back from desiccated rationalism to a form and register that are 
vibrant and forceful’ (Quash, 2004:143). Von Balthasar sees the development of a 
theological dramatic theory as a fruitful way of integrating various motifs of theo-
logical methodology: event, history, orthopraxy, dialogue, political theology, fu-
turism, function/structure, role, and freedom (Nicholls, 2000:12-16). This enter-
prise involves thinking through the whole structure of theology on the basis of a 
model of drama which holds historical indeterminacy and creative purpose in ten-
sion (Williams, 2004:39). In this, horizontal and vertical time are intersected 
(TD2:66) to create a unique, paradoxical ‘dramatic time’ in which normal seeing is 
transcended. Thus things can be simultaneously apprehended from a different 
perspective – ‘what is played out is a unique event and yet as such is a revelation 
of something timelessly valid, a metaphor, a parable’ (TD1:351). As the drama un-
folds and the audience becomes engaged, new horizons of meaning are opened 
up through which they can gain a fresh perspective of themselves and their situa-
tion in the world (TD1:308). Such dynamics are redolent not only of transversal 
rationality but also of those which govern the operation of the transversal spaces 
themselves. Thus in various ways von Balthasar’s work seems admirably suited to 
the adventure of transversal exploration. 
However it is also not unproblematic since, despite his astonishing range, open-
ness, and creativity, he has been charged with being both too anthropo- and too 
andro-centric (e.g. Deane-Drummond, 2010:46-64). From the perspective of this 
chapter, the latter is particularly significant because of his use of some sexual 
analogies to explore kenotic themes. These aspects of his work have drawn severe 
criticism from feminist scholars for their misogyny (e.g. Beattie, 2006; Coakley, 
2002) and for the etiolated account they present of women (Crammer, 2004:102). 
For von Balthasar, sexual difference constitutes one of the three fundamental 
tensions of human existence (Crammer, 2004:93, TD2:355) and thus becomes one 
important locus for his consideration of otherness. But whilst he uses this to open 
up ‘some extraordinary new insights which challenge our assumptions about love 
and action’, he also makes their appropriation more difficult by linking them to 
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‘problematic “fixings” of gender roles’ (Williams, 2004:47): for example in his as-
sertion that man retains a primacy even while undertaking a divinely instigated 
kenotic stepping down from this; or the related implication that woman exists 
primarily as a means for man’s self-recognition and fulfilment (TD2:373). This 
does not necessarily eviscerate this strand of his thinking of useful content, but 
since it is only one way in which he explores the dynamics under consideration 
here, it will not be drawn upon for this chapter. Kilby’s critique that von Balthasar 
has a tendency to overreach, leading his theological method to presume some-
thing which the content of his theology rules out (Kilby, 2012:14-5, 65, 105, 114), 
must also be borne in mind. However this is probably less acute from the perspec-
tive of the project here, since the focus is not primarily on the theological posi-
tions which he arrives at or their religious implications, but on the insights on re-
straint and relationality which are generated as he pursues his wider explorations 
of trinitarian kenosis. 
Von Balthasar’s starting point for enquiry is the fundamental enigma arising from 
human awareness of its own finitude and contingency. The inescapable appre-
hension that I ‘am’, but I could ‘not-be’, raises questions about the division be-
tween the finite and the infinite, between being and essence, which are ‘the 
source of all the religious and philosophical thought of humanity’. From the Chris-
tian perspective, this ultimately condenses into the question of why the world 
exists – since any notion of Creation being in any way necessary makes God indi-
gent, contingent, and thus no longer the Infinite. Von Balthasar holds that no ab-
stract philosophy can answer this question satisfactorily; only Being itself, as it 
reveals itself through our concrete encounter with its transcendental attributes of 
Goodness, Truth and Beauty can do so (von Balthasar, 1991:1-5). The Trilogy, with 
its triple metric of aesthetics, drama and logics, is thus von Balthasar’s attempt to 
unravel – through engagement with different forms of human expression – that 
revelation-through-encounter. The project’s lodestar comes with his theological 
modus of taking the events and actions of Jesus’ life as an epistemic ladder into 
God (TD2:128).  
Of particular interest here is the second volume of the Theo-drama (von 
Balthasar, 1993) in which he considers the chief players in the cosmic drama. A 
major part of this involves an exploration of the nature of divine and human free-
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dom, and of what this then reveals about the relationship between freedom, its 
restraint, and their connection with what is ‘other’. In keeping with the aim of 
raising material which can be offered for transversal appropriation, this discussion 
will not focus on outcomes with respect to the particularities of the trinitarian 
hypostatic identities (since this is a peculiarly theological concern). Instead the 
interest is with the underlying dynamics which give rise to these, since under-
standings arising from these are not necessarily tied to the accompanying theolo-
goumenon. 
5.4.2 Restraint, otherness and freedom – a kenotic perspec-
tive 
The introduction of the dramatis personae immediately raises the critical question 
of ‘who else can act if God is on stage?’ The issue at stake is how finite freedom 
and infinite freedom can co-exist without the former being swallowed by the lat-
ter; or conversely, without the latter surrendering its own nature as infinitude 
(Nicholls, 2000:63). Drawing on Classical, Patristic, Thomist, and Orthodox 
sources, von Balthasar uses insights about God gleaned from his revelation in 
Christ to deepen and expand the rational metaphysics which posits the Divine as 
wholly other. From thence he explores the relationship between essence and exis-
tence in the Divine and the consequences of this for the nature and expression of 
freedom, particularly as this relates to the kenotic activity of God. However since 
human freedom is the only kind of which we have actual experience, von 
Balthasar begins his journey from man (sic) who, as both singular and plural is 
‘endowed with freedom, condemned to freedom and given grace to exercise it, 
with the power of becoming what he can on the basis of his own nature and con-
stitution’ (TD2:195; emphasis mine). 
As von Balthasar points out, there is something inherently contradictory in the 
notion of finite freedom: we have a direct experience of freedom, but also of its 
impassable boundaries, and how can something be free if it is constantly encoun-
tering restraints imposed by the limitations of its own nature? We are thus at one 
and the same time free, yet only moving towards freedom (Nicholls, 2000:66). 
Drawing on material expounded in the first volume of the Theo-logic regarding 
the co-discovery of the self and the world, and picking up a distinction drawn by 
both Patristic and Medieval writers, he unpacks this further by positing two di-
mensions to human freedom: freedom as consent, and freedom as autonomous 
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motion. The first he argues to be an inescapable ‘given’ with our mode of exis-
tence, based in an inherent apprehension of the Good as good, and representing 
‘a fundamental freedom […] that enables us to affirm the value of things and re-
ject their defects, to become involved with them or turn away from them’ 
(TD2:211). In contrast freedom as autonomous motion has, as its name suggests, 
a somewhat less fixed character which is located in self-realisation rather than 
giveness: each person must also decide for themselves what freedom is and under 
what form is should be sought; and both decision and subsequent execution is 
entirely in their hands. Thus freedom comprises both a primordial dimension 
which consists in consent to the Good, and a secondary, self-directed dimension 
of actualisation (Nicholls, 2000:68). Von Balthasar goes on to develop the implica-
tions of this in various dimensions and so eventually to proposing how finite free-
dom can be integrated with its infinite origin and goal without being subsumed 
into and lost in these. The primary aspect of interest here is how the bi-polarity of 
giveness and process is realised in the context of infinite freedom, and of what 
this then reveals about the role of restraint in the generation of otherness and the 
subsequent possibility of relational connection with it.  
Central to this is von Balthasar’s understanding (which draws heavily on the think-
ing of Bulgakov) that in the case of Divine freedom, the process aspect is radically 
different because self-realisation necessarily means something different within 
the Divine life: where infinite being and infinite self-possession are in complete 
concurrence, there can be no equivalent process of ‘coming to be oneself’ 
(Nicholls, 2000:72). For all created things there is, as Aquinas argues, an inescap-
able tension between what they are and that they are, i.e. between their essence 
and their existence (On Being and Essence IV). However in contrast God, as the 
self-declaration of Ex 3:14 indicates, is ipsum esse subsistens – uniquely the ‘pure 
act to be itself’. It is the consequence of this perfect coincidence of esse and es-
sentia – of haecceity and the activity which realises it in particularity – that be-
comes critical to understanding the nature of the divine freedom underpinning all 
trinitarian kenotic activity. Bulgakov’s understanding of the divine life not as a ma-
terial fact (in the way that the being of material things is), but as a living act based 
on ontological reality is helpful here.  In conjunction with this, he draws a distinc-
tion between the life of God according to himself (i.e. as he is in his unchangeable 
essence), and the life of God for himself (i.e. as he lives out this essence for him-
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self in the living act). It is in this latter aspect that the conjunction of freedom and 
self-restraint is manifest: God, by virtue of his nature is completely free, but this 
very fact means he is also free to do what he will with his own nature – including 
to place restrictions on the way this essence is expressed in the living act of the 
Divine life. Hence it is not the presence of a restriction to infinite freedom which 
would contradict divine absoluteness or aseity, but the impossibility of such a self-
definition on God’s part. Thus whilst the ontological and substantial fullness of 
Divinity in the tri-hypostatic relationship of Father, Son, and Spirit cannot be 
changed or diminished, the fullness of the life of Divinity for itself can be limited – 
not from without, but internally by Divine choice (Bulgakov, 1933/2008:221-3). 
The final piece of the jigsaw requires a further examination of how this dynamic 
can then be understood as operational within the life of the immanent Trinity and 
of what role constraint plays in this. For von Balthasar, these interior dynamics 
become visible through the kenosis of the Incarnation, the events of which he un-
derstands to constitute an economic expression of the eternal kenosis at the 
heart of the Trinity (McIntosh, 2007:391; von Balthasar, 1990:90-1). Moreover this 
is not revelation of a static icon, but of the dynamic movement of Divine self-
realisation (Murphy, 1995:146). So to the Cappadocian insight that the unique 
hypostatic identities of Father, Son and Spirit exist because of the schesis between 
them (p117) von Balthasar now brings those arising from his examination of the 
nature of divine freedom to produce a ‘galvanised ontology of divine life’ (Quash, 
2004:151). The resulting exposition of the perichoretic self-donation and simulta-
neous mutual constitution at the heart of the Trinity which such freedom enables, 
is not simply an abstract speculation but is firmly rooted in his overall Christology 
and facilitated by the extensive, critical engagement with other sources which is 
his hallmark. 
However before further discussing how von Balthasar understands the role of 
freedom and restraint in this generation of Otherness, it is necessary to note a 
caveat.  There appears on occasion to be an antimony in his account between 
equality and hierarchy, something which has attracted criticism, particularly when 
this is seen as extending into gender analogies (e.g. Tonstad, 2010:603-31). How-
ever the difficulty is in no small part a linguistic one: whilst the kenotic life of the 
Trinity is understood as existing prior to time, any description of it is necessarily 
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given from, and must use the conceptual language of, an inescapably temporal 
perspective with all the limitations that this involves. Hence it is impossible to talk 
of ‘generation’ without the idea of a beginning intruding and thus the inevitable 
feeling that the coming into being of the Father and the Son constitutes a hierar-
chical event, rather than one of eternal simultaneity. Adjectives such as ‘active’ 
and ‘passive’ are similarly baggage-laden. Whilst the consequences of this are 
more of an issue from a strictly theological/confessional perspective and do not 
significantly impede the general insights I wish to draw here, it does pose difficul-
ties for delivering a coherent and consistent account of Trinitarian kenosis; it thus 
needs to be borne in mind here whenever terminology or constructions irresisti-
bly imply sequential rather than concurrent events. 
The epicentre of von Balthasar’s exposition is an understanding of Trinitarian dif-
ferentiation as being established by the relations of origin which constitute the 
persons as Other – the ‘eternal interplay of active generation and passive being 
begotten and being breathed forth’ (TD5:87-8). At the heart of this hypostatic de-
termination lies the deep paradox outlined above in which freedom uses itself to 
limit itself. Thus the fulcrum on which the possibility of both otherness and rela-
tional connection turns is that of constraint. Von Balthasar begins his explanation 
of this from the standpoint of the Father, and of his absolute renunciation (in 
keeping with the Divine nature as love) of any possibility of being God for himself 
alone (TD4:323). The inevitable consequence which follows is a letting-go of the 
divine Being as the Father begets the co-eternal Son; the self-same nature and 
impulse means that there is a simultaneous and reciprocal letting-go by the Son 
as, in accepting the image of the Father, he allows himself to be so begotten; simi-
larly this movement and exchange generates the hypostasis of the Spirit – whose 
‘I’ is thus also the ‘We’ of Father and Son (TD2:287). 
The infinite freedom which marks the Divine life plays an important role in these 
movements in a number of ways, and in each instance, restraint plays a vital role 
in the operational dynamics. Firstly, for each of the three Persons, the process of 
hypostatisation involves an inescapable element of relinquishment – a voluntary 
letting-go of a particular aspect of the fullest possible expression of the divine life 
in its living act (TD2:287). Thus the Father in sharing his divinity can never be for 
himself alone, but is always himself with and through another; the Son in accept-
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ing the Father’s image, permits himself to be generated by another; the Spirit, in 
submerging his ‘I’ in the ‘We’ of this generative exchange between Father and 
Son, allows himself to be expropriated in their service. However the nature of di-
vine freedom also means that paradoxically such self restriction is both apogeal 
for freedom itself, and also enables the fullest self-actualisation for each of the 
hypostases in their distinctive particularity. In other words the Father acquires 
himself as his nature, not in himself and for himself but in proceeding out of him-
self and in begetting, as Father, the Son (Bulgakov, 1933/2008:97-9). Thus love, as 
self-surrender, is an inextricable part of ‘the bliss of absolute freedom’ (TD2:257, 
Nicholls, 2000:72); and the restraint enabling this self-surrender is a necessary 
condition for the potential coming-to-be of both Otherness and relational connec-
tion. 
There is however a second key element to the differentiation of Otherness within 
the Trinity and this once again involves tension, paradox and the exercise of re-
straint. As already noted, von Balthasar understands the operation of kenoticism 
in the temporal realm, revealed through the Creation and the Incarnation, as ex-
tensions of the primal kenosis at the heart of the immanent Trinity. This leads him 
to posit the existence of an ‘absolute, infinite difference/distance’, a radical 
otherness within the Trinitarian life which can then encompass all other possible 
differences (including sin) which emerge within Creation (TD4:343). He thus un-
derstands the hypostatic modes within the Trinity as being ‘inexhaustibly tran-
scendent to each other’ whilst at the same time experiencing ‘the most intimate 
penetration’ with each other (TD2:258). Indeed it is only on such a basis, as Wil-
liams points out (2004:42), that we can develop a theology which makes sense of 
a created freedom that is simultaneously both truly Other to God and yet orien-
tated towards God. However this leaves us with a further paradox to unravel since 
this infinite difference between Father and Son necessarily entails an infinite mu-
tual freedom in which the Father does not determine the Son and vice versa; but 
this then seems to lead to an irresolvable clash with the intimate exchange and 
connection which establishes the differentiated identities within the Trinity. 
Once again kenotic restraint plays an important role in holding together this ap-
parent antinomy – this time by means of creating a hiatus in which penetration 
and transcendence, sameness and difference can co-exist, held in creative ten-
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sion. Von Balthasar accounts for this in terms of the members of the Trinity mak-
ing room for one another and the opening up of distances (though he uses a prob-
lematic language of hierarchical processions) which allow each member, whilst 
still enjoying the exchanges of mutual love, to also preserve their own personal 
distinctness in both the immanent and the economic Trinity. He envisages this 
occurring within the Trinity as an infinitesimal moment, not of time but of distinc-
tion, in which the Father is but the Son is not – though since the Father is eternally 
generating the Son, this has to be couched in less absolute terms of ‘not 
not’(Tonstad, 2010:608, TD5:94-5). Williams suggests that we might read the 
German Abstand here as difference rather then distance (Williams, 2004:41). 
This is somewhat difficult to grasp but Derrida’s unravelling of Husserl’s ‘im selben 
Augenblick17’ is helpful here: for Derrida auto-affection (acting on oneself) – for 
example when one speaks of oneself or regards oneself in the mirror – is also in-
escapably hetero-affection; thus self is simultaneously experienced as both self 
and other. But this also, and equally inevitably, necessitates a miniscule hiatus 
differentiating me from myself which allows me to be both the speaker and the 
spoken, the looker and the seen: ‘I see myself, and yet the self I see is not me’ 
(Derrida, 1973:60-9). Thus it is possible to say of the Son that ‘insofar as [he] is 
God, he is eternal, infinite freedom; insofar as he is the Son of the Father, he is 
this freedom in the mode of readiness, receptivity, obedience and hence of ap-
propriate response’ (TD2:267) – the two are the same and yet different. More-
over, it becomes possible to see how the Father, whilst eternally generating the 
Son can also, through a further movement of restraint, open a space in which the 
Son can be who he is without being subsumed back into the Father; and that in 
this free being-who-he-is, and in freely accepting the necessary freedom for its 
happening, the Son in turn gives infinite space to the Father to be who he is (Wil-
liams, 2004:41). 
What we have then is a situation in which infinite freedom (and thus the restraint 
which is an inescapable aspect of it) is simultaneously operating in different di-
mensions: the hypostases are divinely free in that each possesses, in its own 
unique way, the divine essence as lived act. But each of the persons is in them-
selves also sovereignly free – that is they are ‘let-be to be’ – whilst at the same 
                                                             
17 ‘At the same moment.’ 
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time, their freedom is co-determined by their interrelationships and the unity of 
their substantial life through these (Nicholls, 2000:72). Trinitarian freedom thus 
has a metric which is both is both active and receptive: it bestows and accepts life 
and identity; and as part of this it lets-be and accepts being-let-be. In other words, 
there is an intimate and complex relationship between freedom, restraint and 
Othering: for the coming-into-being of true otherness, space for differentiation is 
a sine qua non; and the making and preserving of such space requires the exercise 
of constraint – the use of freedom to limit freedom. Ultimately then, such free-
dom involves a two-fold negation: a refusal ‘to be for oneself alone’ and a refusal 
to look for the ground of ones being in ‘an individuality divorced from relation’ 
(Williams, 2004:42). 
It is this ‘primal kenosis’ of the Trinity which ‘makes possible all other kenotic 
movements of God into the world, they are simply its consequences’ (TD4:331). 
To return to Bulgakov’s conception of Divine life in terms of living act – Creation 
and Incarnation are extensions in time of the this eternal activity of self-giving 
love lying at the heart of the Trinitarian life (von Balthasar, 1990:35, GL7:213-4, 
TD2:264). Hence in both instances, restraint is an essential element in the differ-
entiation and development of Otherness and in the establishing and maintenance 
of relational connection. Whilst the incarnational extension will be taken up again 
in Chapter 6; that of Creation provides a useful alternative vignette for succinctly 
summarising the key points here: for Creation to exist and not be subsumed back 
into God, there must be a space where God ‘is not’; thus ‘God Himself and in His 
proper life accepts sacrificial self-limitation in the name of love for Creation while 
preserving the entire fullness of His immanent being’ (Bulgakov, 1933/2008:223). 
Similarly for there to be meaningful exercise of finite freedom, there must be a 
space between this and the Divine freedom which gives it, in which it can be used 
and exercised as human self-expression wills – its ‘autonomous motion’. Thus 
again there is the necessity for a degree of divine withdrawal (TD2:273). There are 
strong resonances here with the 13th century Jewish kabbalists of the Iyyun Circle 
and their images of God holding his breath as a necessary prequel to the creative 
process (Laenen, 2001:106-110, 168); similarly with the 16th century Lurianic idea 
of tzimtzum – the self contraction of the Ayn Sof (Absolute) in order to create te-
hiru, the primordial space within which Creation could then exist and become 
aware of God. The presence of such parallels in other religious frameworks is fur-
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ther testament to the rational generation and explanatory power of kenotic un-
derstandings.  
Kenotic theology thus contributes some suggestive points with regard to the role 
of restraint in the generation of relational connection – the second of the desig-
nated cardinal signs being considered in this chapter. Von Balthasar’s starting 
point is a specific religious perspective of the world, and his ultimate aim the de-
velopment of a corresponding specifically theological understanding of the same; 
however his explorations of the themes of freedom, Otherness and connection 
generate insights which are not inextricably tied to such a view but can be more 
widely appropriated without requiring a concomitant assent to specific elements 
of its framework – such as for example the notion that the drama of Christ ‘be-
comes the norm of every real and possible drama in the personal and public do-
mains’ (TD2:83). Both otherness and freedom are necessary conditions for a genu-
ine relational connection to occur. What von Balthasar’s rationally constructed, 
meticulous, and detailed explorations of the topic yields is the important insight 
that the exercise of restraint is a critical factor in various key aspects of this dy-
namic. It creates the space in which differentiation between self and other can 
occur and be preserved and in which the other can develop. It also gives the other 
the freedom to accept or reject connection and the mutual shaping which goes 
with it. Moreover such self-restraint is, paradoxically, the route to fullest self-
expression of personhood – individuality reaches its expressional apogee when it 
restricts itself in order to create relational connection. We are thus brought to 
another dimension of Tillich’s observation that ‘when individualisation reaches 
the perfect form which we call a person, participation reaches the perfect form 
which we call communion’ (Tillich, 1951:176). 
There are interesting resonances here with the expansion of system possibilities 
through reduction of component freedom, or the separation of self and other cru-
cial to MNS activity and successful ToM skills, discussed earlier. But while this sug-
gests the possibility of useful interdisciplinary transversal development, the aim 
here is to use this theological contribution as the second of three interlocking 
pieces of evidence supporting a transversal case for relationality as an emergent 
phenomenon. The final piece of evidence – indications of possible downward cau-
sation – comes from the perspective of PNI. 
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5.5 Whole-Part influence: a PNI perspective 
As discussed in 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, much of the controversy attending the claim of 
causal efficacy for emergents dissipates when it is considered within frameworks 
appropriate to the nature of complex systems and shaped by the current under-
standings of quantum physics.  In particular, it can be canvassed, not in terms of 
the application of Newtonian linear forces, but in those of whole-part constraint 
on the behaviour of system components. The key question to be considered in 
this section is thus whether there is any evidence to suggest that relationality di-
rectly modifies any of the components of the system which support social signal-
ling and interaction. Here, rather than introducing new data, I want to appeal to 
those already presented in section 5 of Chapter 3. What follows is thus simply a 
very brief reprise of the key salient points of these data as they touch on the pos-
sible issue of downward causality. Since the marital studies alluded to specifically 
examine alterations in endocrine and immune status as a function of relationship 
quality, fuller discussion of these will be deferred until Chapter 6 which considers 
the potential effects of variations in how relationality is realised.  
The immune and neuroendocrine systems are intimately and bi-directionally con-
nected via a complex interplay of hormones and the cytokine signalling system, 
with both systems sharing common receptors for these (Turnbull and Rivier, 
1999:2-5). This combined activity serves two key purposes: firstly the provision of 
a constant surveillance system to monitor both internal and external environ-
ments for threats, and initiate appropriate responses to these; and secondly the 
facilitation and co-ordination of physiological processes serving allostasis, thus 
ensuring the optimisation of cellular and organ function needed to maintain sta-
bility through environmental change, at the smallest overall cost to the organism 
(McEwen and Wingfield, 2003:3; Sterling, 2004:26). If relationality constitutes an 
emergent arising from a complex system involving a range of basic social signal 
decoding neural nets, and associated physiological surveillance, signalling and re-
sponse loops, then arguably its realisation has the potential to constrain the vari-
ous components of this system.  
In Chapter 3 I argued that despite some methodological caveats, PNI data suggest 
that interpersonal relationships can exert a range of effects on the im-
mune/endocrine network, producing both up- and down-regulation of the two 
systems. Over a wide range of studies, close and supportive relationships consis-
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tently correlate with lower levels of stress hormones and stronger immune re-
sponses. In contrast, social isolation and negative or acrimonious relationships are 
consistently associated with raised levels of stress hormones, poorer immune 
function and higher morbidity. Endocrine effects principally involve moderations 
of the hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis – which plays a vital role in al-
lostatic maintenance – but also involve the oxytocin system, which operates in 
parallel with stress response systems to inhibit HPA activity after stress (Uvnas-
Moberg, 1997:38-42; 1998:819-35).  Immune system effects involve alterations to 
activity within both innate and acquired arms of the system. Of note are altera-
tions in the levels and activity of certain key cytokines known to be involved in 
chronic inflammatory processes – something I will return to in chapter 6 when 
discussing possible physiological pathways mediating health outcomes. 
Since adult romantic relationships constitute a primary locus of human social and 
attachment bonds, the subset of PNI studies involving couples are of particular 
interest here. Due to issues with recruiting appropriate subjects however, the 
number of such studies is relatively small within the overall PNI corpus. Dyads 
studied involve married (both new and longstanding) and recently separated and 
divorced couples, and have involved assorted indicators of both endocrine and 
immune activity (Dopp et al., 2000:10-26; Gouin et al., 2010:1082-90; 2009:898-
904; Graham et al., 2009:621; Heffner et al., 2006:317-25; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 
2003a:176-88; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1987:13-34; 1997:339-48; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 
1988:213-29; 2005:1377-84; 1993:395-42; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1996b:324-32; 
2001:472; Loving et al., 2004:595-612; Malarkey et al., 1994:41-51; Mayne et al., 
1997:277-88; Miller et al., 1999:262-71; Robles et al., 2006:305-25). The studies 
themselves will be discussed in Chapter 6 but for the purposes of this chapter, 
their findings can be generally summarised as confirming the links demonstrated 
within the wider corpus viz. that functional differences in relational connection 
between partners are reflected in both endocrine and immune systems. These 
studies are deemed to represent ‘some of the most compelling PNI data to date’ 
on social influenced changes in both innate and adaptive immune markers (Robles 
and Kane, 2012:199, 207).The underlying pathways and mechanisms linking social 
status to PNI alterations are as yet unspecified, but are likely to be multiple and to 
operate additively, or even perhaps synergistically. I will return to the issue of po-
tential mediators in Chapter 6. For the moment I want simply to suggest that the 
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link between the two can coherently be understood as a whole-part restraint sce-
nario, in which relational experience moderates immune and endocrine compo-
nents of the complex integrated system from which relationality emerges. 
5.6 Relationality as emergent: a transversal outcome 
In the previous chapter, scientific and theological perspectives on relational con-
nection were used transversally to build a mutually supportive case for claiming 
such links as basic to humanness. The current focus has been on whether rela-
tionality represents an emergent from rather than simply a summation of certain 
innate decoding skills. In order to support this contention it is necessary to dem-
onstrate that relationality exhibits the characteristic features of such phenomena: 
a base in complex systems operations and the presence of top-down causal effi-
cacy, operating through whole-part restraint mechanisms. In view of the difficulty 
of doing this within the bounds of a single discipline, an alternative, transversal, 
approach has been pursued. In this, evidence for each of these characteristics has 
been sought from a different disciplinary perspective using the tools and epis-
temic standards of the postfoundational rubric set out in Chapter 2. The transver-
sal outcome to be carried forward is thus constructed through a slightly different 
instantiation of Haack’s crossword analogy. In this instance, each disciplinary 
voice does not primarily act as an interlocking support for the evidence of another 
on a specific point – although some obvious resonances indicate that with a dif-
ferently constructed transversal space exchange, this could also be done. Instead, 
each offers a single and distinct piece of evidence to the building of a composite 
transversal argument that relationality is an emergent phenomenon. 
Examination of experimental data from various branches of cognitive neurosci-
ence suggests the presence of a nested set of complex systems underpinning each 
individual decoding. Furthermore the appearance of non-innately specified skills 
such as those involved in ToM processing indicates that complexification of these 
processes also occurs in tandem with brain development. Since self-organising 
complex systems, as well as being novel units in their own right, also have the ca-
pacity to interact with other such systems and processes expressing themselves at 
the same scale, this too can be taken as highly suggestive of complex system func-
tion. Such interactions then become the building block for new iterations at a lar-
ger scale of the complex system dynamic cycle of non-trivial interactions, devel-
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opment of system restraints, symmetry breaking and the appearance of global co-
ordination and associated new patterns and behaviours (Prokopenko et al., 
2009:1-2). One can thus see how a capacity to form and maintain relational con-
nection, which is more than merely summative, might emerge from the organisa-
tion and interaction of individual decoding processes.  
With respect to the nature of emergent causality, the key dynamic is one of com-
ponent restraint which opens an extended range of possibilities to the system as a 
whole. Insights generated through the explorations of kenotic trinitarianism sug-
gest that the operation of restraint is a key element in the exercise of relational-
ity. Genuine relational connection requires both otherness and freedom as its 
condiciones sine quibus non. Otherness in turn necessitates a hiatus – a space in 
which differentiation can occur and the development of distinctive, separate iden-
tity be established. The exercise of self restraint enables the generation and pres-
ervation of this necessary space in which the development of the distinctive, 
separate identity of the other can be established and their autonomy exercised. 
Such restriction simultaneously confers a two-fold expansion: it enables the pos-
sibility of relational connection and, paradoxically, it allows individuality to reach 
its expressional apogee through that possibility. 
Emergent causality also acts in a characteristic, and from classical Aristotelian and 
Newtonian perspectives paradoxical, top-down direction. Alongside ones looking 
specifically at intimate primary relationships, a whole range of PNI studies have 
investigated variations in endocrine and immune markers in conjunction with as-
sorted different quantitative and qualitative measures of social connection. 
Across these studies, variations in numerical and functional measures of relational 
connection consistently correlate with variations in HPA axis reactivity, rapidity 
and height of acute immune responses, and the strength and efficiency of adap-
tive ones. Although precise mechanisms have not been elucidated and are almost 
certainly multiple, these results (particularly those from assorted ‘marital’ studies) 
are strongly suggestive of a scenario in which higher level global function affects 
component parts of the systems which support it – i.e. of the causal signature of 
an emergent phenomenon. 
Data from experimental CGN and PNI studies, and theological reflection on rela-
tionality can thus be combined to provide transversal evidence supporting the 
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contention that relationality displays the requisite features to be designated as an 
emergent rather than a summative phenomenon. This brings in its train the possi-
bility that moderations effected by the experience and expression of relationality 
might constitute one possible physiological pathway whereby the connection be-
tween social relationships and health outcomes discussed in Chapter 3 could be 
mediated. The final piece of the puzzle is thus to look at whether there is any evi-
dence that the different shapes in which relationality can be realised can signifi-
cantly effect aspects of human functioning. This will be the subject matter of 
Chapter 6. 
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Hostility or Hospitality? 
Relationality as realised 
 
We are more entangled, but less attached, than 
ever before. 
(Sandel, 2005:172) 
 
There can be no authentic depth except where 
there can be real communion; but there will never 
be any real communion between individuals cen-
tred on themselves […] the very notion of inter-
subjectivity presupposes a reciprocal openness 
between individuals. 
(Marcel, 1967a:267) 
 
My looking ripens things 
and they come toward me, to meet and be met. 
Rilke (Book of Hours I, i) 
 
6.1 Introduction and outline 
In the thirty-four years since publication of Berkman and Syme’s seminal study 
(1979:186-204), the correlation between social support and levels of morbidity 
and mortality has been consistently and reliably demonstrated over many other 
studies. But whilst the connection has been convincingly confirmed, and though 
the influence exerted is comparable with other well established risk factors for 
mortality (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010:12), the nature of the link is less clear, and the 
underlying mechanisms remain almost completely opaque (Cohen and Janicki-
Deverts, 2009:377). The picture is further complicated by the fact that social sup-
port is not an undifferentiated monolith but comprises, as indicated in Chapter 3, 
distinctly different structural and functional elements. Pathways linking social 
connection and health are thus likely to be multiple, and potentially could act in 
summative or even synergistic fashions. Their elucidation, along with those of the 
mechanisms underpinning them, is seen as the primary research objective for 
‘second-wave’ PNI studies (Uchino et al., 2012:220). 
Uchino (2006:378-9; Uchino et al., 2012:220-5) has recently developed a broad 
theoretical model highlighting the routes by which social support might influence 
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physical health outcomes. Essentially this postulates two distinct pathways: the 
first is a behavioural route involving elements such as general health behaviours 
and adherence to treatment regimes etc. Although known to be predictive of 
mortality in their own right, studies suggest that even when such things are taken 
into account, it does not explain without remainder the observed link between 
social support and health (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010). Thus a second, psychological 
pathway is also proposed involving appraisals, emotions, moods, feelings of con-
trol etc. Behavioural and psychological routes are each thought to be influenced, 
in different ways, by both structural and functional aspects of social support, and 
also to act on each other; and both are deemed to exert their ultimate effects on 
morbidity and mortality through the common broad biological pathway of the 
endocrine and immune systems, which as previously noted, are also intimately 
and reciprocally linked. The resulting web of complex multidirectional influence 
and effect can be visualised thus:  
 
 
There are two additional aspects of the dynamic of connection which the model 
does not directly represent but which must also be born in mind and which again 
Biological Processes 
Neuroendocrine 
function: 
cortisol, 
catecholamines  
etc. 
  Immune 
function: 
innate and 
specific  
immunity 
  
 
  
  
  
  
   
 
Disease  
morbidity 
Disease  
mortality 
Behavioural  
processes: 
Health  
behaviours, 
Adherence 
Psychological  
processes 
Appraisals, 
Depression, 
Control etc. 
Social support 
 
Structure and  
function 
Figure 1: A broad model highlighting the major pathways by which social support may influence 
physical health outcomes (after Uchino et al., 2012:220)  
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were highlighted in Chapter 3: firstly the location of the main protective effect – 
i.e. whether social support works primarily by ameliorating stress/raising the 
threshold at which given events are perceived as stressful (thus reducing the ini-
tial extent of excitation of physiological responses from without); or whether the 
functional response of endocrine and immune systems to CNS excitation are di-
rectly moderated in some way by the experience of social connection (thus alter-
ing response from within). Secondly, there is the timing of the protective effect. 
Here the question is whether moderation occurs primarily in direct connection 
with stressful events themselves (the ‘stress-buffering’ model), or whether it oc-
curs independently of the level of stress (the ‘main effect’ model). Finally, there is 
also the fact that for each individual, their understandings about, development 
and utilisation of, and hence the relative effectiveness of the social support they 
experience, varies across their lifetime. Thus adopting a life-span perspective may 
also be a crucial factor in understanding the pathways involved (Uchino, 
2009:236-55). 
However while there is a robust literature linking both perceived social support to 
psychological outcomes such as lower levels of stress/depression/loneliness or 
increased life satisfaction (Barrera, 2000:215-45; Wills and Shinar, 2000:86-135), 
and psychological factors such as these to immune function (Segerstrom and 
Miller, 2004:601-30), assorted epidemiological and experimental studies have 
provided little direct information on the pathways linking up this triangular rela-
tionship (Loucks et al., 2006b; Uchino et al., 2012:222). The hitherto almost exclu-
sive focus on documenting the link rather than investigating its mechanisms, gives 
some indication of the complexity of the task. One of the aims of this project has 
been to explore whether a transversal approach, which brings together data from 
a range of disciplines in a distinctly different way, might be one possible approach 
to it. The focus of interest is in the possibility of a more direct physiological path-
way by which social connection might moderate immune function, primarily as a 
main effect phenomenon. The hypothesis being advanced is that relationality 
(that is the capacity to form and sustain relationships) is an emergent phenome-
non arising from a complex system supporting social signal surveillance, decoding, 
and response, and can thus exert direct causal influence on components of that 
system, including its endocrine and immune signalling elements. In effect this 
would constitute an additional pathway to Uchino’s basic model which connects 
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‘social support’ directly to ‘biological processes’ without routing it through either 
the ‘behavioural’ or ‘psychological’ staging posts. In so doing, it also follows 
through on an observation made by House in his original paper that social support 
may have directly motivational, emotional or neuroendocrine 
effects that promote health either directly or in the face of 
stress or other hazards but that operate independently of 
cognitive appraisals or behavioural coping (House et al., 
1988:543-4, emphasis mine). 
Earlier chapters have built an argument for considering relationality as an emer-
gent phenomenon of social monitoring systems and thus capable of exerting top-
down constraint on immune and endocrine components of these. If this is so, 
then the shape in which relationality is realised may affect the nature or location 
of that constraint, thus providing a possible route for variations in the quality of 
social relationships to directly affect physiological mechanisms relevant to health. 
The final transversal space engagement therefore explores whether, how, and 
why relational shape might effect functioning. On this occasion, the contributions 
will come primarily from PNI and theology. 
The following section looks at experimental evidence linking the shape of rela-
tionality to alterations in the systems which support it. There are a number of 
studies looking at differential brain activation in conjunction with experiences of 
social exclusion, previous relational experience, or degree of rejection sensitivity 
(e.g. Burklund et al., 2007-53; Cacioppo et al., 2009:83-92; Eisenberger et al., 
2003:290-2; Masten et al., 2012:106-114). However, in line with the primary in-
terest in physiological connection pathways, the focus here is on PNI data. Studies 
looking at correlations between immune or endocrine markers and marital quality 
(both as self-reported and in the context of laboratory induced stress) demon-
strate a high degree of heterogeneity in both design and findings. This is in part 
due to the general issues with PNI studies outlined in Chapter 3, and in part to the 
complexity of the connections under study. Whilst this leads to some discrepan-
cies between individual studies, and to the apparent evaporation of some associa-
tions at the level of meta-analysis (Robles et al., In press:46-7, 53), some broad 
conclusions can be drawn and a summary of these is presented with particular 
attention to the issue of disruptions to inflammatory signalling. 
The articulating voice then passes to theology for a consideration of how the dis-
positions towards relational connection affect how it is shaped and experienced, 
208 
 
and here I draw on the thinking of Gabriel Marcel. Once again, in keeping with the 
post-foundational epistemic contract set out for the project, I begin by discussing 
why Marcel’s approach to investigation, like that of both the Cappadocians and 
von Balthasar (though for somewhat different reasons), not only seems eminently 
suited to transversal work, but also offers a way of addressing a particular prob-
lem involved in the exploration of relational connection. I then consider his no-
tions of disponibilité and hospitality, linking these to ideas discussed in earlier 
chapters to present a theological contribution to informing transversal under-
standing about the significance and potential effects of relational shape. 
With this last piece in place, the final section draws together and rehearses the 
thesis arguments. It then uses these to derive a theoretical transversal model for 
an additional pathway linking relationality and health, operating within the 
framework of allostatic maintenance. Finally I return to the definitions of health 
which were laid out in Chapter 3, to suggest that in the model proposed, biomedi-
cine’s ‘disruption of the mechanics’ and Marcum’s ‘distortion of the life world’ are 
intimately and inextricably entwined. 
6.2 Embrace or exclusion: a PNI perspective 
Links between marriage and health have been a subject of empirical research for 
over half a century. As a key social relationship, marriage provides a vital source of 
emotional, psychological, and practical support and those who are separated or 
divorced experience more acute illness and initiate more physician interactions 
than their married counterparts (Somers, 1979:1818-22). In comparison to them 
they also have significantly higher risks of major depression (Weissman, 1987:445-
51) and of earlier death (Sbarra et al., 2011:454-74).  However marriage can also 
be a significant locus of conflict and stress, and assorted studies have provided 
‘compelling evidence’ (Slatcher, 2010:458) linking marital quality to various as-
pects of health and illness, with alterations in the former also appearing to map 
onto changes in the latter in some of these (Wickrama et al., 1997:143-55). Lower 
quality, as measured by various criteria, has been correlated with increased risk of 
mortality (Eaker et al., 2007:509-13), obesity (Kouvonen et al., 2011:1474-80), 
periodontal disease (Marcenes and Sheiham, 1996:357-69), cardiovascular dis-
ease (De Vogli et al., 2007:1951-7), coronary artery events (Orth-Gomér et al., 
2000:3008-14), higher ambulatory blood pressure (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2008:239-
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44), faster progression of atherosclerosis (Gallo et al., 2003:953-62), poorer dia-
betic control (Trief et al., 2006:318-31) and increased pain flare ups in rheumatoid 
arthritis (Zautra et al., 1998:271-9). It is also predictive of preclinical signs of coro-
nary heart disease (Smith et al., 2007:441-8), length of hospitalisation after coro-
nary bypass operations (Kulik and Mahler, 2006:2031-40), and earlier death in 
chronic medical conditions (Coyne et al., 2001:526-9; Kimmel et al., 2000:1518-
25; Rohrbaugh et al., 2006:1069-72). 
But whilst the available investigative tools have, like the institution itself, under-
gone dramatic transformations, the precise mechanisms underlying these connec-
tions still remain to be elucidated and once again multiple pathways and attenuat-
ing/potentiating interactions are likely. Studies of PNI function in the context of 
marital relationships thus offer a number of benefits from the perspective of the 
chapter exploration: firstly they target the physiological possibilities which are its 
prime interest; secondly they sharpen the focus down from the level of networks 
to that of specific significant relationships and finally, in so doing, also provide  the 
opportunity to look much more directly at whether and how difference in rela-
tional shape affects elements of the systems which support relationality. Atten-
tion has already been drawn to the applicability of the general methodological 
caveats raised in Chapter 3 regarding operalisation, confounders, disaggregation, 
and extension when reading these data. Amongst these, two aspects which need 
to be particularly highlighted are the issue of potential alternative causalities and 
that of extrapolation to actual health outcomes from surrogate endpoints. With 
the former, causal factors other than marital discord may be active but unper-
ceived influences on commonly measured variables such as cardiovascular reac-
tivity thus distorting results (Nealey-Moore et al., 2007:506). With the latter, only 
two studies to date (Gouin et al., 2010:1082-90; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2005:1377-
84) have actually looked at marital quality, immediate physiological changes, and 
health effects (in this case, wound healing) simultaneously. Most studies look at 
either proxy end points such as BP or cholesterol levels or, as is increasingly the 
case, biomarkers. The former have usually been established as predictively related 
to clinical endpoints but the issue is much less clear cut with the latter (Robles et 
al., In press:10). However a number of immune markers are known to be surro-
gates of CVS disease risk (Ridker et al., 2004:6-19) and atherosclerotic progression 
(Libby and Theroux, 2005:3483) and, as previously discussed, an increasing body 
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of evidence points towards chronic inflammatory processes as being heavily im-
plicated in the pathogenesis of a number of major disease groups. Nevertheless, 
questions as to precise mapping onto long term health outcomes and the underly-
ing mechanics thereof still remain to be answered. 
Despite these assorted practical and interpretational difficulties, these particular 
studies, though relatively small in number, are seen as providing some of the most 
compelling evidence to date of social influence on immune functioning (Robles 
and Kane, 2012:205). They have looked at aspects of endocrine function – typi-
cally related to HPA axis or sympathetic nervous system (SNS) function – and/or 
markers of both direct and adaptive immunity, in conjunction with assorted as-
pects of negative and supportive marital behaviour. Dyads studied have included 
newly weds, long-established partnerships, and newly separated and divorced 
couples, and studies have involved both naturalistic and laboratory settings. In the 
latter scenario, centred on real-time interactions, studies typically take the form 
of basal measurement of assorted endocrine and immune markers, and then fur-
ther samples over time in conjunction with a stressor – usually a specified interac-
tive task involving either conflict resolution (for example discussing marital dis-
agreements) or supportive discussions. Interactions are videoed and assessed and 
coded for the presence of hostile or negative behaviours such as criticism, nega-
tive attributions regarding spousal behaviour, interrupting etc. Some studies also 
include self-reported measurements of marital quality or hostility. Given the bidi-
rectional complexity of immune and endocrine feedback and function, it is highly 
likely that different effects investigated are entrained to each other in some de-
gree. However for the purposes of this section results from studies will be disag-
gregated and summarised in three separate categories – endocrine, innate and 
adaptive immunity, and local and systemic inflammatory effects. 
6.2.1 Alterations in HPA and SNS activation 
PNI endocrine studies across the corpus have traditionally focussed on SNS and 
HPA functioning – the classical indicators of initial allostatic response The proto-
typical pathways by which these have been studied have been the measurement 
of circulating catecholamines18 and level of cardiovascular reactivity (CVSR) for the 
                                                             
18 The hormones dopamine, norepinephrine (noradrenalin), and epinephrine (adrenalin) 
which are released from the adrenals in response to SNS stimulation. 
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former, and changes in diurnal cortisol19 secretion in the latter. Catecholamines 
and glucocorticoids have wide ranging effects which are important in allostatic 
maintenance – something to which I will return in section 4. In addition, some re-
cent PNI couples studies have also started to examine levels of vasopressin/ADH 
and oxytocin20 as another way of assessing HPA functioning.  Across this range, 
studies show a correlation between aspects of marital interaction and alterations 
to all of these components. 
With respect to effects of marital quality on SNS activity, 2 large studies have 
looked at changes in circulating catecholamines in response to problem solving 
and conflict tasks. In the first, involving newly married couples, while levels of re-
ported marital satisfaction were high, more hostile or negative behaviour during 
conflict tasks was closely linked to higher levels of epinephrine and norepineph-
rine (Malarkey et al., 1994:41-51). In the second, this time involving long-married 
couples (average length 42 years), lower levels of marital satisfaction and escala-
tion of negative behaviour during a conflict task were correlated with raised cate-
cholamine levels in wives but not husbands (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1997:339-49). In 
an interesting and possibly suggestive ten year follow-up of the first group, cou-
ples who had subsequently separated or divorced were found, on review, to have 
shown significantly higher elevations of both basal and responsive catecholamines 
in the original study compared to those who had remained married. Couples who 
were still married but whose marriages were troubled, also had higher cate-
cholamine levels at the earlier time. In contrast original levels of satisfaction had 
no predictive correlation with subsequent divorce or lower marital quality. 
CVSR, as part of the fight or flight response, is another way of measuring levels of 
SNS activity. Across a wide variety of studies, both poorer marital quality (meas-
ured in a range of ways) and more hostile behaviour during discussion tasks have 
been correlated with increased CVSR (Barnett et al., 2005:36-43; Ewart et al., 
1991:155-63; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1993:395-412; Mayne et al., 1997:277-88; Mo-
rell and Apple, 1990:387-402; Smith and Brown, 1991:581-92). Whether high rela-
tional quality plays a corresponding role in lessening reactivity is unclear with 
some studies showing no significant effect (Barnett et al., 2005:36-43; Ewart et 
                                                             
19
 An important member of the glucocorticoid (steroid) hormones released from the adre-
nals under stimulation from the anterior pituitary hormone ACTH. 
20 Both released directly from the posterior pituitary. 
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al., 1991:155-63), whilst another showed a positive correlation to lower ambula-
tory blood pressure (BP) in a naturalistic setting (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2008:239-
44). With respect to the earlier noted caveat that other factors may influence CVS 
reactivity in unstructured tasks, one study has attempted to control for this by 
comparing positive, neutral, and negative interactions under conditions in which 
speaking and task involvement were precisely specified. In this, negative discus-
sions evoked larger changes in five different measures of CVS reactivity compared 
to positive and neutral ones (Nealey-Moore et al., 2007:509-19) thus supporting 
the contention that at least some of the changes observed in other task-based 
studies are due to the quality of exchange. 
Turning to HPA function, various studies have examined alterations in cortisol re-
sponse curves (one marker of changes in stress level) in relation to a number of 
measures of marital quality. Cortisol has a natural circadian rhythm, and thus as 
well as absolute levels, rates of change (as indicated by the gradient of the diurnal 
slope) are also an important measure of function, with shallower curves indicative 
of disruption to this. Stress is known to trigger cortisol release but the heteroge-
neity of the literature on psychological stress and HPA axis moderation suggests 
that negative situations do not uniformly do so (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004:355-
91). However a number of studies have shown a correlation between negative 
behaviour during interactive tasks and increased levels of cortisol (Heffner et al., 
2006:317-25; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1996b:324-32). This appears to be particularly 
the case when there is either a perceived or actual behavioural pattern in which 
demand by one partner is followed by withdrawal of the other, although the stud-
ies produced conflicting evidence on the actual effects of the latter. In a number 
of other studies, lower marital quality has been consistently correlated with flat-
tening of diurnal slopes and better quality with steeper declines (Adam and Gun-
nar, 2001:189-209; Barnett et al., 2005:36-43; Ditzen et al., 2008:883-89; Ditzen et 
al., 2007:565-74; Robles et al., 2006:305-25; Slatcher et al., 2010:887-96). One 
study also linked supportiveness during highly negative interactions with steeper 
ACTH and cortisol declines in wives, suggesting that constructively engaging in 
discussions promotes adaptive physiological responses to interpersonal conflict  
(Saxbe et al., 2008:15-25). 
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In contrast, couples with higher levels of intimacy show reduced cortisol levels in 
response to work related problems (Ditzen et al., 2008), and women receiving 
positive physical partner contact (neck and shoulder massage) prior to stress tests 
subsequently exhibited significantly lower cortisol and heart rate responses to this 
(Ditzen et al., 2007). A further study (involving newly weds) has also examined 
circulating levels of ACTH (which stimulates cortisol release) in conjunction with 
relative power within a relationship (as measured by comparing reports of de-
pendant love for one another) In this, whilst conflict behaviours per se did not 
vary as a function of power, less powerful partners showed a rise in ACTH in re-
sponse to conflict engagements, with actual cortisol levels also remaining ele-
vated in less powerful wives (Loving et al., 2004:595-612). 
The final tranche of data involves the relationship between oxytocin and vaso-
pressin levels and marital quality. These studies are slightly different in as much as 
they investigate a positive element of relational shape. Oxytocin is not only in-
volved in relational bonding, but the oxytocin system operates in parallel with 
stress response systems to inhibit HPA activity after stress (Uvnas-Moberg, 
1997:38-42; 1998:819-35) – thus it acts to return systems to their baseline state 
once a stressor has been resolved or removed. Moreover, in animal studies it has 
been shown to moderate pro-inflammatory cytokines and speed wound healing 
(Gouin et al., 2010:1083). There are assorted indications that it plays an important 
role in relationships and better relational quality (including actual and perceived 
support) and increased physical contact (in the form of hugs) are both associated 
with higher circulating levels of oxytocin (Grewen et al., 2005:531-8; Light et al., 
2005:5-21). The administration of oxytocin prior to conflict tasks has also been 
shown to increase positive communication behaviours (as compared to a placebo) 
and reduce cortisol levels post stressor(Ditzen et al., 2009:728-31). Finally in a 
wound healing study, associations were demonstrated between high levels of 
oxytocin and more positive communication behaviours in a structured interaction, 
and between higher levels of vasopressin and fewer negative communication be-
haviours. Moreover those with high oxytocin levels also had faster blister-wound 
healing (Gouin et al., 2010:1082-90). 
6.2.2 Alterations to innate and acquired immunity 
The immune system has both an innate and an adaptive arm and whilst the two 
are interrelated and influence each other, they are also different in key ways. The 
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former, which constitutes the first line defence against invasion and insult, is a 
non-specific response producing its maximal effect immediately and making no 
ultimate contribution to immune memory. The latter is a second line mechanism 
which is specific, involves a time lag between exposure and maximum response 
and contributes to developing immune memory. Although inflammatory proc-
esses are part of both of these responses, they will be considered separately. 
Broadly speaking, marital studies show that poorer relational quality affects both 
the immunological response paths but in significantly different ways, leading to a 
short lived up-regulation of innate mechanisms, but a down-regulation of adap-
tive ones. In the case of the former, one of the major changes observed is in the 
dynamics of circulating natural killer cells (NKC) – a subset of lymphocytes which 
constitute a major component of the innate response system. Higher circulating 
numbers, increased levels of cytotoxic activity, and swifter rate of decline were 
noted across various studies, in connection with more hostile or negative behav-
iours. Thus couples with high negative behaviours had higher initial levels of cyto-
toxity and a greater decline at 24 hours after a conflict engagement (Kiecolt-
Glaser et al., 1993:395-412). Higher anger levels during interactions were associ-
ated with higher circulating numbers and greater NKC cytotoxity during and after 
an interactive task in men who also reported cynical hostility (Dopp et al., 
2000:10-26; Miller et al., 1999:262-71). These NKC changes mirror those seen in 
response to acute stressors (Segerstrom and Miller, 2004:607) but are shorter 
lived. The other significant effect on innate immune responses involves alterations 
in local and systemic cytokine activity. This will be discussed in the following sec-
tion dealing with wound healing and inflammation. 
With respect to adaptive immunity, there are once again strong indications of a 
correlation between relational shape and immune functioning, with lower marital 
quality consistently associated with poorer adaptive responses as demonstrated 
by a number of different enumerative and functional measurements. In terms of 
circulating system components, couples showing high levels of negative behaviour 
also had changes in both numbers and relative ratios of key circulating cells re-
lated to adaptive immunity (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1988:213-29; Kiecolt-Glaser et 
al., 1993:395-412). Significant alterations were also seen in three functional 
measures: firstly in couples who displayed high-negative behaviour in conflict 
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tasks, lymphocytes (a major cellular component of the adaptive arm) showed 
poorer proliferative and blastogenic responses to various challenges (Kiecolt-
Glaser et al., 1987:13-34; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1997:339-49; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 
1993:395-412); moreover larger increases in hostile mood during the task was 
directly mirrored by larger decreases in the proliferative response  (Mayne et al., 
1997:277-88). Secondly, both newly wed and older couples with greater hostility 
ratings raised higher levels of titres against Epstein Barr Virus (EBV), indicating 
poorer adaptive cellular control of the latent virus (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1987:13-
34; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1997:339-49; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1988:213-29; Kiecolt-
Glaser et al., 1993:395-412). Finally, a number of studies – involving both spousal 
dementia care givers (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1996a:3043-7; Vedhara et al., 
1999:627-31) and couples reporting low marital satisfaction (Phillips et al., 
2006:279-89) – have linked diminished marital quality to impaired responses to 
influenza vaccine. 
Essentially then, poor quality of marital relationship correlates with changes to 
both innate and adaptive immune function which mirror patterns shown in 
chronic stress situations (see Segerstrom and Miller, 2004:601-30 for an overview 
of these). Once again it is not clear to what extent gender has a moderating effect 
on these. Some studies found none for the innate system changes (Gouin et al., 
2009:898-904; Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2005:1377-84) whereas others recorded lar-
ger effects for men than women (Graham et al., 2009:621-; Miller et al., 
1999:262-71). A similar heterogeneity is seen with adaptive function studies 
which vary from showing no difference between the sexes (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 
1997:339-49) to larger reported effects for both women (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 
1993:395-412) and men (Mayne et al., 1997:277-88). Thus there is not a clear 
match with the larger epidemiological patterns for marriage and health which 
show men deriving greater benefit from marriage in health terms. However this 
probably reflects issues such as small sample size, and the very different time 
scales between PNI and epidemiological studies (Robles and Kane, 2012:205). 
6.2.3 Correlations with local and systemic inflammatory 
markers 
Innate and adaptive responses also both have inflammatory components. But 
whilst inflammation is a key part of the body’s defence arsenal, chronic inflamma-
tory processes are also increasingly implicated in the pathogenesis of major dis-
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eases. Thus anything disrupting the regulation of inflammatory mechanisms may 
have significance for health outcomes. There are fewer studies looking at local 
and inflammatory markers, and various additional methodological difficulties have 
to be surmounted in these, for example the sensitivity of key markers such as IL-6 
to a variety of confounders which are harder to regulate (e.g. diet and activity), or 
the fact that levels rise much more slowly in response to laboratory stressors than 
those of cortisol and the catecholamines  (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2010:36-7). Never-
theless studies have yielded some suggestive information about correlations be-
tween these markers and relational shape. 
Indications of changes in local inflammatory response come from two studies in-
volving the administration of controlled skin insults in the form of suction blis-
ters.21 That wound healing is affected by psychological factors is amongst the 
most well documented of PNI effects (Walburn et al., 2009:253-71). Successful 
repair requires progress through a number of inflammatory stages and pro-
inflammatory cytokines play a vital role in initiating and maintaining the critical 
cascades required for these (Gouin and Kiecolt-Glaser, 2011:86). Thus alterations 
in local expression of cytokines can moderate the timescale of the healing proc-
ess. Both studies examined whether aspects of marital interaction altered the rate 
of wound healing, the first by comparing wound repair following both a conflict 
and a support task (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2005:1377-84) and the second by corre-
lating wound healing against different behaviour patterns displayed during a sup-
portive interaction (Gouin et al., 2010:1082-90). Rates of wound healing, local and 
systemic cytokine levels and systemic hormone levels were the different variables 
measured. The latter have already been discussed in the endocrine section.  
In couples doing the dual interaction, blister wounds administered prior to the 
conflict task healed more slowly than those given before the support task. More-
over the rate of healing also showed a correlation with the quality of the discus-
sion itself: couples displaying more negative and hostile behaviours showed a 
slower rate of healing in both the conflict and support scenarios than those whose 
interactions were less negative. These differences were substantial with couples 
displaying high hostility having a healing rate 40% slower than that of low hostile 
couples (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2005:1377-84).  Similarly in the study monitoring 
                                                             
21 A third, much earlier study (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1995:1194-6) involving dementia care-
givers will be considered below in conjunction with other dementia studies. 
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different behaviour patterns, those couples who displayed more positive commu-
nication patterns – increased self-disclosure, acceptance of their partner, relation-
ship-enhancing statements, and humour – during the structured interaction task 
had faster rates of wound healing, particularly the women (Gouin et al., 
2010:1082-90). Production of the three measured pro-inflammatory cytokines (IL-
6, IL-1β, and TNF-α) at the wound site also paralleled the impact of conflict on 
wound healing: the rate of rise (an indicator of the briskness of the local immune 
response) was less steep following the conflict task than the support one, and 
couples who demonstrated high-hostile behaviour also had lower local levels of 
TNF-α. Moreover for both tasks, high-hostility subjects had significantly fewer in-
flammatory cells in the blister chamber fluid than low-hostile subjects, again indi-
cating a reduced local response (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2005:1881). 
Serum levels of pro-inflammatory cytokines (i.e. measurement at the systemic 
level) did not however correlate with these local patterns, and indeed showed an 
opposite relationship. Here though a critical factor to be borne in mind is the 
complex and pleiotropic nature of the cytokine system, one of the results of which 
is differences in production route and biological significance of particular mole-
cules at local and systemic levels. This leads to the apparently paradoxical situa-
tion in which circulating levels of pro-inflammatory cytokines can be elevated, but 
tissue levels of the same cytokine depressed i.e. there is a simultaneous up-
regulation of inflammatory processes at system level and a down regulation at 
cellular level (e.g. at a wound site) – something I will return to later in the chapter. 
Once again there was a marked difference between couples exhibiting low and 
high hostile behaviours. The latter had relatively greater increases in plasma levels 
of both IL-6, and TNF-α following the conflict than the support discussion: in con-
trast to those with low-hostile patterns who produced approximately the same 
incremental rise in IL-6 over the twenty-four hours following both tasks, their IL-6 
production was almost two and a half times higher (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 
2005:1382). 
Further studies on the same sample population found higher levels of circulating 
IL-6 between conflict and support tasks in individuals who were (self-reportedly) 
less comfortable with personal intimacy and wished to avoid partner dependence 
(Gouin et al., 2009:898-904); and that the use, during conflict tasks, or words indi-
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cating causal reasoning and insight, was correlated with lower circulating levels of 
IL-6 and TNF-α, an effect that was heightened for husbands when their wives also 
used such words (Graham et al., 2009:621-30). Both of these suggest that differ-
ences in aspects of the quality of relational experience are also mirrored physio-
logically in cytokine activity.  
Some corroborative evidence for these associations between relational quality 
and cytokine levels can be adduced from other more general studies of differ-
ences in marital or other social connection related to circulating inflammatory 
markers: for example IL-6 levels have been inversely correlated with the level of 
partner support in young women (Whisman and Sbarra, 2012:290-5), poor social 
relations in older women (Friedman et al., 2005:18757–62), and the strength of 
social networks in men (Loucks et al., 2006b:835-42). Similarly elevated levels of 
C-Reactive protein (another important marker of systemic inflammation) are as-
sociated with poorer integration into social networks in men (Ford et al., 2006:78-
84; Loucks et al., 2006a:1010-16). It is worth recalling here that that higher levels 
of IL-6 and CRP correlate with increased mortality in healthy older populations 
(Harris et al., 1999:506-12). 
A final set of data come from the very different perspective of the spousal care in 
dementia studies. Whilst these are usually presented in the context of studies of 
chronic stress, a situation where a relationship which was previously a main 
source of interpersonal support has become instead a primary and escalating 
source of stress and distress can arguably also give some pointers towards the 
physiological effects of altered relational shape. Tellingly perhaps in this respect, 
care-givers still tend to number their dementia-suffering partners amongst their 
close support network, whilst also reporting fewer important personal relation-
ships than controls (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1991:352, 358). In the key longitudinal 
controlled study (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2003b:9090-5), levels of serum IL-6 were 
monitored over six years in 119 people who were (or had recently been) caring for 
a spouse with dementia, and 106 non care-giving controls. At the point of entry, 
28 of the care-givers' spouses had already died, and an additional 50 died during 
the study. Levels of circulating IL-6 are known to rise with age, but the average 
rate of increase in care-givers was four times as large as that of non care-givers. 
Moreover, bereaved care-givers continued to exhibit the same steeper incre-
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mental slopes as current caregivers even several years after spousal death. These 
patterns were not accounted for by differences in health, medication, or health 
behaviours between the care-giving group and the controls and thus arguably 
suggest a correlation to some aspect of the relational experience itself. 
Two much earlier studies of dementia care-giving also contribute some suggestive 
collateral data linking relational experience to dysregulation of inflammatory 
functions at local and systemic level. Firstly, a small study of women caring for 
dependants with dementia (mothers and husbands), showed two indications of 
impaired local inflammation compared to matched controls: a significant delay in 
the healing of punch biopsies, with wounds taking an average of nine days (24%) 
longer to resolve; and a significantly lower challenge-induced output of mRNA22 
for interleukin-1β (an important cytokine in local inflammatory cascades) by blood 
leukocytes harvested prior to biopsy (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1995:1194-6). Secondly, 
in the care-giver study already referenced in connection with impaired acquired 
immunity (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 1991:345-62), another associated finding was that 
care-givers had a much greater incidence of depressive disorders than controls: 
25% met diagnostic criteria at entry (compared with 0% of controls) rising to 32% 
(and 6%) at 13 month follow-up. Whilst this early study did not measure serum 
inflammatory markers, there is now, as already noted, increasing evidence that 
systemic inflammation is implicated in depressive disorders (Miller et al., 
2009:732-41), hence these higher incidences of depression might well be an indi-
cation of inflammatory dysregulation in the care giving group. 
Although I have considered these effects separately, this is clearly something of 
an artificial disjunction given the complex interrelationship between brain, endo-
crine, and immune systems, and they are likely to be cross-related in web-like 
ways. While these particular studies have not explicitly explored how the meas-
ured changes in various different system elements might be connected, assorted 
evidence from other human and animal studies point towards possible connecting 
threads. Thus for example women with higher CVSR have also been shown to 
have higher EBV titres compared to women with low reactivity (Cacioppo et al 
2002). With respect to aspects of acute response, one of the earliest recognised 
effects of glucocorticoids was the regulation of circulating leukocyte subset com-
                                                             
22 Messenger RNA - an indication of production potential. 
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position, with high glucocorticoid levels leading to neutrophilia and simultaneous 
lymphopenia and monocytopenia (Fauci et al., 1976:304-15). Similarly pharma-
cological studies show that beta-agonists (which mimic the effects of catechola-
mines) produce increases in circulating NKC and that beta-blockers reverse this 
effect (Mills et al., 2000:137). In addition animal studies also indicate that ele-
vated circulating levels of both glucocorticoids and catecholamines can suppress 
production of pro-inflammatory cytokines at a wound site (Gouin and Kiecolt-
Glaser, 2011:86-7). In other words the close relationship between the HPA axis 
and the immune system can lead to situations in which abnormal activity in the 
former has knock-on effects for the latter. I will return to this issue of the poten-
tial effects of dysregulation when outlining the proposed model for connecting 
relationality with health in the final section of the chapter. 
In summary then, this subset of experiments dealing with immune and endocrine 
function in the context of close personal relationships allows a number of obser-
vations to be offered to the transversal synthesis from the PNI perspective. Firstly, 
aspects of how relational connection is realised appear to have direct immu-
nological and endocrine sequelae; secondly, these play out to two distinct time-
scales with different short and long term consequences. Thus whilst more nega-
tive forms of relational expression have short term effects that appear to convey 
some health advantages in terms of immediate response to invasion or insult (I 
will return to the issue of wound healing in the final section), in the long term they 
appear to have adverse consequences from the perspective of health mainte-
nance.  Since these long term alterations replicate those seen in chronic stress, 
the tendency has been to couch explanations of the effects of marital relational 
quality in terms of it either acting as a form of chronic stress in its own right 
(Robles and Kiecolt-Glaser, 2003:409-16) or as both a potentiator and a buffer of 
chronic stress (Slatcher, 2010:455-69). However, such effects can also, when set in 
the framework of allostatic maintenance and overload, also be understood as in-
dicative of maladaptive system re straints stemming directly from the way in 
which relationality is realised. This does not preclude or supersede a stress-
related framework; rather it can be seen as one possible pathway through which 
this can be realised. This possibility will be expanded in section 4 when all the dif-
ferent strands of the thesis argument are finally drawn together. 
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Viewed from an evolutionary perspective, the emergence of relationality from 
systems carrying out social signal surveillance has improved our capacity to effi-
ciently process information from these and thus enabled us to build more com-
plex internal models of the world to direct behaviour and improve survival. At the 
same time, it has also brought in its train the ability to form and sustain personal 
relationships which contribute to our own personal well-being, development and 
flourishing; and the absence or etiolation of such relationships is accompanied by 
the complex feelings associated with loneliness.23 The issue of whether this rela-
tional dimension is also simply a servant of the reproductive safety/kin security 
aspects of tribal/species survival within the evolutionary dynamic is a moot one: 
data from fMRI studies of social exclusion (Eisenberger et al., 2003:290-2) and 
cooperation (Rilling et al., 2002:395-405) appear to indicate that physical pain and 
social pain share an overlapping neural substrate, as do cooperation and reward 
processing. This had led to speculation that because of the adaptive value of 
mammalian social bonds, the social attachment system may have piggybacked 
onto the physical pain system to promote survival (Eisenberger et al., 2003:291); 
and from thence to the hypothesis that loneliness can be completely accounted 
for within an evolutionary framework and in the service of the ‘selfish 
gene’(Cacioppo et al., 2006:1054-85). The argument here is essentially that the 
social pain of loneliness and the corresponding reward of connecting with others 
is what motivates the person to repair and maintain social connections even when 
their immediate self-interests are not served by the sharing of resources 
(ibid:1055). 
However this seems to involve something of a chicken and egg scenario; it also 
seems to insufficiently account for either the fact that lonely individuals are just as 
likely as non-lonely to interact with other people, or why the former perceive and 
judge such interactions to be of poorer quality and providing less comfort and 
support than the latter (Hawkley et al., 2003:105-20). Indeed in many of the stud-
ies cited, the language used to evaluate relational quality goes well beyond the 
language of threat or even simply belonging. In other words poor relational qual-
ity does not seem to simply be linked to survival threat: For some reason the ‘feel’ 
of how we express and experience relationality varies in ways which we detect 
and which seem to matter. It would seem therefore that just as relationality as 
                                                             
23 i.e. perceived rather than objective social isolation (Hawkley and Cacioppo, 2010:218). 
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emergent is about more than summative social signal decoding, so emergent rela-
tionality as experienced is more than mere functional connection. Thus this too 
needs to be considered in any attempt to tease out the links between social con-
nection and health, and since this discrepancy in relational feel is located in con-
scious embodied experience then it seems appropriate for further exploration to 
also focus on this level.  
The question is how best to do this in a way which recognises and responds to the 
challenges peculiar to the conundrum of investigating a situation in which we, as 
both observers and observed, are inextricably enmeshed. Here the transversal 
method once again proves useful, providing as it does the opportunity to intro-
duce a completely different path for enquiry through which to expand under-
standing. In this instance, the theological contribution to transversal exploration 
and synthesis comes from Gabriel Marcel. Marcel’s approach to investigation in 
situations where the ontological status of the investigator cannot be divorced 
from the subject of enquiry offers a way of responding to the inherent challenge 
encountered in exploring the contours of our relational experience. The fruits of 
this approach as he himself has applied it to the issue of intersubjectivity (his cor-
responding terminology) also provide some material for addressing the explicit 
question of why there might be a variable feel to this. 
6.3 Distance or disponibilité: a Marcellian perspective 
In Chapter 2 I argued that a benefit of following van Huyssteen’s postfoundational 
approach was the increased flexibility conferred – in a number of domains – as to 
how science-religion dialogue might be usefully done. One of the aims of this pro-
ject has been to demonstrate, on a chapter by chapter basis, both a variety of 
ways in which shared material can be used to generate transversal outputs, and 
that very different types of theological voice can be legitimate contributors to this 
end. Part of this has involved discussion of the respects in which these can be said 
to engage methods or display skills commensurate with transversal rationality. In 
this final contribution, I suggest that Marcel’s characteristic and innovative narra-
tive style utilises the coefficient dynamics of Schrag’s ‘transversal rationality’ 
(Schrag, 1992:9, 63) in a particular and distinctive way which also honours his own 
specific philosophical/theological commitments. Since there is a close overlap be-
tween this contention and the way in which he addresses what I have suggested 
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as being a fundamental problem here, I propose to expand and examine these 
aspects in tandem in the next section. In the second section, with respect to the 
more explicit issue of why relational connection can sometimes ‘feel’ less reward-
ing, I will discuss some resulting Marcellian insights on intersubjectivity, in particu-
lar his delineation of ‘availability’ or disponibilité. 
6.3.1 Problem and Mystery: Marcellian method as transver-
sal 
Unlike the Cappadocians and von Balthasar, Marcel has undergone no recent ren-
aissance;  on the contrary he has become distinctly less fashionable since the Per-
sonalist heyday of the mid 20th century, but despite this eclipse he retains a per-
ennial relevance (Wood, 1999:94). His is also very much less obviously a primarily 
theological voice, but in this respect the transversal model’s underlying philoso-
phy once again allows for a more expansive approach to identifying these. Thus 
Marcel, though not overtly addressing what might be considered as the typical 
disciplinary themes, or beginning from the usual primary theological starting 
points, nevertheless writes about something which is a major theological interest 
viz. the experience of embodied being. Furthermore, whilst making little explicit 
appeal to such, he writes within a framework which is deeply informed by and 
orientated towards a Christian understanding of God (Marcel, 1973:237-43). This 
combination makes him an ideal dialogical partner since he is writing neither in 
defence of specific doctrinal formulations, or a more general Christian apologetic 
– in fact he specifically rejects these as being incompatible with the intellectual 
honesty that is the ‘first duty’ of both philosopher and dramatist (Marcel, 
1963:113). Instead his avowed intent as ‘a philosopher of the threshold’ is to ex-
plore the experience of humanness in such a way as to ‘somehow stand with be-
lievers, with the Christian religion […] but also speak to non-believers, make my-
self understood by them’ (Marcel, 1973:240); and against the potential charge 
that his ideas imply an unformulated reference to Christianity, he steadfastly ar-
gues that they neither depend on, nor pre-suppose, its data (Marcel, 
1930/2001:106). His is also a well matched contributory voice in some of his key 
themes intersect directly with both the scientific concerns of the current chapter 
and with the theological material discussed in earlier chapters. This provides not 
only the necessary locus for a transversal space dynamic to be developed, but also 
a way of drawing various project threads together. 
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Like von Balthasar, Marcel defies easy categorisation (Tattam, 2013:1) – strongly 
rejecting the ‘Existentialist’ label, he instead considered himself as a neo-Socratic 
(Marcel, 1927/1952:xiii; 1973:237-8) whose role was to help others discover their 
essential selves (Smith, 1969:26). Similarly, he also displays a creative approach to 
thinking which again seems very well suited to the openness of transversal dy-
namics. In this respect, his involvement with both drama and music – as play-
wright, critic, and concert pianist – make significant contributions to his thinking 
(Marcel, 1963:5,50; 1973:231). The resultant writings are diffuse and wide ranging 
with no attempt at either a synoptic or a systematic presentation of his con-
cerns.24 Indeed ‘the conviction that reality cannot be "summed up," that this is 
indeed the last way in which it can be apprehended’ was an early insight (Marcel, 
1948:93); and the consequent rejection of philosophy as system (particularly as 
handed down from Kant through Fichte and Hegel) which was evidenced by the 
Metaphysical Journal (Marcel, 1927/1952), remained a key Marcellian hallmark. 
Instead, Marcel conceives philosophical work as excavation (Marcel, 1973:218-9) 
and exploration (Marcel, 1963:6-8) – an ‘adventure taking place within the greater 
adventure of human thought itself ‘ (Marcel, 1973:11). This approach is perfectly 
illustrated by the Metaphysical Journal with its workbook style in which false 
starts and detours, internal dialogue and persistent self-criticism develop into a 
slowly progressive cumulative understanding. 
In Marcel’s case, the philosophical adventure takes the form of investigating the 
dimensions of human existence, and in this pursuit his dramas form a particularly 
important vehicle through which he develops his understanding of the shape, ten-
sions and redemptive possibilities of intersubjectivity. As such, excerpts from 
these plays feature prominently as points of discussion in his philosophical writ-
ing, and their critical role is indicated by his likening of them to ‘an underground 
stream whose overflow, often scarcely perceptible, irrigates, as it were, my specu-
lative thought’ (Marcel, 1963:5). In fact it is in this use of both his own personal 
narratives – his writings are full of biographical detail and anecdote – and those of 
his characters, that one can most clearly see the operation of the coefficient dy-
namics of Schrag’s ‘transversal rationality’ (Schrag, 1992:9, 63). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Schrag’s first movement of ‘praxial critique’ calls for a dialectic of par-
                                                             
24
A brief biographical tracing in The Existential Background of Human Dignity (1963) is the 
closest to the former; the 1948/50 Gifford Lectures are the nearest he approaches to the 
latter. 
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ticipation and distanciation. The former is something which already sits at the 
very core of Marcel’s thinking, since participation – in one’s own body and from 
thence in the material world, and thus the lives of the others as friends, family, 
and community – is the key dynamic in his unfolding of the notion of Mystery. It is 
in this notion of Mystery and its differentiation from that of ‘problem’ that Marcel 
shines a light on the foundational difficulty under investigation here.  
Essentially Marcel distinguishes two different types of situations which engage 
human enquiry. The first – which he designates as problems – do not involve the 
unique individual: they only require ‘thinking as a thinking being’ and the informa-
tion needed to do this is in principle accessible to any thinking person. However 
some things are not merely external problems to be solved, i.e. they are not ones 
with which we can engage as a subject confronted with objects; on the contrary 
they are ones in which the self is itself involved, and as such they therefore de-
mand a response from the individual in their uniqueness (MacDonald, 2001:84). 
When we deal with the former situation, we work on the available data without 
needing to take into account the I who is at work; but with the latter, our own 
ontological status becomes part of the issue, which we thus cannot simply regard 
as an object to be deconstructed and analysed. Hence in such scenarios we move 
beyond the realm of problem into that of the meta-problematic or Mystery. In the 
former, the intelligibility of the problem is extrinsic to the observer, whereas in 
the latter, the intelligibility of the meta-problem involves his personal participa-
tion. In effect Mystery (which Marcel absolutely resists conflating the unknow-
able) is ‘a problem which encroaches on its own data’ (Marcel, 1930/2001:90-3). 
In other words, what Marcel suggests is that there are not simply ‘problems to be 
solved’, there are also ‘mysteries to be encountered’, and that each of these will 
require a very different form of engagement. Thus our own incarnatedness, along 
with its expression in relationality, is not something which we can hold at arm’s 
length to scrutinise and dissect – it is the reality within which we are inescapably 
included and constantly involved (Lowe, 1986:xii). Exploring its contours therefore 
necessitates achieving some reflective distance on our being ‘in the middle’ with-
out simultaneously distorting our intimacy with that middle  (Desmond, 
2003:135).  
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Here then we begin to see the nature of the dilemma posed by trying to investi-
gate our relational connections with the Other: to approach the issue at the level 
of a problem is firstly to ignore that we are ourselves included in the data under 
investigation in a very particular way, and secondly to deny the subjectivity of the 
one to whom we relate. In other words it is to confuse or conflate problem with 
Mystery, and thus to approach the ground in such a way as will ensure that a vital 
element of understanding it completely eludes our grasp. Marcel – using both the 
description of experience and the reflective clarification of Mystery to enable a 
more expansive exploration of the dimensions of human experience (Hanley, 
1995:132) – has evolved his own particular way of escaping this distortion im-
posed by reductionist interpretations derived exclusively from empirical observa-
tion. It is here that the (albeit unknowing) employment of Schrag’s transversal 
dynamics can be most clearly seen. But in order to appreciate how this is the case, 
it is first necessary to set ‘problem’ and ‘Mystery’ and their associated forms of 
engagement back into the larger framework of human awareness. 
For Marcel there are three distinct levels to such awareness: at the base, there is 
a pre-reflective level of exposure to sense data in which one is aware only of one’s 
existence in a concrete situation. Since this level is the primordial act of life, its 
‘lived experience’ provides the ontological foundation of knowledge. Hence this is 
where values like fidelity, hope and love are originally encountered, rather than as 
part of some rationally reflective conceptual cognitive process (Bryson, 2008:xii; 
Michaud, 1995:15). Here Marcel clearly anticipates Ricoeur’s anthropology in 
which philosophy proceeds as ‘a second order elucidation of a nebula of meaning 
that at first has a pre-philosophical character’ (Ricoeur, 1986:4); and there is an 
equally  obvious connection with Schrag’s ‘pragmatic understanding arising […] 
from our participation in the ongoing life of our intercommunal situatedness in 
the world’ (Schrag, 1992:64). Arising out of this initial level comes what Marcel 
terms ‘first reflection’, which is characterised by a ‘spirit of abstraction’ (Marcel, 
1927/1952:ix). This is the level of ‘problem’ where subject/object dichotomy de-
velops as that which is Other to ourselves is categorised, objectified and analysed 
as a means to understanding it. Marcel views this type of analytical reduction – in 
which every issue and encounter is broached as a problem to be solved – as inexo-
rably leading to the ‘broken world’ described in his Gifford lectures (Marcel, 
1960a:22; 1973:15, 229). To overcome this, what is needed is a recovery of par-
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ticipation in Mystery and thus a move to the level of ‘second reflection’, in which 
the Other is no longer grasped as a problem to be analysed and solved, but is in-
stead encountered as Presence to be experienced (Marcel, 1949:117; 1952:129; 
1960a:83). A vital element of ‘second reflection’ is thus its ‘recuperative’ recovery 
of the primary sense of participation overthrown by the abstractive approach of 
first reflection (Marcel, 1960a:102-3), and the ‘recollection’ of our being as a ‘uni-
fied whole’ consequent upon this (Marcel, 1948:12). 
But whilst participation is thus firmly enshrined in Marcel’s philosophy, distancia-
tion – involving as it does not just a stepping back from, but also a critical assess-
ment of, that knowledge which participation furnishes – appears at first sight to 
present something of a problem, particularly when it comes to his investigation of 
intersubjectivity. The obvious difficulty is that the critical assessment of praxial 
critique is essentially a movement of first reflection, and the necessary reductive 
analysis of that is anathema to Marcel when it comes to considering the Other 
and our relationship with them: to consider these in terms of a problem to be 
grasped and analysed, and to employ deprecatory formulations of the ‘this is only 
that […] this is nothing other than that’ type are essentially an attack against the 
integrity of the real (Marcel, 1952:156) as well as attenuating the thinker’s own 
participation in being. A line from Marcel’s play L’Iconoclaste sums up the prob-
lem with exquisite succinctness thus: ‘Knowledge exiles to infinity all that it be-
lieves it embraces’. But since second reflection – the level at which Marcel wishes 
to locate the articulation of Presence – ‘cannot provide the occasion for problem-
atising’, involving as it does the exact inverse dynamic of relaxation and release 
(Marcel, 1963:86-7), it cannot in any sense stand as a substitute as a distancia-
tional manoeuvre.  
But whilst Marcel obviously has no notion of trying to follow Schrag’s transversal 
dynamic, nevertheless his way of opening up some reflective distance on inter-
subjectivity without reductively analysing it and thus distorting or destroying 
Presence, arguably achieves the necessary degree of distanciation to enable a le-
gitimate critique of participatory knowledge. Moreover he does so in a creative 
way which is not only faithful to the intersubjective ontology he espouses, but 
also allows him, by virtue of his own disponibilité (see further below), to model it 
through his philosophical modus (Tattam, 2010:228). Essentially Marcel’s style 
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structures his philosophy to itself engender an intersubjective experience – 
through both the narratives of the written work and the stage plays (the latter 
frequently also used as exemplars in the former) – between himself and his 
reader. Marcel uses this to allow the narratee/audience (and himself) to simulta-
neously distance themselves from their own particular situated experience and 
yet, through being presented with material within which they can find points of 
identification and intersection, to reflect on these in a non-reductive participative 
way. Thus his dramas do not begin with abstract philosophical ideas about Pres-
ence which are then dramatically illustrated, but from concrete situations of hu-
man estrangement and solidarity which then involve imaginative and evolving 
explorations and enactments of resistance and reciprocity. Marcel claimed that he 
neither dictated to his characters, nor indeed could force their actions to conform 
to any preset philosophical agenda. Instead he had to await and respect the dis-
covery of how they would react to the specific unfolding situations, and thus his 
dramas do not necessarily reach neat conclusions (de Lacoste, 1995:74; Hanley, 
1995:123; Marcel, 1963:60-2. 106, 117). Indeed they often have unexpected ele-
ments and endings which leave the audience with questions requiring reflection 
on and retrospective reconstruction of the drama in the light of these (Hanley, 
1998:19). As Marcel expresses it 
these [fundamental problems] cannot be solved by the drama-
tist […] the question is rather to hold up to the spectator a sort 
of magic mirror in which he finds his own problems, his own 
difficulties, with the result that through the mediation of the 
drama itself, there will emerge this awareness which, most of 
the time, remains in us as though benumbed and inarticulate 
(Marcel, 1963:107). 
Immersion in the life-world of the dramatis personae enables the audience to ex-
perience and even participate in that which their experiences open up (Hanley, 
1998:22). 
In the same way Marcel also unfolds his own personal narrative across his writ-
ings, where it functions as a construction to be ‘nourished‘ by participant experi-
ence (Busch, 1995:181-2; Marcel, 1960a:190-5). Marcel understands such narra-
tives as neither simply a mirror nor a neutral documentary study, but instead as 
selected and summarised sequences which shape things in terms of meaningful 
episodes and which can awaken echoes or set strings vibrating (Marcel, 
1960a:191-3) as they call out to others for recognition or confirmation.  As this 
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happens, subjectivity passes into intersubjectivity which, while it is entirely differ-
ent from the shared third person objectivity of science, can nonetheless surpass 
the limits of the individual first-person consciousness taken in isolation (Marcel, 
1973:6). 
The employment of these different spheres and modes of engagement allows 
Marcel to present both the genesis and the process of his thought ‘with all its fal-
terings and flights, its matured fruits and undelivered suggestions’ (Desmond, 
2003:135) to his audience. In so doing he not only facilitates a mutual distancia-
tion through the resulting intersubjectivity, but also simultaneously integrates this 
with a similarly distinctive and creative variation of Schrag’s interactive articula-
tion and discursive disclosure. In the end it is as much from these narrative and 
dramatic interactions as from the philosophical ideas themselves that the deeper 
understanding which he is trying to awaken flows. This in turn fits in with the 
Marcellian conception of the philosopher’s job as being ‘much less to prove than 
to show’, where such showing is not about establishing empirical facts but about 
making things ‘ripen’, and thus promoting and transforming them (Marcel, 
1973:31). As we will see shortly, there is also something of a feel of ‘ripening’ in 
Marcel’s account of the place of intersubjective engagement in the development 
of persons and in this respect, a strong intersection with both of the previous 
theological voices. 
However whilst the Marcellian approach thus sits very comfortably within a trans-
versal dynamic, and though there is a clear intersection of interests, a potential 
question mark still remains: given Marcel’s opposition to a certain type of reduc-
tive analysis, is he still a viable  dialogical partner for the PNI and CGN perspec-
tives offered in this chapter? Two things add weight to the affirmative evaluation 
here: firstly, as discussed in Chapter 2, prior agreement is not a sine qua non of 
attempting transversal space dialogue, and dissensus and diversity are recognised 
moreover as playing key constructive roles in developing ideas. There is thus no 
in-principle reason why this difference should disqualify Marcel, especially given 
the other dialogical positives which have been noted. Secondly, Marcel is not op-
posed to the scientific method of reduction and problematisation as a means of 
investigation in an absolute way; rather he is concerned to challenge the unreflec-
tive assumption that reality at large is nothing more than the sum of its analysable 
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parts, and to oppose the hegemonic hold of science over things beyond its remit 
(Desmond, 2003:136). In effect he wants to stand against the vision of the world 
described by Janke’s ‘praecisio mundi’, in which only that which can be measured 
and quantified is ‘real’ (Janke, 1999:263), and affirm instead that ultimately the 
real is ‘always more than anything I can say about it’ (Marcel, 1948/2002:224). In 
these respects he also clearly falls within the remit for more expansive enquiry 
which was outlined and espoused in Chapter 2 as the larger orientating frame-
work within which the project is situated. 
Marcel’s first transversal space contribution is thus methodological and comprises 
a number of elements: firstly, he confirms and reflects back the challenge which 
the scientific analyses already face regarding explanations of why the ‘feel’ of re-
lationality is important in ways which do not immediately seem to be simply func-
tional. Secondly, he suggests that the answer to such questions cannot necessarily 
be found purely in reductive analyses of assorted kinds since, in considering the 
problem simply from the perspective of the body-object, we lose its connection to 
the body-subject; and it is the latter, as it participates in being through intersub-
jectivity, where the dynamic of connection operates and where its different di-
mensions are experientially encountered. Finally, the form of second reflection 
established through his particular and creative approach to participation, distan-
ciation, and reflection, provides ‘a rich ontological repository for conceptual 
analysis’ (Bryson, 2008:xii). Thus he offers a different way of exploring variations 
in how relationality might be expressed and experienced at cognitive level which, 
though very different from analysis at synaptic or hormonal levels, forms a vital 
adjunct to these in expanding our understanding of relational ontology and thus 
of its potential connection to health. However his own explorations of intersub-
jectivity through his writings and plays have also generated insights into what un-
derlies this differential in connectional feel which also have much to contribute to 
the chapter exploration in their own right. 
6.3.2 Relational hospitality: presence as participation 
As I suggested in opening, Marcel’s intersubjective ontology has very obvious 
points of connection with the previous theological contributions. Thus there is a 
clear parallel between the Cappadocian understandings of relation as constitutive 
of personhood set out in Chapter 4 and both Marcel’s understanding of being 
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with as the nature of all being (Michaud, 1995:16), and its associated rejection of 
a hermetically sealed  Cartesian ‘I think’ in favour of a more expansive metaphys-
ics of ‘we are’ (Marcel, 1960b:10). Similarly the Marcellian themes of incohesion 
and permeability, their associated and implicitly kenotic imperative to ‘make 
room for the other in myself’ (Marcel, 1948/2002:87-91), and the sense that doing 
so is also a necessary element of realising one’s own full identity (Marcel, 
1930/2001:105; 1948/2002:34,36,163; 1949:78; Smith, 1969:26), have strong 
resonances with von Balthasar’s placing of self-restraint at the heart of the rela-
tional dynamic. Here then, between three very different theological voices, is an-
other example of Haack’s ‘pervasive relations of mutual support’ (Haack, 
2009:57), in this instance for the view of relational connection as being both a 
constitutive but more than merely functional element of humanness which this 
thesis has sought to advance. However Marcel also brings another layer of under-
standing to the picture through his examination of the attitudes which enable, 
structure, and sustain this dynamic; and the apparent antimony between separa-
tion and connection which lies at its heart. To this end he draws on the intercon-
nected motifs of availability and hospitality as ways of exploring and articulating 
how relational space is simultaneously created and bridged in the encounter with 
Presence. As with the idea of Presence itself, availability and hospitality, perhaps 
unsurprisingly since they too are operative in the realm of Mystery, are not easily 
amenable to neat deconstruction and analysis, but are more easily grasped as 
conceptual Gestalts. 
Like von Balthasar, Marcel assigns freedom a critical role in facilitating intersub-
jectivity, with any I-Thou encounter being co-constituted by a ‘dialogue of free-
doms’ between self and other. Such dialogue involves an appeal from the ‘I’, 
which the ‘Thou’ is free to ignore, postpone, refuse, or respond to – with the gra-
tuitous and reciprocal gift of presence occurring if both agree to the implicit ‘con-
tract’ (Marcel, 1948/2002:38-57; 1998:172-197). Hence Presence cannot be 
forced, claimed, demanded, manufactured, or bought – it can only be accepted as 
a gift freely given. At the same time Marcel rejects any notion that relational con-
nection can be fully or adequately understood in terms of using and being used, 
even when the using is ‘reciprocal, fair, knowing and consensual’ (Godfrey, 
1995:120). This suggestion that there is more to genuine human relationships 
than mere utility, is unsurprising in light of Marcel’s other ontological commit-
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ments and the importance he places on intersubjectivity as a key element of the 
experience of Being. In keeping with this, his dissection of the attitudes lying at 
the heart of all relational connection, and which fundamentally determine its na-
ture, have their roots in his key differentiation between problematisation and par-
ticipation – and thus in whether we approach the Other at the level of problem or 
of Mystery. 
For Marcel, an essential ingredient in the second approach is the degree of dis-
ponibilité25 of those involved in the relational connection. Indeed since Presence 
can only ever be offered as a free gift and received as a free offering, disponibilité 
constitutes a sine qua non of its generation: ‘Presence is response to the act by 
which the subject opens himself up to receive; in this sense, it is the gift of one-
self. Presence belongs only to the being who is capable of giving himself' (Marcel, 
1967b:153). What is very clear however is that for Marcel the concept of dispon-
ibilité extends far beyond any simplistic or obvious notion of what such availability 
comprises; thus even the most conscientious listener can convey unavailability – 
and a material gift or visible action, no matter how lavish, is not necessarily a sign 
of Presence:   
There is a way of listening that is a giving of oneself; there is 
another way of listening that is a refusal, a refusal to give one-
self…the being who is available is the one who is capable of be-
ing totally with me when I need him or her; the being who is 
unavailable is the one who seems to extend a temporary loan 
from among the considerable resources that are at his or her 
disposal. For the first I am a presence, for the second I am an 
object’ (Marcel, 1998:192, original emphasis).  
Marcel construes this unwillingness to be available in terms of an alienation in 
which, whilst we can listen and even respond to a story related to us of someone’s 
misfortune or need, we are essentially unmoved by it. We may well recognise a 
contradiction between what we deem we ought to feel and what we actually do 
feel – and indeed feel pained or diminished by this. However we place it within a 
claimed framework of limited capacity to respond to all need, thus allowing this 
particular situation to be designated as ‘only a case’. For Marcel, what character-
ises the one who is present or available, is that they do not think in terms of cases 
(Marcel, 1998:192-3). 
                                                             
25
 The nearest English translation – availability – does not do justice to Marcel’s concept 
hence I will use his own term. 
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Marcel then traces this back further to what he labels a ‘sclerosis’ – a ‘hardening 
of the categories in accordance with which we conceive and evaluate the world’ 
(Marcel, 1930/2001:104). This in turn is seen as a part of an egocentric topogra-
phy we all gradually develop in which we are at the centre of a series of concen-
tric zones of decreasing interest and involvement whose demarcations become 
increasingly hardened over time, although encounters with unknown others can 
sometimes breach these, albeit often in only a temporary way (Marcel, 1998:193). 
In contrast to the enclosed, impenetrable nature of the sclerotic tendency, Marcel 
roots the possibility of openness to the Other in what he describes as porosity or 
permeability (Marcel, 1948/2002:87-8). Moreover he ascribes an ontological pri-
macy to this ‘in-cohesion’, seeing it as an inescapable part of the human condi-
tion, as a fact before it is a task. Thus to welcome the Other is not to make myself 
permeable to them, but to acknowledge and accept the in-cohesion which I al-
ready am; likewise to give oneself to the Other is to affirm a bond which already 
exists rather than seeking to escape or destroy it (Westphal, 2002:xiii). Once again 
the common ground with the Cappadocian model of personhood is clear, as is the 
fact that a failure to make room for the Other is essentially an attempt to recreate 
the world according to an illegitimately seized ontological independence.  
Seen in this light, absent or impoverished disponibilité has non-trivial conse-
quences for both the potential Thou and the unavailable I. The former loses the 
Presence that could be both refreshing and the means of a revelation and further 
realisation of selfhood, in which one becomes ‘more fully myself than I should be 
if I were not exposed to its impact'(Marcel, 1951b:252-3). Moreover in being re-
duced to the level of object/problem, the Thou is prevented from exercising their 
own capacity for disponibilité. For the I too, there is also a significant contraction 
of the possibilities, for both self communication and self-knowledge since ‘I com-
municate effectively with myself only insofar as I communicate with the other 
person’ (Marcel, 1948/2002:34). The vignette of Jesus’ encounter with a Syro-
phoenician woman serves as an interesting exemplar here of the of the inherent 
possibility of expansion through the availability of the Other. In both its early 
Marcan form (Mk 7:24-30) and the expanded counterpart in Mt 15:21-8, the 
woman’s evident and high-risk disponibilité is shown as resulting in a significant 
change in Jesus; moreover the uncomfortable nature of the exchange underlines 
the fact that encounters of Presence are not necessarily serene experiences. But 
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in addition to the potential stunting of self awareness, shunning connection also 
risks a dwindling of our experience of hope and freedom, since these too are also 
organically connected to the degree of our availability to Otherness (Marcel, 
1930/2001:105; Marcel, 1948/2002:40; Marcel, 1949:78). Again there are inter-
esting resonances, this time with the shālômic understandings discussed in Chap-
ter 3, particularly the insight that being well related to oneself is inextricably 
linked with being well related to the Other, with disruption to the one having in-
evitable consequences for the other in terms of health and wellbeing. 
But as well as discussing the consequences of its lack, Marcel also tries to tease 
out a little more clearly what the contours of disponibilité actually are (Marcel, 
1948/2002:38-57). As already indicated, it does not simply equate to being a 
good, or even an attentive listener – some more fundamental basic orientation is 
necessitated in Marcel’s view. This he states in the strong language of ‘I belong to 
you’ which he then expands as ‘I am opening an unlimited credit account in your 
name’. However Marcel does not see this as a condition of slavery – on the con-
trary he couches it in terms of freedom and in a way which is strikingly reminis-
cent of von Balthasar: ‘the best use I can make of my freedom is to place it in your 
hands; it is as though I freely substituted your freedom for my own; or paradoxi-
cally, it is by that very substitution that I realise my freedom’ (ibid:40). Essentially 
then the degree of my disponibilité is a reflection of the extent to which I am both 
willing and able to make my resources – not just material, but also emotional, in-
tellectual and spiritual – available to a particular Other for them to call upon as 
they need. Marcel’s usual analogy is that the person who is unavailable is only 
willing ‘to offer me a temporary loan raised on his resources’ (Marcel, 1995:40; 
Marcel, 1998:192). One can thus see why Marcel assigns the language of alien-
ation and sclerosis to unavailability and this is further underlined by the support-
ing concept of hospitality with which he entwines its diametric opposite of dispon-
ibilité. 
To offer hospitality not only implies certain attitudes of readiness and willingness, 
but also that we receive the person to whom hospitality is offered into our own 
home  rather than into some unknown or public place; in other words we wel-
come them into a place we not only possess, but also experience as our own (Mar-
cel, 1948/2002:89). Hospitality is not about filling up an empty space with an alien 
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presence but ‘of having another person participate in a certain reality, in a certain 
plenitude’ and to provide hospitality is ‘truly to communicate something of one-
self to the other’ (ibid:91). Here we see the connections with Marcel’s notion of 
permeability and incohesion and their contrast to the nacre of sclerosis which, in 
allowing no finger hold to another, resists all possibility of their ingress into our 
domain. The dynamic of hospitality also necessitates that I am willing and able to 
make room in myself for the Other and this requires a fundamental shift in orien-
tation since ‘if I am completely absorbed in myself, concentrated on my own sen-
sations, feelings, anxieties, it will obviously be impossible for me to receive, to 
incorporate in myself, the message of the other’ (Marcel, 1948/2002:88). Hence 
as long as my concerns are my central preoccupation, I will always make the Other 
a means to my ends, any welcome will be pretence rather than Presence, and 
connection will be marked by grabbing rather than giving (Westphal, 2002:xiii). 
There is once again a clear sense that Marcel sees a close connection between our 
treatment of others (as regards how we express relationality) and our own state: 
withholding our resources does not just lead to the potential impoverishment of 
the Other, it also has significant effects on dimensions of our own lived experi-
ence and self-relatedness. Thus whilst availability is not without risk of abuse, un-
availability is not a safe option either in terms of our own flourishing and health. 
In fact there is a strong sense running throughout Marcel’s exposition of this bidi-
rectional implication of good relational engagement and its results which is well 
captured by Rilke’s notion of the ripening qualities of looking at and movement 
towards each other. 
Ultimately Marcel thinks of disponibilité and its associated metric of hospitality in 
terms of an active disposition towards rather than as episodic occurrences – 
something which he captures with the description ‘creative fidelity’ (Marcel, 
1948/2002:147-74; Marcel, 1951a:125-34). This deeply paradoxical notion, which 
is both difficult to grasp and define conceptually, sits at ‘the very centre of the 
realm of the meta-problematical’ (Marcel, 1998:188). Stated simply such fidelity 
stems from an commitment to the Other which will not in principle be called into 
question again (Marcel, 1948/2002:162). This is more than simply constancy 
(though this forms its rational skeleton), which Marcel sees as perseverance to-
wards a goal, because it also involves Presence (Marcel, 1948/2002:153). Thus for 
example the impulse to continue, out of a sense of duty, to provide promised or 
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expected support when there is no longer a  concomitant attitude of disponibilité, 
comes from constancy, not fidelity. The attendant internal and external struggles 
against feelings of, for example disappointment or irritation at the ‘absence’ on 
the one side and irritation or resentment at an ‘oppressive’ obligation on the 
other run the danger of culminating in mutual aversion (Marcel, 1948/2002:156). 
Against this, fidelity represents an I-Thou trustworthiness which involves a ‘crea-
tivity of presencing that goes beyond anything merely habitual or dutiful’ (West-
phal, 2002:xii).  
Marcel’s concepts are, as noted, in some ways more easily accessible at the real-
ised level and thus I want finally to briefly reconnect his account of relationality 
governed by disponibilité and hospitality to some of the Biblical texts already pre-
sented in detail in Chapter 3 by way of furnishing this possibility. In keeping with 
the project’s model, the intent is not to appeal to these as a primary datum in a 
revelatory sense, but simply to offer them as examples which were deemed sig-
nificant enough to remember, record, and hand on within the Christian tradition. 
In fact the texts show examples of Jesus in both I and Thou dimensions of inter-
subjectivity i.e. as both offering, and benefitting from, hospitable relational con-
nection. In the latter category, the example of the Canaanite woman already 
noted, the mother/son exchange of Jn 2:2-7 and the anointing stories of Lk7:36-8 
and Jn12:1-3 (p90) demonstrate the expansive and healing effects of disponibilité 
offered, recognised, and received. In the former, perhaps the most vivid amongst 
many possible examples of what it is Marcel is pointing towards with his descrip-
tion of offering someone a ‘blank cheque to draw on one’s account’, of what it 
means to be faithfully available, are to be seen in the final two relational encoun-
ters recorded in the life of Jesus in Lk 23:40-3 and Jn 19:25-7  where Jesus remains 
available and Present to his mother and a dying man, despite his own extreme 
suffering(p91). 
What Marcel’s exploration and exposition suggests then is firstly that an ontology 
of relationality limited to usefulness (whether this is couched at Darwinian, social, 
or experiential level) is simply inadequate as an account of the nature of human 
relational connection. In this sense he confirms the apprehension raised through 
the experimental studies examined earlier that relational ‘feel’ varies in ways 
which we can detect and which seem to matter over and above any putative sur-
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vival benefit. Secondly, that what shapes our relational connection is rooted in the 
basic orientation with which we approach the Other, and in whether we see them 
as primarily a problem to be solved or as a Presence to be encountered. In the 
first case, withholding ourselves not only denies their subjectivity, it also curtails 
and diminishes our own experience of relational connection with both the Other 
and ourselves; in the latter, the attitudes of hospitality, availability, and fidelity 
facilitate the possibility of a more generous, expansive, and mutually enriching 
encounter, which might legitimately be labelled shālômic. This strong sense of 
bidirectional flow in Marcel’s analyses underlines the fact that, in terms of the 
consequences, how we express relationality is at least as important as how we 
experience it. 
If we now bring together the theological with the scientific contribution to the 
transversal space, we can formulate an expanded account of realised relationality. 
Here the form of the transversal outcome is once again slightly different in that 
the two contributions come together as the obverse and reverse faces of the 
same coin – representing the embodied experiential and cellular levels aspects of 
a complex emergent phenomenon. Theological explorations indicate that the 
shape of realised relationality is not uniform but can vary in ways which signifi-
cantly alter its richness and potential; experimental data from PNI and cognitive 
studies furnish reasonable evidence that poor relational experiences can directly 
affect events at cellular level. 
In Chapter 1 I suggested that for neurotheology to claim legitimacy as a distinct 
enterprise, it must be able to produce and ‘body forth’ insights which are distinc-
tively neurotheological in form and expression. In contrast to the approaches 
adopted by Ashbrooke and Newberg, the route towards this adopted by this the-
sis has been to consider neurotheology not as a hybrid neo-discipline, but instead 
as a joint transversal venture under the governance of postfoundational rational-
ity, and thus answering to the epistemic standards inherent in this rather than to 
those of a specific discipline. This has allowed each discipline to contribute mate-
rial to three transversal space explorations of different aspects of relationality. 
From these a series of transversal outcomes – ‘belonging’ neither to science or 
theology per se, but instead answerable to the epistemic standards of postfoun-
dational rationality – have been proposed. With the final piece in place, these can 
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now be drawn together to form a neurotheologically derived model for one pos-
sible pathway linking relational connection to health outcomes. 
6.4 Relationality and health: a neurotheological per-
spective 
In the century since Durkheim (1897) first sowed the seed, the idea that social 
connection and health are in some way linked has been extensively investigated 
by various disciplines, becoming firmly established at both experimental and epi-
demiological level. Yet despite the wealth of empirical data generated in the 
course of these explorations, the question of ‘how’ remains an enduring enigma. 
Broad models have been proposed and assorted theses explored experimentally, 
but the complexity of the issues under investigation and the difficulties and limita-
tions of scientific approaches to investigating these, means that the details of ac-
tual mechanisms remain tantalisingly elusive. 
In an attempt to circumvent some of these difficulties this thesis has taken a radi-
cally different approach to investigating the connection. Beginning from a specu-
lative thesis (based on experimental PNI data) that the experience of relationality 
per se directly moderates immune function, it has used a transversal methodology 
to build a three stage argument in support of this. In Chapter 4, using material 
from experimental social neuroscience and trinitarian theology to provide trans-
versally interlocking evidential support, I argued that the forming of relational 
connection was a foundational element of being human, but I also raised the 
question as to whether relationality could be adequately explained as simply the 
summation of a suite of basic processes for decoding social signals. In Chapter 5, 
using a tripartite argument built from cognitive neuroscience data, kenotic theol-
ogy, and PNI data, I advanced a case for considering relationality to be an emer-
gent rather than a summative phenomenon and thus capable of exerting causal 
constraint over the diverse cognitive, endocrine, and immune components of so-
cial decoding and response. This final chapter has brought together a systems 
level and a cellular level perspective from theology and PNI respectively to sug-
gest that the shape in which relationality is realised is significant and has non-
trivial consequences. These three components can now be interlocked to propose 
a transversally derived model for one pathway linking social connection and 
health: this posits relationality as an emergent phenomenon arising from a com-
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plex system of components dealing with social signal decoding and exerting causal 
constraint over elements of that system in ways which increase its predictive 
power, and thus the effectiveness of its response to different social scenarios. 
However the differing experiential possibilities of relational connection mean that 
the form and operation of such constraints may sometimes have consequences 
which are not beneficial to overall system functioning, and which may eventually 
lead to downstream health-related effects. 
6.4.1 Allostasis: recognition and response 
In order to understand how this might actually play out physiologically in terms of 
the diverse alterations in immune and endocrine function which have been noted 
in connection with relational experience, it is necessary to set the model in the 
wider context of organism maintenance and repair in the face of stress. In Chapter 
3 I referred to the ambiguities surrounding the concept of stress noting that it is 
neither synonymous with damage nor necessarily compromises health. However 
the paradox of stress is the simultaneity of its adaptive nature and the possible 
maladaptive consequences of this. A helpful analogy here is with aspects of fire-
fighting: whilst water is necessary to extinguish some fires, overuse can lead to 
more damage than the original flames; furthermore increased usage can lead to a 
drop of pressure in the supply system with the consequent decline in effective-
ness then contributing to the spread of flames. In the same way, stress responses 
are necessary – indeed they are a central part of allostatic maintenance and ide-
ally are beneficial – but they can also come at a cost to the body, especially if elic-
ited too frequently, or managed inefficiently (Korte et al., 2005:4-5).  
For an organism to survive, it needs to be able to maintain its internal environ-
ment within certain ranges. Traditionally this has been understood in terms of 
homeostasis - maintaining stability through constancy – with the physiological 
goal construed in terms of the constant maintenance of all internal parameters at 
an optimum set point, and understood as being achieved by immediately correct-
ing deviations from this point via negative feedback loops. However a more dy-
namic understanding has gradually superseded this in the last two decades. This 
allostatic model (first postulated by Sterling and Eyer, 1988), reframes the guiding 
principle as one of achieving stability through change (McEwen and Wingfield, 
2003:3) and physiological response systems become understood in terms of 
achieving maximum efficiency – ‘coordinated variation to optimize performances 
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at the least cost’ (Sterling, 2004:26). Thus the goal of regulation is not constancy 
but fitness (see Sterling, 2004:17-64  for a good introduction to the concept). 
Since the body does not store vast reserves of essential materials, this efficiency 
turns on reciprocal trade-offs which enable resources to be directed where most 
needed in response to dynamic situations. Crucially, effective resource allocation 
involves the ability to predict what resources are likely to be needed as a given 
situation arises; this in turn necessitates that any relevant system sensors are able 
to adapt their sensitivity to the expected range of input, and similarly requires 
each relevant response effector to adapt its output to the expected range of de-
mand. This predictive capacity to anticipate demand, and facilitate rapid response 
shifts to meet this, is crucial to maintaining allostatic balance – and system sen-
sors are a vital lynchpin in this.  
Such sensors transduce a range of inputs which typically take the form of a sig-
moid curve: the mid-point corresponds to the input which is statistically most 
likely, the steep curve sections bracket the likely range, and the shallow end 
curves represent the least likely possibilities at either weak or strong extremes. 
Thus events most likely to occur are matched to the greatest sensitivity and preci-
sion of the sensor. By detecting fluctuating environmental signals, sampling signal 
strength and calculating a new probability distribution, sensors adapt to keep the 
curves centred on the most probable loads. Such Bayesian adaptation is seen at 
all levels of biological organisation and draws on a combination of sense data and 
prior experience to produce a best estimate of what is happening (Sterling, 
2004:30).  
A critical element is therefore the ability of sensors and effectors to adapt their 
sensitivity to the expected range of inputs so that response is not triggered either 
unnecessarily or too slowly, and that it is sufficient to meet the challenge but not 
excessive to the point of causing problems itself. Such adaptation needs to be 
both fast and accurate with respect to the process being regulated, something 
which appears, from extensive work done on visual systems, to be done via a two-
pronged prediction: firstly of the most likely state in the next moment (as cap-
tured from the current state and its rate of change); and secondly the most likely 
time course of the new state (usually best captured by time spent in current 
state). Accurate prediction of the second improves efficiency since all change in-
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volves a physiological cost and the aim is to minimise this. Previous experience 
and higher cognitive functions also play an important contributory role to predic-
tion (see further at p221ff). 
Effectors must also adapt to meet predicted changes of demand, but the higher 
cost involved means that this tends to happen more slowly. Adaptation takes a 
number of forms: internal cellular activities are adjusted to facilitate manufacture 
of required products, but also (and importantly) there is alteration of both sensi-
tivity and numbers of surface receptors in line with predicted demand over a 
spread of possible timescales. Thus prolonged exposure of an effector to high lev-
els of its particular ligand26 leads to down-regulation with a reduction in both the 
number and the sensitivity of its surface receptors (Sterling, 2004:33). In other 
words the responsive arm of that particular physiological pathway learns that the 
baseline circulating level of its signaller is now set higher and adjusts accordingly 
so as not to waste resources producing unnecessarily in response to this. This be-
comes an important factor in the context of possible pathological dysregulation 
resulting from poor relational quality. 
Physiological regulation also receives vital input from high level cognitive mecha-
nisms such as perception, memory retrieval, planning, emotions etc. Information 
from sensory systems is relayed to and decoded in dedicated cortical locations 
and extracted information is eventually collated via the pre-frontal cortex with 
retrieved information from past experience. Emotional components such as anxi-
ety, fear or satisfaction– many receiving input from social signal decoding mecha-
nisms – are added, and a best estimate about the situation under consideration is 
made (obviously not necessarily as an act of conscious cognition) and appropriate 
action initiated at the relevant level. Generally speaking behaviours regulating 
physiological mechanisms tend to be rooted in either the drive to reduce anxiety 
or the desire to increase reward (Sterling, 2004:35-8). 
Allostasis is thus essentially the fundamental process integrating physiology and 
behaviour through which organisms actively adjust to both predictable and un-
predictable events in their environment. The primary mediators by which such 
changes are made and maintained are the hormones of the HPA, catecholamines, 
                                                             
26 The signalling molecule which is specific to its cell receptors and thus which activates its 
response. 
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and cytokines  (McEwen and Wingfield, 2003:3). An allostatic state (i.e. one where 
there is active response to change) must of necessity result in a temporary imbal-
ance of the primary mediators, because of stimulated production of some and 
relative suppression of others consequent on resource allocation. Thus for exam-
ple the paradox noted earlier in discussion of the wound healing experiments, 
where social threat (here in the form of a conflict engagement) leads to a simul-
taneous up-regulation of systemic elements of innate immune responses but 
down-regulation of tissue level ones. In this case, allostatic maintenance dictates 
that resources are diverted to deal with the more important environmental 
change and thus to elements of the cytokine system which can influence physio-
logical and behavioural responses appropriate to regulating social threat, rather 
than those which control tissue inflammation.  Such states can be maintained for 
limited periods provided energy input is adequate. However if for some reason 
the imbalance continues then allostatic load – that is, the cumulative cost to the 
body of adjusting physiology/morphology/behaviour to environmental change 
(McEwen and Wingfield, 2003:12-13) – rises. If the situation becomes chronic, 
allostatic overload can lead to pathophysiological changes with eventual health 
consequences. 
6.4.2 Allostasis: relationality and regulation 
Finally we need to set the suggested connectional pathway into this context to 
see where and how constraining effects might be operative and become signifi-
cant. However two things need prolegomenous highlighting: firstly, as indicated 
earlier, the suggested mechanism is seen as operating at automatic rather than 
conscious level i.e. it is not merely another form of conscious cognitive appraisal 
to set alongside others already proposed in Uchino’s model. At the same time, it 
does not preclude any of these also being pathways of connection between social 
experience and health. Secondly, the constraining influence proposed is at the 
level of receptor/effector sensitivity: thus in the studies discussed earlier, it is not 
the acute responses per se which are being ascribed to the shape of realised rela-
tionality – on the whole these simply constitute part of the spectrum of normal 
allostatic response to the various experimental social stressors (and thus are seen 
to some degree across the spectrum of couples studied irrespective of marital 
quality). Rather, it is the greater scale of these in various dimensions. With regard 
to longer term differences, these, as will become clear, can be seen as markers of 
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chronic dysregulation resulting from the threshold changes wrought by poor rela-
tional experience and its end stage effects. 
In Chapter 5 I suggested that the extended range and depth of social decoding 
processes enabled by their incorporation into a complex system served an evolu-
tionary end by increasing the resources and expanding the ‘language’ available for 
modelling; the improved ability to build and maintain maximally predictive models 
for detecting and responding appropriately to aspects of the social environment, 
conferring survival advantages. In this chapter I have further suggested that a key 
element of allostatic maintenance processes is successful predictive ability. This 
ability depends in part on accessing, at cellular, system, and cognitive level, previ-
ous experience of encountered states and situations. The suggestion here then is 
that predictive environmental modelling from social decoding and response sys-
tems intersects with allostatic predictive mechanisms at the level of receptors, 
providing information as part of sensor adaptation to keep detection curves cen-
tred on the most probable load in a given situation. In such a scenario, it now be-
comes possible to see how effects on immune and endocrine responses might be 
directly influenced by the shape of realised relational experience. If this is poor, 
then predictive modelling is likely to increase sensor threshold sensitivity so that 
allostatic responses are triggered at lower levels of social stress (since interpreta-
tion as potential threat is more likely) than in those who have less threat-sensitive 
comparative models.  
Similarly, effector thresholds may be lowered (or, in the case of restorative regu-
latory elements such as the prolactin system, raised) to enable quicker and 
greater responses to perceived threat as a way of ensuring that maximum re-
sources for adaptive or avoidance behaviour can be accessed and maintained for 
as long as possible. In this respect, studies showing uncontrollable social-
evaluative threat (SET) to be an extremely potent form of social threat (Dickerson 
et al., 2009:1237-44; Dickerson et al., 2004a:1191-1216; Dickerson et al., 
2004b:124-31; Kemeny, 2009:1-9; Kemeny and Schedlowski, 2007:1009-18) are 
interesting and possibly suggestive. Controllable situations of threat to the social 
self are ones where employing active behavioural responses can successfully cir-
cumvent adverse social outcomes. In contrast, uncontrollable threats to the social 
self involve a context where active social responses may be ineffective and, in 
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some cases, even exacerbate conflict (Dickerson et al., 2004a:1204) and studies 
show such stressors to evoke brisk and substantial cortisol and circulating cyto-
kine responses (Dickerson et al., 2009:1237-44). Indeed evidence suggests that 
social-evaluative conditions may have a greater capacity to elicit pro-
inflammatory cytokines than any other type of laboratory stressors examined thus 
far (Dickerson et al., 2004a:1203). As discussed in Chapter 3, these cytokines act 
on the CNS to produce, amongst other things, behavioural changes geared to-
wards withdrawal from demand or danger as part of allostatic responses (as for 
example in ‘sickness behaviour’). 
These social evaluative responses have tended to be ascribed primarily to higher 
level cognitive processes (Kemeny, 2009:4) i.e. they have been placed within the 
‘psychological appraisal’ section of Uchino’s model with ‘sensitivity to rejection’, 
and ‘fear of negative evaluation’ identified as important difference factors sensi-
tising people to SET  (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004:355-91; Gruenewald et al., 
2006:410-19; Slavich et al., 2010:39-45). However I want to suggest that these 
data could also be read as evidence for the adaptive threshold model being pro-
posed here: if negative relational experience becomes tied to anticipatory percep-
tions of being unable to avoid certain outcomes, and if predictive relational mod-
elling contributes to threshold sensitivity setting, then allostatic mechanisms trig-
gering withdrawal/submission in the face of social stressors are arguably likely to 
be triggered at lower levels and to greater effect. 
A number of studies of aspects of PNI function in conjunction with loneliness pro-
vide another piece of potential evidence. In these, the differential between the 
lonely (i.e. those with perceived social isolation) and the non lonely, was neither 
numbers of social interactions, nor level of exposure to objective stressors, but 
altered reactivity to them, both in terms of perception and physiological response 
(Cacioppo et al., 2003:71-4; Hawkley et al., 2003:105-20; Hawkley and Cacioppo, 
2003:98-105; Steptoe et al., 2004:593-611). Thus those with poorer models of 
relational interaction (as assessed from verbal description) had lower thresholds 
for perceiving and reacting to events as stressful. Moreover, evidence also sug-
gests that activation of CVS regulatory mechanisms occurs via different routes in 
this group, possibly leading eventually to chronic dysregulation and associated 
hypertension in older lonely adults (Cacioppo et al., 2002:407-17; Hawkley et al., 
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2003:105-20). Other studies have also produced data linking loneliness to differ-
ential responses in endocrine, cytokine and cellular responses to acute stressors 
(Hackett et al., 2012:1801-9; Steptoe et al., 2004:593-611). Empirical evidence of 
autonomic, endocrine, and immune functioning suggesting that the physiological 
effects of loneliness unfold over a relatively long time period (Hawkley and Ca-
cioppo, 2003:98), also offers support to the suggestion that poor relational ex-
perience leads to long term alterations in threshold sensitivities within allostatic 
systems, thus perpetuating a cycle of chronic dysregulation that eventually leads 
to health pathologies. 
Additional collateral supportive evidence for the proposed link between relational 
experience of different kinds and threshold sensitivities can arguably also be ad-
duced from various cognitive neuroscience studies. Thus for example at the level 
of neural substrate activation, individuals with high scores in rejection sensitivity 
tests, exhibit greater reactivity to facial expressions signalling potential rejection 
but not to threatening facial expressions in general (Burklund et al., 2007: 238-
53). A number of studies triangulating neural activity, social support and cortisol 
responses with experiences of rejection or threat also offer evidence that the link 
between good social connection and attenuated cortisol responses to a stressor 
test is mediated by diminished activity in cortical regions associated with the dis-
tress of social separation (Eisenberger et al., 2007:1601-12) and involves en-
hanced inhibition of threat responses during threat regulation (Taylor et al., 
2008:197-211). Finally, in a very recent study, positive early experience of social 
support was subsequently, during an experience of peer rejection two years later, 
related to less activity in brain regions linked with negative affect and pain proc-
essing—an indication of less neural sensitivity to exclusion (Masten et al., 
2012:106-114).  
In support of the idea that predictive models derived from relational experience 
might play an important role in allostatic network maintenance I want also to 
bring in the insights from Marcel discussed earlier, and the extent or not to which 
we encounter disponibilité in those with whom we routinely engage. The impor-
tance of perceived social support has been referenced in various discussions 
throughout the thesis as something which has strong correlations with health 
outcomes, and indeed sometimes more strongly so than received support  
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(Reinhardt et al., 2006:117-29; Uchino et al., 2012:216). Also of relevance is work 
suggesting that support perceptions are developed primarily in the context of 
daily, mundane interactions (Lakey and Orehek, 2011:482-95), and that such 
schemas serve as automatic organisational guides for navigating complex social 
worlds (Baldwin, 1992:461-84). Moreover, there is also evidence that simply re-
calling support schemas is enough to attenuate physiological reactivity to a 
stressor (Ratnasingam and Bishop, 2007:308-16; Smith et al., 2004:476-85). Here 
then theological, cognitive, and PNI perspectives all suggest that how we encoun-
ter the Other in our day to day living has a significant effect on how we set the 
basic relational schemas which then feed into different aspects of physiological 
function connected with social signalling and response: the way we experience 
and express our capacity for relational connection is the start of a cascade whose 
effects extend from the cognitive to the cellular with far reaching consequences. 
To summarise thus far then, the model suggests a point of interaction between 
allostatic control mechanisms and predictive modelling arising from a complex 
system of social decoding and response, with poor relational experience leading 
to brisker responses at lower levels of social threat and stress. In essence, how 
relationality is realised acts as a constraining influence on parts of the social moni-
toring system in order to maximise appropriate response in the system as a 
whole. If we view this in the light of the Juarrero’s argument that in downward 
causality, component constraints operate to increase the range of system possibil-
ity (p158ff): raising sensor thresholds (i.e. decreasing sensitivity) in line with posi-
tive relational experiences prevents unnecessary expenditure of resources and 
energy; conversely, lowering them in the light of negative experience allows ear-
lier, greater and more sustained response, thus improving survival chances. 
6.4.3 Relationality: dysregulation and damage 
However as has been earlier noted, it is not the acute responses to stress per se 
which are necessarily injurious to health – indeed such responses are called up to 
maintain health in the face of environmental changes. The difficulty arises when 
responses are engaged too frequently or sustained inappropriately and allostatic 
overload occurs. In these situations, alterations in sensitivity leading to overstimu-
lation and over production in one part, with consequent development of receptor 
resistance to circulating signallers in another can, because of the complexity of 
the interplay between the SNS and the HPA axis, lead to chronic dysregulation 
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with downstream effects with heath implications. In this respect the wide ranging 
effects of the cytokine signalling system at every level from the cell through to the 
behavioural, are clearly crucial. The possible scenarios of how this could play out 
are obviously beyond the scope of this piece; however a brief example of one 
possibility would be via the dynamic and complex relationship between cortisol 
and pro-inflammatory cytokines, one element of which is the suppression of the 
latter by the former. However sustained elevation of circulating cortisol (as for 
example in chronic stress) leads, via the mechanism described earlier, to a situa-
tion of glucocorticoid resistance as effectors adapt their sensitivity thresholds 
(Avitsur et al., 2001:247-57; Miller et al., 2002:531-41; Rohleder et al., 2001:966-
72; Stark et al., 2001:R1799-1805). The consequences of this are a diminished 
ability to suppress production of proinflammatory cytokines (e.g.Miller et al., 
2002:531-541) – something which is also seen in those who are more sensitive to 
SET (Dickerson et al., 2009:1237-44). The net result is a chronic elevation in the 
level of pro-inflammatory cytokines – whose role in various major disease groups 
was noted in Chapter 3 (p97-8)(see Slavich et al., 2010:39-45 for an example of a 
theoretical model linking glucocorticoid resistance and inflammation to depres-
sion). Whilst it is also completely beyond the scope of the current project to dis-
cuss how these mechanisms become established, recent advances of understand-
ing in epigenetics and social genomic point to possible ways whereby differing 
experiences of relational connection might become embedded at a biological level 
(see for example Champagne, 2010a:564-74; 2010b:299-311; 2013:33-41; Cham-
pagne and Mashoodh, 2009:127-31; Cole et al., 2012:20578-83; Szyf, 2011:971-8; 
Weaver et al., 2006:3480-5). The last piece of the model is hence to suggest that 
poor relational quality has both short and long term consequences for allostatic 
maintenance: thus it leads to greater amplitude allostatic responses, triggered at 
lower thresholds and more frequently in its own right, for the reasons outlined; 
but in addition, the constant resetting of sensors and effecters leads, over time, to 
chronic dysregulation in allostatic maintenance systems; this in turn has long term 
health consequences.   
Thus finally we return to the point of departure for this transversal exploration 
and the notion of health itself. In Chapter 3 I discussed the perennial difficulties 
surrounding attempts to adequately define or delineate the concept of health; 
and as part of this I explored the tensions between the biomedical model which 
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currently dominates Western thinking and the biopsychosocial models which 
stand as the main alternative conception.  In the former, health is construed pri-
marily in terms of mechanical disruption and in relation to the individual body. – 
Porter’s ‘body as […] its own cosmos’ (Porter, 1999:7). In the latter, with its wider 
emphases on not just the biological but also the psychological and sociological 
dimensions of illness, health is less easy to define so succinctly but is understood 
in a much broader and more connectional sense with a corresponding expansion 
of therapeutic targets. Though the dichotomisation is somewhat oversimplified, 
the tension is essentially between an understanding of health shaped by a Carte-
sian view of mechanised bodies and one shaped by a more phenomenological 
view of embodied persons. The neurotheological investigation undertaken in this 
project has produced a model linking relational experience with health outcomes 
which, whilst it builds on a large volume of data generated within the first para-
digm, sits very comfortably within the second. In this instance at least, disruption 
of the mechanics and distortion of the life-world are shown to be intimately and 
inextricably entwined and the consequent view of health expanded and deepened 
accordingly. 
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Neurotheology: Matter and Method 
Reflections on research objectives 
 
The historical record is like the night sky: we see a 
few stars and group them into mythic constella-
tions. But what is chiefly visible is the darkness. 
(Porter, 1999:13) 
 
For the explorer, on the other hand, everything 
that comes into view is in some way welcome and 
appears as a sort of gratuitous gift which is like an 
enrichment for him who finds it and receives it. 
(Marcel, 1963:8) 
 
 
This doctoral thesis has had two primary objectives – one focussed on ‘matter’ 
and the other on ‘method’, tied respectively to its twin research hypotheses that: 
1. Relationality is an emergent phenomenon of a complex system involved 
in social signal decoding and response, and the way in which this faculty is 
expressed and experienced can directly affect health. 
 
2. A dialogue between theology, psychoneuroimmunology, and cognitive 
neuroscience can both optimise the understanding of the nature of this 
connection, and facilitate the exploration of possible underlying mecha-
nisms. 
The first relates to an idea which has intrigued me since I was a final year theology 
undergraduate, and the second to a situation which has increasingly frustrated 
me as a postgraduate as I have tried to engage in dialogue with scientific (and 
theological) colleagues – particularly those outside the dedicated arena of sci-
ence-religion. In this brief concluding reflection, I want to consider each of these 
objectives in turn and offer an evaluation of the degree or not to which the pro-
ject was successful in meeting them. 
Regarding the first hypothesis and objective, I believe the theoretical model laid 
out in the preceding chapter is reasonably well supported with regard to both the 
arguments offered for the basic thesis that relationality is an emergent phenom-
ena exercise exerting causal constraint, and the postulated mechanism for how 
this might then mediate downstream health effects. Looking at the first element 
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of this, the epistemic contract for the selection of material allowed an argument 
to be built which did not rely on special privileging for either the scientific or the 
theological material. These can thus be robustly defended from the perspective of 
postfoundational rationality and epistemic responsibility both as regards their 
selection and their content. Furthermore Haack’s model of interlocking evidence 
has allowed various problems, for example the limitations of the raw data and the 
problems of extrapolating between levels, to be addressed in a way which, whilst 
it does not decisively settle the matter, at least allows these to be circumvented 
them to some extent. In effect, it has allowed crossword entries to be pencilled in, 
even in the absence of questionable or missing letters, because of the presence of 
other intersecting ones. 
However a combination of the inherent complexity of the issue itself, as well as of 
adopting a tripartite approach to it, and the inherent restrictions of an externally 
circumscribed project, (hence this is not a failure of the methodology per se) 
meant that ultimately the amount of development possible was far less than the 
issue warranted. Moreover, whilst the data examined indicated the possibility of 
some interesting overlaps and resonances – for example aspects of the Cappado-
cian understanding strongly prefigure findings currently emerging from cognitive 
neuroscience – space restrictions precluded me pursing transversal dialogue and 
exchange at the interdisciplinary level envisaged by van Huyssteen. There is 
clearly some interesting and rich potential to be explored and developed at this 
level, with the distinct likelihood that further dimensions, both for providing 
added support for the argument and for suggesting other possibilities to explore 
in connection with it, could be opened out. Being able to incorporate this addi-
tional dialogical dimension with its differently parsed cross-connections would 
add another layer of robustness to the basic arguments, and extra supporting in-
tersections from the perspective of Haack’s crossword model. 
With respect to the postulated mechanism, this is admittedly more speculative. 
However its generation is in keeping both with Uchino’s injunction that this is 
where the next stage of investigation and development should be directed 
(Uchino et al., 2012:225), and with the well detailed complexity of the potential 
connectional pathways and the consequent difficulties of direct experimental in-
vestigation. In fact it is these very issues which have kept the first wave of PNI 
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studies on the topic tied into recording the connection rather than elucidating its 
mechanisms. In this respect the neurotheologically derived model I have outlined 
is more detailed than any yet coming from within the scientific disciplines, al-
though it is inevitably somewhat simplistic and underdeveloped, given both the 
massive complexity of the systems involved and the restricted nature of the pro-
ject. However within these limitations, I believe it accords well with both the 
mechanisms of allostasis as we are increasingly coming to understand them, and 
with a steadily growing corpus of data implicating dysregulation of inflammatory 
cytokine signalling systems as an important factor in various pathological proc-
esses.  
Regarding the overall success or not of this dimension of the enterprise, Porter’s 
observation on the experience of trying to write a history of medicine seems very 
apt: in pursuit of the first thesis objective, I have looked at many research papers, 
teased out a number of ideas and tried to link them together in a coherent way to 
essay an account of a possible link between social connection and health out-
comes. Whilst I believe the model is coherent and defensible, what is most appar-
ent in the end is how much is still completely unknown, and how many elements 
of the mechanisms of various postulated chains between social connection and 
health, remain almost as mysterious now as when the link was first described. 
The second of the thesis objectives relates the issue of how the insights generated 
within theological frameworks of thought can be used to contribute to ontological 
knowledge about the world in a way which has valency and traction outside of the 
immediate science-religion loop. In Chapter 1, I raised the question as to whether 
and how this might be achieved by moving the focus of conversation away from 
things ‘God’ (and thus inherently causality) related, and instead developing con-
versations between theology and neuroscience centred on understanding aspects 
of humanness; and whether this could also be done in a way which also avoids the 
‘many voices issue’. Developing van Huyssteen’s transversal space model has not 
only allowed the theology to make a contribution on an equal footing with sci-
ence, but also has opened up a completely different possibility for how to bring 
together scientific and theological insights to explore an issue and expand under-
standing of it. 
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As regards the model’s general success as a vehicle for exploring the connection 
between relationality and health, this has been dealt with to a large extent in the 
previous section. The development of both a transversally informed argument, 
and from this a coherent model which sits comfortably with both the strengths 
and the limitations of the empirical data, and which does justice to current under-
standings of allostatic and disease mechanisms, testifies its utility as a vehicle in 
this particular instance. However the main questions for consideration here relate 
to the extent or not to which the model has succeeded in bringing together the 
scientific and theological voice in a way which allows both to make an equal con-
tribution without either requiring assent to dogmatic religious propositions by the 
former or emasculating the latter. 
With regard to the success of the mechanics themselves, the model’s underlying 
dynamics have allowed the identification of areas of sufficient intersection of in-
terests to form a platform on which to begin a neurotheological project, and from 
which to facilitate the development of transversal outcomes consequent on this. 
The project also successfully demonstrated that the model’s inherent flexibility 
allows a variety of possibilities for how such outcomes can be constructed in order 
to provide the interlocking support for justified belief envisaged by Haack. Thus in 
Chapter 4, whilst there were weaknesses and missing elements in the case offered 
by both disciplines, the two offered mutual support for each other in a way which 
enabled the answer to the question to be pencilled in despite some missing let-
ters. In Chapter 5, whereas no one discipline could provide unequivocal evidence 
for all three of the designated hallmark features of emergence, each was able to 
furnish evidence for one of them, with the resulting strands integrated to form a 
transversal proof for the emergent nature of relationality. In the final chapter, 
both theology and PNI provided a perspective on the same issue but at different 
levels of operation. This time these were conjoined to provide complementary 
facets of understanding a complex whole, operating in effect like the obverse and 
reverse of a coin, with each side bearing different information, but each necessary 
to complete the whole. Each of the transversally supported outputs was then 
used in a similar interlocking way to build the argument from which the final 
model was derived. 
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These transversal conjunctions were themselves possible because the dynamics 
underpinning the model also successfully facilitated the selection of theological 
material which was epistemically defensible from a postfoundational perspective. 
Once again the inherent flexibility and thus the expansive possibilities of the ap-
proach were demonstrated by the very different ways in which different theologi-
cal approaches – both classical and modern – can be shown to employ the tools of 
post-foundational rationality. Thus with the Cappadocian contribution in Chapter 
4, the emphasis was on the responsive evolution of ideas in the light of critical 
challenges; with von Balthasar the focus was on his way of drawing out connec-
tions and knitting together widely disparate material to expand and amplify un-
derstanding; and with Marcel his creative approach to the conundrum of how to 
critically investigate something when we ourselves are part of the data under con-
sideration. In this respect there is also an overlap with Morin’s suggestion that 
one of the necessary ingredients of developing complex knowledge is the integra-
tion of the knower back into the knowledge (Montuori, 2008:xxvii). 
The end result of this has been the development of a dialogue which is somewhat 
different from those generally encountered in the science–religion literature: it is 
not centred on issues relating to God and causality; it makes no appeal to privi-
leged theological material; it does not require concomitant assent to religious 
propositions in order to accept its validity; and finally its primary object is expan-
sion of general knowledge, not apologetic intent. In all these respects then the 
model seems to offer a richly promising way of taking the science-theology dia-
logue in a very different direction. However the question still remains as to 
whether the theology is ultimately eviscerated by these manoeuvres to such an 
extent that it becomes the debased coinage which Aristos and Polyphilos discuss 
in the ‘Garden of Epicurus’ (France, 1908:208-9) or the anaemic myth which Wes-
thelle (2000:171) warns against. However Westhelle’s criticism is raised against a 
scenario in which theology seeks to rescue itself ‘not on the basis of its unique 
claims of thinking about and within the limits, but in subservience to powers and 
knowledges that too often discipline its discourse’ (ibid:172). Whilst it is true that 
there is no explicit appeal to God or to specific religious propositions in the mate-
rial ultimately contributed to the transversal work in this project, nevertheless 
such material is undeniably generated within a religious framework using the 
tools and motifs of, and arising out of grapplings with, specific religious questions. 
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Moreover, the model’s framing within a paradigm of post-foundational rationality 
and the transversal dynamic which regulates it, mean that in fact theology is free, 
contrary to the normal scenario, to contribute its own unique insights without 
these having to answer to particular epistemic criteria which are domain specific 
only to science, rather than to rationality per se. It thus stands as the exact oppo-
site to that which Westhelle decries, and far from being ‘debased coinage’, it 
represents a way of harvesting theological riches to be used in a more expansive 
conversation with science than is currently possible.  
Finally I want to return to the vexed issue of neurotheology itself. In Chapter 1, I 
argued that both Ashbrooke’s and Newberg’s attempts to develop or delineate 
this suffered from a number of serious problems regarding the triple metric of 
engagement outlined there. I suggested that for neurotheology to succeed, then 
with respect to ‘encounter’ better specification of dialogical loci and selection of 
contributory material were needed; regarding ‘exchange’ that a robust and defen-
sible methodology was required; and finally that ‘expression’ necessitated not just 
the generation of coherent outputs, but also the development of a distinctively 
neurotheological discourse. The model developed and used here addresses the 
first two comprehensively and with demonstrable success; similarly with the first 
part of the final element. Ultimately however, it remains a moot point as to 
whether the discourse generated can be properly labelled ‘distinctively neurothe-
ological’. In this respect, the experience of doing this work leads to me argue that 
ultimately, neurotheology is much more fruitfully understood and engaged with 
as a transversal venture rather than a hybrid discipline i.e. as process rather than 
corpus. The change in approach between the early paper reproduced in the ap-
pendix and the current work is obvious, and is reflected both in the progression of 
the thesis title away from its original form of ‘Towards a Neurotheology of Health’ 
and in the designation of the final project outcome not as a neurotheology of rela-
tionality and health, but as a neurotheologically derived model for a possible 
pathway linking the two. I believe that such an approach not only opens up a po-
tentially fruitful new approach for engaging the discourses of science and religion, 
but is also a way of addressing the wider epistemological issues which were 
sketched out in the introduction.  
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I began the project with some lines from Alice Fulton’s poem ‘Cascade Experi-
ment’ with its suggestion that the unknown only reveals itself as we move to-
wards it, and which captured something of the feel there was when starting out 
on this transversal venture. Similarly the words from Marcel with which I end 
seem a good summary of how I have found the process: approaching the journey 
from a different perspective, with no clear idea of what would transpire, or where 
it would end, so much that has come to hand in its course has turned into fruitful 
contributions to my thinking on issues beyond simply the one explored here, of-
ten expanding or challenging it in unexpected ways. Although the passage has 
taken longer, and been more difficult – and at times painful – than I anticipated, 
yet in the end I find myself enlarged and enriched by it. 
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